Colonels and Industrial Workers in El Salvador, 1944-1972: Seeking Societal Support through Gendered Labor Reforms

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Abstract

[Excerpt] How do military regimes seek support or legitimacy from society? What strategies, besides violent repression, do military leaders use to remain in power? In other words, how do military leaders try to achieve hegemony? El Salvador's long period of military rule (1931-1979) gives researchers ample opportunity to investigate the mechanisms whereby military regimes try to gain societal support. Erik Ching’s chapter shows that General Martinez’s regime sought support through locally based patron-client relationships. Some analysts of El Salvador’s subsequent military regimes find that these regimes pursued a political alliance with urban industrial workers in order to gain support. Nevertheless, the alliance between the state and urban industrial workers during the 1950s and 1960s remains overgeneralized in the literature. Even those who specify Salvadoran governmental policy during this period as “repression with reforms” do not fully elaborate the mechanisms whereby military leaders formed an alliance with urban industrial workers. Moreover, research on these later military regimes has not explored the role that gendered labor reforms played in solidifying the alliance. As a result of this oversight, researchers may have underestimated the reformist tendency of Salvadoran military regimes from 1944 to 1972. Drawing on newspaper accounts and government publications, we show that adopting labor legislation designed to protect women workers was an element of a broader government strategy to ally with urban industrial workers.

Examining how military regimes seek societal support is important because each strategy to secure regime legitimacy may have different social implications. For example, gendered labor legislation can have important social implications for industrial women workers. Research on other countries suggests that labor laws giving women special protections tend to make employers less willing to hire them and that special legal protections for women workers can depress women's participation in the industrial labor force. Therefore, by illuminating the gendered nature of the reforms pursued by the Salvadoran military regimes, we hope to contribute to future research on the potential relationship between labor reforms and women's industrial labor force participation in El Salvador.

Keywords
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Colonels and Industrial Workers in El Salvador, 1944-1972

Seeking Societal Support through Gendered Labor Reforms

How do military regimes seek support or legitimacy from society? What strategies, besides violent repression, do military leaders use to remain in power? In other words, how do military leaders try to achieve hegemony? El Salvador's long period of military rule (1931-1979) gives researchers ample opportunity to investigate the mechanisms whereby military regimes try to gain societal support. Erik Ching's chapter shows that General Martínez's regime sought support through locally based patron-client relationships. Some analysts of El Salvador's subsequent military regimes find that these regimes pursued a political alliance with urban industrial workers in order to gain support. Nevertheless, the alliance between the state and urban industrial workers during the 1950s and 1960s remains overgeneralized in the literature. Even those who specify Salvadoran governmental policy during this period as "repression with reforms" do not fully elaborate the mechanisms whereby military leaders formed an alliance with urban industrial workers. Moreover, research on these later military regimes has not explored the role that gendered labor reforms played in solidifying the alliance. As a result of this oversight, researchers may have underestimated the reformist tendency of Salvadoran military regimes from 1944 to 1972. Drawing on newspaper accounts and government publications, we show that adopting labor legislation designed to protect women workers was an element of a broader government strategy to ally with urban industrial workers.
Examining how military regimes seek societal support is important because each strategy to secure regime legitimacy may have different social implications. For example, gendered labor legislation can have important social implications for industrial women workers. Research on other countries suggests that labor laws giving women special protections tend to make employers less willing to hire them and that special legal protections for women workers can depress women's participation in the industrial labor force. Therefore, by illuminating the gendered nature of the reforms pursued by the Salvadoran military regimes, we hope to contribute to future research on the potential relationship between labor reforms and women's industrial labor force participation in El Salvador.

Building an Alliance with Urban Industrial Workers, 1944–1972

After 1944, Salvadoran military leaders made a commitment to industrialization. This brought with it, however, the danger that urban workers would unionize, mobilize, and destabilize the country politically. As table 1 indicates, the percentage of El Salvador's gross national product (GNP) contributed by industry increased from 9.5 percent in 1942 to 19.2 percent in 1971. Tax exemptions for industry (1950–1956) and an import substitution industrialization policy during the 1960s (which promoted domestic production of industrial products previously imported) stimulated industrialization. The Central American Common Market, in place from 1961 to 1969, spurred El Salvador's industrial growth. Industrialization attracted migrants to the cities and converted urban poor into workers. The percentage of workers in the industrial sector increased from 11.4 percent in 1951 to 20.9 percent in 1971 (see table 1). The participation of urban workers in the general strike that helped bring down the Martinez regime in 1944 inflamed the military's fear of the burgeoning ranks of urban workers. Furthermore, between April 1944 and December 1947 there were at least ninety-three labor conflicts. Urban workers organized themselves into various types of organizations, including unions. By 1956 there were 14,088 union members in El Salvador affiliated with fifty-one unions; although in 1956 only 27 percent of these were industrial workers, by 1971 industrial workers represented 45 percent of unionized workers.

