2015

Social Dimension of Intra-EU Mobility: Impact on Public Services

Eurofound

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR.
Support this valuable resource today!

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Key Workplace Documents at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been accepted for inclusion in International Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more information, please contact hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Social Dimension of Intra-EU Mobility: Impact on Public Services

Abstract
Freedom of movement of citizens constitutes one of the core values of the European Union and is closely linked to European citizenship. There is, however, a heated debate in many of the destination Member States about the impact of intra-EU mobility on their public services. The debate centres on the 'welfare magnet hypothesis', which holds that migrants, including mobile citizens from the central and eastern European Member States, are attracted by the better quality of these services and easier access to them in the host countries. The issue has become highly politicised recently, especially as a consequence of the economic crisis and the increased inflow of these EU mobile citizens.

The main objective of this research project is to explore whether there is any evidence to support the welfare magnet hypothesis. It examines the take-up of benefits and social services by mobile citizens from 10 central and eastern European Member States (EU10 mobile citizens) in 9 host countries – Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK – compared to the native populations and other citizen groups. It also seeks to identify the obstacles to their integration in the host countries and initiatives to aid their integration.

Keywords
European Union, mobility, welfare magnet, public services

Comments
Suggested Citation

This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/intl/489
Social dimension of intra-EU mobility: Impact on public services
Social dimension of intra-EU mobility: Impact on public services
# Contents

**Executive summary**  
1

**Introduction**  
5

**1 – Profile of EU10 mobile citizens in the host countries**  
11
- Extent of immigration  
11
- Demographic profile  
13
- Economic profile  
20
- Economic and living conditions  
27

**2 – Take-up of benefits and social services**  
29
- Rules governing access to benefits and social services  
29
- Comparing take-up across national groups  
35

**3 – Initiatives for EU mobile citizens and unmet needs**  
55
- Specific initiatives for EU mobile citizens  
55
- Unmet needs and other challenges  
55
- Impact on established services and service providers  
62

**4 – Conclusions, lessons learned and policy pointers**  
65
- Policy implications and recommendations  
68

**Bibliography**  
69

**Annex**  
73
**EU country groups**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EU2</th>
<th>Bulgaria and Romania</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU8</td>
<td>the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU10</td>
<td>Member States of the EU2 and EU8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>Member States of the EU10 plus Cyprus and Malta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Executive summary

Introduction

Freedom of movement of citizens constitutes one of the core values of the European Union and is closely linked to European citizenship. There is, however, a heated debate in many of the destination Member States about the impact of intra-EU mobility on their public services. The debate centres on the ‘welfare magnet hypothesis’, which holds that migrants, including mobile citizens from the central and eastern European Member States, are attracted by the better quality of these services and easier access to them in the host countries. The issue has become highly politicised recently, especially as a consequence of the economic crisis and the increased inflow of these EU mobile citizens.

The main objective of this research project is to explore whether there is any evidence to support the welfare magnet hypothesis. It examines the take-up of benefits and social services by mobile citizens from 10 central and eastern European Member States (EU10 mobile citizens) in 9 host countries – Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK – compared to the native populations and other citizen groups. It also seeks to identify the obstacles to their integration in the host countries and initiatives to aid their integration.

Policy context

Key points of the debate on the impact of mobility in individual host countries were reflected in a letter of April 2013 written by the home affairs ministers of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK to the President of the European Council. They claimed that certain mobile citizens from other Member States place a burden on their public services, especially on education, health and housing services, and that they draw on social assistance, often without having genuine entitlement.

The European Commission subsequently in its 2013 Communication Free movement of EU citizens and their families: Five actions to make a difference made five proposals on how to address these issues. It specifically mentioned the need to support local authorities and concluded that it is a shared responsibility of the EU and the Member States ‘to make the free movement rules work to the benefit of citizens, growth and employment’.

Previous research has shown that welfare dependency of migrants is reduced when they are successfully integrated in host countries. However, evidence shows that EU10 citizens have problems with integration. In addition, according to a 2012 European Commission policy document, there are few integration measures specifically aimed at EU10 citizens in the countries to which they immigrate.

Key findings

Take-up of benefits and social services

• EU10 mobile citizens’ take-up of welfare benefits and public services in host countries is lower overall than that of the native population, and significantly so in the case of social housing and pensions. However, there are certain benefits, mainly employment-related benefits (unemployment and in-work benefit), that EU10 citizens claim more than the native population. Evidence from this research project confirmed findings of previous analyses showing that EU10 citizens make a positive fiscal contribution to host countries’ economies.

• Since work is their main reason for mobility, EU10 citizens’ take-up of services focuses on employment services, although take-up of education is increasing, especially compulsory
education for younger children. Available data also suggest that because they are concentrated in younger age groups, EU10 citizens tend to use health services less than native populations.

- Their less favourable labour market position (most are in jobs for which they are over-qualified) and the consequent wage penalties have important implications for their take-up of benefits and their need for social services.

- As regards the impact of increased use of education, some countries, such as the UK, have high concentrations of mobile citizens in certain geographical areas. The increasing pressure this puts on schools could cause tension, especially in rural areas that have no previous experience of immigration.

- Take-up of social housing by EU10 mobile citizens is lower than that of native populations. Data from Ireland and the UK showed that the difference is significant even when their socioeconomic characteristics are the same as natives. One reason is insufficient supply, even for the native population, leading to waiting lists. These were already long prior to the arrival of mobile citizens, who join the bottom of the list when they apply.

Main challenges

- Access to benefits in the host country can be problematic even for eligible EU10 citizens, partly because of difficulties with navigating the often complicated social welfare systems, and partly because they often lack information and language skills.

- Certain services do not always meet the needs of EU10 mobile citizens. For example, employment services may not provide help with recognition of diplomas.

- Apart from increasing destitution and homelessness as a consequence of the financial crisis, the vulnerable position of older, low-skilled migrants especially is exacerbated if they have little knowledge of the local language.

- Looking to the future, challenges in integrating children of EU mobile citizens in the education system will need to be addressed.

- Although intra-EU mobility might help ease the problems caused by population ageing and an ageing workforce in the host countries, it could exacerbate the consequences of demographic change in the sending countries.

- Demand on housing services is likely to increase as citizens from the EU10 become more settled in the host countries.

Policy pointers

- There is a need for greater employment support for EU mobile citizens because of the disadvantages they face in the labour market and in integrating into society.

- In order to more precisely assess and remedy the situation, much more data on nationality in relation to the use of welfare services and entitlements needs to be recorded.

- At EU level, to achieve more systematic support for the inclusion of mobile citizens, it is worth considering having a separate fund within the European Social Fund that specifically serves this purpose.

- More stability in legislation at national level is needed for easier application of rules.
• At municipal level, more attention should be paid to applying for EU funds. Central government can help with this and with ensuring that service providers are properly trained to apply rules correctly in complying with the fundamental rights of EU citizens.

• Homelessness is a serious challenge in some host countries and is also recognised by the EU as a severe obstacle to social inclusion. The recently established Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) could prove to be an efficient way of alleviating this problem.

• Migrant organisations, particularly, require more financial support in order to meet increased demand and improve integration, in close cooperation with public authorities.

• The EU should play a more proactive role in helping host Member States to support language learning. Recent budget cuts by individual Member States badly hit the language learning opportunities of the most vulnerable EU mobile citizens.
The Europe 2020 strategy describes the mobility of EU citizens across Member States as a means to create modern labour markets and raise employment levels. The European Commission is committed to facilitating and promoting intra-EU labour mobility in order to better match labour supply with demand. There is a heated debate in the media of some Member States, however, about the impact of mobility on their public services. In the receiving countries, this debate centres on the ‘welfare magnet hypothesis’, which posits that migrants, including mobile EU citizens from the central and eastern European Member States, are attracted by the host countries’ higher level of social services, which offer better access and are of higher quality. As a consequence, migrants are said to put additional pressure on social services.

Although the literature has dealt extensively with the issue of welfare dependency of migrants, there has been less focus on those EU citizens who arrived after the two waves of enlargement in 2004 and 2007. If there is a serious risk of these mobile citizens straining social services, what policies are needed to prevent this? And what has been learned since the first wave of enlargement in 2004? The recent financial and economic crisis put severe pressure on public finances, and budget cuts curtailed welfare services; how did this affect EU mobile citizens? Earlier findings on their situation have shown that due to their high level of employment in the host country, EU mobile citizens had not relied to a larger extent than the native population on social services (OECD, 2013b; Drinkwater and Robinson, 2013). But has their welfare dependency increased, particularly compared with the native population, as a consequence of the crisis? What are the key underlying factors that influence the differences between the two groups?

Previous research has shown that welfare dependency can be reduced when migrants are successfully integrated. And it has been pointed out that ‘a policy of closing welfare access to migrants is hardly enforceable and may turn out to be ineffective, besides raising equity issues and making the assimilation of migrants more difficult’ (Boeri, 2010, p. 673). The evidence on the situation of citizens of the central and eastern European Member States shows that there are problems with integration in the host countries. This issue is all the more relevant in their case because there are no integration measures in place specifically targeted at EU mobile citizens in most of the EU countries to which they immigrate (European Commission, 2012, p. 127). After enlargement, there was an assumption that intra-EU mobility would be temporary, and so integration was deemed irrelevant. The rationale behind the absence of measures could also arise from the presumption that EU mobile citizens enjoy the same rights as the native population (at least in principle), and, consequently, there is no need for specific measures targeting them.

Another reason that could explain their lower participation in integration measures is that, according to EU law, in contrast to third-country nationals, integration projects cannot be made compulsory for EU mobile citizens. Indeed, as the European Commission’s annual European report on the free movement of workers points out:

Whereas there are mandatory integration measures … [for] third-country nationals in some EU Member States (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom) … EU citizens are not encompassed by such measures unless they are part of the naturalization process (United Kingdom).

(European Commission, 2014b, p. 130)

Reality has shown, however, that without integration measures, it is difficult to implement regulations aiming at equal treatment. Not only are EU mobile citizens often not well informed of their rights,
formally granted equal rights do not always facilitate integration since other obstacles face them, such as insufficient knowledge of the host country’s language, a lack of awareness of certain local rules, and cultural differences.\footnote{The need for integration measures for EU citizens was recognised even before the crisis by Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008).} Therefore, the current research project is concerned not only with the impact of intra-EU mobility but also the integration needs of EU mobile citizens.

As regards the impact of mobility in the individual host countries, key points of the debate were reflected in a letter of April 2013 written by home affairs ministers of Austria, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK and addressed to the then President of the European Council. First, the ministers emphasised that free movement is subject to the limitations and conditions that ‘have been specified above all in Directive 2004/38/EC on the freedom of movement of persons’. They claimed that a number of municipalities, towns and cities in various Member States were under considerable strain from the arrival of certain immigrants from other Member States, who

\begin{quote}
avail themselves of the opportunities that freedom of movement provides, without, however, fulfilling the requirements for exercising this right. This type of immigration burdens the host societies with considerable additional costs, in particular caused by the provision of schooling, health care and adequate accommodation. On top of this strain on vital local services, a significant number of new immigrants draw social assistance in the host countries, frequently without genuine entitlement…
\end{quote}

The letter, written just eight months before the transitional restrictions on free movement of workers from Bulgaria and Romania were lifted, obviously reflected fears of an increased inflow of these nationals and its possible consequences. It is not surprising, therefore, that as the date for lifting the restrictions, and also that of the UK general election in May 2015, approached, in November 2013 the UK prime minister David Cameron presented a plan that aimed to make the free movement of people ‘less free’ and put forward the idea of capping immigration, including that of EU mobile citizens. In December 2013, the German interior minister warned of poverty immigration, referring mainly to the inflow of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals to Germany.

Although the tone and, to some extent, the content of the debate varies by country, there are also similarities. No doubt, in all the four aforementioned countries, negative consequences of the recent increased inflow of EU citizens from central and eastern Europe, including welfare tourism, are widely perceived by the public and covered by the media. At the same time, even in those countries where welfare tourism is not high on the agenda, certain issues have raised concern. These include homelessness in Sweden and illegal employment in Italy and Spain. An overview of the key points of the debate on welfare tourism and the consequences of the inflow of central and eastern European citizens into the host countries is available in Table A1 of the Annex.

The European Commission, in its Communication of November 2013 entitled *Free movement of EU citizens and their families: Five actions to make a difference*, put forward proposals to address the concerns raised by Member States (and clarified the conditions and limitations of free movement mentioned in the letter – including a definition of the terms of fraud and abuse). It is clear that the Commission recognised the importance of the impact of mobility at local level since out of the five actions proposed, three mention the need to assist local authorities. When assistance is suggested for meeting the challenges of social inclusion, the need to help build the capacity of local authorities is specifically recognised. The last two proposals explicitly target this point: the fourth action proposes
‘addressing the needs of local authorities by promoting the exchange of best practices’, while the fifth focuses on ‘helping local authorities to apply EU free movement rules on the ground’. (The first proposed action addresses the issue of marriages of convenience, while the second offers help to authorities applying EU social security coordination rules.) In its conclusion, the Communication recognises that it is a responsibility shared by the EU and by the Member States ‘to make the free movement rules work to the benefit of citizens, growth and employment’. At the same time, it points out that

> EU rules on free movement … contain robust safeguards to ensure that the rights afforded to EU citizens are not abused, that the obligations under EU law are respected and that unreasonable burdens are not placed on the social assistance schemes of the host Member States. It is the joint responsibility of Member States and the EU institutions to uphold the right to free movement, including by countering public perceptions that are not based on facts …

(European Commission, 2013a, p. 13)

**Objectives and methodology**

This study seeks to shed a light on whether the negative public perception of EU mobile citizens as a burden on public services is supported by evidence. It aims to assess the impact they have, not on individual service providers on the ground, but at national level, when compared with the native population, mainly, and other citizen groups. It also examines the difficulties EU mobile citizens are likely to face when entering, working and living in another EU Member State.

The study focuses on citizens from the eight central and eastern European countries that acceded to the EU in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia – the EU8) and the two that acceded in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania – the EU2). These countries will be referred to collectively as the EU10 in the report. In those cases where the available data included citizens from Cyprus and Malta as well, the group of countries is referred to as the EU12.

The study looks at the demographic and socioeconomic profiles of these mobile citizens, such as age, gender, employment status, education and occupation, as these may provide an insight not only into the motivation for their migration but also into the level of their integration (for example, the match or mismatch between their skill level and their occupation). It may also provide valuable background information to explain their take-up of certain benefits and services.

The report is based on individual studies of eight host countries: Austria, Denmark, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and the UK. In some of the data analyses, a ninth country, Ireland, is also included.

Each study consisted of two main parts: a data analysis and results of qualitative research, based partly on desk research and partly on interviews with key stakeholders, to explore the key challenges to integration and measures to address them. The interviews were conducted with representatives of government departments, local service providers, migrant organisations and social partners. In addition, interviews were conducted with EU mobile citizens about their experiences of using the services of the host countries and their integration into the society.
Due to the limited scope of this study, it outlines only those features of a host country’s welfare system that are necessary for understanding the context. The focus is on those benefits at the centre of the debate and on those services that are specifically relevant for EU mobile citizens. Due to their high labour market participation, mainly labour-market-related benefits and services (unemployment benefit and employment services) are highlighted, and the take-up of social assistance is also described. Although education, including tertiary education and vocational training, could be interesting, its detailed analysis merits a separate study, and this research outlines only some relevant points.

Although the initial aim was to make cross-country comparisons on the basis of the available data, such as census data, this was not possible. Comparability of the most basic data and even the data themselves are questionable, as is outlined in Box 1. It would have been relevant to conduct a more detailed analysis of the composition of mobile EU10 citizens by their length of stay and to relate this to their access to benefits and services, but this could not be done for most countries, due to the lack of reliable and sufficiently detailed data. However, estimates made on the take-up of benefits and services could, in some cases, provide new insight.

**Box 1: Challenges with measuring the number and profile of EU10 citizens in the host countries**

One of the major challenges of any research on intra-EU mobility is that it is almost impossible to identify the exact number of EU citizens living and working in another EU country. Therefore, in most cases, researchers rely on estimates. There are four main reasons for these limitations.

1. Data from the Member States of origin is not reliable. Citizens in some countries have to notify their government if they are planning to leave their country of residence for more than three months. However, this rule is not enforceable.

2. Researchers, when estimating the numbers, often turn to ‘mirror statistics’ – data on foreign residents in the host countries. Even if these data are more reliable (for example, in the Scandinavian countries, where administrative data are based on registration), cross-country comparisons are, in most cases, dubious. This is because of differences in definition (for example, whether temporary workers or those who still reside in their home country are included in the statistics or not) and a great variety of data collection methods. For example, even if census data is in principle comparable, censuses are conducted only every 10 years (although micro censuses are carried out during the intervening periods in some countries, such as Austria and Germany).
3. EU-wide surveys, conducted with the same or very similar standard methodology in each Member State, such as the EU Labour Force Survey (EU-LFS) or the EU Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), could provide comparable data. However, the sampling frame is not designed for measuring intra-EU mobility, and migrants, including mobile EU citizens, could be underrepresented in the sample. In addition, the sample size is usually not large enough to give reliable results by nationality, and the same applies to any other smaller groups among EU citizens. Even the director-general of Eurostat confirmed that the EU-LFS is not suitable for detailed analysis (Radermacher, 2015). Therefore, in order to have meaningful results, pooled data are needed, meaning that estimates can be made only at larger group level (for EU10 or EU12 countries). Indeed, pooled data for EU12 countries are used by Eurostat (see the data on employment rates in Table A4 in the Annex).

4. Only estimates of the number of EU10 mobile citizens can be made because many do not register. Due to the variety of methods used to make these estimates (occasionally even within one country) and the varying share of non-registered EU mobile citizens, cross-country comparison is totally excluded in these cases.

**Structure of the report**

Chapter 1 provides an outline of the demographic and socioeconomic profile of EU10 mobile citizens, looking at age, gender, labour market participation and family characteristics, as well as economic characteristics such as employment status, educational attainment, and economic and living conditions. Chapter 2 focuses on the take-up of benefits and services, while Chapter 3 deals with those (few) services that were either designed specifically for EU10 citizens or that are largely used by them. Within this context, the unmet needs of mobile EU citizens will be identified and key challenges will be analysed. Chapter 4 sums up the conclusions of the analysis and the policy implications.
Profile of EU10 mobile citizens in the host countries

Extent of immigration

Although one has to be very cautious in interpreting the data presented in this chapter, especially in terms of cross-country comparison, as noted in the Introduction, they can at least provide some pointers. According to the European Commission, by 2013, ‘as a result of the latest EU enlargements, the number of EU12 citizens residing in EU15 Member States has increased from 1.7 million to 5.6 million’ (European Commission, 2014d, p. 1). As can be seen from Figure 1, in 2012–2013, five and a half million EU10 citizens resided in the nine host countries examined by this study, representing the overwhelming majority of citizens arriving from the newer Member States. It is understandable that the share of the EU10 citizens is highest in the smallest country (in terms of population), Ireland. The four host countries with the highest absolute numbers of resident EU10 citizens are Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. In each of these, the share of EU10 citizens in the population ranges between 1.6% (Germany) and 2.5% (Spain). In the other five countries, the numbers are much lower. Denmark has the fewest, with 63,898 EU10 citizens, 1.1% of the total population.

Figure 1: Number and share of all EU10 citizens in the EU host countries, 2011–2014

Note: Caution is required when comparing data across countries, as data sources are different. More detailed figures are available in Table A2 in the Annex.

