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International Labor Rights and the Sovereignty Question: NAFTA and Guatemala, Two Case Studies

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International Labor Rights and the Sovereignty Question: NAFTA and Guatemala, Two Case Studies

Abstract

[Excerpt] Labor rights advocates in the United States and allied organizations abroad attempting to establish international fair labor standards run up against traditional notions of sovereignty in formulating national labor policies and development strategies. In the same way that entrenched sovereignty principles gradually yielded to international human rights claims after World War II, sovereignty is now being challenged by claims of international labor rights in the field of employment standards and industrial relations.

This Article seeks to illuminate this challenge to sovereignty in two case studies of labor rights advocacy. Part I sets the stage with an overview of the growing importance of labor rights and labor standards as the world economy shifts from a nation-based economy to a single, global economy. Part II examines the case studies: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Guatemala. NAFTA is a case study of advocacy to establish fair international labor standards. The Guatemala case study exemplifies advocacy by U.S. labor rights supporters on behalf of workers and trade unions in Guatemala, where recourse is sought through worker rights provisions in U.S. trade laws and through a litigation strategy that views U.S. courts as a forum for asserting international labor rights claims.

Keywords

North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA, labor rights, Guatemala, sovereignty, standards, worker rights, economic growth, industrial relations

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Comments

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INTRODUCTION

Worker rights advocates in trade unions, human rights groups, and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have played an increasingly important role in promoting internationally established fair labor standards as a factor in international trade. Particularly in the United States, recent developments have widened the scope for action on labor rights in a transnational economy. Advocates of international fair labor standards have challenged the traditional right of countries to address their labor laws and labor relations as solely internal matters. They have sought to constrain the right of multinational corporations to implement labor policies based solely upon the laws of each nation where they operate, especially where laws are designed to repress rather than protect workers, and provide a competitive edge in international trade.

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2. See Trade's Hidden Costs, supra note 1, at 42.

3. See Trade's Hidden Costs, supra note 1, at 54-59 (recommending increased publication of foreign labor rights violations and the consideration of these violations when the United States conducts trade negotiations).

4. See Trade's Hidden Costs, supra note 1, at 28-40 (reviewing repressive labor laws and practices in Haiti, Chile, South Korea, Guatemala, Taiwan, and South Africa).

5. Rep. Don J. Pease, Preface to Trade's Hidden Costs, supra note 1, at viii
Opponents of international fair labor standards contend that each nation has the sovereign right to order its labor relations in accordance with domestic economic policies and development strategies. Most labor laws reflect this domestic approach. United States domestic regulations and laws, for example, regulate union organizing, collective bargaining, and other features of labor-management relations, and also set wage and hour levels, occupational safety and health rules, and other minimum workplace standards.

As the United States has applied worker rights provisions of its trade laws to other countries, some leaders in those countries have responded with charges that the United States acts hypocritically. They further contend that the United States Government fails to ratify most of the Conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and is

(arguing that countries which trade with the United States and deny basic labor rights to their citizens are engaging in unfair competition). Labor rights advocates argue that countries and corporations can gain a competitive advantage by employing "social dumping" tactics, such as banning strikes or independent union organizing, holding wages below a genuinely fair return on the workers' productivity, or permitting forced labor or child labor. Id.

6. See Gary S. Fields, Labor Standards, Economic Development and International Trade, in LABOR STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 19, 31-32 (stating that raising trade-linked international labor standards may conflict with a country's economic objectives and likely will protect one part of the workforce at the expense of another).

7. See Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 143-44 (1957) (declaring that United States labor law "is concerned with industrial strife between American employers and employees"). In Benz, the Supreme Court held that the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 did not cover labor disputes between a foreign ship and its foreign crew and dismissed a claim by a foreign sailor to enforce worker rights under United States law while in a United States port. Id.

8. See Karl Schoenberger, The Model Here Isn't America, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1992, at A1 (quoting Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammed's statement to a group of American businessmen that "[t]he hedonistic materialism of present (Western) models [of development] is not for us."); see also Paul Lewis, Splits May Dampen Rights Conference; Some Standards Don't Apply to Third World, It Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1993, at A1, A14 (reporting statements that "different cultures have different human rights standards while insisting that developing countries also have an absolute right to assistance with their economic development").

9. See Edward Potter, FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION, THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: THE IMPACT ON U.S. LAW AND PRACTICES OF RATIFICATION OF ILO CONVENTIONS NO. 87 AND NO. 98 (1984). A specialized agency of the United Nations, the ILO is the principal multilateral body devoted to labor rights and labor standards. While its conventions and recommendations reflect consensus among government, employer, and trade union representatives to annual ILO conferences, the ILO has no power to enforce the standards that it sets. See Stephen I.
itself guilty of widespread labor rights violations.¹⁰

Labor rights advocates in the United States and allied organizations abroad attempting to establish international fair labor standards run up against traditional notions of sovereignty in formulating national labor policies and development strategies. In the same way that entrenched sovereignty principles gradually yielded to international human rights claims after World War II,¹¹ sovereignty is now being challenged by claims of international labor rights in the field of employment standards and industrial relations.

This Article seeks to illuminate this challenge to sovereignty in two case studies of labor rights advocacy. Part I sets the stage with an overview of the growing importance of labor rights and labor standards as the world economy shifts from a nation-based economy to a single, global economy. Part II examines the case studies: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Guatemala. NAFTA is a case study of advocacy to establish fair international labor standards. The

Schlossberg, United States Participation in the ILO: Redefining the Role, 11 COMP. LAB. L.J. 48-49, 57-58 (1989) (providing a brief history and description of the ILO and discussing the role of the United States in the ILO's development); see also DAVID A. MORSE, THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF THE I.L.O. AND ITS ROLE IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY (1969) (providing a historical overview of the ILO). The United States has ratified eleven of 174 ILO Conventions, seven of them relating to conditions in the maritime industry. Of the rest, one ratification concerned approval of ILO constitutional changes. The other three are of wider significance: Convention No. 144 on Tripartite Consultations, committing to government-business-labor consultation on labor affairs (ratified 1988); No. 160 on Labor Statistics, standardizing statistical reporting requirements and measurement methods (ratified 1990); and, most significantly, No. 105 on forced labor (ratified 1991). United States multinational corporations acceded to ratification of Convention No. 105, given the universality of strictures against forced labor, but strongly resisted United States ratification of ILO Conventions favorable to trade unions.


Guatemala case study exemplifies advocacy by U.S. labor rights supporters on behalf of workers and trade unions in Guatemala, where recourse is sought through worker rights provisions in U.S. trade laws and through a litigation strategy that views U.S. courts as a forum for asserting international labor rights claims.

I. THE GROWING IMPORTANCE OF WORKERS’ RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE

As the world moves toward a global economy, differences in labor standards, worker organization, and labor relations policies among countries at varying levels of development become critical variables in trade and investment decision making. The NAFTA and Guatemala labor rights cases that are the focus of this Article do not arise in a vacuum: these cases arise in a context of increasing importance of labor rights on the international agenda.¹²

A. ORGANIZED LABOR, TRADE, AND INVESTMENT PATTERNS

In many countries, organized labor movements play an important role in influencing trade and development strategies. For example, workers and unions often mount sharp resistance to austerity and privatization policies imposed on their governments by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other global lending agencies.¹³

¹² The United States has recognized the importance of labor rights by linking them to preferential treatment for developing countries in trade programs. Labor rights provisions in U.S. trade laws specify five “internationally recognized worker rights” whose observance conditions a country’s beneficiary trade status with the United States:

(A) the right of association;
(B) the right to organize and bargain collectively;
(C) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;
(D) a minimum age for the employment of children; and
(E) acceptable conditions of work with respect to minimum wages, hours of work, work, and occupational safety and health.