Mexico's success in quelling urban worker militancy inspired El Salvador's military leaders during this period of industrialization. Mexico's president in the late 1930s, Lazaro Cardenas, successfully transformed militant oil and railroad workers into an important base of political support. Cardenas did this by granting these union leaders privileged access to government decision making through the ruling political party, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, PRI), and by responding to demands by rank-and-file
workers for social reforms. Like Mexico's semiauthoritarian leaders, El Salvador's military leaders attempted to convert this potential menace into a base of social support. Instead of relying solely on violent repression, they pursued an alliance with urban industrial workers. Military leaders allowed certain unions to organize and to publicly advocate for social reforms in exchange for assurances that union leaders and workers affiliated with their unions would remain loyal to the regime.

Like leaders in Mexico, El Salvador's military leaders marginalized Communist and radical labor leaders but granted privileged decision-making access to a select group of moderate union leaders. Moderate union leaders were able to advocate for labor reforms from this vantage point. For example, on February 11, 1947, the executive branch of the Salvadoran government appointed two moderate labor representatives to the six-member commission charged with drafting a labor code. The commission's proposals became the basis for groundbreaking labor legislation contained in the 1950 Constitution. The constituent assembly charged with writing the Constitution summoned the Salvadoran Committee for Union Reorganization (Comité de Reorganización Sindical Salvadoreño, CROS) and selected labor organizations to participate in the debates regarding labor legislation. CROS included key industrial workers, such as railroad workers, bread makers, cobblers, and tailors. Labor representatives were in the assembly "day and night" and "many of them spoke up and intervened in discussions" and "demonstrated large popular support." Throughout the 1950s, military leaders

### Table 1. Indicators of Industrialization, Union Growth, and Industrial Union Growth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Industrial sector, percentage of GDP</th>
<th>Industrial sector, percentage of total workforce</th>
<th>Number of unionized workers (total)</th>
<th>Number of unions (total)</th>
<th>Industrial sector, percentage of unionized workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>9.50</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>10.60</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>14.07</td>
<td>11.42</td>
<td>13,521</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>16.37</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>14,088</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>16.76</td>
<td>12.84</td>
<td>21,566</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>18.80</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>24,126</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>19.20</td>
<td>20.93</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


a. 1951–1956 data represent totals as of 1 September; 1961–1971 data represent totals as of 31 June.
invited moderate sectors of labor to send representatives to the National Assembly to discuss decisions regarding labor law.\(^\text{13}\)

Salvadoran military leaders further imitated Mexico’s model by institutionalizing labor’s participation in decision making through political parties. In Mexico the state gave the Mexican Confederation of Workers privileged access to decision making in the PRI. Similarly, the Salvadoran Revolutionary Party of Democratic Unification (Partido Revolucionario de Unificación Democrática, PRUD) (1948–1960) and its successor, the National Conciliation Party (Partido de Conciliación Nacional, PCN) included certain labor unions within its decision-making structure, albeit in a subordinate role.\(^\text{14}\) As López Vallecillos states, Colonel Osorio (1950–1956) aimed to “affiliate the labor movement with party politics.”\(^\text{15}\) PRUD officials did this by rewarding moderate labor leaders with PRUD-affiliated government posts.\(^\text{16}\) They also initiated a union central to be incorporated into the government decision-making apparatus in 1958: the General Confederation of Unions (Confederación General de Sindicatos, CGS).\(^\text{17}\) Like PRUD, PCN granted labor leaders access to decision making and positioned itself as a party that could reconcile economic class divisions: a party in which “capitalists and workers . . . could all find a home.”\(^\text{18}\) The first PCN president, Colonel Julio Rivera (1962–1967), even dressed in “workman’s clothes” on ceremonial days to appeal to urban industrial workers.\(^\text{19}\) PCN leaders developed a close relationship with the CGS during the volatile years after the fall of President Colonel José María Lemus in 1960.\(^\text{20}\) The PCN subsequently included CGS as labor’s representative in state decision-making bodies.\(^\text{21}\) For example, the PCN appointed a key CGS leader to be the under-secretary of the Ministry of Labor. Many CGS union leaders also held seats as PCN delegates in the National Assembly.\(^\text{22}\)

Between 1944 and 1972 El Salvador’s military leaders introduced social reforms designed to secure legitimacy from urban workers and their families. In the early 1960s President Colonel Rivera expressed a sentiment shared by other military leaders during the 1950s and 1960s: “If we do not make the reforms, the Communists will make them for us.”\(^\text{23}\) PRUD officials instituted price controls on basic goods, and increased state subsidies for education, housing, healthcare, and sanitation projects. In addition PRUD officials gave benefits to urban workers in the formal sector by mandating a minimum wage, a bonus system, paid vacation and leaves, a social security system, a forty-four hour work-week, industrial training programs, and disability payment for accidents on the job.\(^\text{24}\) PCN presidents, including Colonel Rivera and his successor Colonel Fidel Sánchez Hernández (1967–1972), reduced rents and increased the urban minimum wage. These social reforms benefited urban workers, helping the government gain societal support from this important group. Thus, Salvadoran military leaders sought societal sup-
port by building a limited alliance with urban industrial workers. The cornerstone of this strategy was giving privileges to moderate unions, including limited access to decision making within political parties and the government. As a result, labor leaders were able to exert some influence within these military regimes. One of the issues that labor leaders pursued was protective legislation for women workers.