In the Netherlands, official data published by Statistics Netherlands in 2015 (on foreign residents officially registered with the local population registration) show that there were 140,673 EU10 citizens present in the country in 2014. However, other data from the same source show that by the end of 2011, there were 166,000 registered workers from central and eastern Europe. Other estimates that include unregistered temporary migrants yield much larger numbers. For instance, estimates in 2010 put the total number of registered and unregistered EU mobile citizens at about 340,000 (Van der Heijden et al, 2013), putting the share of EU10 mobile citizens in the population well above 1%. Due to the large number of mobile citizens who have not registered, there could be similar differences in other host countries between the official data and estimates by other researchers. For example, the country study on Sweden noted that many EU10 citizens have problems with access to social services and, as a result, are not registered with the local authorities.

The large number of temporary or unregistered EU10 mobile citizens is not the only cause of problems with the data, however. Even if the share of EU10 citizens is relatively low in Germany, the inflow has been increasing, especially since 2011, when the remaining restrictions on access for EU8 nationals to the German labour market were lifted. Figure 2, which shows stock numbers of EU10 and other Member State citizens living in Germany, illustrates that although the inflow from other Member States has increased recently, the arrival of EU10 citizens dominates immigration from the EU to Germany, and this has been a trend for 10 years.

Figure 2: Immigration to Germany from the EU10 and other EU Member States, 2004–2013

An uninterrupted increase of EU10 citizens can also be observed in Denmark during the same period. Here, the share of EU10 citizens in the total population has grown from 0.5% to 1.1%, according to Statistics Denmark.

As can be seen in Table 1, countries vary in terms of concentration of the top three nationalities in each. In this respect, Italy and Spain show many similarities, with the overwhelming majority of EU10 citizens being Romanian (82% and 74%, respectively). In all other countries, the spread is more even,
although the share of Poles among EU10 mobile citizens exceeds 50% in Ireland, the Netherlands and the UK. In the case of Denmark, where the concentration of EU10 citizens is smaller, Lithuanians initially ranked second in terms of their numbers; but from 2011, there has been an increased inflow of Romanian citizens, which has made them the second largest EU10 nationality in the country. The ranking of nationalities has also changed in Austria from that indicated in the table. Although recent data are available for employees only, the figures show that with 62,557 Hungarian employees, this nationality occupied the first place in November 2014, followed by Romanians (34,427) and Poles (31,855) (Federal Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Consumer Protection, 2014).

Table 1: Top three EU10 nationalities in the EU host countries, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Austria</th>
<th>Denmark</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>Ireland</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Netherlands</th>
<th>Spain</th>
<th>Sweden</th>
<th>UK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>Roman</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>Poland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Lithua</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Notes: Each nationality calculated as a percentage of all EU10 citizens in the country; 2011 data for Ireland, 2012 data for Italy, and 2014 data for Austria and Sweden.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Demographic profile

The term ‘EU10 mobile citizens’ covers a heterogeneous group, even if some specific characteristics distinguishing them from other population groups in the host countries (nationals, other EU mobile citizens and third-country nationals) can certainly be identified. This heterogeneity is reflected in Figure A3 in the Annex, showing how they are categorised in Denmark. Generally, their main categories from the perspective of this report are:

- employed people and their accompanying spouses and family members (including children, some of whom could be in education) – all legally residing in the host country;
- people in illegal employment;
- commuters or seasonal workers;
- job-seekers;
- socially marginalised and excluded people.

No doubt, some of the above categories could constitute a heterogeneous group in themselves (for example, employed people and their families). Investigating their demographic and economic profile may reveal both their heterogeneity and those features that distinguish them from the other groups. At the same time, it has to be emphasised that the second group is unlikely to be included in most statistics, even on demographic profile, and the third group (commuters or seasonal workers) was not the focus of this research.

The characteristics and profile of EU8 and EU2 citizens have already been analysed primarily through labour force surveys (see, for example, Kahanec (2012) for Europe; Rica (2010) for Spain).
Initially, this project intended to explore census data for this information, assuming that this very basic data could be comparable. However, these data were not available in many countries, so other sources were used, and since they vary by country, direct comparison is difficult.

Not only do the data make cross-country comparison challenging (see Box 1), so does the fact that some of the host countries are traditional destinations for central and eastern European migrants. Austria and Germany had a sizeable immigrant population from many EU10 countries even before enlargement. Consequently, the composition of EU10 mobile citizens by their length of stay (and their migratory experience) could be different in these countries from other host countries, especially in Austria, where there is a large share of more established immigrants. The number of people who have acquired citizenship illustrates the point well. In Austria, for example, out of those people who were born in the Czech Republic, the number who have Austrian citizenship is about three times higher than those who are Czech citizens (32,791 compared with 9,919). In this specific case, the gap demonstrates not only the high number of well-established migrants, but probably also the current low inflow of Czech citizens. Nevertheless, in the case of Austria (and probably Germany), the data differ greatly, depending on whether people are looked at by country of birth or country of citizenship.

**Age**

All the country studies confirm that EU10 citizens are young; most of them are of prime working age – see Table 2.

**Table 2: Age statistics on natives and EU10 citizens in selected host countries**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% who are of working age</th>
<th>Average age (years)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Natives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: n.d. = data not available; * denotes estimates.


The focus of this project includes a comparison of EU10 mobile citizens with both the native population of the selected destination countries and with third-country nationals residing in those countries. The UK country study gives a good overview and illustrates that in the UK, not only is the average age of EU10 citizens much lower than the native population, but also in comparison with third-country nationals (albeit the difference is understandably smaller – see Figure A1 in the Annex).

In Austria, more than 60% of EU10 citizens are aged 25–54 years, prime working age. This share is higher than in any other national grouping, much higher than natives (42.5%) and also higher than EU15 mobile citizens (58.9%) and third-country nationals (below 58%).

The Danish country study illustrates that the strikingly high share of the younger and middle-aged working age population has increased since enlargement: the total share of people aged 16–50 years stood at 79% in 2004, and this has increased to 81%–82% since then. This is due to the uninterrupted
rise in the number of EU10 citizens living in Denmark. The inflow was particularly high in the years preceding the crisis. The very young age composition may also be partly linked to the fact that 9 out of 10 EU10 mobile citizens with a salary income have arrived in Denmark since the enlargement of 2004, and most of these are young people. This explains why the age composition of Danish citizens is more balanced, compared with that of EU10 mobile citizens (see Figure 3).

**Figure 3: Age composition of EU10 citizens in Denmark, 2004–2013, and of Danish citizens, 2013**

Source: StatBank Denmark, Statistics Denmark

Most EU10 citizens in Sweden are of prime working age, and they are concentrated in the younger age groups. This is especially true for the group aged 25–33 years, which contains the highest share of EU10 citizens. Although the age distribution is similar for EU15 nationals, and the share of that group is also remarkable, the spike in the 25–33 years age group is not so high. In Germany, the highest share of EU10 citizens, close to 30%, is in a similar age group (25–35 years). The share of EU10 citizens is also higher in the next age bracket (35–45 years) than the share of other EU citizens and third-country nationals, but the gap is not as large as in the case of the younger age group.

In Ireland, the EU10 population seems to be even younger than in Germany: close to half (45%) of all EU10 citizens are aged 25–34. In the case of some nationalities, the proportion in this age group is even higher, with Poles at 49.5%, Slovaks at 53.9%, Hungarians at 48.8% and Czechs at 48.3% (Central Statistics Office, 2011 Census). The difference between the countries can be attributed to the fact that, whereas in Ireland the inflow of EU10 nationals is a relatively new phenomenon, in Germany, even if there has been a recent increase, many of these nationals arrived well before 2000. The role that the length of stay plays in age composition will be illustrated in more detail below.

In Italy, almost half (49.8%) of EU10 citizens are in the 20–39 years age group, a high share compared with the other population groups (natives, other EU nationals and third-country nationals). Even among third-country nationals, whose population is also young, the share of this age group is lower (42.1%). In fact, in Italy, 83% of EU10 mobile citizens are of working age (15–64 years), whereas among the native population, this share is 64%. In Ireland, the share of the EU10 population of working age is exactly the same, at 83% (although these data are from two years earlier, 2011).
Social dimension of intra-EU mobility: Impact on public services

Interestingly, however, the share in the 19–39 years age group in Ireland is higher than in Italy, at 63%. At the same time, the share in the older working age group (40–64 years) in Ireland is much lower than in Italy: 14.7% vs. 29.7% (CSO, Census 2011 and EU-LFS, respectively).

In the Netherlands, 64% of EU10 citizens are aged 25–49 years. Similarly, in Spain, the share of the 15–34 years age group among most EU10 nationalities is greater than the 35–64 years age group. This is true for Czechs, Romanians, Slovaks, Slovenians and people from all three Baltic countries.

In sum, the age composition of EU10 citizens in the key host countries shows a straightforward pattern. If, however, it is compared to that of other EU nationals, some variation across the receiving countries can be observed, depending on differences in the length of or the reason for their stay. The two host countries that are illustrative in these respects are Germany and Spain.

Not surprisingly, there is a remarkable age difference between those EU nationals who arrived in Germany during the 1960s and early 1970s and the new EU10 migrants. It is worth comparing the age composition of Poles and Italians, each making up the highest number of immigrants from the EU10 and EU15 groups, respectively, to Germany. As Figure 4 shows, the highest share of Poles is in the 25–35 years age bracket, and over 25% are in the next age bracket of 35–45 years, meaning that their share in the prime working age population is much higher than that of the Italians (who themselves have a younger profile compared to German nationals).

Figure 4: Age composition of Italian and Polish mobile citizens in Germany, 2013

Source: Statistics on Foreigners, 2013, Destatis
This is largely the consequence of an increased inflow of mainly young EU10 citizens, particularly since 2011. Indeed, there is a remarkable difference in length of stay between the EU10 and Italian nationals (see Figure 5). Apart from citizens of Slovenia, which has a different emigration history, having been part of the former Yugoslavia, the overwhelming majority of people from each of the EU10 countries have been in Germany for between 1 and 10 years.

**Figure 5: Average length of stay of EU10 and Italian mobile citizens in Germany, 2013**

![Figure 5](image)

**Source:** Statistics on Foreigners, 2014, Destatis

In Spain, the proportion of other EU nationals within the oldest age bracket is larger compared with EU10 citizens, whereas the proportion in the youngest age brackets is lower. In particular, 32.8% of UK citizens in Spain are aged 65 years and over, as are 31.1% of Germans. As is well known, there are many retired UK and German citizens living in coastal areas of Spain. Needless to say, this divergence in age composition between EU10 and other EU mobile citizens has major implications for the differences in their employment patterns and status (a point that will be taken up again later).

**Gender**

Most country studies show a balanced picture regarding the gender make-up of EU10 nationals. In Spain, for example, men accounted for 50.8% of EU mobile citizens, with women accounting for 49.2%. In some host countries, however, the gender breakdown is not so even. Italy is a case in point, although as will be seen later, it could be regarded as a special case. It has had a consistently higher share of women among its EU12 population since 2007, and the difference is substantial, being between 10 and 14 percentage points (see Figure 6).
Furthermore, if women’s age composition is examined (see Table 3), it becomes clear why there is a shift towards older workers within the working age population in Italy, compared with other countries (such as Ireland). As Table 3 shows, the share of women of working age above 40 years among its top three nationalities – Romanians, Poles and Bulgarians – is higher in Italy than in any other host country examined. As is well known, care workers tend to be older women, and in Italy, migrant care workers play an important role in providing care services. The country study on Italy found that, as a general rule, men tend to work in manufacturing and construction, whereas women typically provide home care and elderly assistance. The fact that, despite the crisis, the share of women in this group has not changed reflects a persistently high demand for care workers.

Table 3: Share of women aged over 40 years among Bulgarian, Polish and Romanian mobile women of working age in host countries, 2009–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>BG %</td>
<td>PL %</td>
<td>RO %</td>
<td>BG %</td>
<td>PL %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>58</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: n.d. = no data available; BG = Bulgaria, PL = Poland, RO = Romania. No UK data available.

Source: Eurostat
Even if in some other countries, such as the Netherlands, the share of women is higher than that of men in general, the difference is still lower than in Italy (the share of women among EU10 citizens in the Netherlands in January 2014 was 53.2%). In Austria, where the data allowed citizens of a group comprising the EU8 plus Cyprus and Malta to be distinguished from EU12 citizens, the comparison showed that the share of women among the EU8 plus Cyprus and Malta was close to that of Austrians (54.2% and 51.0%, respectively). The proportion of women was much higher among the EU12, at 59.5%.

**Household and family characteristics**

As regards household trends, the country study on Denmark shows that there is a gradual but increasing tendency of EU10 mobile citizens to have families; whereas in 2007 only 9% of the EU10 population were children (between the ages of 0 and 15), by 2013 their share stood at 13%. Similarly, research in the UK found that, related to their younger age, EU10 citizens have more dependent children per family on average than the native population and that the children are younger.

At the same time, the share of unmarried people is usually still higher than that of natives. For example, in Denmark, more than 60% of EU10 citizens were unmarried in 2010 and 2013, whereas the respective share among Danes was less than 50%, according to Statistics Denmark. It is interesting, however, that in Austria, the share of married people among EU12 citizens is a little higher than that of natives. This may be related to the fact that in Austria, as in Germany, quite a high proportion of EU12 citizens are much more well established than in most other EU destination countries. But even here, the share of widows is lower among them than among Austrians (2.1% compared with 6.5%).

**Figure 7: Average number of dependent children per family for various national groups, UK, 2012–2013**

![Average number of dependent children per family for various national groups, UK, 2012–2013](image)

**Notes:** *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.1; weighted estimates

**Source:** APS 2012–2013, Office for National Statistics

Not surprisingly, EU10 citizens tend to live in bigger households. In Spain, for example, only 2.4% of EU10 citizens are in one-person households, compared with 6.7% of all EU citizens and 9.5% of Spanish citizens. However, 20 times as many EU10 citizens live in households with two or more families (4.4%) as do natives (0.2%); 5% of Romanians live in such households. In this regard, there is some similarity with the pattern found in Austria: although the share of natives living in households comprising two or more families is much higher than in Spain, at 4.3%, the share of Bulgarians and Romanians living in such households is still higher, at 6.6%. As regards multiperson, non-family households, in both Austria and Spain the share of natives having this arrangement is much smaller.
than the share of EU10 citizens. In Spain, the figures are 0.9% and 2.2%, respectively; in Austria the figures are 1.3% for Austrians, 6.8% for citizens of the EU8 plus Cyprus and Malta, and 4.4% for EU2 citizens.

The country study on the Netherlands points out that the household composition very much reflects the average duration of stay. Migrants who have been in the country for a long time are more likely to live with their family (partner and children). Almost half of all Polish migrants live with their family in the Netherlands, whereas a much smaller share of Bulgarians (about 30%), whose migration to the Netherlands is more recent, do so. In addition, many registered Poles (40%) and Bulgarians (35%) live without a partner or children but still in a multiperson household.

Length of stay certainly plays a key role in influencing household patterns in Austria. Migrants from the former Yugoslav states (excluding Slovenia) or Turkey tend to have a longer length of stay than EU12 citizens but fewer live in non-family or one-person households (10.7% and 8.4%) than people from either the EU8 plus Cyprus and Malta or the EU12 (23.7% and 17.3%). However, they tend to have bigger families than either people from the latter two EU groups or Austrians, and their share is higher especially among families with three children.

**Economic profile**

**Employment status and the effect of the crisis**

This section provides an overview of the employment rate of EU12 citizens (Cyprus and Malta are also included in the Eurostat data) compared with that of natives and the total population, following the economic crisis. The changes between the pre- and post-crisis period are outlined. In order to provide a more detailed explanation of the data, examples from different countries are highlighted as regards EU10 citizens’ participation, full-time employment and temporary employment. Sectoral patterns of employment might also provide some explanation of changes in the labour market status of EU10 citizens; therefore, before trends in unemployment are analysed, key sectors of employment are outlined.

It is not surprising that the employment level of EU10 citizens is high, given the high share of this population that is of working age (more than 80%) compared to native workers (see Table 2). As Figure 8 shows, the employment rate of EU12 workers in the nine countries is slightly higher both in the EU as a whole and in the EU15 than that of either the native populations or that of the total populations. However, analysing the host countries individually, it is only Ireland, Italy and the UK where this is the case, although in all these countries the differences in employment rates are quite high.

In Spain, the employment rate of EU10 citizens fell below that of Spanish nationals only in recent years. This is obviously a consequence of the crisis and illustrates the greater vulnerability of EU10 mobile citizens’ position in the labour market than that of the native population, even when the native population also suffered as a result of the severe impact of the crisis. Nevertheless, in Italy, which was also heavily affected by the economic downturn, this was not the case: not only has the employment rate of the EU10 mobile citizens always been higher than that of Italians, it remained so throughout the whole crisis period, between 2007 and 2014. It is true, however, that initially, in 2007, the gap in employment rates was higher for Italy than for Spain: 13.6 and 7.6 percentage points, respectively (see Table A4 in the Annex for more employment data).
Although, overall, the crisis seems to have had a more severe impact on EU12 citizens in EU15 countries than on natives, this is not always true when examining individual countries. In the EU15, in 2007, EU12 citizens had an employment rate 4.7 percentage points higher than that of natives, which fell to a lead of just 1.4 percentage points by 2011. As a sign of recovery, the gap increased to 2.7 percentage points in 2014, but it has not reached the pre-crisis levels. In some countries, according to Eurostat data, the employment rate of EU12 nationals relative to native workers seemed to improve after the crisis. In the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden, the original, much lower employment rate of EU12 citizens rose to converge with that of the native population, even though it remained lower. In the UK, the employment rate of EU12 nationals remained consistently higher compared with that of UK citizens throughout the whole period between 2007 and 2014. At the same time, in Ireland, the initially much higher employment rate for EU12 nationals (a difference of 15.6 percentage points in 2007) slumped to a gap of 6.3 percentage points in 2011, although this gap later increased to 9.6 percentage points by 2014. The difference, however, has not reached the level prior to the crisis (see Table A4 in the Annex). On the basis of Eurostat data, it can be concluded that, within the context of the crisis, the employment situation of EU12 citizens varied in the individual host countries, depending mainly on the extent to which a particular country was able to weather the economic downturn.

In general, the country studies confirm this finding and give a more nuanced picture. In the Netherlands, based on data broken down by gender and including people in part-time employment and the unemployed seeking work for at least 12 hours per week, the net participation rate² among men from the EU12 countries is actually higher than that of native men (77.2% and 74.9%, respectively), whereas that of EU12 women is lower than that of native women (51% and 61.6%, respectively). Further research is required to find the reasons for this. It could be that many women work in the domestic care and cleaning sector, either on an occasional basis or for fewer than 12 hours, so by definition, they are not included in the working population. Neither are those who work in the informal economy, which is particularly dominant in the domestic care and cleaning sector. Indeed, survey data show a heavy concentration of Bulgarians in the domestic help and cleaning sector. According to the survey Nieuw

² The net participation rate is defined as the share of working population within the working age population (15–65 years). The working population includes those who are either employed for at least 12 hours a week, or who have accepted a job for at least 12 hours a week, or who want to work at least 12 hours a week, and are available and actively looking for work for at least 12 hours a week.
in Nederland, quoted by Gijsberts and Lubbers (2013), no fewer than 33% of Bulgarians (the second biggest nationality among the EU10) are employed in the domestic care and cleaning sector (another 33% are in construction, but are most likely to be men). In addition, both the age composition and certain information about households seem to show that many women are at home with children; they are either not looking for a job of more than 12 hours (because their children are too young) or gave up searching for one, since they could not find something to fit their childcare needs.