Traditional union tactics of organizing, bargaining, and striking also have important effects on trade and investment. Korean workers, after decades of suppression by military governments, countered the suppression with a broad movement of strikes in the 1980s and organizing campaigns that transformed Korea's export base. This movement forced sharp salary increases and challenged management's autocratic control of the workplace. Companies retaliated by moving operations to Thailand, Malaysia, Central America, and other lower-cost export processing areas. As turmoil continued to jeopardize the stability desired by international investors, the Korean government responded by launching new crackdowns on organized labor. Like Korea, the Malaysian Government intervened by prohibiting independent, freely-chosen unions in the growing semiconductor industry. This measure created investment problems in Malaysia and placed the government in a precarious situation. If Malaysia continued to prohibit the formation of national unions, the United States considered imposing trade sanctions for labor rights violations. If Malaysia lifted the ban on genuine unions, United States-based multinational companies threatened to leave. Political reform and union tactics presented governments with difficult questions on how to address labor rights in the context of international trade.

14. See generally George E. Ogle, South Korea: Dissent Within the Economic Miracle 115-53 (discussing the Korean labor movement from 1987 to 1989).
18. See Jeyamalar Kandiah, National Union's Out; Electronic Workers Can Form Only In-House Unions: Kim Sai, Star (Kuala Lumpur), Oct. 20, 1988 (stating that the Malaysian Government announced that electronic workers could form in-house unions but not a national union); see also International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, Petition Before the United States Trade Representative for Malaysia's Violations of the Worker Rights Provision of the Generalized System of Preferences, June 1, 1990 (requesting that Malaysia's status as a beneficiary of the Generalized System of Preferences be terminated because Malaysia's non-compliance with worker rights standards).
B. WORKER EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE

1. Child and Forced Labor

A tactic that may affect investment and directly provide a country with a competitive advantage in international trade is the exploitation of workers. For example, the ILO\textsuperscript{19} determined that the exploitative use of child labor was a growing factor in world trade,\textsuperscript{20} and several media reports in recent years have substantiated these accusations.\textsuperscript{21} The use of children younger than age thirteen to produce clothing, hand-woven carpets, and other products in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other Asian countries has provoked legislation in Congress to outlaw the importation of goods produced in this manner into the United States.\textsuperscript{22}

The United States also has disapproved of countries that employ prison or forced labor. The use of prison labor in China to manufacture goods for the United States market has led to congressional challenges to China's most favored nation (MFN) trade status.\textsuperscript{23} Similarly, charges of forced labor of Haitian sugar cane cutters in the Dominican Republic has prompted the United States to threaten export sanctions.\textsuperscript{24} Finally,
millions of workers around the world are offered advance payments of salary and then held in debt bondage by their employers.\textsuperscript{25}

2. Discrimination and Additional Worker Abuses in Developing Countries

Claims of discrimination in the workplace also have contributed to the recognition of labor rights as an international dilemma. Apartheid in South Africa, for example, has been a target of trade sanctions for many years. Workplace discrimination against Black South Africans prompted anti-apartheid advocates in the United States to promulgate the Sullivan Principles, which stated that U.S. corporations voluntarily should enforce non-discrimination practices in their operations in South Africa.\textsuperscript{25} In 1986, Congress passed more expansive, mandatory sanctions.\textsuperscript{27}

The massive transfer of operations from developed to developing countries in the garment, manufacturing, and electronic assembly industries\textsuperscript{28} has led to widespread claims of sex discrimination against women workers, who make up the majority of the workforce in these factories.\textsuperscript{29} Seen as submissive to male authority, women workers are

\textsuperscript{25} See \textsc{International Labour Organisation}, \textit{World Labor Report} 11 (1993) (explaining that, due to low wages and practices that require payments from laborers for tools and fine workers for unsatisfactory work, laborers are never able to repay their debts); \textit{see also} Molly Moore, \textit{Casting Off the Caste System; Indian Movement Teaching Bonded Laborers to Rebel}, \textit{WASH. Post}, Nov. 17, 1992, at A1 (providing specific examples of debt bondage in India).

\textsuperscript{26} See Daniel Pink, \textit{The Valdez Principles: Is What's Good for America Good for General Motors?}, 8 \textsc{Yale L. \\& Pol'y Rev.} 180, 182-85 (1990) (outlining the Sullivan Principles and discussing their success in achieving certain improvements in working conditions).

\textsuperscript{27} \text{Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2151(d), 5001-5116 (1988).}

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{See Joseph Grunwald \\& Kenneth Flamm, The Global Factory: Foreign Assembly in International Trade} 217-37 (1985) (differentiating the means of production in the semiconductor industry in the developing world from that in the industrial world).

\textsuperscript{29} \textit{See Kathryn B. Ward, Women in the Global Economy, in 3 Women and Work: An Annual Review} 28-32 (Barbara A. Gutke, Ann H. Stromberg \\& Laurie Larwood eds., 1988) (discussing economic subjugation of women in the global assem-
thought to be hostile to labor unions and are vulnerable to sexual exploitation by supervisors.\(^{30}\)

In addition to discrimination in the workplace, payment of minimum wages, excessive working hours and poor occupational health and safety standards also can affect trade and investment patterns. During the fall of 1992, United States television shows *60 Minutes* and *Nightline* broadcast dramatic revelations of United States government assistance to Central American countries luring businesses from the United States.\(^{31}\) In one telling sequence, a hidden camera and microphone at a trade show sponsored by the United States Agency for International Development (AID) recorded representatives of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala underbidding each other with minimum wage quotes, beginning at ninety cents and falling to fifty-seven cents per hour.\(^{32}\) The controversy became a potent issue in the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign\(^{33}\) and provoked immediate congressional action ordering AID to halt such assistance.\(^{34}\)

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31. *Nightline: Paying to Lose Our Jobs* (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 29-30, 1992 [hereinafter *Nightline*] (reporting that money from the United States Agency for International Development is given to foreign governments to finance their promotion of a better business climate for United States manufacturers in Latin America and the Caribbean Basin); *60 Minutes: Hiring Rosa Martinez* (CBS television broadcast, Sept. 27, 1992) (documenting that the United States Government is promoting the export of textile factories to Central America and the Caribbean Basin by providing companies with low-interest loans, as well as by advertising the availability of inexpensive labor in foreign countries).


33. See Richard Rothstein, Economic Policy Institute, Setting the Standard: International Labor Rights and United States Trade Policy 5 (Mar. 1993) (outlining President Clinton's campaign promises with respect to achieving uniform workplace standards and proposing various initiatives that should be pursued in order to achieve better standards for workers throughout the world).

Excessive working hours, like minimum wages, characterize life on the "global assembly line" in the developing world. Twelve- to fourteen-hour days, double shifts, overnight work to meet rush orders, and other extended workdays are not uncommon. Hazardous job safety and health conditions are also common. In Korea, the economic "miracle" was financed, at least in part, by ignoring worker safety. As noted above, violent rank and file reaction to such policies in the late 1980s deeply affected trade and investment patterns throughout Asia.

3. Labor Rights in Developed Nations

Discrimination and abuses in the workplace do not occur solely in developing nations. They also occur in and have major trade implications for industrialized nations. In Europe, many employers have objected to "burdensome" employee protections in European labor law, such as layoff restrictions and severance pay requirements. In turn, major European car manufacturers such as BMW and Mercedes-Benz are beginning to erect plants in the United States, citing lower wages and weaker unions than the powerful German Metalworkers Federation.