Labor's Demands

In the late 1940s industrial workers wanted not only social reforms but also governmental intervention in the workplace to protect workers from employer abuses. Industrial workers expressed their desire for intervention in more than half of the conflicts that occurred between April 1944 and February 1945. They particularly wanted help ensuring that women workers had special protections. To do this, however, workers first had to convince El Salvador’s military leaders to establish a Department of Labor and to develop labor laws. Organized industrial workers felt that a Department of Labor would give them more state protection in the workplace as well as increased influence over state policy. Thus, the demand that women be given special protections was part of a broader political strategy to increase government intervention in the workplace.

Organized industrial workers demanded special protections for women from dangerous and arduous work. In its 1944 manifesto the National Union of Workers (Unión Nacional de Trabajadores, UNT) declared that it would fight for “the prohibition of women’s involvement in dangerous work and night shifts.” The Fraternal Union of Workers (Unión Fraternal de Trabajadores, UFT) stated in its manifesto, “the U.F.T. will fight so that the woman neither works in dangerous factories nor in heavy lifting work and in principal that she takes care of herself during pregnancy.” In 1946 Salvadoran labor leader J. J. Valencia told government officials, “another major concern [of ours] is . . . to remove them [women] from public spaces and to rebuild the home in order to build families with good values.” In March 1950 the Society of Salvadoran Workers was commemorated for its “pro woman-worker campaigns,” calling for special considerations for women workers. In 1951 labor leader Carlos Salinas argued that the first phase of labor protections for workers should focus on the “weakest part: the woman worker . . . whose body suffers more as a consequence of long, tiring work.” Julio Cesar Tejado, a labor delegate at the 1954 Ministry of Labor Conference, asked for “immediate legislation” regarding women and minors and asked for protections against women’s work in construction, and work involving cement. Labor delegate Jorge Alberto López said that the state should not “permit women
and minors to work in night-time restaurants and billiard halls where alcoholic beverages are served." He argued that "women and minors who work in environments of vice sacrifice themselves and warp their personalities; in contrast, if they work in a healthy environment, they are more likely to acquire good habits and customs."33

In the 1950s labor leaders demanded a reduced workweek for women workers. During the debates regarding the 1950 Constitution, a labor representative, Rafael Gamero, proposed a woman's maximum workweek be thirty-nine hours, compared to a man's maximum workweek of forty-four hours.34 At the 1954 Ministry of Labor Conference labor delegate López stated that "because of her social role and her condition, it is humane and practical to reduce women's maximum daily shift to seven hours and to prohibit women from working overtime for any reason." He justified his request saying, "reducing the women's shift, because of her sex, will ensure that she doesn't wear herself out physically and that a strong, capable, and responsible future generation of workers will be possible."35

Once the government legalized special protections, organized industrial workers pressured state leaders to enforce these special protections and conduct special studies on appropriate working conditions for women and minors. At the 1954 Ministry of Labor Conference labor leaders pressured Ministry of Labor officials to increase government enforcement of regulations regarding women and minors' work. Labor delegate López stated that the ministry should be doing more inspections in environments where women and minors work.36 He solicited the ministry to budget for studies regarding women and minors. Labor delegate Tejado argued for increased enforcement of the law prohibiting women and minors from working in unhealthy and unsafe environments.

Labor leaders also promoted sex-segregated industrial training programs. One of labor's demands at the 1954 Ministry of Labor Conference was to establish training centers. In 1958 various unions in San Salvador petitioned the Ministry of Labor to create a separate Center of Home Economics for Women.37 After 1963 labor representatives in the National Department of Apprenticeship were in a position to pressure the Ministry of Labor for more sex-segregated industrial training. They approved and supervised training programs and played a role in hiring apprentices.38

Labor's Demands or Female Worker's Demands?

Even though female industrial workers comprised close to a quarter of the industrial labor force, they were underrepresented in unions and nearly excluded from organized labor's leadership. We cannot assume, therefore, that labor leaders
expressed the interests of women workers. As Table 2 shows, from 1951 to 1953, women made up only 12 percent of the unionized workforce. Men historically dominated Salvadoran labor leadership. Labor leaders and representatives continued to be almost exclusively male in the 1940s and 1950s. Between May 1944 and May 1946, thirteen unions listed their executive committees in the newspaper; eleven of them were exclusively male, and the remaining two each had only one female member. Of the 180 labor representatives listed in the newspaper during this period, 175 were male. Moreover, throughout the 1940s to the 1960s, male union leaders represented labor in most of the important labor assemblies. For example, all of the delegates representing all “existing labor societies” at the meeting held to coordinate efforts in the key months after the fall of Martínez in 1944 were men. Male union leaders also exclusively represented labor’s interests to the government. Thus, labor representatives in the three labor delegations to the government in the 1940s, the Labor Law Defense Committee, the 1953 union delegation to the National Assembly, the 1954 Ministry of Labor Congress, and the 1964 Minimum Wage Commission were all male.

Rather than relying on the organized labor movement to represent them, organized women workers represented themselves to government officials when they had a grievance. For example, in 1946 an all-female labor delegation visited the president to request help to resolve a labor dispute. The strategy of a leading women’s organization in the 1950s, Fraternidad de Mujeres Salvadoreñas (Fraternity of Salvadoran Women), further emphasizes women’s minimal participation in union leadership. These women leaders advocated for increased participation of women workers in union leadership. Their concern reflected the historical tendency of women to participate in unions as wives and supporters. A union newspaper reporting on the 1918 Workers’ Congress, for instance, announced that “the woman, who is in the working man’s home, the great bearer of our equilibrium . . . receives the affection of our white flag.” Moreover, at the regional general assemblies in the 1920s, it was reported that “every member brought his wife, kids, and neighbors” to the meetings.