In many respects, this situation resembles that of Italy, not just because of the higher share of women on average among EU10 mobile citizens, but also because of the labour market position of these nationals. Although there are no directly comparable data, the high share of EU10 citizens in temporary employment in Italy is similar to the Netherlands. It is highest among EU10 citizens compared to all other groups (Italian nationals, other EU15 citizens and third-country nationals), approaching 20% in 2012, compared, for example, to 15% among third-country nationals. Only in 2010 did the share of EU15 citizens (excluding Italians) in temporary employment exceed that of EU10 citizens, but, as has been mentioned, their number is small (90% of all EU mobile citizens came from one of the EU10 countries).

Denmark presents a more nuanced picture of employment, where a comparison of full-time employment rates between Danish nationals and EU10 citizens reflects more clearly the impact of the crisis than that given by the general employment rates, because full-time employment rates take hours worked into account. Whereas employment rate data indicate some improvement even after 2008, the full-time employment rate reveals a deterioration at this point. It fell both for Danes and for EU10 citizens, but the decline was larger in the case of the EU10 citizens (seven percentage points, compared with two percentage points for Danes). This decline continued after 2009, and although the gap narrowed, EU10 citizens still experienced a greater drop. The difference between the two groups has since stabilised up until 2013.

Although the extremely high sectoral employment concentration of Bulgarians in the Netherlands (mentioned above) seems to be rare, there is a certain pattern characterising EU10 citizens in this regard. They tend to be occupied in typically migrant-dominated sectors, such as construction, agriculture, manufacturing, health and care, domestic work, and hotels and catering (tourism). As evidence from the country studies shows, a high concentration of these workers in certain sectors is directly related to the higher exposure of EU10 citizens to labour market imbalances that occurred during the economic downturn. For example, in Denmark, according to Statistics Denmark, EU10 citizens’ employment dropped sharply both in manufacturing and construction. In manufacturing, it fell from 22% in 2008 to less than 17% by 2013, and in construction, although the decline was smaller (from 7% to 5% during the same period), the initial share was also lower. Employment increased, however, among EU mobile workers in agriculture (from 12% to 15%) and even more so in cleaning and other support services (from around 11% to about 18%). This latter sector seems to be the one where demand remained the most stable despite the crisis. (The big part this sector plays in the employment of EU10 citizens in Italy may also provide some explanation of the relatively high employment of the EU10 citizens there.) Even if the sectoral pattern of employment of EU10 citizens may have changed as a consequence of these sectoral changes in employment, large drops in demand in certain sectors where they were concentrated must have contributed to their increasing unemployment.

The unemployment rate of third-country nationals is usually higher than that of EU10 or EU12 mobile citizens. However, as the unemployment rate of the latter two groups is higher than that of natives, their vulnerable position is clear. (Among other countries, a typical example of this is Sweden.) In some

---

3 The full-time employment rate is used as an estimate for how many full-time jobs, measured as full-time employees (having 160.33 working hours per month), are covered as a share of a given population.
countries, for example in Italy, this difference is not large and the pattern is very similar. Although Germany is not an exception to the rule – the unemployment rate of EU12 citizens falls between that of third-country nationals and Germans – the rate is nevertheless close to that of natives (and especially to that of citizens of other EU15 countries). In addition, unemployment among EU12 citizens has been declining since 2010, showing the resistance of the German economy to the effects of the crisis (especially the long-term ones).

In Spain, the difference in the unemployment rates of EU10 citizens and Spanish nationals is especially high, even though the labour market position of Spanish workers also deteriorated as a consequence of the crisis. Some 22.4% of EU10 citizens working in Spain became unemployed, compared with 12.9% of natives. The number of unemployed Bulgarians and Romanians more than doubled between 2008 and 2012, and the unemployment rate of the EU10 citizens reached 36.6% by 2013, more than triple the rate in 2007 (11.9%). Although unemployment among natives also tripled over the same period, it started from a lower base (7.6%) so the rate of 24.4% in 2013 was still lower (albeit very high). In 2013, there were 205,300 unemployed Romanians but almost 5 million (4,919,000) unemployed Spaniards.

Despite some improvement in the employment situation in some countries during the crisis, the unemployment rate of the EU10 mobile citizens seems to have fluctuated after the downturn. For example, in the Netherlands, from 2010, the rate converged towards that of Dutch natives, but in 2013, it started to increase again, so the gap widened to 2.7 percentage points by the second quarter of 2014. The unemployment rate of EU12 citizens reached 6.9%, while that of Dutch nationals remained low at 4.2%. At the same time, the unemployment rate of third-country nationals was 10.1%.

**Educational attainment and occupations**

In general, empirical evidence presented by this research confirms previous findings showing that, in most countries, the largest share of the EU10 migrants has medium-level educational attainment, as Table 4 shows.

| Table 4: Educational attainment of various national groups in selected host countries |
|--------------------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Low %     | Medium %  | High %  |
| Austria  |            |            |            |
| Natives  | 23.9       | 60.7       | 15.4       |
| EU15 (excluding Austria) | 9.0       | 54.4       | 36.5       |
| EU8 plus Cyprus and Malta | 13.6       | 63.3       | 23.0       |
| EU2      | 19.9       | 59.9       | 20.3       |
| Italya   |            |            |            |
| Natives  | 32.0       | 47.0       | 19.0       |
| EU nationalsd | 27.0       | 60.0       | 11.0       |
| Third-country nationals | 51.0       | 38.0       | 10.0       |
| Spainb  |            |            |            |
| Natives  | 22.1       | 45.7       | 16.3       |
| EU10     | 10.9       | 61.6       | 8.8        |
| Swedenc  |            |            |            |
| Natives  | 22.8       | 50.7       | 25.8       |
| EU15 (excluding Sweden) | 25.6       | 40.8       | 27.3       |
| EU10     | 11.9       | 41.7       | 32.5       |

Notes: Based on ISCED categories, defined as follows: ISCED 1 and 2 = low; ISCED 3 and 4 = medium; and ISCED 4 and 5 = high.

*a* Data on ISCED 4 is not available. *b* In Spain, no ISCED categories were indicated, so the categories are defined as follows: illiterate, incomplete primary education or primary education = low; secondary education = medium; and tertiary education = high. *c* The educational attainment of a relatively high proportion of EU10 citizens is unknown at 13.8% (compared to 6.4% of mobile citizens from the EU15 group and 0.7% among Swedes). *d* The data in Italy refer to EU nationals only, but because 90% of EU nationals are EU10 citizens, this data could be regarded as a proxy for the EU10.

This in itself may not be surprising, since it can be assumed that most people in the country of origin have a medium level of education. More interesting, however, is their relative share in the host country. Some caution is needed in cross-country comparison, however, because:

- most countries use the standard International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) categories, but not all (Spain, for example);
- even if ISCED categories are applied, they do not cover exactly the same groups because of the differences in education systems;
- in some countries (for example, Denmark, Sweden and the UK), there could be a large group of people whose qualifications are unknown.

The available data show that, in most cases, the educational attainment of EU10 nationals is relatively high if this is defined as attainment of at least upper secondary level (ISCED 3). This could be linked to their younger age profile, as younger people tend to be better educated than the older generation. Although Germany is no exception to this pattern, it is remarkable that 41% of EU8 citizens arriving in 2008–2009 had a lower secondary level (ISCED 2) of attainment. Although this was lower than that of German nationals (59% of whom attained ISCED 2), 27% of these EU8 citizens had upper secondary (ISCED 3) and 29% had tertiary (ISCED 5) attainment.

Overall, in terms of educational attainment, in most countries EU10 nationals can be placed between third-country nationals and the native population. Data for Italy clearly illustrate this: the majority of its EU10 citizens have attained a medium educational level, whereas most third-country nationals have a low level of education. The share of EU10 citizens with a high educational level is also slightly greater than that of third-country nationals (but lower than that of Italians). The country studies for Austria and Spain, where data are also available for third-country nationals, seem to confirm this. However, the picture is not so clear in the UK, due to data problems. Some studies from the Netherlands also concluded that EU10 migrants are better educated than third-country nationals.

As regards the share of EU10 citizens with higher education, this seems to vary by host country. For example, in Spain, the share of those EU10 citizens who completed tertiary education is relatively low, at 8.8%, a little more than half of the share of natives attaining tertiary education.

Even if there is quite a large mismatch between skills and jobs (see the discussion on this below), labour demand (what types of jobs are available for the incoming foreign citizens in a given host country) plays an important role in determining the educational profile of EU10 mobile workers; institutional factors may do so too. For example, as can be seen from Table A2 in the Annex, EU10 citizens comprise a small group in Sweden, which may be because there is a low demand for low-skilled jobs (the minimum wage in Sweden, which is set by collective agreements, is relatively high).

To a certain extent, the occupational patterns of EU10 citizens are reflected in the sectoral distribution of their employment presented above. For example, in Germany, the largest share of Romanians (around 26%) works in the ‘Production of raw materials, production’ sector, and this may be related to the fact that out of all occupations, the largest share of Romanians works in elementary occupations. Similarly, the share of Polish citizens working in agriculture is almost double that of Germans, and this is reflected in their occupational pattern: the biggest share of Polish workers works in the category of skilled agriculture, forestry and fishery workers.
In the UK, 35.3% of EU10 citizens work in elementary occupations, compared with 10.1% of UK citizens and 15.7% of third-country nationals, according to the Annual Population Survey. The second most frequent occupational category for EU10 citizens is process, plant and machine operatives, employing 18%, three times that of either natives or third-country nationals. Even the third most common occupation of skilled trades occupations (employing 16.3%) does not require a high level of education. Very low shares are employed in the occupations of managers (2.2%) and professionals (5.1%). Even if one adds the 5.6% in the category of associate professional and technical occupations, the resulting figure of 12.9% is much lower than the share of those who have a university degree or equivalent, which is 21.6%. Therefore, bearing in mind that those who have a medium-level education are not counted here, there is clear evidence of a big mismatch between skills and occupation in the UK.

In the Netherlands, 50% of Poles and 40% of Bulgarians work in elementary occupations, with 10% of Poles in higher-skilled jobs such as accountancy, architecture, information technology (IT) and engineering. However, around 20% of Polish citizens in the Netherlands have a university or higher vocational degree (Gijsberts and Lubbers, 2013). In Italy, the overwhelming majority of EU10 citizens have jobs that require a low skill level, with around 85% working as technicians, service workers, craftsmen, or plant and machine operators.

The skill–job mismatch therefore seems to be a real problem. Its extent, however, and the occupations and educational attainment that are most affected are not always entirely clear. Therefore, this research project submitted a special request for relevant data to the statistical offices of Denmark and Sweden, where it is available (although with some limitations). Even if, at EU level, these data can only be regarded as illustrative, they indicate the problems facing mobile EU10 citizens when integrating into the labour markets of the host countries.

The 2007 data for Denmark show that the skills of Danes are a better match for the jobs they occupy than those of EU10 citizens. Within this context, it is worth noting that Denmark launched a scheme in 2008 to recruit highly skilled third-country nationals for technical and IT jobs because of local labour shortages in this area. It is not known whether this was due to a lack of adequate skills among EU mobile citizens, or whether those who did possess the required skills struggled to get their qualifications formally recognised, or whether there were integration difficulties because of a lack of language skills.

Of Danes who have a bachelor’s degree, 11% work in elementary occupations, compared to 47% of EU10 mobile citizens with a similar degree. Of Danes with a master’s degree, 8% work in elementary occupations, whereas the figure for EU10 citizens is 33%. The biggest difference, however, can be found in the educational attainment one grade down from the bachelor’s degree, called the ‘short-cycle tertiary’ level. One-fifth (20%) of Danes and 60% of EU10 citizens with this level of qualification work in elementary occupations. If, in contrast, one examines the professional category, the data show that 69% of Danes with a master’s degree have a professional occupation, as opposed to 49% of EU10 citizens. This may be linked to differences in the sectoral structure of employment: EU10 mobile citizens are underrepresented in sectors that tend to employ more highly skilled workers.

---

4 The most important limitation is that the educational attainment of a large share of EU10 citizens is unknown and has risen over time. In Denmark, for instance, the share was about 1 in 4 in 2007, rising to 7 in 10 in 2013. For this reason, 2007 data are used.

5 As mentioned already, even with ISCED categories, there can be problems with comparing educational attainment levels. For example, short-cycle tertiary may not count as tertiary in some countries since only master’s and bachelor’s degree are considered as such. In some EU10 countries, this category is regarded as high-level vocational training, giving access to tertiary education.
(such as information and communication, knowledge-based services, and public administration and social security). Other factors that are thought to contribute to this underrepresentation are:

- lack of language competences;
- differences between skills gained in the Danish education system and those acquired in the countries of origin;
- lack of sufficient knowledge of the Danish labour market;
- demographic characteristics, such as age and gender.

It has to be emphasised, however, that further research is required to confirm or reject these assumptions. It is worthwhile analysing the occupational patterns of the substantial share of EU10 mobile citizens who have a medium-level education. The data here, too, show that EU10 citizens are generally over-qualified for the jobs they do. The data show that of the top three EU10 nationalities in Denmark, 69% of Poles, 71% of Romanians and 76% of Lithuanians are employed in elementary occupations. Among those with vocational training, 53% of Poles and 67% of Lithuanians are employed in elementary occupations. In the case of Romanians, this proportion is lower (46%), but the data are from 2007, the year of Romania’s accession to the EU, which may explain why their composition is different (their educational level in general was somewhat higher than that of the other two nationalities, probably reflecting the previous tighter restrictions on the migration of Romanians). More recent data, from 2012, also show a high share of EU10 citizens with a master’s or bachelor’s degree working in elementary occupations (1.2% of the active population of EU10 citizens has a master’s degree, compared to 0.4% of Danes; the figures for bachelor’s degrees are 2.7% and 1.2%, respectively).\(^6\)

As can be seen from Table 4 on educational attainment, Sweden could be regarded as a special case in this respect, since the share of EU10 citizens with a higher education is high (33%). In reality, however, this figure may be lower, since the share of EU10 citizens whose educational attainment is unknown (14%) is also quite high (compared with 1% of Swedes). Since, according to experience, it is those people with a low educational level whose attainments are likely to be unknown, the high figure for ‘unknown’ may explain the low share of those categorised as having low educational attainment (only 12%, see Table 4), whereas this share in other countries is higher. A further problem with analysing the matching of skills to jobs is that data on occupations, classified according to International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) categories, are often missing. Therefore, the data should be regarded as indicative. The results show a similar pattern in Sweden as in Denmark: among those working in elementary occupations, 23% of EU10 nationals have completed first-stage tertiary education (ISCED 5), whereas the same figure for Swedes is 6%. EU10 citizens in middle-skilled jobs, such as clerical workers or service and sales jobs, tend to be over-qualified, with 32% of EU10 citizens in clerical work having a first-stage tertiary education, compared with 15% of Swedish clerical workers. In service and sales, 27% of EU10 citizens have a first-stage tertiary education, compared with 10% of Swedes.

---

\(^6\) In case of EU10 citizens, however, these shares are uncertain, since the number of those whose educational attainment is unknown is high.
Economic and living conditions

Although mostly secondary data are available on the economic and living conditions of EU10 mobile citizens, the country studies do contain some valuable information to provide a background to the next chapter on the take-up of social services.

It is clear that, in general and on average, EU10 citizens have lower incomes and earn less than the native population of the host countries. The extent of this, however, varies by host country, depending partly on the labour market position of EU10 citizens and partly on circumstances specific to individual host countries, such as the role of social partners, the coverage of collective agreements, and welfare provisions. For example, in Denmark, a study has shown that, although EU10 citizens are paid less than Danes in similar jobs, most are paid more than the minimum wage as set out by collective agreements (Andersen and Felbo-Kolding, 2013). However, in agriculture and the hotel and services industry, where EU10 citizens are heavily concentrated, wages could be even lower. According to the study, 10% of workers in the agricultural sector and 50% of workers in the hotel and service industry are paid around or below the minimum wage. These data may be upwardly biased, however, since they are based on information from employers and do not include temporary workers and others not legally registered in Denmark.

Wages in Germany follow a similar pattern; in fact, the wages of EU10 citizens are not only lower than those of Germans but also of other EU mobile citizens. This is all the more remarkable since Germany has a sizeable Italian population, which in many respects shows some similar labour market and other characteristics as EU10 citizens. The country study on Germany, referring to Elsner and Zimmerman (2013), notes that the lower wage seems to be due at least in part to the young age of the mobile EU10 citizens and possibly also to the fact that the professional and educational attainment gained in the home country may be uncompetitive in the German labour market. Average wages for most mobile EU10 citizen groups are well below 50% those of Germans and are also significantly lower than those received by citizens of other Member States (about 87% of the German average).

In Italy, the much lower income of EU10 citizens could be attributed to the high level of temporary employment among this group. There is a large gap between the average income of a household of EU10 citizens and that of an Italian household: the average income of a Romanian household in 2010 was €14,892; a Polish household, €17,070; and an Italian household, €30,018.

In Sweden, in terms of income from work and business, the gap between EU10 citizens, EU15 citizens (excluding Swedes) and the total population in the country is substantial. While the data on EU10 citizens relate only to those who arrived between 2004 and 2006 and who were aged over 25, it could be regarded as indicative: the average salary of EU10 citizens in 2013 was SEK 151,917 (€17,660 approximately), while that of EU15 mobile workers was SEK 244,880 (€28,300) and that of the total population was SEK 267,011 (€30,860) (Ruist, 2014).

Data on housing are sparse, but from information on household types (particularly in the Austrian, Dutch and Spanish country reports), it is clear that due to their lower income and greater disposition to save, EU10 citizens tend to live in multiperson or multifamily households, as already noted earlier in this report, in the section ‘Household and family characteristics’. This reflects a much more unfavourable housing situation than that enjoyed by natives or other EU mobile workers.
Similarly, there is no systematic information on poverty across the countries. The country study on Italy, however, cites EU-SILC data that suggest that 49% of Romanian households live below the relative poverty threshold, while 17% of Italians are living in relative poverty. The country study adds that this could put a strain on social services in those areas where mobile citizens are heavily concentrated.

The issue of living conditions will be further discussed in the next chapter, within the context of the take-up of social services.
As the previous chapter illustrates, most EU10 mobile citizens are of prime working age, and their employment rate is usually high, even though in six out of nine host countries, it is somewhat lower than that of the native population. Despite this high employment level, unemployment still poses a challenge for EU10 mobile citizens. In addition, they are more likely to be in lower-skilled jobs than native workers, even if their skill level is similar or even higher. In some countries (for example, Denmark and the Netherlands), there is some evidence of relatively fewer being in full-time employment than natives. Their apparently more vulnerable labour market position, which deteriorated after the crisis, exposes them more to poverty and poor living conditions. This could explain their increased reliance on social services. Whether their increased need is reflected in the uptake of social services will be analysed in this chapter, whereas evidence of unmet needs will be discussed in the next.

Direct cross-country data comparison according to type of service is not feasible, due to:

- lack of national-level data in many countries;
- use of different categories and indicators;
- different methods of gathering administrative data;
- reliance on estimates due to lack of administrative data.