35. See Denis MacShane, *Dreaming of the Forty-Hour Week*, 1989 NATION 658 (illustrating the excessive working hours faced by laborers in parts of Asia).
37. See OGLE, supra note 14, at 1-26 (explaining that the poor working conditions in South Korea evolved from a legacy of military rule throughout the early and middle 1900s, and left the Korean worker with a long, uphill struggle for better wages and conditions once their labor movement was established).
38. See Patrick Oster, *EC's Labor Proposals Are Causing Concern; Changes Would Raise Costs for U.S. Firms*, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 1991, at C4 (reporting that European business owners are wary that, if enacted, the new workplace rules proposed by the European Community (EC) Council will result in higher operating costs); see also Donald C. Dowling, Jr., *Worker Rights in the Post-1992 European Communities: What "Social Europe" Means to United States-Based Multinational Employers*, 11 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 564, 594-613 (1991) (outlining the twelve worker rights proposed by the EC Council in the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights); Roger Cohen, *European Fears of Unemployment Will Only Rise; Companies Shift Jobs to Escape High Pay*, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993, at A1 (hypothesizing that the recent increase in unemployment in Europe is due in large part to the changes in workplace rules, not as a result of the overall economic depression).
Additional labor problems exist in Europe. The Maastricht Treaty, which set forth an economic integration plan for Europe, has been jeopardized by Great Britain's refusal to accept the "Social Chapter" on labor rights and labor standards. Upsetting its continental partners, the UK is luring enterprises by promising low labor costs and tamed unions. The controversy promises to continue as the opposition Labor Party pledges to adopt the Social Chapter if empowered. Even Mickey Mouse cannot evade labor rights issues in trade: the new EuroDisney park near Paris ran into protests when Disney—a leader in the United States trade surplus in international services and entertainment—imposed its personal appearance code on employees who claimed that their fundamental rights were violated.

In addition to Europe, worker rights in the United States also are sharply debated in connection with trade and investment plans. Thousands of employees are illegally fired each year for union activity. In the United States, the right to strike, treated by most analysts as an integral feature of the right of association, has been weakened by the use of permanent replacements to break strikes. One case in particular,
when the Caterpillar Corporation broke a United Auto Workers strike in 1992 by threatening to bring in permanent replacements, has important implications for a key export industry. The resulting bitterness, in contrast to what had been an extensive program of labor-management cooperation, now jeopardizes Caterpillar's place as a premier exporter of heavy construction equipment in its competition with Japanese manufacturers.

Charges of sex, race, and national origin discrimination also mark labor relations in developed countries. The place of immigrant laborers from Southern Europe and Northern Africa has been sharply debated in France, Germany and other Northern European countries. The opening of borders in Eastern Europe has brought large-scale migration of workers seeking better-paying jobs in the West, and finding painful discrimination as well. Discrimination against Hispanic workers in the United States, both undocumented migrants and United States citizens, continues to undermine worker rights in this country.

As the globalization of economic activity proceeds apace and capital goods and services become increasingly mobile, workers and unions are pushing for expanded rights and protections on an international scale. In many cases, employers and governments are responding with demands for austerity and concessions. The ensuing conflicts complicate


46. See Kevin Kelly et al., Caterpillar's Don Fites: Why He Didn't Blink, BUS. WK., Aug. 10, 1992, at 56-57 (citing the UAW's animosity and its belief that it is engaged in a "long war").

47. Id.


50. See Don J. Pease, New Thinking in East-West Trade, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, April 20, 1989, at 18 (noting that recognition of economic rights of workers may be a harbinger of future international policy making).

51. See Ben Parfitt Vansun, Mill Closures Will Idle More Than 500 Staff, VANCOUVER SUN, Sept. 4, 1991, at D1 (stating that as a result of higher costs, a Canadi-
trade policy and development strategies, and challenge traditional patterns of sovereignty in establishing labor rights and labor standards within national borders.

Having established a framework focusing on the growing importance of labor rights in international trade, this Article now addresses two concrete cases of international labor rights advocacy. The cases show a variety of ways in which the issues arise and are dealt with by unions, employers, governments, and NGOs.

II. CASE STUDIES

This Article examines two current case studies to evaluate the effectiveness of private actors challenging traditional notions of sovereignty with respect to worker rights in the transnational economy. The first study looks at the role of trade unions and allied human rights organizations in the struggle over NAFTA. The second examines labor rights advocacy in the United States on behalf of workers and unions in Guatemala. Although the elements, strategies, and tactics of the non-governmental actors differ, they still share the same effect of raising labor rights and labor standards from a purely domestic to an international level.

A. PRIVATE ACTORS AND NAFTA

1. Contributions and Actions of Private Actors

The U.S. House of Representatives approved the North American Free Trade Agreement on November 17, 1993. The Senate gave its approval on November 20, 1993. The congressional voting culminated an arduous legislative battle marked by splits among Democratic Party leaders, and Republican and Democratic Party activists. In addition,

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an company is seeking concessions in areas of seniority and scheduling).


unusual pro- and anti-NAFTA coalitions formed, which resulted in Clinton Administration "trading" for pro-NAFTA votes. The NAFTA vote also exposed conflict between the Democratic Administration and two of its chief constituencies, the organized labor movement and an important faction of the environmental movement.

International labor rights and other social standards became pivotal issues in the debate over NAFTA. These issues became critical in part due to the breadth of the coalitions formed in the United States, Canada, and Mexico to oppose NAFTA, and in part due to the barbed treatment of the agreement by Ross Perot, who evoked "the great sucking sound" of jobs going South in televised presidential debates and in a

56. See David E. Rosenbaum, Splintered on Trade: 2 Unusual Political Alliances Reflect Long-Term Gain and Short-Term Fear, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1993, at B12 (noting "scrambled politics" surrounding the NAFTA debate in the United States).


58. See Peter T. Kilborn, Unions Gird for War Over Trade Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1993, at A14 (reporting that unions sought to turn NAFTA into a single issue debate over labor rights); Thomas K. Friedman, Adamant Unions Zero In on Clinton, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at B10 (discussing union leaders' grave concerns with NAFTA).


61. See generally INSTITUTE FOR POLICY STUDIES AND ALLIANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE TRADE, NAFTA RESOURCES (1993) (providing a substantial list of anti-NAFTA coalition participants and resources). The principal United States coalition with respect to labor, trade, and development concerns is the Alliance for Responsible Trade (ART), coordinated in Washington, D.C. by the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF). The Citizens Trade Campaign (CTC), also based in Washington, D.C., focuses on environmental and consumer affairs in connection with NAFTA. Canada's major coalition is the Action Canada Network, based in Ottawa; Mexico's major coalition is the National Action Network on Free Trade, based in Mexico City.
later debate with Vice President Al Gore. The alleged lack of adequate labor protections became a focal point of opposition to NAFTA, along with news of Mexican efforts to lure deliberately businesses from the United States, by revelations that claims of net gains in United States employment under NAFTA are exaggerated, by continuing evidence that Mexico's political and judicial systems are rife with corruption, and by reports that United States companies operating in Mexico are among the worst violators of labor rights.

United States NGOs have long been active on issues of labor rights and working conditions, particularly in the maquiladora factory zones along the United States-Mexico border. United States-based companies own hundreds of maquiladora plants and employ approximately half a million Mexican workers. Concerns about pollution, unsafe working

62. The '92 Vote: The 2nd Presidential Debate (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 15, 1992); The '92 Vote: The 3rd Presidential Debate (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 19, 1992); Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 9, 1993).

63. See Lane Kirkland, A Backward-Looking Deal: The Pact Is Full of Safeguards for Property Rights, but None for Workers' Rights, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1993, at A25 (criticizing NAFTA for failing to account for critical labor issues in the United States and Mexico).