Although sources on female industrial workers are sparse, evidence suggests that in the mid-1940s organized female workers did not appear to share male workers’ concerns for special protections. Women prioritized increased industrial wages and called for increased safety protections for all workers. Nine of fourteen newspaper articles reporting female workers’ concerns (between June 1944 and July 1946) highlighted salary as their major concern. Six of the fourteen articles highlighted female workers’ demands for labor rights for all workers. None of the articles mentioned the need for protective legislation for women or sex-segregated training programs. Labor leaders Angélica Trigueros
Table 2. Women’s Participation in the Industrial Labor Force and Unions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Female industrial workers, percentage of total</th>
<th>Female unionized workers, percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

a. Includes only industrial workplaces with five or more workers.

and María Luisa Bonilla did not promote protective legislation for women during their speeches at the 1946 Labor Day celebration. Instead, they called for improvements in the working conditions for both men and women. In 1956 female industrial workers even opposed a proposal to prohibit women from working the night shift. Some female workers preferred to work night shifts so they could take care of their children during the day.

Moreover, major women’s rights organizations at the time did not make special protections for female workers a priority. A leading women’s group, Liga Femenina Salvadoreña, founded in 1947, did not appeal to state leaders for special protections for women. After significant discussion of the issue at the 1951 National Women’s Seminar, women made no demands in favor of special protective legislation for women in the workforce. Instead, women sought improved educational and training opportunities and full political participation. The scant participation of women in union leadership and the tendency for female workers and reformers to avoid calling for special protections for women suggests that they may not have supported organized labor’s gendered demands.

In the 1944-1956 period industrial workers led by a predominantly male leadership sought protection for workers through greater state intervention in the workplace, particularly through gendered labor reforms. Industrial workers wanted the government to legalize and enforce special protections for women workers and to provide sex-segregated industrial training programs. As part of the military’s effort to build an alliance with moderate urban unions, the government promoted gendered labor reforms that mirrored labor’s specific demands during this period.

The State’s Gendered Labor Reforms

El Salvador’s military leaders during this period were not the first to advocate for gendered labor reforms. They echoed sentiments first expressed by two democratic reformers from the late 1920s and early 1930s. President Pío Romero Bosque (1927–1931) prepared labor laws that included protections for women and minors. Presidential candidate Araujo’s “Plan de Trabajo” expressed the govern-
ment's commitment to "persistently protect" Salvadoran female workers. Furthermore, Araujo (March—December 1931), like many labor leaders of the time, highlighted a woman's primary role as mother. According to Araujo, the woman is, perhaps, "the principal spring" of the next generation of male workers.59 P10

Romero Bosque and Araujo employed gender in their political discourse with workers, although they stopped short of implementing any labor laws.

Military leaders after 1944 again recognized that responding to labor's gendered demands might help them gain societal support. In the mid-1940s General Castañeda Castro's government (1945—1948) stated that the National Department of Labor would give special attention to "women and children's work."60 The Labor Code Drafting Committee's 1947 statement affirmed that "one of its [Ministry of Labor's] principal goals is to protect the life and physical, mental, and moral development of minors and women, as they, because of their special conditions, are at greater risk than adult men. . . . For their own good, they will be prohibited from working in certain jobs, and they will be put in situations that guarantee their safety."61 President Colonel Lemus (1956—1960) often mentioned the primary role women play as mothers. In 1958 Lemus provided state-funded bonuses for selected female workers and wives of male workers who had recently given birth. As Lemus stated, "it was an act of justice, for the noble function of motherhood."62 In the 1960s, the Christian Democrat Party (Partido Demócrata Cristiano, PDC) candidate and then mayor of San Salvador, José Napoleón Duarte, called for legislation "to protect" the economic rights of wives and mothers. According to the PDC, only with economic protections could a Salvadoran woman be free "to accomplish her grand mission as queen of the home and educator of her children."63 Salvadoran military regimes during the 1950—1972 period took these promises seriously and legalized special protections for female workers through the Constitution, labor laws, and labor codes.64

**Legalizing Special Protections for Women**

El Salvador's 1950 Constitution diverged from earlier ones by gendering labor legislation.65 It gendered the definition of worker by mandating that "the state will employ all of the resources in its reach to provide employment for the worker . . . and to make sure that he and his family have the economic conditions for a dignified existence." It identified the family as the "fundamental base of society" that should be "specially protected by the state."66 It assumed that women's primary social roles were as workers' wives and mothers. The new labor legislation protected pregnant women from losing their jobs and gave them the right to paid leave before and after pregnancy.

When the Constitution considered women as workers, it posited that they
merited “special legislation” beyond protections for pregnant workers. Article 183 was the first to restrict women from working in “unhealthy and dangerous labors.” At the 1954 Ministry of Labor Conference, labor, state, and business representatives further fleshed out what special legislation for women would mean in El Salvador. The conference included gendered labor reforms among its six agenda items. The final recommendations at the conference included reforms prompting government officials to state that the law about “women and minors” was one of the “most important and delicate” laws the state promoted.