The country reports, however, cover quite a wide range of services, and while the individual services do not always cover exactly the same activities, in many cases the same services were analysed. This means that some, mainly qualitative, comparisons can be made. Before looking at take-up, the next section gives an overview of the rules governing access of mobile EU citizens to individual services and benefits.

**Rules governing access to benefits and social services**

Non-discrimination in the treatment of EU mobile citizens in any EU Member State is closely linked to EU citizenship and is, therefore, a core element of recent EU treaties. The aim of the EU rules on free movement and access to social assistance and social security is, as laid out in Directive 2004/38/EC on free movement of EU citizens, to ‘facilitate the effective exercise of the right to free movement and protect those who genuinely make use of it’. At the same time, the rules must contain ‘robust safeguards to ensure that the rights afforded to EU citizens are not abused’ and ensure that ‘unreasonable burdens are not placed on the social assistance schemes of the host Member States’ (European Commission, 2013a, p. 13).

At first sight, these principles seem to give clear guidance to Member States. However, interpreting when the rules should be applied is difficult, especially in light of the specific provisions of national legislation. For example, what does ‘genuinely’ mean within the context of making use of free movement? Does it refer, for example, to a worker in ‘pursuit of effective and genuine activities’ (as defined in EU legal terms) and their dependent family members only? What are the criteria under which this can be decided by the national authorities? Moreover, as Member States are responsible for making their own rules for their welfare systems, could the EU rules establish ‘robust safeguards’ against any abuse? No doubt, as Commissioner Viviane Reding underlined in a speech on 5 December 2013 in the Council of Justice and Home Affairs, it is the responsibility of individual
Member States to make their national system ‘abuse-proof’, and in principle, this is in their interest (European Commission, 2013b). As has been pointed out, however,

*Member States face considerable difficulty in restricting their welfare-state services to nationals … Member States have taken care to restrict the potential for abuse when they adopt legislation coordinating welfare-state services that facilitate the free movement of workers, disallowing, for example, the export of special non-contributory benefits, which are tax-financed.*

(Blauberger and Schmidt, 2014, p. 2)

But this means that the Member States have to provide their services to all those EU mobile citizens living in their country. Indeed, as another article concludes, ‘a society can no longer limit its solidarity to its nationals and should include all persons who demonstrate a sufficient degree of integration in that society’ (Minderhoud, 2014, p. 224). At the same time, the Court of Justice has so far not allowed unconditional access to social assistance benefits by EU citizens. Conditions include legal residence and a genuine link with the host country’s labour market.

What are the criteria, therefore, for residence status? Ireland and the UK use a ‘habitual residence test’ to decide this. In other host countries, similar criteria and concepts exist; for example, in Austria, the country of residence for new immigrants is defined as ‘where the person has his/her new centre of life’, and in Sweden the term ‘true life and home’ is applied.

The right to reside is also an important question if the situation of a job-seeker is considered. Although workers can move freely within the EU, Member States are allowed to limit their right to reside to six months.

*This time limit must not be imposed if a job-seeker can show ‘that he is continuing to seek employment and that he has genuine chances of being engaged’ … Regarding state support to facilitate labour market access, jobseekers may not be excluded, if ‘a real link between the job-seeker and the labour market of that State [exists] … It is for the competent national authorities and, where appropriate, the national courts … to establish the existence of a real link with the labour market’ … As to other social benefits, which do not primarily aim at facilitating labour market access, the Court has yet to decide whether member states may impose restrictions for EU job-seekers in general legislation, or only after individual assessment.*

(Blauberger and Schmidt, 2014, p. 3)

The Commission published a practical guide to the application of the habitual residence test in January 2014. This is part of a broader handbook

*intended to assist institutions, employers and citizens to determine which Member State’s social security legislation should apply in specific circumstances.*

(European Commission, 2014c)

The term ‘unreasonable burden’ concerns the right of residence for economically inactive EU mobile citizens such as pensioners, the long-term unemployed, tourists and students. The time limit on their free movement and residence is three months. Beyond this period, they have to prove they
have ‘sufficient resources’ so that their presence (involving the claiming of any kind of benefit or the use of services) does not become a ‘burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State’ (Article 7(1) Directive 2004/38/EC on free movement). It has to be noted, however, that the proportion of the non-active EU mobile citizens is very low, at between 0.7% and 1.0% of the overall EU population. In addition, the majority of these (64%) have worked before in their current country of residence. As regards the job-seekers among them, a third were employed one year before (ICF GHK and Milieu, 2013).

Although the country studies in this research have not focused on the details of applying EU law, the many changes in national rules that will be presented reflect not only the consequences of the crisis, but also some uncertainty the Members States and local authorities had to face when applying the rules.

As a background to the take-up of benefits and services in the individual host countries (examined in the next section), Table 5 gives an overview of the rules governing selected individual services and benefits, with special relevance to access of mobile EU citizens.

It is evident that, in addition to the enlargement rounds of 2004 and 2007 and the inflow of citizens from the EU10 countries, the crisis has had a profound effect on legislation and rules for the welfare systems of the individual host countries examined. Some key changes in these rules are highlighted in Table 6.

### Table 5: Rules for access to and eligibility for selected benefits and social services in host countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Social housing</th>
<th>Unemployment benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Insurance-based. For first-time applicants, at least 52 weeks of socially insured work is needed in the two years prior to application.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Financing is shared between employers and employees; the contribution of the latter is 7.3%.</td>
<td>Means-tested (income level, number of children, age, marital status) ALG I is based on employers’ and employees’ contributions (1.5% of employees’ gross income). Eligibility requires two years of contributions. Entitlement is 60% of previous net income for a period of 6-24 months. A person is eligible for ALG I if participating in an advanced vocational training (Arbeitslosengeld bei Weiterbildung, AlgW). After ALG I has expired, a person may apply for standardised subsistence allowance, ALG II; to be eligible, claimant must accept all job offers, even if low paid.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Access to free healthcare is means-tested. For medical card holders, access to GPs and in-patient services is free (since 1970); GP Visit Cards give free access to GPs but not to hospital services (Stan, 2015, p. 3).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Job-seeker benefit, as a pay-related social insurance (PRSI)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Social dimension of intra-EU mobility: Impact on public services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Healthcare</th>
<th>Education</th>
<th>Social housing</th>
<th>Unemployment benefit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Italy</strong></td>
<td>The Servizio Sanitario Nazionale (SSN) is financed through general taxation and managed by the regional administrations. Universal, but co-payments required. EU citizens should apply for EHIC/TEAM card with a local health authority. Unregistered migrants are not covered but eligible for emergency treatment.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Finance and responsibility lie with the regional administrations, which also define eligibility, which is based on a set of criteria (such as income and family size) for registration on waiting lists.</td>
<td>Eligibility requires contribution for minimum amount of time (criteria depend on the type of benefit accrued).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netherlands</strong></td>
<td>No tuition fee for primary and secondary education, but a school care fee is paid by parents. Higher level requires co-payment (students receive basic grant from the government). Low-income households are entitled to supplementary grants.</td>
<td>Free access for primary and secondary education</td>
<td>Means-tested Eligibility: annual earnings less than €34,678 (2014) and housing permit issued by municipalities.</td>
<td>Minimum of 26 weeks’ work is required out of a 36-week period prior to application. Entitlement period further depends on the number of years previously worked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain</strong></td>
<td>No problem with obtaining health card, but some adverse effects of the 2012 health reform. Free access for children; for adults, there are problems with recognition of diplomas.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Autonomous communities have their own rules.</td>
<td>Eligibility for contributory unemployment benefit requires the claimant to have worked for at least for 12 months. Entitlement period depends on the amount of time previously worked.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden</strong></td>
<td>Registration with population registry necessary or showing employment contract. (Non-worker must have sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness insurance.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>UK</strong></td>
<td>Universal for residents</td>
<td>Free access for primary, secondary and post-secondary state-funded education</td>
<td>Free access for residents</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social assistance/minimum income</th>
<th>Employment services</th>
<th>General requirements, comments, other services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austria</strong></td>
<td>In an emergency (unexpected termination of work plus risk of poverty), unless EU citizen is unwilling to pursue legal work. Legal residence is another eligibility criterion.</td>
<td></td>
<td>EU citizens should register with the police on arrival, proving they have an income of at least €837 per month.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td>Applicants must be legally resident in Denmark, with a Danish CPR (civil registration number, see general requirement) and be available for work in Denmark. EU citizens who lose their job within 12 months keep their status as a worker for six months. If workers have had a job for more than 12 months, the municipality of residence makes an assessment as to the length of eligibility for social assistance on the basis of Directive 2004/38/EC. The resident also needs to fulfill EU requirements for preserving worker status. Once the mobile citizen has a registration certificate, they can receive a CPR number and have equal access to the same social benefits as Danish citizens.</td>
<td>All EU residents have the right to stay in the country for three months and, if actively looking for employment, for a minimum of six months. To stay longer, a registration certificate is needed, for which one of the following criteria must be met: having paid employment for a minimum of 10–12 hours a week or having had paid employment for a certain period; having one’s own business or intending to start business activities in Denmark; to study at an institution financed by the Danish government and during this period of time be self-supporting; being a family member of someone belonging to one of the other categories; or to be in all cases self-supporting so that one is not a burden on the social system.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Social assistance/ minimum income</td>
<td>Employment services</td>
<td>General requirements, comments, other services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>All unemployed who are not eligible for ALG I (contributory unemployment benefit) due to their short or low amount of contribution automatically receive ALG II, which is means-tested and tax-financed. ALG II is currently €391 per person. In addition, recipients are eligible to participate in employment services (active labour market policy measures).</td>
<td>Largely compulsory social security system, based on contributions by employers and employees (generally equally shared between them). The system consists of cash transfers and services in-kind. Contributions are based on income and automatically deducted. To be eligible, EU10 citizens must have more than 12 months of stay in Germany to get child allowance, means-tested housing benefit and parental leave benefit.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Means-tested, based on income and property, that is, ‘any property in excess of their primary residence’ (Barrett et al, 2013, p. 145).</td>
<td>‘Social welfare payments are made through contributory or insurance-based payments (without a means test) and through non-contributory payments (means-tested)’ (Barrett et al, 2013, p. 145). PPS number is required for work and access to social services.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Means-tested. Criteria are family size, disability, age and employment status; these are under review currently.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>An implementation rule (since 2012) states that without employment history in the Netherlands during the first two years of legal stay, an application is deemed an unreasonable burden and entails discontinuation of right to reside.</td>
<td>In the last 10 years, targeting measures for migrants and ethnic minority groups have been gradually abolished.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Non-contributory assistance for unemployed includes unemployment subsidy, temporary programme for unemployment protection and insertion (PRODI), agrarian income and the subsidy for temporary agrarian workers. Active inclusion income also available.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Anyone staying in a municipality is eligible for social assistance and other social services. However, an EU citizen who has not received a residence permit will normally be granted only emergency relief, in other words, the fare to their home country, money for food and help with temporary shelter. To be eligible for social services, a right of residence permit should have been granted. For this, having enough financial assets and valid health insurance should be proved. Otherwise, the person should be economically active or a dependent family member. For access to social security benefits (except healthcare and unemployment benefits), a worker in Sweden is usually covered by Swedish legislation. Non-workers are covered by the country where they are considered ‘most resident’. In addition, the social welfare service requires ‘true life and home’ in the relevant municipality.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Habitual residency test for EU migrants. ‘Cap on total amount of state benefits that can be received by working-age claimants. Lower housing benefits for larger housing units’ (OECD, 2014, p. 44). Jobcentre Plus (government-operated support service) provides employment support and administers working-age benefits. First contact point for EU citizens (most relevant provider).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurofound country studies, unless otherwise indicated
Table 6: Changes in response to enlargement or the crisis that affect access of EU mobile citizens to benefits and social services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Changes after the crisis or the lifting of restrictions on EU8 and EU2 citizens</th>
<th>Future plans</th>
<th>EU response or revisions initiated at EU level</th>
<th>Changes after the crisis or the lifting of restrictions on EU8 and EU2 citizens</th>
<th>Local changes (examples)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>In April 2011, a post of integration state secretary was set up, which was later incorporated into the foreign ministry. A new unified social assistance system, the means-tested minimum income scheme (Bedarfsorientierte Mindestsicherung, BMS), with legislation establishing the competence of the federal state. For short employment histories, duration of BMS benefits is limited.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Entitlement period of unemployment benefit was reduced from four years to two from 2010 (the measure is neither related to the inflow of EU10 citizens nor to the free movement of citizens). In 2010, an accrual principle was applied to govern access to child benefit, meaning phased eligibility depending on length of stay during the last 10 years. This condition has, however, been abolished in the wake of an intervention by the European Court of Justice.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Until June 2013, EU citizens had to live and work in Denmark for at least 2 of the previous 10 years to be eligible for child benefit. This measure has been eliminated. Students from other EU states are eligible for a student subsidy (2012).</td>
<td>In August 2014, national legislation was adopted requiring EU citizens to find a job within six months or return home. Cutting of benefits for the long-term unemployed. See also in OECD (2014): ‘In 2011, transitional UBI payment discontinued.’</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>New controversial provision envisaged by the German government to apply a re-entry ban of up to five years on EU citizens who cheated the system or lied in their applications for welfare benefits. European Commission’s reaction is to take a closer look at compliance of this provision with Directive 2004/38/EC. Proposal by Bavarian conservatives that child allowances should be restricted to those families whose children are present in the host country (this may breach EU law).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Criteria for granting social assistance are currently under review on the basis of a financial situation certificate, providing local administrations with common national standards for assessment of applicants’ claims. In 2011, new rules were introduced that abolished the ‘sufficient economic resources’ criterion; instead, the overall economic circumstances of EU mobile citizens are considered within a broader context (Law Decree of 23 June 2011, no. 89 on Urgent initiatives required for the complete implementation of Directive 2004/38/EC on the free movement of EU citizens and for the reception of Directive 2008/115/EC on the repatriation of undocumented third-country nationals).</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>From 2012, the municipality of Rome gives priority for social housing to people receiving a formal eviction notice from private establishments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>From 1 January 2013, the Civic Integration Act has been amended so that central government no longer finances language courses provided at local level. The central government has, however, introduced a social loan system for participants in order to finance these courses.</td>
<td>New implementation ruling since 2012 that for those without an employment history in the country, during the first two years of legal stay, an application for social assistance is deemed an unreasonable burden and entails a discontinuation of the right to reside. From 1 January 2013, the Civic Integration Act has been amended so that central government no longer finances language courses provided at local level. The central government has, however, introduced a social loan system for participants in order to finance these courses. From 2014, mobile citizens staying less than four months in the country may also register in order to get a personal service number. From 2015, people lacking Dutch language skills and applying for social assistance will be entitled to a full benefit only if they are prepared to learn Dutch. In 2014, the Dutch Housing Act was amended to make it easier for municipalities to combat undesirable situations in the housing market by imposing fines on slum landlords. On 1 January 2014, the Social Support Act was amended, allowing municipalities to deny shelter to those who have been legally present in the Netherlands for less than three months.</td>
<td>In January 2014, the European Commission criticised Germany’s law prohibiting EU citizens who have arrived to look for a job from getting ALG II benefits, and questioned the general exclusion of many EU citizens from access to social benefits.</td>
<td>Between 2014 and May 2015, 13 municipalities participated in a pilot project called ‘participation declaration’, aimed at informing migrants (including EU mobile citizens) about their rights and duties in the Netherlands, through workshops and booklets. Migrants must sign a participation declaration agreeing to respect the country’s prevailing values. A number of municipalities (including The Hague and Rotterdam) have taken various measures trying to improve the housing situation of EU mobile citizens.</td>
<td>From 2014, mobile citizens staying less than four months in the country may also register in order to get a personal service number. From 2015, people lacking Dutch language skills and applying for social assistance will be entitled to a full benefit only if they are prepared to learn Dutch. In 2014, the Dutch Housing Act was amended to make it easier for municipalities to combat undesirable situations in the housing market by imposing fines on slum landlords. On 1 January 2014, the Social Support Act was amended, allowing municipalities to deny shelter to those who have been legally present in the Netherlands for less than three months.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Take-up of benefits and social services

#### Spain

**Changes after the crisis or the lifting of restrictions on EU8 and EU2 citizens**

To register, EU citizens must, since the Royal Decree-Act 16/2012, have a work contract or be self-employed or have enough resources (in 2013, this was €5,108 per person) ‘so as not to burden the Spanish National Health Service’. A previously non-contributory benefit (active inclusion income) was changed so that in order to be entitled, previous contributions to the social security system are now needed (Royal Decree-Act 20/2012).

Access to social housing is available only for permanent residents (Act 2/2009).

Since 2013, a person must be a permanent resident (minimum of five years’ residency) to claim an education grant.

#### Sweden

**Changes after the crisis or the lifting of restrictions on EU8 and EU2 citizens**

Since 1 May 2014, economically active EU citizens are no longer required to register with the Migration Board.

#### UK

**Changes initiated before enlargement**

Before enlargement, in 2004, the government changed the law so that new migrants from EEA (European Economic Area) countries had to fulfil an additional requirement for accessing benefits and public services as part of the habitual residence test and show that they had a right to reside in the UK.

**Changes after the crisis or the lifting of restrictions on EU8 and EU2 citizens**

‘Stronger, more robust’ habitual residence test applied since December 2013 (Kennedy, 2015).

It is not possible to claim Jobseeker’s Allowance (JSA) during the first three months of residency (January 2014).

Income-related JSA is stopped after six months for EEA migrants unless they can prove that they have a genuine chance of finding work (January 2014).

Minimum earnings threshold for EEA nationals (£150 per week) who claim in-work and out-of-work benefits to help determine whether an EEA national is or was in ‘genuine and effective work’, and so has a right to reside as a worker or self-employed person (March 2014 – see Kennedy, 2015).

Since 1 April 2014, EEA migrants have been unable to claim housing benefit unless they are in work.

From 1 July 2014, new job-seekers arriving in the UK need to have lived there for three months in order to claim Child Benefit and Child Tax Credit (Kennedy, 2015).

The Welfare Reform Act 2012 established a new, single, means-tested welfare support (Universal Credit) to replace the contribution-based JSA in October 2013.

**Future plans**

Temporary re-entry ban for those who lost their right of residence (Blauberger and Schmidt, 2014, p. 9).

Universal Credit has replaced income-based JSA and eventually the income-related Employment and Support Allowance, Income Support, Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit and Housing Benefit. It is to merge the six main, means-tested benefits and tax credits into a simple monthly payment to cut costs.

**EU response or revisions initiated at EU level**

The European Commission launched infringement proceedings against the UK government concerning the application of the right-to-reside test.

Source: Eurofound country studies, unless otherwise indicated

---

### Comparing take-up across national groups

As far as the authors know, this section is the first attempt to explore the take-up not only of benefits, but also of some social services, where data or information are available. A similar topic was analysed by a recent study, commissioned by the European Commission (ICF GHK and Milieu, 2013). It focused, however, on ‘non-active intra-EU migrants’ and their entitlements to special non-contributory cash benefits as well as healthcare.

The country studies of this research cover many social services, although it proved particularly difficult to find data on the take-up of services, and what was available tended to be sporadic and fragmented.