65. See Keith Bradsher, Trade Pact Job Gains Discounted, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1993, at D1 (analyzing reports that claims of job gains for the United States under NAFTA do not hold up beyond 1995, and concluding that in the long term the United States will lose jobs).

66. See Enrique Rice et al., 'Trick or Trade?'; For Most Mexicans, This Treaty Only Props Up One-Party Rule, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1993, at C3 (arguing that reform in Mexico's civil liberties, political process, and labor rights are needed before approving the free trade agreement); Tim Golden, Mexican Leader Asks Executives To Give Party $25 Million Each, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1993, at A1 (stating that the contributions may have been improper and that such contributions are unregulated in Mexico); Tod Robberson, In Mexico, System Turns Cops Into Robbers, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 1993, at A1 (reporting that bribery and theft is a way of life for Mexico City police officers due to the corruption of their "bosses").

67. See Anthony DePalma, Report on Trade Treaty Is Critical of Companies, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1993, at D2 (discussing reports that "major American companies that are staunch supporters of the North American Free Trade Agreement [have] . . . consistently violated workers' rights").

68. See Larry Weiss, The Wealthy, Not Workers, Stand to Gain from Trade Pact, STAR TRIB., May 16, 1992, at 17A (noting that of the half-million Mexican workers employed by U.S. companies, seventy percent are women).
conditions, and poverty-level wages have motivated the AFL-CIO and a coalition of religious and environmental groups to issue a code of conduct for United States companies in the *maquiladora* region.\(^{69}\)

The *MAQUILADORA STANDARDS OF CONDUCT* (Code) seeks to promote a safe environment, safe workplaces, and an adequate standard of living for workers.\(^{70}\) The Code addresses hazardous waste disposal, chemical leaks, and transportation of toxic materials. The Code further requires disclosure to workers and communities on the use and risks of chemicals and other hazardous materials; suggests mandatory workplace safety and health committees with training for worker members; seeks to protect the right to organize and ban discrimination, including sexual harassment; and calls for fair wages, hours, and working conditions.\(^{71}\) The Code also would abolish barracks-style living quarters for workers, and establish a trust fund to improve housing, health care, sanitary services, and other infrastructure.\(^{72}\)

In addition to NGOs, some organizations, such as the United Electrical Workers (UE), the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers (ACTWU), and other trade unions active in organizing among Mexican-American workers in Southern California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas have created joint movements with independent Mexican unionists to support organizing in the *maquiladora* factories.\(^{73}\) Women's organizations and environmental groups have forged similar movements.\(^{74}\)

Researchers in the legal field contributed analyses of labor laws and how they would affect the new trade agreement,\(^{75}\) including a detailed


\(^{70}. \) Id.

\(^{71}. \) Id. at 3-5.

\(^{72}. \) Id. at 5.

\(^{73}. \) See, e.g., UNITED ELECTRICAL WORKERS, RADIO AND MACHINE WORKERS OF AMERICA AND FREnte AUTENTICO DEL TRABAJO STRATEGIC ORGANIZATIONAL ALLIANCE, STATEMENT OF JOINT WORK (1991) (stating their intention to collaborate in organizing unions in *maquiladora* zone electronics plants).

\(^{74}. \) See EQUAL MEANS, WHY IS FREE TRADE A WOMEN'S ISSUE? (1991) (noting the strides made by women in this movement); NATIONAL TOXIC CAMPAIGN FUND, BORDER TROUBLE: RIVERS IN PERIL (1991) (illustrating the environmental groups positions and actions); see generally TEXAS CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES, NAFTA AND THE UNITED STATES/MEXICO BORDER ENVIRONMENT: OPTIONS FOR CONGRESSIONAL ACTION (1992) (listing the organizations involved in creating the NAFTA document).

\(^{75}. \) See, e.g., Ann M. Bartow, Comment, *The Rights of Workers in Mexico* 11
study of women workers in the *maquiladora*.\(^76\) Private sector activism on NAFTA culminated in a comprehensive Citizens’ Analysis of NAFTA, released in December 1992.\(^77\) At the same time, the Mexican Action Network published "Our Evaluation on the Formal Negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement," and the Canadian Center for Policy Alternatives issued its "Which Way for the Americas: Analysis of NAFTA Proposals and the Impact on Canada."\(^78\)

\(^76\) See Frances Lee Ansley, *U.S. Mexico Trade from the Bottom: A Postcard from the Border*, 1 Tex. J. Women & L. 193 (1992) (describing the reaction of American women factory workers, who had lost their jobs when their factories relocated to the *maquiladora* region, at their meeting with the Mexican women who worked in the new Mexican factory zone). A University of Tennessee professor organized a delegation of women who lost their jobs to the *maquiladora* region to tour the Mexican factory zone and meet with the women workers there. *Id.* In addition to the written report, the nationwide public television program *NOVA* aired footage showing working conditions in the *maquiladora* and their effect on United States and Mexican women workers. Frances Lee Ansley, *North American Free Trade Agreement: The Public Debate*, 22 Ga. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 329, 332 n.8 (1993) (noting filming of visits with women workers in the border region, aired by Public Broadcasting System on May 26 and 27, 1992).

\(^77\) See John Audley et al., *U.S. Citizens’ Analysis of the North American Free Trade Agreement* (1992) [hereinafter Citizens’ Analysis] (addressing labor rights, working conditions, employment and income, environment, agriculture, energy, economic development, consumer affairs, health and safety, dispute resolution and enforcement, human rights and democracy, and other NAFTA-related issues). Representatives of the following organizations coordinated the NAFTA analysis: the Sierra Club, United Auto Workers, Fair Trade Campaign, Institute for Policy Studies, National Lawyers Guild, Greenpeace USA, The Development Group for Alternative Policies, International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, Economic Policy Institute, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, and Public Citizen, and contained contributing materials from dozens of other citizens groups. *Id.*

\(^78\) See *supra* note 61 (describing NAFTA-related coalitions).
2. The Labor Agreement

During his successful campaign for the presidency, then-Governor Bill Clinton insisted that final approval of the NAFTA depended on further negotiation of a parallel agreement with Canada and Mexico on labor rights and labor standards. Labor advocates opposed the side agreement that emerged, especially for its failure to include rights of association, organizing, and bargaining in the scope of independent review and enforcement mechanisms in the side agreement.

The NAFTA labor side agreement simultaneously preserves and breaches traditional sovereignty in labor matters. The side agreement affirms "the right of each Party [the United States, Canada, and Mexico] to establish its own domestic labor standards, and to adopt or modify accordingly its labor laws and regulations."

At the same time, the labor side agreement subjects eight areas of labor standards to the tripartite oversight system set up in the agreement. In addition, three of the eight areas come under the dispute settlement and enforcement provision of the side agreement that could result in fines of up to $20 million or a suspension of NAFTA trade benefits against a country that has a "persistent pattern of failure . . . to effectively enforce its occupational safety and health, child labor or minimum wage technical labor standards."

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82. The eight areas are: 1) forced labor; 2) child labor; 3) minimum wage and overtime pay; 4) employment discrimination; 5) equal pay for men and women; 6) occupational safety and health; 7) workers’ compensation; and 8) protection of migrant workers. See id. art. 41 (defining "technical labor standards"). Section B, art. 23 of the Labor Side Agreement subjects "technical labor standards" to reporting by an Evaluation Committee of Experts. Id. section B, art. 23.