The labor sections of the 1962 Constitution, the 1963 Labor Code, and its subsequent revisions in 1972 all further amplified the “protective” legislation. Chapter V of the 1963 Labor Code, dedicated to “the work of women and minors,” established that jobs “should be especially appropriate to a worker’s sex, age, physical state, and development.” It specified that “oiling, cleaning, inspecting, or repairing machines or mechanisms in motion” or jobs in which workers handle toxic substances, including gas, vapors, or dusts, which could potentially poison them, were too dangerous for women workers. Women were also prohibited from working underground or underwater, in industries such as mining, or in work involving the “fabrication of explosives.” The revised 1972 Labor Code further specified that women should not work in jobs involving “construction of any type” and work related to “demolition,” “repair,” and “conservation.” Chapter V of the 1972 Labor Code states that “minors under eighteen and women of any age are prohibited from working in unsafe or unhealthy workplaces... Dangerous work includes the oiling, cleaning, revision, or repair of machines or mechanisms in motion and any job that uses automatic or circular saws, knives, cutters, drop hammers, and all other mechanical apparatus that require precautions or special knowledge, except kitchen or butcher utensils, or other related tasks.”

Enforcing Special Protections

Salvador’s military leaders demonstrated their commitment to special protections for women by enforcing the new legislation. In the 1950s and 1960s state officials restructured the Ministry of Labor and enhanced personnel capacity in order to improve enforcement of special protections for women workers. In 1951 the National Department of Social Services, a section of the Ministry of Labor, was reorganized into three divisions. One of these, the Division for Women and Minors, was dedicated solely to enforcing laws related to women and minors through factory inspections and special studies. In April 1951 Ministry of Labor representatives officially expressed their willingness to increase inspections and conduct more special studies to develop and enforce “effective mechanisms of protection” for women workers.
After the 1954 Ministry of Labor Conference, an expert committee was formed to further develop criteria for identifying unhealthy and unsafe work environments. The division conducted eight studies in 1956 focusing on women's limitations, conditions, and opportunities in the labor force. Ministry of Labor inspectors identified and fined factories with unhealthy and unsafe working conditions for women as well as those out of compliance with maternity regulations. The number of inspections conducted each year increased throughout the 1960s (105 inspections were conducted in 1954, 190 in 1956, 287 in 1957, 333 in 1963, 655 in 1964, 1,975 in 1965, and 5,238 in 1967). The Ministry of Labor also trained and expanded its personnel and progressively extended the work of the Women and Minors' Division in 1952 and again in 1955.

Segregating Industrial Training Programs

Reports from as early as 1949 indicate that El Salvador's military governments promoted sex-segregated training programs. For example, in 1949 and 1950 state leaders founded home economics training schools for young women in San Salvador. In December 1950 government leaders reported that the Casa del Niño, a vocational school for children, offered shoemaking, mechanics, and carpentry workshops for boys and cleaning, ironing, sewing, cooking, and bread-making workshops for girls. The rising interest by the Ministry of Labor in defining what constituted sex-appropriate industrial training after the 1954 conference suggests, however, an increased commitment to training programs as a means of segregating the industrial workforce by sex. After the conference, the officials from the Women and Minors' Division visited twenty-two training programs between September 1954 and September 1955, including the School of Domestic Economics and the Female Vocational School of France to determine criteria for sex- and age-appropriate industrial training.

The Women and Minors' Division subsequently administered sex-appropriate training programs in the late 1950s. Male industrial workers received training in higher paying occupations considered too dangerous for women, such as electronics, mechanics, shoemaking, and shoe repair. Male minors received government grants for vocational training in mechanics, electricity, and construction. When women received training, it tended to be in lower paid industries involving cooking, cleaning, and sewing. In 1956 Ministry of Labor officials reported that young women attended state-funded cooking and sewing courses. From 1957 to 1958 state-funded programs trained about 150 women in "domestic" industries such as sewing, culinary arts, food management, and typing. In Morazán and other regions state leaders established similar industrial training schools exclusively for women in the late 1950s.
The 1963 Apprenticeship Law strengthened the military's commitment to sex-appropriate industrial training. It mandated that the state establish a National Department of Apprenticeship, under the auspices of the Ministry of Labor, and include representatives from the Women and Minors' Division. The law charged a seven-member National Council with designing a new law and dictating general norms that would regulate industrial apprenticeships. The department supervised public and private training programs and implemented the National Council's recommendations to develop state-funded sex-segregated training programs and on-the-job apprenticeships.

In the early 1960s the state began monitoring whether "trainings are appropriate to a workers' sex, age, physical state, and development." Industrial job announcements listed in several Salvadoran dailies during the 1960s suggest that employers almost exclusively recruited men for state-sponsored on-the-job industrial apprenticeships. A photo series in the publication Industry, of the Association of Salvadoran Industrialists (February 1963–March 1966), also suggested that men were most likely to benefit from these on-the-job apprenticeships. As a Ministry of Labor official active in the 1960s expressed, "These programs were for men, they were designed to train men in more skilled positions, and women never participated, only when there were trainings on sewing."