Insights from the qualitative part of this research, consisting mainly of interviews with relevant stakeholders, are presented in this section. Although more data are available on the take-up of benefits than on services, caution is again required in making direct comparisons, since data, even on benefit recipients, are not always equivalent. For example, in Denmark, it is not compulsory to join an unemployment insurance fund (a-kasse or arbeidsøksekasse), whereas in other countries (for example, Austria and Germany) contributions to unemployment insurance are obligatory and...
are deducted from employees’ pay. This difference could greatly influence not only the number of unemployment benefit recipients, but as a consequence, the number of people who use employment services.

**Unemployment benefits, employment services and training**

The deterioration of the labour market has been highlighted in Chapter 1. It is not surprising, therefore, that since 2008 the number of EU10 nationals receiving unemployment benefit has increased to a larger extent than that of either natives or EU15 mobile citizens. In Austria, for example, the number of other EU mobile citizens receiving unemployment benefit grew by more than 50% between 2008 and 2012, but the number of EU10 nationals receiving benefit increased by almost 90%. (The increase in the number of recipients among third-country nationals was more moderate, at 38%.) However, in the UK, where the employment rate of EU10 citizens remained higher than that of UK citizens even after the crisis, the share of EU10 citizens receiving unemployment benefits is still the lowest compared with the other nationality groups (Figure 9).

![Figure 9: Take-up of unemployment benefit by different citizen groups, UK, 2013](image)

**Source:** UK Labour Force Survey, 2013 Q2

In Spain, the share of EU10 job-seekers registered with the Spanish State Public Employment Service (SEPE) in 2012 was equal to their share in the working age population, 3.1%, whereas their share among recipients of all types of unemployment benefits (including non-contributory – see Table 5) was lower, at 2.7%. The share of EU10 citizens receiving contributory unemployment benefit is similar at 2.8%, as is the proportion of EU10 citizens receiving non-contributory unemployment benefits, at 2.7%.\(^7\)

If one also looks at employment services in Spain, one can see that not all of those registered with the SEPE are registered as unemployed. People can also register as looking for a job to receive the services offered by the SEPE. It can be assumed that this group mainly comprises first-time job-seekers and possibly those who are either employed but want to get another job or are at risk of becoming unemployed. Among EU10 citizens, this group is quite sizeable, numbering 58,075 in 2012.

---

\(^7\) It should be noted, however, that the rate for non-contributory benefits includes receipt of active inclusion income, despite the fact that since precisely that year (2012), it has been changed to contributory (see Table 6).
while the number of registered unemployed EU10 citizens was 134,886. Of the latter, 59.8% (80,659 people) received one of the different types of unemployment benefits. This share is slightly higher than the share of all foreigners (55.3%), suggesting that the share of third-country nationals receiving one type of unemployment benefit among the registered unemployed people is lower. Therefore, it can be assumed that a higher proportion of EU10 citizens fulfils the eligibility conditions for unemployment benefit than third-country nationals.

In Spain, the overwhelming majority of EU10 job-seekers, including registered unemployed and benefit recipients, are Romanians, with Bulgarians in second place. Although Poles are third, their number and share among recipients of unemployment and other benefits is much lower than the first two. (See Table 1 for the top three nationalities in the individual host countries.) In terms of the key nationalities receiving benefits in the EU10 group, the situation is similar in Italy – Figure 10 illustrates their concentration. Italy also provides a good example of the increase in the number of EU10 citizens receiving unemployment benefits; the increase was nearly five-fold between 2007 and 2011, from 7,487 to 35,513. The top three EU10 nationalities in Italy – Romanians, Poles and Bulgarians – make up 95% of EU10 citizens receiving unemployment benefit. According to EU-LFS data, the percentage of unemployment benefit recipients among EU mobile citizens is in line with the rate of Italians (6.4% in 2011), and the share of unemployment benefit recipients among third-country nationals is significantly higher (7.9%) (European Commission, 2014a).

**Figure 10: EU10 unemployment benefit recipients by nationality, Italy, 2011**

![Figure 10: EU10 unemployment benefit recipients by nationality, Italy, 2011](image)

*Source: INPS (National Social Security Institute)*
In the Netherlands, in 2012, the take-up of contributory unemployment benefits by EU10 nationals was higher than their share in the working-age population, according to Statistics Netherlands: they comprise 2% of all beneficiaries, whereas their proportion in the working-age population is 0.8%. The data also show the impact of the crisis, with the number of EU10 recipients of unemployment benefit (known as WW) increasing from 1,020 to 3,650 between 2007 and 2011.

As regards Ireland, the most recent estimates\(^8\) show that, in 2012, EU10 mobile citizens were almost 18 percentage points more likely to receive unemployment benefit than natives. This difference is significant even if their most important socioeconomic characteristics are controlled for. It means that the situation has completely changed since 2008, when they were less likely to receive benefits (Barrett et al, 2013, p. 148). The estimate also shows that, although immigrants in general are more likely to receive unemployment benefit than Irish nationals, the difference is greatest between Irish nationals and EU10 citizens. Apart from their disproportionately deteriorating labour market position due to the crisis, another factor that may explain this disparity is that by now most EU10 mobile workers will have accumulated enough time in work to qualify for unemployment benefit. Their worst position among immigrants could be partly explained by the fact that, in Ireland, many immigrants arrive from the UK and find it easy to integrate, whereas the non-speakers of English (many are third-country nationals) may not be present in the labour market to such an extent as EU10 workers, and therefore do not claim unemployment benefit.

Based on entirely different data, the trend of increasing numbers of EU10 citizens claiming unemployment benefit is very similar in Denmark. As can be seen in Figure 11, up to 2010, the recipient rate of EU10 citizens was lower on average than that of Danish nationals. From 2010 on, however, the recipient rate of Danish citizens dropped, while that of EU10 citizens continued to rise. Although the increasing trend among all groups from 2007 can be attributed to the crisis, it may well be that the drop in the Danish recipient rate from 2010 is mainly due to reforms that cut the entitlement period from four years to two years (see Table 6 on changes to the rules). Two factors may play a role here. As can be seen from Figure 11, Danish nationals’ recipient rate was higher than that of EU10 citizens because, as mentioned already, joining an unemployment benefit insurance fund is voluntary, and more Danes are likely to have joined one. This would mean the cut in the entitlement period would have had a greater effect on the Danes. In addition, due to the difference in their age composition, Danes will have accumulated much more time at work than the younger EU10 citizens; therefore, a higher share of Danes will have been eligible for a longer entitlement period.

The country study on Denmark documents that expenditure on unemployment benefit for EU10 citizens amounted to DKK 345 million (€47,564,000) in 2012, equalling 1.5% of Denmark’s total spending on this benefit. This is less, however, than EU10 citizens' share of the working-age population (1.8%).

---

\(^8\) EU-SILC data from 2012, probit regression results, where marginal effects are shown (estimates conducted by ESRI, Bertrand Maître, requested by Eurofound).
Take-up of benefits and social services

Figure 11: Recipient rate of unemployment benefit among Danish and EU10 citizen groups, Denmark, 2004–2013

![Graph showing recipient rates of unemployment benefit among Danish and EU10 citizen groups from 2004 to 2013.]

Source: Database on Benefit Claimants (DREAM), Statistics Denmark, 2014

Regarding third-country nationals, as with Ireland, their take-up of unemployment benefit is lower, 3%, equalling that of Danish nationals. The reasons are assumed to be similar, too: their activity rate being lower than the EU10 citizens.

The country report on Sweden also addresses the issue of spending on unemployment support. Although the average contribution of EU10 citizens per capita under this budget heading between 2007 and 2010 is a little lower than spending on their unemployment support (SEK 1,286 (€136) compared with SEK 542 (€54)), this is more than compensated for by their much larger contribution to spending on other transfers such as sickness support, public pensions and early retirement. Indeed, the total average per capita spending on welfare benefits for each EU10 citizen in 2007–2010 was SEK 10,797 (€1,142), compared with their total average per capita contribution to all transfers of SEK 50,290 (€5,321) (Ruist, 2014, p. 23). As regards recipients of unemployment benefit in Sweden, Table 7 shows that the share of EU10 citizens is somewhat higher than the share of Swedish nationals. This is also true for participants in employment measures.

Table 7: Recipient rate of unemployment benefit and employment measures among EU10 citizen groups and Swedes, Sweden, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Unemployment benefit</th>
<th>Employment measures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedes aged 16–64 years</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU10 citizens aged 16–64 years</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Sweden
Although the Swedish and Danish data are not directly comparable, EU10 citizens’ participation in employment measures seems to be high in both countries. In Denmark, for example, a larger share of the EU10 citizens who receive unemployment benefit and social assistance participate in activation measures of some sort compared to Danish citizens. As can be seen from Table 8, the difference is quite high, especially in guidance counselling and further qualification measures; by 2013, the disparity had increased to 18 percentage points. It is also notable that EU10 citizens’ participation was continuously higher than that of natives in each year. Further research is required to ascertain the reasons, but authors of the country report suggest that EU10 citizens are unemployed for longer periods and, according to the rules governing participation in these measures, there is increasing pressure to take part in them.

Table 8: Share of unemployment benefit recipients using employment services among Danish and EU10 citizens, Denmark, 2004–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guidance counselling and further qualification measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish citizens</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU10 citizens</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage-subsidised jobs in private sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish citizens</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU10 citizens</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job training in private sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish citizens</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU10 citizens</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage-subsidised jobs in public sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish citizens</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU10 citizens</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job training in public sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish citizens</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU10 citizens</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total participation in activation measures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Danish citizens</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU10 citizens</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n.d. = not available due to anonymity considerations.
Source: Statistics Denmark

As can also be seen from Table 8, the gap between Danish and EU10 citizens has widened since 2004. This happened not only because the share of EU10 citizens participating increased, but also because Danish nationals’ participation dropped, especially since 2010. It may well be that unemployment benefit recipients among EU10 citizens have had a harder time regaining their foothold in the labour market after the crisis. In addition, among EU10 citizens, the average number of weeks spent in activation is higher, especially for the first type of measure (guidance counselling and further qualification). In 2013, for example, they spent double the amount of time compared to Danes involved in these types of measures (11.1 weeks compared with 5.5 weeks, respectively). Their labour market integration difficulties are further confirmed by another finding, namely that EU10 unemployment recipients who participate in one of the measures will be less likely to become independent of public subsidies than natives taking part in the same measures. Data for 2013 show this especially clearly since, for all measures, the share of those EU10 citizens who became independent was lower.
With the introduction of the 2003 Hartz reform, the labour market in Germany underwent substantial institutional changes. The main objective of the reform was to give more incentives to job-seekers and more flexibility to the labour market.

**Figure 12: Average growth in number of unemployment benefit recipients, by citizen group, Germany, 2007–2013**

As can be seen from Figure 12, the number of recipients of unemployment benefit (contributory, insurance-based ALG I) as well as those who participated in vocational training (AlgW) increased only among EU10 (EU8 + EU2) citizens, whereas the number of those who participated in AlgW only rose slightly among German nationals, other EU mobile citizens and third-country nationals. This reflects the ongoing qualitative shift in the approach to targeting unemployment benefits towards facilitating lifelong learning even while workers are unemployed. In all three categories presented in Figure 12, the increase was the highest among EU2 nationals. As regards ALG I and AlgW, the number of EU2 recipients was only 1,315 in 2007 (1,210 ALG I recipients and 105 AlgW recipients); this increased to 3,640 in 2013 (3,350 ALG I and 290 AlgW).

ALG II (widely known as Hartz IV) is a means-tested, non-contributory social welfare payment for those who are not eligible for ALG I or AlgW (see the description in Table 5). As can be seen from Figure 13, the number of Romanians and Bulgarians (EU2 citizens) claiming it increased more than five-fold between January 2007 and July 2014 (from 7,700 to 42,000), with an even sharper increase more recently, between January 2013 and July 2014, when it doubled. ALG II is a kind of unemployment benefit that many newly arrived immigrants receive if they come to Germany without a job or if they come for work but become unemployed before they qualify for the regular ALG I. Indeed, there was a high share of ALG II recipients among all EU10 unemployed by 2013, with the absolute number of EU10 unemployed increasing between 2005 and 2013. This is true for nearly all
EU10 nationalities, Czechs and Slovenians being the only exceptions. The share of ALG II recipients is especially high among unemployed Bulgarians (80%). As the authors of the country report note, this is alarming since it means that a very high proportion of the Bulgarian unemployed is receiving just enough for subsistence and is at serious risk of poverty.

Figure 13: Trends in the number of ALG II recipients among EU mobile citizen groups, Germany, 2007–2014


In addition, many ALG II recipients are, in fact, long-term unemployed (jobless for longer than 12 months) or they belong to the ‘working poor’, who are without a sufficient wage to make ends meet. Therefore, in addition to the regular ALG II for working-age recipients, these people are eligible for other benefits, taking into account the needs of their children or other dependent family members.

As regards employment measures in Germany, there is a distinction between measures for those who are eligible for the contributory unemployment benefit and those who receive the means-tested, non-contributory unemployment benefit. The measures are set out in different German Social Code Books (SGB) and are named after these: the employment measure for recipients of means-tested, non-contributory unemployment benefit is SGB II, while that targeted at recipients of contributory unemployment benefit is SGB III.
In a breakdown of all participants in Germany, it is clear that among the short-term unemployed (SGB III), EU10 citizens are overrepresented in advanced vocational training (Figure 14b). This could be regarded as an indirect indication of EU10 citizens’ relatively high skill level, since this measure is designed in part for qualified workers who recently lost their job. The authors of the country report found that within the SGB II target group (the long-term unemployed), less than 10% of non-German beneficiaries participate in any kind of labour market measure other than counselling or direct intermediation, and they comment that shares of around 10% are too low to contribute to increased labour market integration, especially for those who are unfamiliar with the German labour market. There is a significant risk that these unemployed might not be absorbed by the labour market at all and will not experience gains in social status for themselves or their children.
Other benefits

Social assistance

As mentioned before, in Germany, some benefits are closely linked to the non-contributory unemployment benefit, ALG II. Due to the low level of the standard ALG II (see Table 5), an extra benefit is also provided for vulnerable people, called ‘social money’ (Sozialgeld). Other people with multiple needs may be eligible for a higher ALG II rate (Mehrfordarf), due to, for example, disability, illness, special nutritional needs, pregnancy, or financial hardship because of single parenthood or having a large family. These two benefits could be regarded as more or less equivalent to benefits called social assistance or social minimum benefits in other countries. Housing benefit (also including a heating allowance) can also supplement ALG II. Figure 15 shows the growth rate in the take-up of these benefits. In the case of EU2 citizens, a significant increase occurred between 2007 and 2013, whereas among EU8 citizens, although there was some increase in the take-up of each benefit, the growth was much smaller, around 30%–40%, with the exception of the higher ALG II for those with multiple needs. This was, however, the only benefit that increased in all population groups, apparently as a consequence of the crisis.

Figure 15: Growth in annual average take-up of various social benefits by citizen group, Germany, 2007–2013

Other countries where trend data are available also show an increase in the take-up of social assistance. In Denmark, where the objective of social assistance is very similar to that of the social benefits described above in Germany, the increase in take-up among EU10 citizens equalled that of Danish nationals (as can be seen from Figure 16), with a rise of just one percentage point between 2010 and 2013. The recipient rate among the EU10 citizens in 2013 was much lower than it was in 2004.
At 16% in 2013, the social assistance recipient rate among third-country nationals in Denmark was much higher than for the nationalities presented in Figure 16.

As in Denmark, the take-up of social assistance by EU10 citizens and Italians in Italy in 2013 was more or less equal, according to EU-SILC and EU-LFS data (European Commission, 2014a). Despite this general picture, however, take-up of income support benefit by workers in construction was notable.

In the Netherlands, the take-up of social assistance by EU10 citizens is lower than that of the native population. A very low share are recipients of minimum income schemes, well below 1% for all EU10 citizens who have lived in the country for fewer than three years. A deterioration of their labour market position due to the crisis may have contributed to an increase in the share of recipients in line with their length of stay in the country: above 1% for those who have lived in the country for 3–5 years, above 4% for those resident 5–10 years, and above 6% for those resident for more than 10 years (arriving before enlargement). The direct impact of the crisis is reflected in the increase in the number of social assistance recipients from the EU10 from 2,190 to 2,780 between 2007 and 2011 (Statistics Netherlands). If non-contributory benefits are further considered, the supplement to guaranteed minimum income is claimed by a slightly higher share of EU10 citizens than their proportion in the population (0.9%). This reflects the more vulnerable labour market and income position of EU10 mobile citizens in the Netherlands.

In the UK, the take-up of income support by EU10 citizens is actually the lowest compared not only to natives, but to other EU mobile citizens (from the EU15 plus Cyprus and Malta) and third-country nationals. Although there are no national-level data available for Austria, figures from Vienna, where most foreigners live (comprising 24.2% of the population, almost twice the country average of 12.5%), show that the share of EU10 citizens receiving the means-tested social assistance is 5% of all Viennese recipients. Since the share of the EU10 citizens in the population of Vienna is estimated to be similar, their take-up of social assistance does not seem to be particularly high. In Spain, the take-up of the active inclusion income by EU10 citizens was very low in 2012, at just 6,412.
As mentioned already, their number was much higher in unemployment-related schemes, reaching 38,226 in the case of contributory unemployment benefits and 36,021 in the case of the non-contributory unemployment assistance. In Sweden, in 2010, 5% of EU10 citizens received social assistance, a higher percentage than that of either Swedish nationals (3.5%) or EU15 mobile citizens (4.8%). In particular, the recipient rate of EU2 citizens is higher, at 5.4%. On average, the take-up by other EU mobile citizens is not much lower than the take-up by EU10 citizens.

**Sickness and disability benefit**

As for the take-up of sickness and disability benefits, there seems to be a similar pattern across all countries examined. The data show that natives use these types of benefits more often than EU10 nationals, although the difference may vary by country. For example, in the Netherlands, the percentage of EU10 citizens in receipt of social assistance for the young disabled (the Wajong scheme) (1.3%) was actually higher than their share in the population; however, young people are over-represented among the EU10. The same share applies for sickness benefit. The higher take-up by EU10 citizens is unusual when compared with other countries, although the absolute number of recipients among EU10 citizens is minimal, at 1,260. However, the take-up of another benefit, the general disability benefit (WIA/WAO), by EU10 citizens is marginal (0.5%) and below their share in the population (0.8%). In contrast, the take-up of this benefit by Dutch nationals was more than 10 times greater, over 6%, whereas for EU15 mobile citizens, it was more than 2%. It has to be noted, however, that, as with social assistance, take-up of disability benefit increases with length of stay: the recipient rate among EU10 citizens living in the Netherlands for 5–10 years is just under 1%, whereas for those living in the country for more than 10 years, it is slightly above 5%. During 2008–2011, the number of disability benefit recipients among EU citizens (including those in receipt of WAO/WIA and Wajong) increased from 1,230 to 1,500, according to Statistics Netherlands.

Both in Denmark (see Figure 17 for sickness benefit) and in the UK (see Figure 18), the lower take-up of social benefits by EU10 citizens compared with country nationals is very clear, but it is less so in Sweden (Table 9).

**Figure 17: Recipient rate of sickness benefits among EU10 and Danish citizens, Denmark, 2004–2013**

![Graph showing the recipient rate of sickness benefits among EU10 and Danish citizens in Denmark from 2004 to 2013.](image-url)
In Spain, the take-up of contributory social benefits by EU10 mobile citizens is marginal: only 6,271 receive some kind of non-employment-related contributory benefits, including permanent disability, retirement, widow’s pension, orphan and family member benefits. This number constitutes just 0.1% of all such beneficiaries in Spain (the share of the EU10 population is around 3% in Spain). Out of this very small number, 30.5% receive permanent disability benefit (1,915 people). In addition, the level of these benefits (in euro) received by EU10 citizens is the lowest, due to their lower previous wage. In Italy, the recipient rate of disability benefits among Italians (4%) is higher than among EU10 citizens (around 3%).