83. Id. art. 39(4)(b) and Annex 39.

84. Id. art. 41.

85. Id. art. 29(1).
The NAFTA labor side agreement fails to establish international standards that can be enforced under the agreement; to that extent, sovereignty in setting domestic labor standards is maintained. The agreement does permit, however, international oversight, and a measure of enforcement, over each country's administration of its own labor laws. This "half a loaf" disappoints advocates of binding international labor standards, but sets the stage for continuing efforts to establish labor standards in international trade both in future changes in NAFTA, and in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Future debates over NAFTA will continue to address such questions. Should countries limit themselves to a uniform set of minimum labor standards to be enforced separately by each government, or to a supranational enforcement regime like that envisioned for the trade rules under NAFTA? Will a lowest-common-denominator of the three country's labor laws serve as the basis for continental standards, or will the labor rights clauses of United Nations human rights instruments and human rights conventions of the ILO serve as the starting point, as recommended by labor rights advocates? How will the disparity in levels of development between two advanced industrial powers and a Third World country be reconciled in matters of child labor or minimum wage requirements? What standing will private parties — individual workers, trade unions, human rights organizations, and other private advocates — have to invoke labor rights protection under a NAFTA labor rights agreement?

86. See Levinson, supra note 80.
87. See Steve Charnovitz, Environmental and Labour Standards in Trade, 15 World Economy 335-56 (1992) (discussing efforts to include labor and environmental standards in the GATT).
88. See Barr, supra note 75, at 47-49 (analyzing the structure of the European Community institutions as a possible model for enforcing policy options of NAFTA); see also Citizens' Analysis, supra note 77, at 46-50 (discussing NAFTA dispute resolution provisions that alarm labor and environmental groups).
89. See Citizens' Analysis, supra note 77, at 27-28 (showing how United Nations standards have obtained sufficient consensus to be adopted as standards to be included in NAFTA); Lance Compa, International Labor Standards and Instruments of Recourse for Working Women, 17 Yale J. Int'l L. 151 (1992) (noting that the specialized United Nations body called the International Labour Organisation is the primary forum for presenting international labor rights claims).
90. See Rothstein, supra note 33, at 1 (discussing the issue of standardized wages internationally).
91. See Terry Collingsworth, American Labor Policy and the International Economy: Clarifying Policies and Interests, 31 B.C. L. Rev. 31 (1981) (noting the lack of
or permitted to stand undisturbed in the federal system of each coun-
try.\footnote{See \textit{Citizens' Analysis}, supra note 77, at 51 (discussing how federal pre-
emption of state law becomes problematic in the application of international}
agreement; \textit{see generally} John Jackson, \textit{Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems:}
systems must take international institutions and treaty-making processes into account in
order to preserve the validity of legal domestic application in addition to incorporating
international legal norms).

Whatever the answers to these and other issues involving labor rights
and labor standards in North America, they pose direct challenges to
traditional principles of sovereignty in domestic economic and develop-
ment policies.\footnote{See Theresa A. Amato, \textit{Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade}
Legislation and the International Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 79 (1990) (discuss-
ing the goal of human rights advocates to create viable international mechanisms for
the protection of labor rights).} Taken as a whole, action by private labor rights adva-
cates has opened up opportunities for new roles and new influence by
workers and trade unions in the transnational economy of North Ameri-
ca.\footnote{See \textit{id.} at 80 (noting that both governmental and NGOs are seeking to ad-
vance human rights via policy decisions); \textit{but see id.} at 109 (discussing how a private
party may be ineffective in gathering information due to possible inaccessibility to a
particular country).}

\section*{B. United States and Guatemalan Labor Rights Advocacy}

Over the past four decades, suppression of organized labor has been a
consistent feature of both open military rule and military-controlled
civilian governments in Guatemala.\footnote{See \textit{James A. Goldston, Shattered Hope: Guatemalan Workers and}
\textit{The Promise of Democracy} 5-9 (1989) (discussing the history of the repression of
labor unions in Guatemala).} In the late 1980s and early 1990s, how-
ever, United States labor rights advocates targeted Guatemala's re-
cord through a systematic movement to expose worker rights violations
and created new models for labor rights advocacy.\footnote{See \textit{International Commission for Central American Development and Recov-
er}, \textit{Poverty, Conflict and Hope: A Turning Point in Central America}, Feb.
15, 1989 (press conference) \textit{available in LEXIS}, Nexis Library, Omni File (discussing
how Commission members met with government officials and were able to create
town meetings in certain countries, bringing together representatives of the government, private sector, labor, and church).} As with labor
rights issues in NAFTA, these efforts initially seemed fruitless, if not

\begin{itemize}
\item regulatory protections for workers in developing countries).
\end{itemize}
futile. Their innovative use of different forums in the United States for raising international labor rights claims on behalf of Guatemalans exploited the fissures in traditional doctrines of absolute sovereignty in labor relations matters, fissures that appeared under the pressure of global economic integration. 97

1. Background

A decade of blossoming for Guatemalan trade unions and popular organizations in the decade following the Second World War ended with a military takeover in 1954 sponsored by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that eliminated the elected government. 98 Prior to the coup, one-fourth of the Guatemalan workforce belonged to the unions. 99 The majority of these workers were in stable, regular employment settings with minimum wage and social insurance legislation designed to protect employees. 100 For the past four decades, however, the military rule and military-controlled civilian governments in Guatemala have consistently suppressed organized labor. 101 Enforcement of protective legislation languished as the wealthy land- and business-owning class, backed by the military, reasserted control over the country, its resources, and its workers. 102


99. See Handy, supra note 98, at 124-25 (explaining the increase in tolerance and numbers of unions prior to the coup of 1954); Goldston, supra note 95, at 7 (noting that 536 unions were registered with the Guatemalan Government at the time of the coup in 1954).

100. Goldston, supra note 95, at 6.

101. See Handy, supra note 98, at 5-9 (discussing Guatemala's repression of labor unions).

102. See Goldston, supra note 95, at 147-54 (discussing the failure of labor law
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a brutal military campaign against a small guerilla movement resulted in massive human rights violations that were predominantly targeted against the indigenous peoples of the highlands. Estimates of the persons killed by the army or "disappearances" exceeded 100,000. In 1980, the police kidnapped seventeen members of the executive board of the national trade union federation who were never seen again. Dozens of individual union leaders were assassinated, and many went into exile due to death threats.

International concern and revulsion towards these practices in Guatemala led to the inauguration of a nominally civilian government in 1986. With the advent of the Christian Democratic government of Vinicio Cerezo came a new constitution that guaranteed the rights of workers to organize and bargain. Guatemalan labor activists responded by increasing activity, forming new unions, and seeking to bargain with employers. But physical assaults, threats, relaxed enforcement of labor laws, a hostile judiciary, and continued employer resistance to unions frustrated and wore down many labor activists. Trade unionists continue to face accusations of links to the guerilla movement as businesses employ tactics to frighten unionists and their co-workers to abandon union organizing.

enforcement to protect "a substantially illiterate working population, scarred by years of organized terror").

103. See AMERICAS WATCH, GUATEMALA: A NATION OF PRISONERS 104 (1984) (documenting the history and recent resurgence of human rights abuses in Guatemala with emphasis on the developments following the coup of August 1983, when General Mejia Victores seized power).

104. See id. at 16 (tabulating massive numbers of flagrant killings and disappearances); see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA: INVESTIGATIONS INTO DISAPPEARANCES: THE INVESTIGATORY COMMISSION (1987) (reporting on Guatemalan disappearances); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA TRADE UNIONISTS AND POLITICAL ACTIVISTS TARGETED UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENT (1991) (addressing trade unionists as targets in Guatemala); and AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, GUATEMALA IMPUNITY: A QUESTION OF POLITICAL WILL (1993) [hereinafter GUATEMALA IMPUNITY] (documenting the continued of human rights abuses of workers and other civilians).