What is particularly noteworthy here is not that the military regimes between 1944 and 1972 legalized special protections for women workers but that they took such an active role in enforcing these regulations and in redirecting women out of higher paying industrial jobs and industries. The latter indicates that the Ministry of Labor committed considerable resources to this endeavor.

With the exception of a few recent studies, scholars traditionally portray El Salvador's military leaders as monolithically repressive and commonly refer to the military as a repressive political instrument of the economic elite. Nevertheless, the evidence presented here suggests that Salvadoran military leaders from 1944 to 1972 did try to persuade society to support their regime and that one of the ways they did so was by introducing special protections for female workers. Because gendered labor reforms may not challenge the profit margins of industrialists as much as significant increases in minimum wage, we might expect the military to be more open about negotiating with labor leaders for these type of demands.

Intervening in the workplace to protect women and minors constituted a way for military leaders to demonstrate a political commitment to urban labor leaders that did not tax the relationship between military leaders and industrialists too severely. Therefore, a focus on gendered labor reforms gives us an opportunity to
document the extent of the state-labor alliance during this period. By enforcing special protections for women workers and by promoting sex-segregated industrial training programs, the government demonstrated that it was willing to respond to the labor leadership of urban workers. Because gendered labor reforms constituted such an important aspect of the state-labor alliance, gender-neutral analyses of the state-labor relationship during this period risk underestimating the reformist nature of these military regimes.

A gendered reading of the state-labor alliance may help us understand why many industrial workers joined the ranks of the leftist anti-government movement in the mid-1970s. The fact that the military repeatedly responded to labor's gendered demands between 1944 and 1972 helps to explain why, by the early 1970s, many industrial workers and their moderate labor leaders expected to be included in the government's decision-making process. Government leaders also responded to some of labor's nongendered demands for labor reforms favorable to urban workers. Many industrial workers may have joined antigovernment forces of the left when they realized that military leaders had retracted from the alliance in the mid-1970s. Explanations of El Salvador's civil war have often noted the incomplete nature of the government's reforms during the 1944–1972 period. The explanations highlight that the state-labor alliance was confined to urban workers and that rural labor relations remained unchanged throughout this period. Although the failures of the military to redistribute in the rural sector are an important explanatory factor, future research on the causes of El Salvador's civil war should more fully consider the legacy of the development and decline of the state-labor alliance in El Salvador.

Our analysis raises several questions: What were the social implications of the military's strategy to build an alliance with moderate unions during the 1950s and 1960s? How did special protections affect women workers? Research on other countries suggests that the gendered nature of labor regulations can affect women's participation in the labor force as well as the wages they receive. For example, in Mexico the participation of women in the industrial labor force sharply declined after Mexico put similar labor regulations in place in the 1940s.89 

The history of gendered labor reforms in El Salvador may help us understand the dramatic changes in the composition of El Salvador's industrial work force. Although the special protections for women remained legal until 1994, they decreased in the late 1970s. Moreover, the state's commitment to enforce these regulations waned in the 1970s and during the decade of war in the 1980s.90 In 1994 the government repealed the protections altogether.91 The proportion of women workers in industrial jobs in El Salvador has increased from roughly a quarter of all industrial workers in 1950–1970 to roughly half in the late
In the export-processing industrial sector, the *maquiladoras*, women made up over 80 percent of the workforce in 1998. El Salvador exemplifies a trend toward increased women's participation in industrial work throughout Latin America. Prominent analysts link this change to the preference of *maquiladoras* to hire women. Yet analysts disagree about why foreign companies might prefer to do so. Some argue that foreign employers believe women are more docile than male workers, and others argue that women are less expensive; hiring women allows the industry to devalue its wage levels.

Yet the research has not considered how employer hiring preferences may interact with domestic legacies of state-labor relations such as gendered labor reforms. Could it be that the aggressive role of El Salvador's political leaders in segregating industrial work in the 1950s and 1960s contributed to the notion that women as workers were less valuable than men, or that, unlike men, they did not need to be paid enough to support a family? Did foreign companies establish *maquiladoras* in the early 1990s simply to take advantage of the artificially depressed wage expectations of women workers and thereby create lower wage expectations for both women and men working in the *maquiladora* industry? By tracing the origins of gendered labor reforms we have provided the groundwork for understanding the role that the state-labor alliance may have played in paving the way for the recent upsurge in women's industrial employment in El Salvador.
45. Telegram Circular 7, from General José Tomás Calderón, 3 January 1935, AGN-FG-So, box "Politica, 1930–9."

46. Pedro Ramos, Alcalde of Santiago de Guzmán, 11 January 1935, AGN-FG-So, box 1. The box is filled with similar reports.

47. Juan Vidal, departmental comandante, Cabañas Department, to governor of Sonsonate, 14 January 1935, AGN-FG-So, box 1.


50. The case of the teacher/spy is contained in José Cruz Peñate, to General Felipe Ibarra, 18 August 1932, AGN-FG-So, box 2. The term oreja is found in Colonel Julio César Calderón, governor of Sonsonate Department, to General José Tomás Calderón, 22 July 1935, AGN-FG-So, box "Politica, 1930–9."

51. These coups, both actual and plotted, occurred in January 1934, October 1935, October 1936, and January 1939. For more information, see Ching, "Clientelism," chap. 7.