The situation in Sweden seems slightly different, although it also shows a lower benefit take-up rate by EU10 citizens. As can be seen from Table 9, there is little difference between Swedes and EU10 citizens regarding take-up of disability pensions and sickness benefits. The share of recipients is relatively high among Polish nationals; further research is required to establish the reasons, but it could be that the share of older people (close to retirement) in this national group is relatively high.

Table 9: Take-up of disability pensions and sickness benefits by EU10 and Swedish citizens, Sweden, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Disability pension</th>
<th>Sickness benefits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lithuanians</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swedes, age 16–64 years</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU10, age 16–64 years</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Statistics Sweden

Family benefits

In terms of family-related benefits, the take-up by EU10 citizens of child benefit schemes in the Netherlands is low (0.4%). It has to be noted, however, that this could increase as EU10 citizens who stay in the country begin to have families. At the moment, there are around 12,000 children under the age of 18 from EU10 countries living in the Netherlands. In Italy, the take-up of family assistance benefits by EU10 citizens is 35%, slightly higher than that of Italians (30%). In Denmark, in 2007, out of the three most prevalent nationalities, only the Lithuanians’ recipient rate of maternity or paternity benefit was higher than that of Danes, whereas by 2013 the rate for Poles and Romanians also exceeded the rate for natives. Trends in the take-up of child benefit in the country also show an increase. Data show that this is linked to the increased inflow of citizens from eastern European Member States. According to the think-tank Kraka (2013), since 2007, the number of EU8 citizens receiving child subsidy has more than doubled. In Sweden, in 2010, both natives and EU15 mobile citizens had a higher take-up of parental allowance (18.1% and 12.8%, respectively) than citizens from the EU10 (10.1%), with the recipient rate of EU2 citizens even lower at 7.6%.

The UK seems to be a special case in this regard. As can be seen from Figure 17, child benefit is one of those (rare) benefits where the take-up by EU10 citizens (28%) is higher than that of UK nationals (18%), because they are younger and have younger children (see Figure 7). The importance of child-related benefits among EU10 citizens seems to be confirmed also by their higher take-up of tax credit (19%, compared with 12% for UK nationals). Considering some EU10 nationalities individually, in 2010–2013, Latvians, Lithuanians, Poles and Slovaks all had a significantly higher take-up rate of child benefit than UK nationals. At the same time, the take-up rate of child benefit by Romanians was lower since they might not have formed families as yet.
Figure 18: Take-up of different benefits, by citizen groups, UK, 2013

Notes: Population aged 18–69 years; weighted estimates; * indicates that the difference between EU10 citizens and UK nationals is significant at least at the 5% level.

Source: UK Labour Force Survey, 2013 Q2

In Austria, although the take-up of family benefits by EU10 citizens has been increasing recently, the share of this group in receipt of the benefit in 2013 equalled that of Austrian nationals, at 2%. Children with Hungarian, Polish, Romanian and Slovakian citizenship made up the biggest subgroups within the EU10 group, with the largest increases in 2013 observed for Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania.

**Housing benefit**

Some data on the take-up of housing benefit in Germany have already been presented (see Figure 15). This was one of the benefits where the take-up by mobile citizens from EU8 and especially from EU2 countries has increased (quite considerably so in the case of Bulgarians and Romanians). At the same time, its take-up declined both among Germans and third-country nationals. EU-SILC data show that in Italy, EU mobile citizens are more likely than Italians to receive housing assistance from local authorities (European Commission, 2014a). In 2010, almost 5% of EU mobile citizens received housing benefits, compared to around 2% of Italians; the share of third-country nationals receiving assistance was even higher. Anecdotal evidence, collected via interviews with local service providers, suggests that fewer than 5% of new occupants of social housing in Rome and Turin in 2012 were EU citizens.

In Spain, financial aids for paying rent vary among the autonomous communities and, even if the preconditions are formally the same as for natives, the foreign population frequently has difficulty in fulfilling the conditions required. For example, in many municipalities there is a prerequisite referring to the number of years registered in the Municipal Register of Inhabitants; for many EU mobile citizens, it is not possible to reach the minimum number of registration years required.
Comparative overview of benefit take-up

As has been noted already, the data do not allow one to make a direct cross-country comparison regarding the take-up of benefits. On the basis of the description above (based on information and data provided by the country reports), it is possible, however, to give a brief overview comparing the take-up by EU10 nationals and natives in each country.

Table 10: Overview of the take-up of benefits by EU10 citizens compared to take-up by natives

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Social assistance or income support</th>
<th>Unemployment benefits</th>
<th>Housing benefits</th>
<th>Disability and sickness benefits</th>
<th>Social housing</th>
<th>Child or family benefit</th>
<th>Tax credit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Equal to their share of population in Vienna</td>
<td>Increasing more than natives and other groups</td>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing, but the share equals their share in population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Equal</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher (recently)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Increasing more than for natives</td>
<td>Increasing more than for natives</td>
<td>Increasing more than for natives and other groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Equal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Slightly higher</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Slightly higher for supplementary minimum income; lower for social assistance, increased between 2007 and 2011</td>
<td>Higher than their share in working-age population; increased between 2007 and 2011</td>
<td>Higher than their population share for contributory sickness benefit; higher for non-contributory disability benefit</td>
<td>Lower than their share of population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td></td>
<td>Much lower (marginal)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>n/a</td>
<td>Much lower</td>
<td>Lower</td>
<td>Higher</td>
<td>Higher</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Eurofound country studies

Use of services

Health

Data on the use of health services by EU10 mobile citizens are scant. National-level data are usually not broken down by citizenship; regional data can give some indication, but they should be analysed carefully. For example, in Austria, there are data for Vienna on the number of visits to doctors. The data concern public health services delivered by the Viennese Municipal Health Insurance (WGKK), and they show an increasing number of patient visits by EU12 citizens between 2005 and 2013, which is not surprising given the increased inflow of these citizens in recent years. These numbers, however, include multiple visits by one person, and therefore the take-up of the service by individuals cannot be established. The share of such WGKK services used by EU12 citizens more than doubled between 2005 and 2014 from 2.3% to 5%, while the share of medication covered by WGKK that was
received by EU12 citizens in Viennese pharmacies increased from 1% to just over 2%. Nationalities with the largest number of WGKK doctor visits in 2013 among EU10 citizens were those from Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Romania; the same countries also figured highest in use of medicines.

At the same time, the country study points out that EU10 citizens from bordering countries (especially Hungary and Slovakia) seem to return regularly to their country of origin for medical treatment. This finding is supported by the relatively low number and low increase in the use of health services observed in the host countries, but also from the interviews with mobile workers who said they viewed healthcare as important and that they valued highly the local doctors in their country of origin. Many seem to return for treatment (for a few days, during vacation or over the weekend), if necessary.

Another study found a similar situation – increasing reliance on health services in their home country – among Romanians working in Ireland (Stan, 2015). The study concluded that ‘Romanian migrants compensate their low engagement with the Irish healthcare system by a relatively more vigorous use of the Romanian healthcare system’ (p. 4). Despite that finding, research on Ireland for this report suggests that EU10 citizens are more frequent users of medical cards than either Irish nationals or other immigrants. According to estimates based on the latest Irish EU-SILC data, EU10 mobile citizens are 13% more likely to have a medical card than Irish nationals, and this was found significant even after controlling for the most important socioeconomic characteristics. However, this finding does not contradict the results of the study by Stan since it is people with a low income who use a medical card. At the same time, immigrants in general, including EU10, also were more likely than Irish nationals to have a medical card, but the likelihood was half that of EU10 citizens, at 6.4%.

In the UK, similar to the other host countries examined, there were no data available on the take-up of health services by nationality or country of birth. The authors of the country report, however, estimated the share of healthcare expenditure that is directed towards different groups of the population by combining the age profile of these groups with the age-related expenditure profile. The underlying assumption is that, at a given age, EU10 migrants are as likely as UK nationals to use the healthcare system. This method may tend to overestimate or underestimate the healthcare consumption by EU10 mobile citizens as it assumes that they access healthcare under the same conditions as UK nationals, when in reality they may face certain issues – language barriers, for example – that might make it more or less likely that they would access healthcare.

Healthcare expenditure and age are strongly correlated, since spending is high for young children, relatively low for older children and adults, increases steadily after the age of 55–60 and peaks for those aged 85 and over.

The results of the UK estimates are presented in Table 11. It shows that about £1.9 billion (€2.6 billion) is spent on healthcare for EU10 citizens in the UK, 1.4% of total public healthcare expenditure. Healthcare expenditure per capita is much lower for EU10 citizens than for UK nationals because their age composition on average is younger. The key conclusion is that EU10 citizens account for 2.1% of the UK population but are allocated only 1.4% of public health expenditure.
Table 11: Estimated health expenditure, by citizen group, UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UK citizens</th>
<th>Mobile citizens of EU15 plus Cyprus and Malta</th>
<th>EU10 mobile citizens</th>
<th>Third-country nationals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>£ million</td>
<td>128,754</td>
<td>2,558</td>
<td>1,914</td>
<td>4,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£ per capita</td>
<td>2,244</td>
<td>2,095</td>
<td>1,487</td>
<td>1,671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of UK expenditure</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of UK population</td>
<td>91.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: APS 2012–2013; Department for Health, 2011; PESA 2013; author’s calculations

The qualitative findings of this research also confirmed the low use of health services by EU10 citizens in the UK. One interviewee said, ‘I didn’t even register with my GP [general practitioner] until about five years after I arrived in the UK, and even then, it was only because I had to register, because I was pregnant.’ Another interviewee, a representative of a stakeholder organisation, explained that the lack of data on EU10 citizens’ take-up of healthcare was because they did not use it much.

In some countries, Spain for example, recent health reforms have led to some restrictions and, therefore, more administrative burdens for users, although under ‘normal circumstances’ (if there are no problems with residence status), formal access to healthcare does not seem to be particularly difficult for EU10 citizens. Despite the aforementioned Spanish health reform, most of the EU10 population can normally get the public health card that allows free access.

Results of some surveys (for example, findings of the latest Irish EU-SILC) show that EU10 citizens do not perceive problems accessing healthcare because most of them are healthy and young. In Italy, according to the results of a survey by the National Statistics Institute (ISTAT, 2014), EU citizens reported greater ease in accessing healthcare services than third-country nationals, in particular because of fewer barriers to communication and greater familiarity with paperwork. Not surprisingly, analysis of EU-SILC data show that healthcare-related transfers are the largest item of welfare transfers to EU citizens. Some local charities in Milan confirmed that health services are the most used services. Even so, per capita medical spending is about 15% lower for EU10 citizens (€1,578) than for Italians (€1,857), according to a recent survey (ISTAT, 2014).

These findings on spending in Italy seem to be consistent with the estimates in the UK country study (even if the per capita difference is larger according to that estimate). In Spain, however, not only did the recent health reform lead to some administrative difficulty, it also caused some confusion among those professionals who had to apply the new rules, since they may not have always been aware of immigrants’ rights. The country report quoted an interviewee with an NGO working with the Roma population on the topic:

In order to obtain the health card, they need to be registered for six months in the Municipal Registry of Inhabitants. Some EU10 mobile citizens have the health card, but others don’t. Sometimes public authorities refuse to issue the health card, apparently without a precise reason, even if they fulfil the requirements established.

Indeed, other country studies – those conducted in Austria, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands – indicated that problems are caused by the relatively high number of uninsured EU10 citizens. (In Italy, a regional government even introduced a specific measure to address this, as will be described in Chapter 3.) In the Netherlands, survey results that show that the share of uninsured Poles could be around 10%, with 12% of Romanians in this situation and 15% of Bulgarians.
The Dutch press recently reported that thousands of uninsured eastern European citizens in the Netherlands cost hospitals millions of euro. The medical centre Haaglanden in The Hague, for example, claims to have treated 5,000 uninsured EU mobile citizens at a loss of about €3.5 million (RTL News, 2013). The Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport has requested more information on this issue, including information on the number of uninsured individuals and their nationalities. In Austria, an organisation in Vienna that specialises in free outpatient healthcare for people without health insurance says that 14% of their patients are from Bulgaria and 11% from Romania (AmberMed, 2013). The country report on Germany echoes this situation, saying that many Romanians and Bulgarians living in Germany do not have health insurance, including many self-employed and those working on the black market. In such cases, these individuals have only limited access to emergency medical care. Some are also treated by volunteer doctors at clinics if they become ill.

In Sweden, healthcare is universal and therefore not linked to health insurance. Access could be problematic, however, for EU10 citizens who do not have a personal identification (ID) number. For example, people living in the country for less than a year and who therefore do not need to be registered with the population registry might experience considerable difficulties accessing healthcare services. This is also true for people not working in Sweden but staying for more than a year, for instance students and retirees. In order for them to register with the population registry and get a personal ID number, they must prove that they will not be a burden on the healthcare system by showing both sufficient resources to support themselves and comprehensive sickness insurance. This has caused problems for some EU10 citizens in Sweden.

**Education**

Although education is usually low on the list of services put under pressure by the recent influx of the EU10 mobile citizens, the media in Ireland has been concerned recently with increasing diversity in schools. Also, in the UK, the sudden rise in the number of pupils in certain local schools seems to have become the centre of attention in the media. There are also some specific challenges in other countries. For example, in Spain, an additional obstacle to children’s integration can be observed in regions with two official languages, such as Catalonia or the Basque Country. According to the latest available data, in the school year 2011–2012, about 130,000 children from the EU10 attended public education prior to university studies (about 1.6% of the total number of students). This is still lower than the share of EU10 citizens in Spain (3%). At the same time, the number of these students equals 11% of all EU10 mobile citizens. Interestingly, this share is similar in the Netherlands, where 10% of all EU10 citizens (around 12,000) are under 18. The proportion of students coming from the EU10 has increased substantially in this country. Here, it seems that it is non-take-up that may cause problems. Based on stakeholder interviews, the country study points out that many EU mobile citizens do not register with local population administrations. This means that among other public tasks, compulsory education cannot be enforced.

As regards adult education and specifically language training, provision for this is still available in the UK for EU citizens who are out of work or on benefits, but there are some gaps in the level at which it is provided, especially as regards pre-entry (or basic level) classes. In these cases, it might be necessary to hire language teachers who are native speakers of the mobile citizens’ own language. In addition, from the point of view of occupational mobility, knowledge of languages could be critical for EU mobile citizens, especially those with relatively high levels of qualifications and technical skills, as evidence suggests (again from the UK). The country study concluded that obstacles to language learning might contribute to migrants becoming trapped in low-skilled work. Hence, lack of language
learning opportunities may well explain this report's previous finding that many EU mobile citizens are overqualified for the jobs they do.

The authors of the UK country study made similar calculations for the costs of education as they had done for healthcare services, using the number of children aged 5 to 16 in each national group to derive the education expenditure that is allocated to each group. Since expenditure per pupil is typically lower for younger children and EU10 citizens have on average younger children, spending per child is lower for EU10 children than for UK nationals. They found that the UK spends 2% of the education budget on EU10 children, which equals the share of the EU10 population in the total UK population.

**Social housing and homeless services**

Similarities across the countries are evident in the field of social housing. The most important common finding is that the take-up of social housing is lower among EU10 citizens than natives, mainly due to long waiting lists, a fact which reflects that access to social housing is problematic also to other citizen groups, including host country nationals. In the Netherlands, for example, a recent survey carried out in Amsterdam covering 500 resident EU mobile citizens found that:

- 23% of eastern European citizens lived in social housing;
- 31% rented in the private sector;
- 17% had bought a house;
- 29% lived either with family or friends or rented a room in the private sector.

Non-registration with the local municipal authority leads to similar problems as mentioned with education: non-registered EU mobile citizens are not entitled to social housing.

An important finding in the UK is that the lower take-up of social housing by EU10 citizens remains significant even if socioeconomic characteristics are controlled for. The authors of the UK report assume that this disadvantageous position is caused by long waiting lists, as in other countries. According to one report, the share of social housing tenants among EU10 citizens is as low as 0.5% (Rutter and Latorre, 2009). Interviews conducted at local level confirmed the EU10 citizens' low use of social housing. A representative from a local authority housing department reported:

> Our social housing policy is primarily based on the level of need, amongst other things, and the communities which we find are most in need are not usually from eastern Europe. However, the public perception is often different; because we don’t have enough social housing to meet demand, they [eastern European migrants] become an easy target to blame.

In Austria, waiting time for social housing (Gemeindewohnungen) is about two years. In Vienna, an agency specialising in social housing, called Wiener Wohnen, manages about 250,000 low-rent apartments. From 2004, the municipality has also subsidised cheap flats for people with incomes below a certain threshold. Social housing is a widespread service in the capital, with one out of four people using it. Currently, people from EU10 countries amount to 5% of all people in social housing, compared with 25% of third-country nationals.

In Spain, the situation is similar: 68.5% of the EU10 population live in rented homes, whereas this share for nationals is 8.2%. Some 39.8% of Spanish nationals own their home without a mortgage,
compared with 2.1% of EU10 citizens. EU15 mobile citizens are also in a much better position than those from the EU10, having more home ownership and renting less.

Homelessness among EU10 citizens, particularly among the Roma population, is a serious problem in Spain. A survey on homeless people published by Spain’s National Institute of Statistics (INE) shows that 22% of homeless people come from other EU countries, a higher percentage than their share in the whole population of Spain (which is 5.7%) (INE, 2012).

In Vienna, support for homeless people is financed by the Fonds Soziales Wien, but access to it, as with social assistance (BMS), is restricted. As a consequence, take-up by EU10 and third-country nationals is small. In addition, there are also winter sleeping quarters (Winterschlafstellen, an initiative of the City of Vienna) and night sleeping quarters (run by Caritas) for the homeless, used especially by those out of work or looking for work but without eligibility for benefits. The ‘2.Gruft’, for example, offers a place to sleep, hot meals, fresh clothes, showers and social workers ready to listen. It was set up to cater for homeless people from newer EU countries and is run by volunteers. It was initially meant to exist for a limited period, but is now open all year. Co-financed with Fonds Soziales Wien, it also offers social counselling and counselling on returning to the home country.
Specific initiatives for EU mobile citizens

As has been noted already, the country reports identified few specific measures that were designed originally for EU mobile citizens and clearly related to their legal status. However, it is relevant to explore those initiatives that have over time emerged to help EU citizens integrate into the society of their host country and access social services – even if, in many cases, these specific measures were introduced within the framework of existing programmes for third-country nationals. The initiatives cover a wide range of social service areas, and a certain pattern related to specific needs of EU mobile citizens was found by the country studies. The specific measures, gathered through interviews with key stakeholders (such as government representatives, social partners, migrant organisations and local government representatives), are summarised in Table 12. The list of measures is not comprehensive but is illustrative. (Those that are tailored for newly arrived EU citizens are highlighted in bold.)

Unmet needs and other challenges

The concept of unmet needs encompasses a broader context than just the apparent needs of EU10 citizens for social benefits and services. The term also covers barriers preventing EU10 citizens from accessing those benefits and services to which they are entitled (Eurofound, 2015). There are a number of areas where migrant organisations and EU mobile citizens have indicated specific problems.