105. GUATEMALA IMPUNITY, supra note 104.

106. GUATEMALA IMPUNITY, supra note 104.

107. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 11 (noting that the civilian government instituted in 1986 tolerates dissent).

108. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 11 (discussing how the Christian Democratic Government is credited by most union leaders as easing constraints on unionizing).

109. Goldston, supra note 95, at 11.

110. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 11 (noting that union participants continue to be persecuted, albeit to a lesser extent).

111. See GOLDSTON, supra, note 95, at 12 (discussing how many businesses in
In the 1990 elections, conservative businessman Jorge Serrano ousted the Christian Democratic administration and rose to the presidency in January 1991. Serrano campaigned on promises of economic development, especially in the maquila sector of factories that exported apparel and electronics goods, predominantly to the United States. A program that began in the mid-1980s with just six factories employing fewer than 2,000 workers grew to more than 275 factories and 50,000 employees by 1992. Fierce employer opposition to union organizing, massive minimum wage and hour law violations, hazardous working conditions, and use of child labor characterized the industrial relations in this sector.

2. Using the Labor Rights Clause of the GSP

United States labor rights advocates employed the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) as a means of addressing worker rights violations in Guatemala. A 1986-87 General Review conducted by the United States Trade Representative yielded no actionable basis in Guatemala. The International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund and allied United States union, church, and human rights groups filed petitions every year to the United States Trade Representative calling for Guatemala’s removal as a GSP beneficiary country unless it consistently respected labor rights.

In connection with each petition, the United States coalition sent a...
delegation to meet with workers, union leaders, church leaders, United States embassy officers, and Guatemalan government officials (including, in 1988, then-President Vinicio Cerezo).

United States delegations met with factory owners and plantation managers, with officials of the Guatemalan Chamber of Commerce, and with the heads of the maquila sector promotional group. The labor rights delegation gathered information for its petition, and pressed for improved protection of worker rights. Similarly, invited by their United States counterparts, Guatemalan unionists sent delegations to the United States to meet with labor, church, human rights, community organizations, as well as United States Government officials to discuss labor rights and labor conditions in their country.

Although the first four GSP petitions filed by United States labor rights advocates from 1988 to 1991 carefully detailed assassinations, arrests and torture of trade union activists, repressive provisions of the Guatemalan Labor Code, and non-enforcement of worker protection laws, the interagency committee that considers GSP worker rights petitions failed to accept the petitions for review. Despite this failure, the cycle of delegations, petitions, and rejections created a dynamic of increasing pressure on the Guatemalan government and employers to avert trade sanctions for worker rights violations. Allowing the Guatemalan

119. See Labor Groups Say They Will Ask USTR to Deny GSP Benefits to Guatemala, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (May 20, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (discussing the actions of labor groups following a week-long visit to Guatemala).


121. See Guatemala Charges, supra note 120, at 30 (discussing the actions of such United States labor groups as the AFL-CIO and the International Ladies Garment Workers Union, who pressed for United States and Guatemalan Government involvement to correct current problems).

122. Guatemala Charges, supra note 120, at 30.

123. See O'Kane, supra note 120, at A8 (emphasizing the importance of GSP trade benefits to Guatemala).
Government to recognize such pressure allowed the Government to claim that it was “taking steps” under the GSP to afford labor rights without making substantive changes.  

The exchange of petitions and rejections in 1988 to 1991 also created embarrassment for the United States Government, which found itself having to devise increasingly contorted arguments to justify a refusal to accept these petitions for review.  

Year after year, the Trade Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) pointed to the introduction of a labor code reform bill in the Guatemalan Congress as evidence of “steps” toward worker rights enhancement, despite the fact that each year the reform bill failed to pass and all parties acknowledged that it had no chance to pass.  

In 1992, the persistent efforts of United States labor rights advocates who pursued the GSP strategy proved fruitful.  

Following the submission of a new labor rights petition in June 1992, the Labor Rights Fund and related union, church, and human rights groups organized letter-writing campaigns among their grass roots members to the USTR urging acceptance of the petition for further review in public hearings.  

At the urging of petitioners, over one hundred members of the United

124. See O’Kane, supra note 120, at A8 (noting how, in one Guatemalan analyst’s opinion, meetings and negotiations that are beginning to take place between the Chamber of Commerce, political parties and the popular movement in Guatemala are only for the sake of appearances); see also PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 181 (discussing the requirement under the GSP that a country be “taking steps” toward worker rights to maintain beneficial tariff treatment).  

125. See GOLDSTON, supra note 95, at 157 (discussing how the decision to reject the petitions violated the spirit of the law by not allowing information to flow to the U.S. Trade Representative as Congress intended). Furthermore, the refusal to review the petition allowed for GSP trade benefits to remain intact in the face of violations of labor rights, which clearly violated the statute. Id.  

126. See, e.g., 1990 GSP Annual Review: Workers’ Rights Review Summary; Petitions Not Accepted for Review (USTR 1990) (asserting that “the Government of Guatemala is actively pushing the passage of the code”).  


128. See Letter from Stephen Coats, Executive Director, U.S./Guatemala Labor Education Project, to Mickey Kantor, USTR (Mar. 26, 1993) [hereinafter Letter to USTR] (on file with the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund) (urging the USTR to extend the review by six months in order to assess adequately whether the GSP benefits for Guatemala should be suspended based upon evidence that efforts to improve labor rights have been demonstrative and not substantive).
States Congress responded by writing to the USTR calling for acceptance and review.\textsuperscript{129}

Like its predecessors, the 1992 GSP labor rights petition cited continued attacks and threats against trade unionists, labor code provisions that run afoul of International Labour Organisation Conventions, non-enforcement of minimum wage and hour laws, widespread child labor abuses, and life-threatening health and safety hazards.\textsuperscript{130} Much of the petition focused on conditions in the burgeoning \textit{maquila} sector, with special attention given to the large number of Korean-owned apparel manufacturing factories.\textsuperscript{131} Evidence assembled by petitioners reflected massive minimum wage violations, use of child labor, health and safety hazards, and illegal crushing of efforts by workers to form unions.\textsuperscript{132}

The GSP petition created an uproar in Guatemala, shattering expectations that it would be treated, as in previous years, by being sloughed off with a few minor "steps" toward labor rights. Employers, government spokespersons, and the press complained of United States interference in the sovereign affairs of Guatemala, and warned of dire economic consequences if the United States sought to apply labor rights sanctions.\textsuperscript{133} Guatemalan union leaders who had cooperated with United

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129. See Letter from Members of Congress to Ambassador Carla Hills (July 30, 1992) (on file with the ILRERF, Washington, D.C.) (requesting the USTR to review the petition on labor rights in Guatemala).

130. See \textit{GSP Petitions}, supra note 111 (noting that the 1992 petition was filed by the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund (ILRERF), the United States/Guatemala Labor Education Project (U.S./GLEP), the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America (UE), the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union (ACTWU), the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU), the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), the International Union of Food and Allied Workers' Associations (IUE), the International Union of Electronics Workers (IUE), the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and the National Council of Churches of Christ in the U.S.A., Human Rights Office).