52. A brief discussion of the meaning of regime change and references to appropriate literature can be found in Hagopien, Traditional Politics.

53. Harris, Military Attaché in San José, Costa Rica, G-2 Military Report no. 2318, 23 February 1934, USNA, RG 59, 816.00/941.

54. Rubin, Decentering the Regime, 14.

55. Hagopien, Traditional Politics, 16.

56. It could be argued that Brazil's civil society was stronger comparatively and thus more able to limit the military's initiatives. For example, see Maria Alves, State and Military Opposition in Brazil (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1985).

57. Williams and Walter, Militarization. See also Stanley, The Protection Racket State. For an excellent study of the military during the Peace Accords, see Knut Walter, Las Fuerzas Armadas y el Acuerdo de Paz: la transformación necesaria del ejército salvadoreño (San Salvador: FLACSO, 1997).

Colonels and Industrial Workers in El Salvador, 1944–1972

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1. Williams and Walter, Militarization and Demilitarization.

2. For example, Alistair White, El Salvador (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1973).


4. This chapter draws on El Salvador al Día and Informaciones de El Salvador 1949 and 1952; Memorias and Estadísticas de trabajo in the 1948–1968 period; Ministry of Labor reports of labor conferences; Diario de Hoy from 1944 to 1951; La Prensa Gráfica from 1949
and 1965; headlines in La Prensa Gráfica's summary journal, Libro de Oro, from 1944 to 1965; and over thirty interviews by the author with labor leaders, scholars, and state officials.


7. Diario de Hoy, June, 1944, see eight editorials entitled "La sindicalización como necesidad nacional." For evidence of how politicians appealed to labor, see 21 July 1944, "Posición de obreros y campesinos en los partidos políticos capitalistas."


9. Diario de Hoy, 23 August 1950, "Incorporado el Código de Trabajo a la constitución."


11. See La Prensa Gráfica, 21 April 1949, "Celebraciones del Día del Trabajo preparan Obreros." Also see Aristides Augusto Larín, Historia del movimiento sindical de El Salvador (San Salvador: Editorial Universitaria, 1971), 150. The state favored some commercial unions as well but focused on industrial unions.

12. Larín, Historia del movimiento sindical, 151. They considered a prepared statement by labor, see Salvador, Documentos Históricos de la Constitución Política Salvadoreña de 1950, 222.


17. La Prensa Gráfica, 18 February 1957, "Pronto será fundada una confederación de obreros"; and Mario Lungo, La lucha de las masas en El Salvador, vol. 7 of Colección Debate (San Salvador: UCA Editores, 1987), 45.


19. Webre, Jose Napoleon Duarte, 69.


21. For labor leader and state official discussions of the labor code at CGS's II National Conference, see La Prensa Gráfica, 1 October 1962; See also La Prensa Gráfica,


24. White, El Salvador, 134–35; and Montgomery, Revolution, 46. For information regarding state industrial training programs, see La Prensa Gráfica, 18–19 February 1951. For social security, see Dr. Ernesto Romero Hernández, "Historia del Régimen del Seguro Social en El Salvador 1954–1979" (San Salvador, 1979), 1–35.

25. For labor demands, see Diario de Hoy, 1 July 1944, "La Comisión de Legislación Obrera Pide Colaboración"; La Prensa Gráfica, 2 October 1944, "El Congreso Obrero no tiene miras políticas," and Rafael Guidos Véjar, "El movimiento sindical después de la segunda guerra mundial," Estudios Centroamericanos 45, no. 504 (1990), 885.

26. Diario de Hoy, 11 August 1944, Luis Mendoza "El Obrerismo Nacional espera que sea aprobado un hermoso Proyecto de Ley; Que se refiere a la creación del Departamento del Trabajo"; and La Prensa Gráfica, 4 September 1944, "El Departamento Nacional del Trabajo es la Esperanza de los Obreros."

27. Quoted in Diario de Hoy, 27 May 1944, "La Unión Nacional de Trabajadores dio a conocer ya su declaración de principios."

28. Quoted in Diario de Hoy, 30 June 1944, "Surge a la vida pública otra agrupación con fines obreristas: Plataforma ideológica de la 'Unión Fraternal de Trabajadores.'"

29. Quoted in Diario de Hoy, San Salvador, 6 May 1946, "Organización futura del obrerismo salvadoreño." All translations are the author's. The shorthand term labor refers to organized or unionized urban industrial workers.


31. Quoted in Diario de Hoy, 9 February 1950, "Urge protección a la mujer trabajadora."


33. Ibid., 205.


36. Ibid., 207.


38. Jorge E. Solórzano, "Adiestrar a nuestros trabajadores es fomentar la economía na-

40. All of the members of the executive committee of the 1918 Workers’ Congress, for instance, were men. Vallecillos, *El Periodismo en El Salvador*, 307.


43. *Diario de Hoy*, 4 June 1944, “Se comprometerá no ir a la Huelga los Obreros.”

44. For 1940s labor delegations, see *La Prensa Gráfica-Libro de Oro*, 1 November 1945, “La ‘Confederación de Sociedades Gremiales de El Salvador’ ha enviado un memorial al Presidente de la República”; 30 November 1945, “Ante el Ministro de Trabajo la Unión de Trabajadores Ferrocarrileros y la Corporación de Protección y Mejoramiento de ese gremio firmaron un acuerdo”; and *Diario de Hoy*, 2 March 1946, “Detalles completos de la reunión de funcionarios, trabajadores, reporteros celebrada anter en Casa Presidencial.”