Vulnerable labour market position and its consequences

As seen earlier (Table 5 on access and eligibility rules), labour market integration is often crucial for legal residence and hence for access to public services. The country studies, however, provide ample evidence of the precarious living conditions of EU mobile citizens who are in employment. In the Netherlands, for example, there is a growing concern about exploitative practices in the labour market. This seems to be happening especially in low-skilled work in agriculture, manufacturing and construction, where terms of employment and working conditions are found to be poor and unfair. Often these practices can be attributed to irregular labour relations. EU mobile citizens are frequently engaged under unlawful terms of employment that not only expose them to precarious working conditions, but, if unregistered, preclude their access even to basic services. It may well be that many of the so-called ‘package deals’ offered by temporary work agencies, even if legal, could put workers at greater risk of being hired under unfair terms of employment. These deals, reported mainly in the Netherlands, may seem attractive at first sight for potential EU mobile citizens since they offer work, accommodation and transport combined. Once workers who accept such a deal lose their jobs, however, they also lose their accommodation.

In the UK, difficulties were reported with enforcing the employment rights of EU10 mobile citizens, as was the non-payment of wages. The trade unions are active in this area, with nearly all of their projects running at regional and local level, which is important because EU10 citizens can be highly concentrated in rural areas. The country report notes, however, that much of this activity has been small scale, uncoordinated and short term. In addition, although there are some services available that address similar issues (Advice UK, the Employment Tribunal Service, the website of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills), many EU citizens are totally unaware of their existence. The country study identified a lack of English language skills as another factor making mobile workers particularly vulnerable to labour market exploitation. Related to low wages,
### Table 12: Overview of specific measures for EU mobile citizens by key providers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Central government</th>
<th>Local government (examples)</th>
<th>Social partners or cooperation with them plus cooperation between other actors (examples)</th>
<th>NGOs (examples)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Austria</strong></td>
<td>Offices of the Austrian Public Employment Service (AMS) as first contact points; special migrant integration centres within their regional branches in Vienna and Upper Austria; special migrant information centres, Beratungszentrum für Migranten und Migrantinnen (BMM). Information brochures for migrants on living and working in Austria, funded partly by AMS and partly by EU funds; multilanguage websites related to skills recognition, funded by the Austrian Integration Fund (ÖIF) and the government. Many EU10 citizens get their diplomas checked for recognition.</td>
<td>The Vienna branch of the BMM is partly financed by the local AMS. Within its Vienna office there is a centre for helping with recognition of foreign certificates and diplomas, Anlaufstelle für Personen im Ausland erworbenen Qualifikationen (AST). Initiative by the Wiener Wohnen housing service in Vienna introducing mediator services in their apartment blocks to mitigate tension among tenants. The organisation cooperates with social services, tenants’ councils, cleaning services, diversity managers, and so on.</td>
<td>Cross-border cooperation between the Austrian Trade Union Federation (ÖGB) and trade unions in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia up to 2015. Projects for migrant and mobile citizen trade union members, who receive free advice related to labour law in their native language. The ÖGB Burgenland set up a multilingual information centre on labour issues for Hungarian and Romanian mobile citizens. It is financed jointly by the central and the federal provincial government of Burgenland (source: personal information from Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, WIIW)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark</strong></td>
<td>Various policy packages introduced with the aim of preventing social dumping in general, including more information for foreign companies and workers on labour market regulations. The Finance Act of 2014 has the same goal for 2014–2017. A range of information is available online on rights and conditions in Denmark.</td>
<td>City of Odense introduced regulations on chain of responsibility (the lead contractor should be held responsible for working conditions provided by sub-contractors). Have been discussed, but not yet implemented at national level (relevant for all employees). Business Centre Copenhagen runs courses for start-ups by migrant entrepreneurs. EU10 citizens are included in the target group. Some cities provide information in all EU10 languages on rights and conditions relating to working and living in Denmark.</td>
<td>Trade unions undertake outreach for migrant workers to become their members.</td>
<td>Kompasset is a guidance service in Copenhagen for unregistered EU10 mobile citizens (main target group), set up by the Danish Church Social (Kirkens Korshær), run partly by volunteers, who give counselling and information on how to navigate Danish society, other services available, support job-seeking. An emergency clinic was opened in 2011 for EU10 citizens illegally residing in the country, set up by civil society organisations in cooperation, such as Red Cross, Danish Refugee Council, Danish Medical Association.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany</strong></td>
<td>Faire Mobilität is a programme set up in 2011 and specifically designed for those EU mobile citizens who are at work or in search of a job. Its aim is to ensure fair wages and working conditions. Financed by government, the European Social Fund (ESF) and the German Confederation of Trade Unions (DGB) until 2015. It provides advice to EU mobile citizens in their mother tongue on their rights and work opportunities, raising awareness of services available to them. There are local hubs or centres. Funding was cut, so no new centre has been opened since 2013.</td>
<td>Municipality of Hamburg introduced various measures for newcomers, providing them with a whole range of information. Various outreach activities with the aim of increasing awareness of EU mobile citizens’ rights and integration in local communities.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>Local government (examples)</td>
<td>Social partners or cooperation with them plus cooperation between other actors (examples)</td>
<td>NGOs (examples)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>EURES advisors as multilanguage point of assistance and information.</td>
<td>Introduction of ‘ENI code’ by government of Lazio, with the aim to grant free access to healthcare for unregistered EU citizens.</td>
<td>The Italian trade unions have a network of outreach offices, called INCA, within the Italian General Confederation of Labour (Cgil). It provides legal support and information services on labour contracts, healthcare, taxes, entitlements to social assistance and unemployment benefits. Trade unions have adjusted their service provision to the emerging needs of EU mobile citizens.</td>
<td>The website Stranieri provides information in different languages on legislation and regulation to foreigners (both third-country nationals and EU mobile citizens). Nasz Świat is a web space in Polish linked to the main site. A Milan-based charity called NAGA aims to protect the rights of EU mobile citizens and third-country nationals in the area of healthcare and social assistance. Provides assistance with access to services plus advice on a wide range of legal and administrative issues to all non-Italian citizens, including Roma.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Information brochures and self-study packages issued in several languages, distributed also in sending countries; government’s official website contains foreign language web pages (for example, in Polish). Various measures against misconduct by employers or employment agencies towards mobile EU workers. Since 2013, an official strategy has targeted fake self-employment in construction work. To encourage registration with municipalities, penalty introduced in 2014 for those who have not registered. Within the framework of the Dutch law on housing vacancy, it has become possible to create temporary accommodation in empty buildings for EU mobile citizens. Pilot participation declaration project (see details in Table 6) with several municipalities.</td>
<td>Municipality of Den Haag recently opened a special information centre that provides a ‘welcoming package’ on working and living in the country. Municipality of Rotterdam set up special classes for non-Dutch-speaking youth. Short-stay facilities set up by some municipalities (‘Polenhotels’).</td>
<td>A National Declaration was signed between umbrella organisations of employers and trade unions in 2012 for (temporary) housing for EU migrant workers; nine regions agreed to provide more and better housing.</td>
<td>Barka, an originally Polish non-profit organisation, helps homeless and destitute people with voluntary repatriation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Centres of Participation and Inclusion (CEPI), set up in 2006 by the regional government of the Community of Madrid, are a network of centres plus a labour mediation programme operating in towns. The network includes the Hispanic-Romanian and Hispanic-Bulgarian centres. Telephone services for easing access to public services in some autonomous communities. Bilzen, an intercultural mediation centre set up by the Basque government (2004).</td>
<td></td>
<td>The biggest trade unions, the General Union of Workers (UGT) and the Workers’ Commissions (CCOO), operate networks of Information Centres for Immigrants (for example, the CCOO’s CITE offices), offering labour and social inclusion support, but not to workers, since those who are at work get the same services as nationals. Staff of these services progressively adapted their work to specific needs of new immigrants.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>Local government (examples)</td>
<td>Social partners or cooperation with them plus cooperation between other actors (examples)</td>
<td>NGOs (examples)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Stockholm municipality opened up an information phoneline about homelessness and begging among EU mobile citizens, plus a taskforce of social workers was set up for dealing specifically with EU mobile citizens. A coordinator was appointed to coordinate action by social services, voluntary organisations and the police. Local municipalities arrange bus transport returning mobile citizens to their home country on a voluntary basis. Example of Borås municipality returning migrants to Buzau, a Romanian town (in December 2013).</td>
<td>Crossroads initiative started in 2011 by an NGO in Stockholm (Stadsmission) in cooperation with the municipality, public employment service and the Salvation Army and funded by the ESF. It provides meals, showers, laundry facilities and space to sit and rest, plus information, training courses and counselling services, and discussion groups where clients share their experiences. All are free of charge and designed to help homeless EU migrants. The aim is to be the first contact point. The majority of users are third-country nationals, with a residence permit from an EU country. Projekt Vinternatt (Winter Night Project), focused on providing shelter to homeless EU migrants.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Jobcentre Plus is the employment support service, which administers working-age benefits and is accessible to EU citizens in the same way as it is to UK citizens. It has an interpretation service, although it may not be available consistently. Government's Work Programme for the long-term unemployed, although very few EU10 citizens use it. Pay and Work Rights Helpline, run by the government. Migration Impacts Fund, set up in 2009 but closed in 2010, to help integrate migrants into local communities.</td>
<td>West of Scotland Regional Equality Council runs the Good Community Relations Project, aiming to promote EU10 citizens’ rights and responsibilities. A website, called Worksmart and run by the Trade Union Congress (TUC), supports projects raising awareness of migrants’ employment rights and providing support services for vulnerable migrants at risk of exploitation. Nearly all are run at regional and local level, in rural areas where EU migrant workers are highly concentrated. These are small-scale projects.</td>
<td>Citizens Advice Bureau (CAB) is a network of independent charities that gives free, confidential information and advice to help people with their money, legal, consumer and other problems. East European Advice Centre (EEAC) helps disadvantaged EU10 citizens in settling down in the UK.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Measures that are tailored for newly arrived EU citizens are in bold.

Source: Eurofound country studies
Initiatives for EU mobile citizens and unmet needs

growing demand for in-work support, including in-work benefit, was reported from the UK. A similar phenomenon was reported from Austria, where low wages are causing a growing need for financial support, especially among EU10 mobile citizens. Service providers pointed out, however, that it is difficult to reach out to people in regular jobs since they do not turn to AMS, the public employment service and the first contact point, which refers people to apply for social assistance.

In Sweden, the duration of a person’s employment contract affects their eligibility for a personal ID number, which in turn is a prerequisite for accessing services, such as housing, or benefit, or even basic activities such as setting up a bank account or a subscription for a mobile phone. The personal ID number can be obtained if one stays in the country for more than one year, making EU citizens with shorter work contracts ineligible.

In general, the more vulnerable labour market position of EU10 citizens, especially at the beginning of their stay in the host country, is all the more understandable because, as those who were interviewed in Sweden said, they experience a ‘career detour’ when moving abroad, meaning that they had given up, or at least suspended, the career they had started in their home country. Or, if they had just entered the labour market, they had to accept that they could not find a job matching their qualifications. This is true especially for those who have not been in direct contact with an employer in the host country before arriving. In some cases, employers have acted as information sources and advisors and have helped employees to get ID cards.

Homelessness and housing

Homelessness among EU10 mobile citizens poses a major challenge and was reported in many of the host countries. Not only is it a serious problem in itself, it also has far-reaching consequences for access to services. In Austria, for example, due to non-registration with local municipalities, homeless people have restricted eligibility for services. This is the same in Denmark and Sweden. In Denmark, according to some NGOs, legally residing EU mobile citizens could be denied access to shelter, even though they are eligible for such help, because they do not have a registration certificate. This is because, according to the stakeholders interviewed for this report, without a certificate, shelters cannot be sure that the person applying to them is legally resident and therefore they risk losing their claim for reimbursement from the Danish government.

For those who are rejected, and for illegal migrants, only private shelters are available, making them highly vulnerable, particularly in cold winters. In 2012, the government put aside DKK 4.5 million (€0.6 million) to expand the capacity of the shelters during the cold winter months (Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, 2012, p. 15). A year later, an additional DKK 3 million (€0.4 million) was allocated (Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, 2013, p. 6). These are, however, only temporary measures.

Homelessness in Sweden has accelerated recently, with a recent report concluding that, out of all migrant groups, homelessness is increasing fastest among EU mobile citizens (Stockholms Stadsmission, 2013). According to another survey, 64% of homeless people come from EU10 countries, with Romanians in the majority (National Board of Health and Welfare, 2013). For most, the main reason is unemployment. The Stockholms Stadsmission report advocates that the lack of national housing guidelines or policies for this group needs to be remedied. The country report on Sweden points out that, so far, NGOs such as the Stockholms Stadsmission and Crossroads, which are important providers of services to the homeless, have taken an unusually big responsibility to cater for such needs, but this is not a sustainable solution.
In the Netherlands, there are insufficient housing facilities for EU10 citizens whose income is particularly low and who therefore are unable to cover the costs of housing on the open market. In Austria, it was reported that housing costs make up a substantial proportion of the total income of EU10 households.

**Unmet need for information and language training**

In terms of access to services, those who are weakly attached to the labour market are in an especially vulnerable situation since, in many countries, labour market services are the first contact points in accessing other services. A typical example is Austria, where funding provided for migrant organisations is meant specifically for labour-market related consultation. The migration centres detect a growing need for more general information provision, but funding for a broader social integration of EU10 citizens seems to be lacking. Case-by-case consultation is also required so that more specific problems can be addressed. Issues associated specifically with intra-EU mobility need to be clarified to (potential) EU mobile citizens prior to entering the host country, but also when they settle down and encounter problems such as job loss. Another problem identified by the representatives of migrant organisations in Austria is how to reach EU10 mobile citizens who are most in need of such information services. As a rule, those with higher education, better language skills and more information in general will find their way to the relevant centres.

A similar experience with provision of information was reported from Denmark, where many of the measures in place seem directed towards EU10 mobile citizens at the ‘top’, that is, high-skilled and already in employment or education, although needs may be more immediate among the least resourceful mobile citizens.

The UK country report underlines the unmet information needs of the recently arrived and the newly unemployed. Many are unaware of and have no access to formal local support networks and services. In addition, they are less likely to access Jobcentre Plus employment support because they are not eligible for benefits or because they have never needed to access the service before. As an illustration, the country report quotes the following view from a representative of a migrant group:

> One of the most common issues we find among EU migrants is that they are totally unaware of the benefits they can claim in the UK. Because most of them have worked, and came here to work, they have never had to get familiar with the benefits system or what their rights are within it, so by the time they come to us, they are sometimes in pretty dire circumstances. Some have been sleeping rough, in need of food banks and other charitable handouts.

The country study on Sweden reports that in the case of the Roma, not only do they lack information themselves, but the public authorities also lack knowledge about them. According to estimates, about 50,000 Roma live in Sweden. While most are citizens of the EU10, many are citizens of other countries. It is true, however, that many of those who come from the EU10 countries do not stay for long. Previous research has found that they typically do not seek employment (SOLI, 2010), probably as a result of having encountered discrimination in their home country and having become discouraged after failing to secure work there. They typically do not stay longer than three months, possibly because three months is the time limit for which no report is required with the Swedish Migration Board (and, as elsewhere, a stay of less than three months gives no entitlement to services other than that afforded to a ‘normal’ tourist) (Nyzell and Martensson, 2010). A representative of the
Initiatives for EU mobile citizens and unmet needs

organisation Roma International, giving an example of how vulnerable they were, said that Romani people were being wrongfully charged by private health service providers.

Knowledge of the language of the host county is crucial in accessing information in Sweden since most information is available in Swedish only. Although some migrant organisations (for example, those for Hungarians and Poles) offer help with these difficulties, they cannot help with more complex problems, since regular cooperation with public authorities is not in place. At the same time, desk officers within the public authorities lack knowledge about the needs of the EU10 citizens in general. Due to the complexity of some public services, such as the healthcare system, the lack of information is a serious problem. Lack of Swedish language knowledge also presents a significant barrier to labour market integration, with the EU mobile citizens who were interviewed reporting that, even if knowledge of Swedish is not a formal requirement, those who do not speak the language are at a disadvantage during the recruitment process.

More recently, accessing language studies for those on low incomes has become more difficult. The country study on the Netherlands reports that there are not enough language courses available, especially since financing from central government was abolished on 1 January 2013. In the UK, although technically not a public service, English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) training was heavily funded by government up to 2007, when cuts were made. The coalition government made further cuts in 2011, which severely affected migrants in low-paid, low-skilled jobs particularly, since they could no longer claim such support. In addition, both the stakeholders who were interviewed and the government’s ESOL Equality Impact Assessment report pointed out that these changes are likely to have a disproportionate effect on EU10 mobile citizens (NIACE, 2011). At the same time, some evidence from previous research suggests that even those who are eligible for such support may encounter some problems with the courses on offer since there are gaps in ESOL provision, particularly with regard to pre-entry (or basic level) classes (Oakley et al, 2013).

Difficulty with accessing language courses was also identified in Austria. As the country report points out, whereas third-country nationals in need can avail of these services at reduced cost or even for free, EU10 mobile citizens have to pay. This could pose a substantial barrier for EU mobile citizens on low incomes, not only to their labour market progression (as is the case in the UK), but also to their social inclusion.

Other challenges

As Table 12 on the measures supporting EU10 citizens shows, most of the services were initially designed for third-country nationals or for issues related to the labour market and social services in general, such as the Danish packages to prevent social dumping. Although they were not developed exclusively for EU10 citizens, their importance has certainly increased in the wake of increased inflow from the EU10 countries. The country report on Austria emphasised that many regulations and integration services provided apply to third-country nationals only. If not already the case (as in the use of labour market services), they could also be offered to EU10 citizens. This could facilitate integration into local society and potentially improve access to services if needed. Such measures comprise, for example, language courses (currently obligatory for third-country nationals but which could be offered on a voluntary basis to EU10 migrants), information, special counselling services and integration services.

Other country studies, such as those for Spain, Sweden and the UK, note that the staff of service provider organisations are themselves unaware of the rules and regulations applicable to EU10 citizens. For
example, the UK country report mentions that there is often confusion amongst Jobcentre Plus advisers themselves as to the eligibility criteria, and in particular, around the habitual residence conditions (see also Sibley, 2013).

Another problem identified with the take-up of benefits is social stigma. While such stigmatisation is a general phenomenon, it can be especially keenly felt in smaller communities, where anonymity is less possible (Eurofound, 2015).

As indicated before, many challenges obviously appear at local and community level. The rising tensions even constitute an important subject of national debates on the increased inflow of EU mobile citizens. These challenges can, to some extent, be attributed to lack of skill in the language of the host country, but other reasons – such as lack of basic information on rules and procedures and the consequent poor access to public services – also seem to play a significant role in this. In the Netherlands and Austria, for example, there are pilot projects or measures in place to address these issues: the participation declaration project in the Netherlands and the Wiener Wohnen initiative in Austria. The Netherlands – in cooperation with Bulgaria, Poland and Romania – has recently reinforced activities of its embassies in these three countries in providing information to those citizens considering a move to the Netherlands.

**Impact on established services and service providers**

The UK country study reports that the additional demand placed on schools to provide language support had a major impact, and the demand seems to be increasing. It appears, however, that this kind of challenge could be solved, as this quotation from a deputy head teacher in a primary school in a region that has seen a large inflow of EU10 migrants suggests:

> It wasn't easy at first, I'll admit. We're a small, predominantly white British community, and that's how it's always been since I've been here. But with the influx of eastern Europeans, there have also been greater opportunities for children and local families to learn about other cultures and now many of the children leave here bilingual or even trilingual.