131. See \textit{PETERSEN}, supra note 112, at 137 (noting that fifty of the largest \textit{maquila} sector factories are owned by Korean investors). Promoters of export-led development in Guatemala held out the Korean "economic miracle" of the 1970s and 1980s as a model for Guatemala. \textit{Id.}


133. See \textit{Boicot al Gobierno o a los Guatemaltecos? [Boycotting the Government or the Guatemalans?] EL GRAFICO} (Guatemala City), June 16, 1992, at 8 (stating that "Eso es lo absurdo de los norteamericanos cuando meten sus narices en los asuntos internos de otros pueblos . . . . Si hay un pueblo que ha sido a lo largo de su historia violador de los derechos humanos, ha sido los Estados Unidos.") [This is the
States labor rights delegations and had come to Washington to testify at the GSP hearing received renewed death threats.\textsuperscript{134}

Despite such fulminations, Guatemala was anxious to avoid sanctions. The government and employers moved quickly, settling a number of longstanding labor disputes and amending the labor code with provisions sought over time by trade unions.\textsuperscript{135} Included in the reform was a simplification of union organization and strengthening of enforcement measure for violators.\textsuperscript{136}

There were three possible results from the petition/hearing process under the GSP labor rights clause. The first view determined that Guatemala was "taking steps" to afford internationally recognized worker rights, and thus would be entitled to remain in the GSP program.\textsuperscript{137} In contrast, if Guatemala were not taking steps, it would be removed from GSP beneficiary status.\textsuperscript{138} Lastly, Guatemala could be "pended," or placed on "continuing review" status.\textsuperscript{139} In this last scenario, Guatemala would remain in the GSP program, but the United States would closely monitor it to ensure that Guatemala makes improvements in labor rights and working conditions.\textsuperscript{140} If Guatemala failed to make such improvements, the United States would apply sanctions.\textsuperscript{141}

Although there was progress in specific labor disputes, unions whose applications for legal recognition had been delayed for months were finding themselves quickly certified and permitted to function. Some absurdity of the Americans, who stick their noses into the internal affairs of other countries . . . . If there is one country that has been throughout its history a violator of human rights, it has been the United States].

\textsuperscript{134} See Jared Kotler, \textit{Keep the Economic Heat on Guatemala's Leaders}, MIAMI HERALD (int'l ed.), June 7, 1993 at 11A (claiming threats against union leaders).

\textsuperscript{135} See United States Department of State, Cable from United States Embassy in Guatemala, Labor Code Amendments: Review and Analysis (Dec. 22, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with ILRERF) (Listing changes in the labor code).

\textsuperscript{136} See \textit{id.} (stating that reforms have clarified the union organization process and increased penalties for violators); see also \textit{Guatemala: Labor Code Meets First Test}, BULL. DEPT. INT'L AFF., AFL-CIO, Feb. 1993, at 5 (reporting a case which tested positively the effectiveness of the stronger enforcement of the new labor code).

\textsuperscript{137} See \textit{Kantor Underscores Workers Rights in announcing 1992 GSP Results}, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) (June 28, 1993), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File (discussing requirements of GSP status).

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{139} See Nicholas Petche, \textit{Guatemala City}, UPI, Mar. 28, 1993, § Domestic News (discussing review options for the U.S. Government under the GSP).

\textsuperscript{140} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{141} \textit{Id.}
difficult collective bargaining conflicts were settled with reasonable compromises and finally, labor code reforms were enacted.\textsuperscript{142} Insisting on strict, immediate application of the trade sanctions against Guatemala posed a danger to the lives of those trade unionists closely allied with United States petitioners.\textsuperscript{143} In March 1993, petitioners and Guatemalan unionists jointly called for a six month "continuing review" in the forthcoming announcement by USTR of the decision on Guatemala,\textsuperscript{144} dated April 1, 1993. For unrelated reasons, the USTR delayed the announcement of the GSP labor rights decisions. This delay, coupled with the subsequent dramatic turn of events in Guatemala, made the GSP labor rights petition a pivotal issue affecting the fate of constitutional order in Guatemala.\textsuperscript{145}

On May 25, 1993, President Jorge Serrano dissolved the Guatemalan Congress and Supreme Court and suspended constitutional rights.\textsuperscript{146} He made charges of corruption in Congress and warned against "destabilizing" demonstration activity by trade unionists and popular organizations.\textsuperscript{147} The Guatemalan military initially announced support for the \textit{auto-golpe} (self-coup) and Serrano.\textsuperscript{148} Union leaders, farmworkers, and community activists took extraordinary security measures, fearing a return to mass arrests or worse atrocities.\textsuperscript{149}

The Serrano self-coup only lasted one week, as domestic and interna-
tional outcry forced him to abdicate. On June 1, 1993, his vice president, Gustavo Espina Salguero, announced his intent to assume the presidency, again with the support of the military, but Espina lasted no more than five days. On June 5, 1993, the reconvened Guatemalan Congress elected Ramiro Deleon Carpio, an independent human rights special counsel and leading Guatemalan human rights advocate, as the new president.

While the timing may have been coincidental, the pending decision on Guatemala's GSP status proved to be a decisive policy tool for the United States in influencing the restoration of constitutional rule and the surprising accession of a promising human rights leader to the presidency. At news of the coup, the United States labor rights petitioners immediately met with USTR and State Department officials and demanded a removal of Guatemala's GSP benefits unless it restored constitutional rule. In response, the State Department issued a statement that "unless democracy is restored in Guatemala, GSP benefits are likely to be withdrawn."

Early press commentary cited the leverage in the GSP decision:

But perhaps more damaging to the local economy and Mr. Serrano's cause could be the call by U.S. labor rights groups to revoke Guatemalan industry's tariff-free access to the United States market for certain products . . . . Guatemala's labor practices are already under review by the United States Trade Representative's office . . . . Given Serrano's suspension of the right of public protest and strikes, analysts expect U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor to consider terminating Guatemala's trade benefits.

152. Id.
156. David Scott Clark, Guatemalans and the U.S. Put Pressure on President to Restore Democracy: Labor, Political and Religious Groups Mount Protests as U.S.
The *New York Times* also noted the impending labor rights sanctions as critical to Serrano's fate, reporting that on the day before his abdication, "businessmen have panicked at a threat by the United States to withdraw Guatemala's trade benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences." A controlling factor lending to Serrano's downfall was the concern of Guatemala's business leaders that rising exports to the United States and Europe could be devastated if the United States imposed the threatened sanctions. Within hours of the United States' threat to cut Guatemala's trade benefits, business leaders who had previously supported authoritarian rule began pressing government and military officials to reverse Mr. Serrano's action.

Continual pressure quickly ended the Espina presidency bid, facilitated a clean break with military-dominated governance of Guatemala's ruling elite, and resulted in the inauguration of Deleon Carpio as President on June 6, 1993. On June 25, United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor announced that Guatemala would remain a GSP beneficiary country at least during a six month "continuing review" period: "If countries fail to make substantial concrete progress in addressing worker rights concerns during this time, their GSP benefits will be in serious jeopardy."

In addition to the labor rights issue, the conclusion of Guatemala's Ambassador to the United States who opposed the coup is similarly important: "The true heroes of the drama are the Guatemalan people, who simply would not permit the trashing of their constitution — a constitution owed to thousands and thousands massacred, kidnapped, tortured and disappeared . . . . Their response to the coup was a virtual revolution." The GSP labor rights petition, however, was still a for-

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tuous policy instrument available at just the right time to have a pronounced effect on events in Guatemala. This effect demonstrated the potential power of international labor rights advocacy in a world marked by the intertwining of national and regional economies with continuing struggle for democracy and social justice.

3. Litigating Guatemala Labor Rights in United States Courts

As disputes over Guatemala’s GSP status continued, United States labor rights advocates turned to a new strategy to help end one of the longest and most bitter labor disputes in Guatemala: using United States courts as a forum for asserting international labor claims.