45. *Diario de Hoy*, 12 February 1946, “Costureras se unifican en pro de bienestar.”


47. Miguel Marmol comments that “our women were selling fruit during the morning, and during the afternoon they made tamales to sell in order to endure the situation and so that the men could dedicate full time to organizing and revolutionary work,” Dalton, *Miguel Mármon; los sucesos de 1932 en El Salvador*, 148.

49. Quoted in Larín, *Historia del movimiento sindical*, 140.


51. See *La Prensa Gráfica-Libro de Oro*, 18 June 1944; *Diario de Hoy*, 23 June 1944; 15 July 1944; 17 July 1944; 28 July 1944; 4 August 1944; 9 August 1944; 5 September 1944; and 12 February 1946.

52. *La Prensa Gráfica*, 23 June 1944; *La Prensa Gráfica-Libro de Oro*, 18 June 1944; *Diario de Hoy*, 10 October 1944; 12 February 1946; 1 May 1946; and 17 July 1944.


60. Quoted in *Diario de Hoy*, 30 July 1944.


64. It should be noted that there were limits to the reformist nature of the state. The state was unwilling, for instance, to concede to labor’s demand to mandate a shorter female work week; see Gallardo, *Las Constituciones de El Salvador*, 263, 265–66. According to Ministerio de Trabajo, "Memoria Del Primer Congreso Nacional de Trabajo y Previsión Social" (San Salvador, 1955), 206, the state’s unwillingness to implement this proposal may reflect the hesitation of businessmen to support this idea.

65. For information regarding preliminary drafts of 1950 gendered labor law, see *Informaciones de El Salvador*, 14 October 1950, “Política de Amplia Protección Para Las Clases Laborantes Salvadoreñas.” Martínez (1932–1944) also included limited protections for women workers in the 1939 and 1944 Constitutions, but the 1950 Constitution and further legislation significantly enhanced gendered reforms.


67. *La Prensa Gráfica*, San Salvador, 5 November 1954. The conference was designed to bring together an equal number of state, labor, and business leaders.


69. Quoted in *Informaciones de El Salvador*, 14 April 1951, "Importante estudio previo a la elaboración de códigos sanitarios y legislación sobre higiene industrial."


72. *Memorias*, various years, Ministry of Labor. Also, from 1956 to 1957, the Women and Minors’ Division conducted maternity rights inspections. Ibid., 1957.


74. A home economics school was founded in 1949 according to *El Salvador al Día*, 14 January 1949, "Establecerán escuela de economía doméstica"; and in 1950 the National Institute of Young Ladies was founded, according to *Informaciones de El Salvador*, 14 September 1950, "La Revolución está en marcha!"
75. Informaciones de El Salvador, 14 December 1950, “Algunas de las Actividades Realizadas por los Distintos Ministerios.”

76. They also did research on policies on how to use women workers, see Memoria, 1955, Ministry of Labor, 57.


82. For the Apprenticeship law, see DO, 193 (204), 8 November 1961; and La Prensa Gráfica, 30 January 1963, “Servicio de Aprendizaje Ampliará Ministerio del Trabajo.”

83. DO, 201, 10 December 1963.


85. La Prensa Gráfica job announcements from the first Sunday of every month in 1964, 1966, 1968, 1970, 1972, and 1974 were reviewed. All nine announcements calling for apprentices were directed exclusively toward men.

86. Several interviews with Ministry of Labor officials confirmed that these programs were sex-segregated and that the few female apprentices benefiting from the program were “sewing apprentices.” Ministry of Labor officials, interviews by author, 11 November and 20 October 1999.


95. Leslie Sklair makes the latter argument in Assembling for Development: The Maquila Industry in Mexico and the United States (San Diego, Calif.: Center for U.S.-Mexico Studies, 1993). Others that have found evidence of the former include Susan Tiano, Patriarchy on the Line: Labor, Gender, and Ideology in the Mexican Maquila Industry (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1995).

The Formation of a Rural Community

This work is part of a larger study undertaken in Joya de Ceren, July 1995–June 1996, and financed by UNESCO and supported by the National Council for Art and Culture of El Salvador.

1. Cantones and caseríos are geopolitical units akin to hamlets and villages, respectively, in anglophone usage.

3. Instituto de Colonización Rural, Lo Que Dice La Prensa Nacional, 69.
5. Founding member of Joya de Ceren, interview by author.
6. Regarding the pervasiveness and fundamental importance of corruption in rural cooperatives, see Lisa Kowalchuk's chapter, this volume.
7. Founding member of Colonia Joya de Ceren, interview by author.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Member of church board, interview by author.

Civil War and Its Aftermath

1. For an important exception to this neglect, see Hammond, Fighting to Learn.

Peasants, Catechists, Revolutionaries

This chapter benefited from close, critical readings by Marcus Taylor, Nancy Chance, and Aldo Lauria-Santiago.

1. Compare Penny Lernoux, Cry of the People (New York: Penguin, 1982); Anony-