Solving children's initial language difficulties, however, requires their parents to settle in an area. One stakeholder highlighted that the potential issue of pupil turnover in some schools could cause class disruption and difficulties in tracking the educational progress of children. The problem is associated with more mobile types of EU citizens, such as low-skilled workers. It was acknowledged to be more of an issue in areas with relatively little prior experience of immigration or diversity, such as rural locations, and less of an issue among inner-city schools, which seemed to be more experienced in dealing with this issue. A representative from a rural local authority stated:

> I know of specific pressures in [two named rural locations] where a few schools have been struggling to deal with a more mobile population of EU migrants and therefore more churn in the schools. Children starting mid-term or leaving the school because their parents are now moving out of the area creates more work for the school.

Therefore, the authors of the country study conclude that the impacts of EU1 citizens’ use of compulsory education are highly localised and more pronounced in rural areas that have little experience of dealing with population change and diversity.
As regards the impact of increased inflow on service providers, the EU10 mobile citizens interviewed in Austria reported that staff seemed to be overloaded with work both in the reception area of AMS (labour) offices and also when they applied for social assistance. Since the number and proportion of EU10 citizens is likely the increase in the future, the situation could deteriorate unless more funds and staff are provided to accommodate the increased needs. There is the related problem, highlighted by EU10 citizens, of the complicated and lengthy procedures. Similarly, in Sweden, the country report tells of an increased workload for staff at one of the most important institutions of the welfare system, the Swedish Social Insurance, when assessing the residence criteria. New legislation adopted in 2013 changed these criteria, leading to a more complicated process for EU mobile citizens.

In the Netherlands, it was reported that due to the increased inflow of EU mobile citizens, extra funding was needed for the municipalities of some big cities (for example, The Hague) in order to address the housing conditions facing EU mobile citizens. The municipality of The Hague spends about €1 million extra on helping to alleviate these and other integration problems experienced by EU mobile citizens.

In Italy, the various municipalities give different accounts of the impact of EU mobile citizens, depending on the inflow into their area. For example, EU mobile citizens’ demand for social housing in Turin is on the increase, so the municipality’s workload is rising, whereas in Milan the demand has consistently been dropping recently.
This research focused on the consequences of increasing intra-EU mobility in nine host countries. More specifically, it examined the impact on public services in these Member States, comparing the take-up of benefits and social services by mobile citizens with that of the native population and other citizen groups. The main objective was to explore whether there was any evidence supporting the widespread view that the main motive driving the influx of new EU mobile citizens into key host Member States is ‘welfare tourism’. The issue has become highly politicised in some Member States recently, especially as a consequence of the global economic crisis and the increased inflow mainly from the central and eastern European Member States that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. No doubt, in the wake of the crisis, the inflow from southern European Member States to the traditional host countries also increased. Since, however, east–west mobility still dominates current intra-EU mobility and the debate on welfare tourism is attached mainly to the ‘new migrants’, the focus of this report was the impact of the inflow of EU10 citizens on the take-up of benefits and various social services. This take-up is strongly influenced by demographic and socioeconomic factors, so these were analysed before the issue of benefit and service take-up was explored. It was also important to discuss the main obstacles to the integration of EU10 citizens in the host countries. This could have important policy implications at Member State and EU level, as well as for regions and local municipalities within the individual Member States.

The main conclusion of this study is that, although there are certain social benefits where the take-up by EU10 citizens is higher than that of natives, mainly employment-related benefit, overall their take-up of benefits and social services is lower, and significantly so in most countries for benefits such as disability and sickness benefits, social housing and pensions. Evidence from this study confirmed findings of previous analyses (such as that by the OECD) that have shown that the fiscal contribution of EU10 citizens to state budgets of the host countries is positive. With respect to the demographic and socioeconomic profile of EU10 mobile citizens, the research also confirmed earlier findings that most of these citizens are young people of prime working age. Their composition, however, varies by host country. For example, Austria and Germany, which are traditional host countries for central and eastern European migrants, have the highest share of older and more established EU10 migrants. In these, therefore, it is important to distinguish between ‘older’ migrants and ‘newly arrived’ mobile citizens. In Austria, many immigrants who were born in one of the EU10 countries have become Austrian citizens. No doubt, this has a significant impact on their access to benefits and services.

It should also be noted that the research was not concerned with all the factors explaining different patterns of take-up of benefits and services by EU10 mobile citizens compared to natives. Some ‘soft’ factors may play an important role in explaining different patterns but are difficult to quantify, such as:

- the effect of welfare regimes in the country of origin;
- EU10 mobile citizens’ strong motivation and focus on work and immediate gains;
- their attitudes towards certain services that diverge from those of the native populations;
- their lower perception of risk (of unemployment, poverty, accidents at work and so on), which is associated with their young age.
During the research for this report, it became clear that the recent financial and economic crisis had far-reaching consequences not only on the extent and characteristics of intra-EU mobility, but also on opportunities for integration of EU mobile citizens and on public perceptions. The debate on welfare tourism has been fuelled by the wider impact of the crisis and this can be detected in the individual host countries.

More specifically, several important challenges for EU10 citizens were identified.

- In most countries, particularly those severely hit by the crisis, EU10 mobile citizens were directly affected by a higher risk of unemployment, salary reductions and more precarious working and living conditions.

- One of the reasons for this is that many EU10 citizens work in sectors that are usually dominated by migrants, which are particularly exposed to economic turbulence (such as construction, catering, tourism and hospitality, and the retail trade).

- Even though EU10 mobile citizens are usually well educated (the majority have a medium skill level and a substantial number possess a degree), they are most often employed in low-skilled jobs and, again, exposed to in-work poverty and economic uncertainty.

- While in some countries, their employment rate is higher than that of natives, many lost their jobs as a result of the crisis. They either ended up in less well-paid part-time jobs (sometimes juggling several at once to make ends meet) or became unemployed. As a consequence, their take-up of unemployment benefit tends to be higher than that of the native population.

- In some countries, they participate in employment measures more than natives do (in Denmark and Sweden, for instance). This is, however, not always the case (Germany is a case in point). And even when their participation in active labour market policy measures is higher, they may attend programmes that do not lead to jobs. Partly as a result of this and partly due to other difficulties with labour market integration, their labour market outcomes are poorer than those of native workers.

- In countries where budget cuts were extensive (for example, the UK), opportunities for the inclusion of mobile EU citizens have deteriorated. The cuts affected not only the most vulnerable groups (those who are out of work), but also those in employment, who, for instance, experienced cuts in in-work benefits.

Several conclusions can be drawn on the take-up of benefits and social services by EU mobile citizens.

- Since employment is the dominant motivation for mobility among EU10 citizens, most of the benefits and services they use are related to the labour market and low income. Their take-up of unemployment benefit is higher than that of host-country nationals in most cases where such data are available. In Germany, the take-up of unemployment benefit by EU10 citizens has recently been increasing more than that of other citizen groups.

- Their less favourable labour market position (most of them are in jobs for which they are over-qualified) and the ensuing wage penalties due to often precarious jobs have important implications for their needs and eventually their take-up of benefits and social services.

- It seems, however, that in some countries their needs are not always met due to strict eligibility conditions for non-contributory benefits – a factor which could contribute to their exclusion and eventually lead to them becoming destitute.
The lower take-up of social housing among EU10 citizens may be related to a lack of knowledge regarding its availability or a perception of the waiting times being insurmountable. It is likely, however, that as family formation becomes more of a priority for EU10 mobile citizens and if their financial circumstances remain much the same as at present, more will apply for social housing in the future.

It is important to investigate the consequences of intra-EU mobility within the context of demographic changes in Europe. Whereas increased mobility could contribute to mitigating the consequences of population ageing and an ageing workforce in the host countries, it could exacerbate the consequences of population ageing in the sending countries, even if remittances and accumulated pension entitlements could help in the future.
Policy implications and recommendations

At EU level

- A separate fund within the ESF could be earmarked to facilitate the integration of EU mobile citizens, which would finance activities such as in-depth consultation, language classes and special follow-up calls or advice – services that in some countries are available to third-country nationals.

- The EU should play a more proactive role in helping host Member States to systematically support language learning. The evidence of the research for this report suggests that the recent budget cuts by individual Member States badly hit the language learning opportunities of the most vulnerable EU mobile citizens (such as those on low incomes and in precarious jobs). It needs to be recognised at EU level that a better command of a host country’s language is crucial to the social inclusion of EU mobile citizens. It is also an important (and effective) tool in facilitating mutual trust with the native population. Investing in language skills seems to be the right way to achieve the Commission’s aim of ‘countering public perceptions that are not based on facts or economic realities’ (European Commission, 2013a, p. 13).

- More publication of research and analysis is needed to counter ideological and uninformed assessments.

At national level

- There is a need for greater activation, training and subsidies targeted at EU citizens because of the disadvantages they face both in the labour market and in their wider societal inclusion.

- In order to more precisely assess and remedy these disadvantages, much more data by nationality are needed in most of the countries examined. The current systems in most host countries generally do not record data on nationality in relation to mobile citizens’ use of welfare services and entitlements.

- More stability in national legislation is needed for easier application of rules.

- Specific attention should be given to the short-term implications of plans for greater restrictions on access to services by EU mobile citizens, as they may actually trigger needs for extra services (for example, more hardship may give rise to the use of emergency help).

At local level

- More attention should be paid to applying for EU funds. Central government can help with this and with dealing with sometimes complex administrative procedures.

- Staff of local service providers need to be properly trained to apply rules correctly in complying with the fundamental rights of EU citizens.

- More coordination between different organisations is needed. Migrant organisations need more financial support in order to meet increased demand and improve integration, in close cooperation with public authorities.

- Municipalities should be prepared for increasing demand on housing services as citizens from the EU’s more recent accession states become more settled.
Bibliography

All Eurofound publications are available at www.eurofound.europa.eu/publications


Andersen, S. and Felbo-Kolding, J. (2013), Danske virksomheders brug af østeuropæisk arbejdskraft, Research Centre for Labour Market and Organizational Studies (FAOS), University of Copenhagen.


European Commission (2013b), Free movement: Vice-President Reding’s intervention at the December Justice and Home Affairs Council, speech, Brussels, 5 December.


Federal Ministry of the Interior (Austria), Federal Ministry of the Interior (Germany), Ministry of Security and Justice (the Netherlands) and the Home Office (UK) (undated), Letter sent to His Excellency Mr Alan Shatter, Minister for Justice and Equality, President of the European Council for Justice and Home Affairs, available at http://docs.dpaq.de/3604-130415_letter_to_presidency_final_1_2.pdf.


ICF GHK and Milieu (2013), *A fact finding analysis on the impact on the Member States’ social security systems of the entitlements of non-active intra-EU migrants to special non-contributory cash benefits and healthcare granted on the basis of residence*, Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, Brussels.

INE (Instituto Nacional de Estadística) (2012), *Encuesta a las personas sin hogar*, Notas de prensa.


Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, Denmark (2012), Udmætning af satsreguleringspuljen for 2012, Delaftale for det sociale område, Copenhagen.

Ministry of Social Affairs and Integration, Denmark (2013), Udmøntning af satspuljen for 2013 – delaftale for social- og integrationsområdet, Copenhagen.


NIACE (2011), Policy update: The impact on English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) learners of the funding and eligibility changes, NIACE, Leicester, UK.

Nyzell, B. and Mårtensson, L. (2010), Utredning/uppdrag angående ökad migration av EU-medborgare; fattiga europeer, Gøteborgs stadskansli och Sociala resursförvaltningen, Gothenburg.


Social dimension of intra-EU mobility: Impact on public services


Table A1: Overview on key points of national debates about welfare tourism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Tone of debate on social tourism</th>
<th>Reasons and issues</th>
<th>Other related issues in the media</th>
<th>Comment or overall tone</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Strong – high on the agenda</td>
<td>Burden on the welfare system</td>
<td>Displacement of native workers (cheap labour)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Strong – high on the agenda</td>
<td>Burden on the welfare system</td>
<td>Social dumping and downward pressure on wages</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Strong – high on the agenda</td>
<td>Burden on the welfare system</td>
<td>High concentration in a few cities, including some districts specifically</td>
<td>The debate on negative side-effects of free movement has become more prominent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Rarely debated</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>Illegal employment; displacement of Italian workers; crime and security</td>
<td>Renewed fears as Croatia joined the EU – much stricter application of transitional measures than for Bulgaria and Romania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Strong – high on the agenda</td>
<td>Burden on the welfare system; alleged benefit abuse, disruption to the labour market</td>
<td>Managing unexpected high inflow; promoting decent work and combating exploitation of EU mobile workers; problematic integration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>Rarely debated</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>Illegal employment; displacement of native workers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>Debated before 2004 but rarely since then</td>
<td>Lack of evidence supporting welfare tourism</td>
<td>Homelessness, begging on street</td>
<td>The term ‘EU-migrants’ appears much more often in the media, but not necessarily with a negative connotation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>Strong – high on the agenda</td>
<td>Significant strain on free public services to which they have made little fiscal contribution</td>
<td>Displacement of native workers; crime; most negative rhetoric against the Roma (criminality, anti-social behaviour, among others)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n.d. = data not available
Source: Eurofound country studies

Figure A1: Average age of various national groups, UK

Note: *** = p < 0.01
Sources: APS, 2010–2013, and Eurofound country study on the UK
Table A2: Number of EU10 citizens in EU host countries, by national group, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Bulgaria</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
<th>Lithuania</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Romania</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
<th>Slovenia</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total share in population (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria**</td>
<td>19,607</td>
<td>11,631</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>54,939</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>1,253</td>
<td>54,262</td>
<td>73,374</td>
<td>32,052</td>
<td>13,507</td>
<td>262,362</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>4,951</td>
<td>906</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>2,779</td>
<td>4,204</td>
<td>8,674</td>
<td>27,017</td>
<td>12,423</td>
<td>1,313</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>63,898</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland*</td>
<td>1,759</td>
<td>5,451</td>
<td>2,560</td>
<td>8,034</td>
<td>20,593</td>
<td>36,683</td>
<td>122,585</td>
<td>17,304</td>
<td>10,801</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>225,962</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>54,685</td>
<td>834</td>
<td>1,301</td>
<td>11,521</td>
<td>2,763</td>
<td>5,134</td>
<td>121,265</td>
<td>953,943</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>3,592</td>
<td>1,128,511</td>
<td>1,162,838</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands**</td>
<td>17, 846</td>
<td>3,170</td>
<td>971</td>
<td>10,280</td>
<td>3,287</td>
<td>4,572</td>
<td>85,785</td>
<td>9,986</td>
<td>3,941</td>
<td>835</td>
<td>140,673</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>168,997</td>
<td>9,250</td>
<td>1,998</td>
<td>10,046</td>
<td>4,595</td>
<td>21,401</td>
<td>79,099</td>
<td>870,258</td>
<td>8,147</td>
<td>1,437</td>
<td>1,175,138</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>5,522</td>
<td>1,434</td>
<td>4,455</td>
<td>5,184</td>
<td>6,297</td>
<td>10,406</td>
<td>48,227</td>
<td>13,022</td>
<td>1,352</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>96,662</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK****</td>
<td>61,232</td>
<td>46,223</td>
<td>9,298</td>
<td>64,686</td>
<td>84,743</td>
<td>151,155</td>
<td>713,137</td>
<td>72,788</td>
<td>1,461</td>
<td>1,328,250</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Challenges with direct comparison arise when the stock of the EU10 mobile citizens in the host countries, even if Eurostat data are available (for 2012), which, in principle, should be comparable. Data sources are different in the individual host countries – for example, whereas in Denmark and Sweden an annual registration system is in place, in other countries it is only the census every 10 years that offers detailed population data. The fact that different data sources were used and some cover country of birth data whereas others cover citizenship explains why Eurostat data (which cover country of birth data) differ from the data given by the individual country studies. n.d. = no data available; numbers in italics are Eurostat data from 2012 referring to country of birth.

*2011; ** 2014; **** 2009, end of year

### Table A3: Gender composition of EU10 or EU12 nationals in selected host countries: Share of male population (%), 2011–2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>PL</td>
<td>RO</td>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>PL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: BG = Bulgaria, CY = Cyprus, LT = Lithuania, LV = Latvia, MT = Malta, PL = Poland, RO = Romania; EU8 = the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia; EU2 = Bulgaria and Romania.


### Table A4: Total employment rates of natives and EU12 mobile citizens in the EU and selected host countries (%)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EU28</td>
<td>EU27</td>
<td>EU15</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Germany</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>71.4</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>69.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>65.6</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>72.1</td>
<td>72.0</td>
<td>72.4</td>
<td>70.0</td>
<td>61.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>70.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>78.7</td>
<td>71.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>71.1</td>
<td>71.0</td>
<td>71.6</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>64.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>66.3</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>73.3</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>68.3</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64.0</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>65.4</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>75.3</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>64.4</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>66.0</td>
<td>63.5</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td>67.9</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64.1</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>64.5</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>67.5</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>64.8</td>
<td>64.9</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native</td>
<td>65.2</td>
<td>65.3</td>
<td>66.1</td>
<td>65.9</td>
<td>74.1</td>
<td>65.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Author's calculations, based on Eurostat data.
Table A5: Sectoral pattern of employment of EU10 citizens (%) in selected host countries, 2010–2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality/ groups</th>
<th>Construction</th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Transport</th>
<th>Health</th>
<th>Domestic help and cleaning</th>
<th>Social security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Denmark (2013)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Germany (2011)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romanians</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Netherlands (2011)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poles</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgarians</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Spain (2013)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sweden (2010)</strong></td>
<td>EU12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natives</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Figures show the percentage of nationals or group employed in a sector; n.d. = no data available.


Figure A2: Overview of target groups among EU10 mobile citizens using the example of Denmark

Source: Eurofound country study on Denmark
HOW TO OBTAIN EU PUBLICATIONS

Free publications:

- one copy:
  via EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu);

- more than one copy or posters/maps:
  from the European Union’s representations (http://ec.europa.eu/represent_en.htm);
  from the delegations in non-EU countries (http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/index_en.htm);
  by contacting the Europe Direct service (http://europa.eu/europedirect/index_en.htm) or
  calling 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (freephone number from anywhere in the EU) (*).

(*) The information given is free, as are most calls (though some operators, phone boxes or hotels may charge you).

Priced publications:

Freedom of movement across Member States is one of the core values of the European Union and is closely linked to European citizenship. There is, however, a heated debate in many of the host Member States about the impact of the rising inflow of mobile citizens on their public services. This research project aimed to examine the extent to which mobile citizens from the central and eastern European Member States (the EU10) take up benefits and services in nine host countries. It also provides a demographic and socioeconomic profile of EU10 mobile citizens and identifies initiatives aimed at integrating them in the host countries and providing them with access to benefits and services. The main finding of the report is that overall take-up of welfare benefits and services by EU10 citizens is lower than that of the native population of the host country, especially social housing and pensions. However, their take-up of certain specific benefits, mainly employment-related benefits (unemployment and in-work benefit), is higher.

The European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions (Eurofound) is a tripartite European Union Agency, whose role is to provide knowledge in the area of social and work-related policies. Eurofound was established in 1975 by Council Regulation (EEC) No. 1365/75, to contribute to the planning and design of better living and working conditions in Europe.