The dispute arose when a United States owner of Internacional de Exportaciones ("Inexport", an apparel factory) fired the union leadership committee and more than one hundred union supporters after they formed a union in 1989 and demanded bargaining. The owner claimed the unionists were communists and guerilla sympathizers and hired armed guards to patrol the factory floor and frighten other workers into submission. The guards also assaulted fired workers who staged a protest at the factory gate.

The Inexport owner’s actions violated both international labor norms and the Guatemalan labor code. In proceedings before the


163. Id.

164. See Memorandum from Kurt Petersen and Paul Sonn to Michael Ratner et al. (Dec. 11, 1991) (on file with ILRERF) (discussing Inexport case and possible jurisdictions).

165. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129. The factory was one of the largest garment making facilities in Guatemala, with over five hundred workers. Id. at 48. Established in the 1970s, the factory was later converted to maquila status under the special maquila incentive laws passed in 1984 to enhance export-led development in Guatemala. Id.

166. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129.

167. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129.

168. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 128-35.

169. See ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1919-1991 (1992) (including Convention No. 87 regarding freedom of association, and Convention No. 98 regarding the right to organize collectively). Guatemala had ratified ILO Conventions guaranteeing the right of association and to bargain collectively. Id.

170. PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129-30 (stating that Guatemalan courts repeat-
Labor Court of Guatemala, the workers won judicial orders for reinstatement and back pay. On appeal, the Labor Court upheld these orders.\textsuperscript{171}

The company owners, however, never complied with the court orders, and the courts never took steps to enforce their orders.\textsuperscript{172} Three years after the firings, the workers still remained unemployed.\textsuperscript{173} United States labor rights supporters first cited the Inexport case in GSP petitions, but the TPSC argued that the case had not yet been adjudicated.\textsuperscript{174}

Labor rights advocates, therefore, attempted to “bring the litigation home” to courts in the United States.\textsuperscript{175} Lawyers and law students from the International Labor Rights Education and Research Fund, the U.S.-Guatemala Labor Education Project, the Center for Constitutional Rights and the Lowenstein Human Rights Project at Yale Law School, with \textit{pro bono} assistance from two Washington, D.C. law firms and attorneys in Miami, Florida, devised a plan to sue the United States owner of the Guatemalan factory on behalf of the fired workers.\textsuperscript{175}

The United States “Inexport Team” traced the owner’s sales and distribution operations to find possible United States judicial forums which had jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{177} They discovered that the company’s distribution headquarters were based in Miami, Florida, and had substantial funds in Florida banks.\textsuperscript{178} They also learned that Inexport’s largest customers were in New York City, the site of accounts payable to the Miami sales office.

While the strategists examined the potential claims under international labor rights norms, they decided instead to adopt a more prosaic cause of action that arose often in the international business context: to enforce the judgment of the Guatemalan courts under established principles.

\textsuperscript{171} PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129.
\textsuperscript{172} PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 129.
\textsuperscript{173} PETERSEN, supra note 112, at 130.
\textsuperscript{174} See USTR, GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Worker Rights Review Summary: Petitions Not Accepted For Review (Guatemala, 1990 & 1991) (on file with USTR and ILRERF) (indicating that the GSP subcommittee would not consider the Inexport case as long as it was still being adjudicated in the Guatemalan courts).
\textsuperscript{175} Memorandum from Paul Sonn and Kurt Petersen to Michal Ratner et al., Inexport Team (Dec. 22, 1991) (on file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.).
\textsuperscript{176} Id.
\textsuperscript{177} Id.
\textsuperscript{178} Id.
of comity rather than a vague claim that still-evolving international labor rights norms were violated.\textsuperscript{179} Although a United States court could not enforce a reinstatement order, it could satisfy the judgment of the Guatemalan courts by ordering back pay for the workers from the company assets in the United States.\textsuperscript{180}

In early 1992, the Inexport Team chose to pursue this route, and drafted pleadings for submission to a Florida state court that targeted the assets of the distribution company.\textsuperscript{181} Team attorneys also prepared pleadings to submit to a New York state court that would seek to garnish accounts payable to Inexport by New York customers of the company.\textsuperscript{182} Additionally, a delegation from the legal team visited Guatemala in March 1992, to secure certified judgment papers from the Guatemalan courts, to work with the union there to identify and consult with named plaintiffs in the case, and to take affidavits from fired workers.\textsuperscript{183}

In April 1992, the Guatemalan Ministry of Labor convened new, tripartite negotiations among the ministry, Inexport’s owner, and the union in an effort to resolve the dispute.\textsuperscript{184} The labor rights legal team delayed filing the lawsuit to await the results of these negotiations.\textsuperscript{185} In July, the parties reached a settlement. The fired workers were reinstated, a schedule of back pay payments over a seventeen-month period was implemented, and the union was recognized as the bargaining agent for employees.\textsuperscript{186}

CONCLUSION

These case studies of strategies and tactics developed by labor rights advocates in the United States in connection with NAFTA, and in support of workers and trade unions in Guatemala, amount to a preliminary survey of the field.

\textsuperscript{179} Id.
\textsuperscript{180} Id.
\textsuperscript{182} Id.
\textsuperscript{183} Memorandum from Paul Sonn and Kurt Petersen to the Inexport Team (undated) (on file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.).
\textsuperscript{184} Memorandum from Kurt Petersen to the Inexport Team (July 27, 1992) (on file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.).
\textsuperscript{185} Id.
\textsuperscript{186} Memorandum from Lance Compa to the Inexport Team (Sept. 1, 1992) (on file with ILRERF in Washington, D.C.).
These accounts of actions by United States labor rights advocates on behalf of workers and unions in the transnational economy, however, are not intended to overstate their results. First, although the Clinton Administration did sign the labor agreement, critics contend that the NAFTA text as it stands contains serious flaws: a secretive dispute resolution process that shuts out labor, environmental, and human rights voices; imbalances in tariff reduction schedules that will accelerate United States and Canadian job losses; clauses that override efforts by state and local governments to protect their citizens, and inadequate “side agreements” on labor rights and labor standards.

Similarly, notwithstanding a series of concrete victories in Guatemalan labor disputes, the military and the land- and business-owning elite continue to dominate Guatemala. Similarly, fewer than six out of the three hundred maquila factories in the export processing sector recognize unions. United States and Guatemalan labor rights supporters, therefore, must continue to assist workers against what remains a constant, defensive struggle against great odds.

The importance of these case studies lies in their evocation of the possibilities for expanded labor rights advocacy in international trade. The growing volume of labor rights controversies outlined in Part I, and the growing number of arenas surveyed in Part II where labor rights claims can be asserted and adjudicated in some form, with varying degrees of effective enforcement, suggest how workers, unions, human rights proponents, and other private labor advocates can become potent actors in the transnational economy. The NAFTA and Guatemala labor rights case studies show how at least some of these arenas can be used to advance workers rights: labor standards in bilateral or multilateral trade agreements; use of labor rights clauses in United States trade statutes; creative litigation strategies; invocation of ILO Conventions and other international norms.

A strong, enforceable regime of international labor rights ensures, or

189. See LEVINSON, supra note 80 (discussing the shortcomings of the labor side agreement).
190. Interview with Stephen Coats, Executive Director, United States/Guatemala Labor Education Project (Mar. 20, 1993).
at least tends to ensure, that competitive advantage derives from genuine, natural trade flows without being accelerated by exploitation. With ample space for associating and organizing free of repression, workers can protect their interests through collective bargaining with multinational employers and by pressing their own governments through a democratic political process for fair labor standards under domestic law. Aggressive international labor rights advocacy can force governments and employers to take account finally for the interests, passions, and rights of workers and their unions in making policy and investment choices in the transnational economy.