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Abstract

[Excerpt] In 1988 the fifteen-year campaign to organize office and laboratory workers at Harvard University ended with an NLRB election win. *We Can’t Eat Prestige* is the most comprehensive examination to date of this compelling story, offering new detail and sufficiently bold assertions to re-ignite a smoldering debate about what this victory means for the future of unions. The author is a highly regarded journalist with thirty years of experience reporting on labor issues. Predictably, the book is extraordinarily well written, weaving a fascinating story of the union’s evolution.

Keywords
union, organizing, Harvard, office workers, clerical workers, labor movement

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ent lack of anti-union animus invalidates predictions of the demise of trade unionism. The favorable attitudes to trade unionism on both sides of industry reflect durable perceptions, such as the judgment of many managers that trade unions help them communicate with the workforce in large workplaces and facilitate the introduction of changes.

While the survey research supporting earlier continuity theses was apt to overlook the potential of novel forms of management, Gallie et al. are dismissive of those management systems, which, they contend, have been introduced piecemeal and have not affected employees' attitudes toward trade unionism. However, their data base is not, in my judgment, sufficient to sustain such a blanket assertion, nor the claim that the new management forms may be complements to rather than substitutes for bargaining. None of the researchers explore such issues sufficiently, and where management's behavior is examined, it is only within highly specific contexts. Moreover, the editors' focus on commonalities across employers constrains their exploration of the variety of management practice.

Research based on British Social Attitudes survey data suggests that new management methods may not have had any significant effect on employees' perceptions of how management treats them. Of more interest, however, may be the effects of the development of such methods on management's attitudes, the seeds of which may have been sown in the 1980s. An aversion to any revival of unionism in Britain is evident among managers, and such research as we have suggests that a growing attachment to human resource management, itself driven by broader initiatives such as TQM (as is borne out by Gallie et al.'s data), underlies this. This implies the need for an approach to managerial perspectives that is evolutionary and employs a greater range of concepts than that used by Gallie et al.

The book's strengths make it important reading for all researchers of British industrial relations, especially those focusing on managerial attitudes or union membership. The case studies may be especially valuable for teaching purposes. The book's weaknesses expose how little we still know about managerial behavior and how under-conceptualized is its study.

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In 1988 the fifteen-year campaign to organize office and laboratory workers at Harvard University ended with an NLRB election win. We Can't Eat Prestige is the most comprehensive examination to date of this compelling story, offering new detail and sufficiently bold assertions to re-ignite a smoldering debate about what this victory means for the future of unions. The author is a highly regarded journalist with thirty years of experience reporting on labor issues. Predictably, the book is extraordinarily well written, weaving a fascinating story of the union's evolution.

Hoerr asserts that the Harvard Union of Clerical and Technical Workers (HUCTW) became a "unique local union," one that was consciously constructed to manifest a "feminine model of trade unionism." These conclusions are reserved for Chapter 15, and to appreciate their basis it is essential to explore with Hoerr the events, organizations, and personalities that ultimately shaped the HUCTW.

The story begins in 1973 in the university's Medical Area. Inspired by the women's movement, lab assistant Leslie Sullivan initiated a newsletter for hourly employees. It contained "more information about employment at Harvard than Harvard itself had ever disseminated." A nascent women's group attracted new participants, and a year later a militant core announced a union drive. Affiliation with District 65 followed, and Sullivan was hired to coordinate an organizing campaign. The long, tumultuous relationship between Harvard's white-collar workers and organized labor had begun.

The book goes on to trace the case history in rich detail through two NLRB election losses in the Medical Area in 1977 and 1981, then the five-year effort for a campus-wide unit that established the HUCTW as bargaining agent in 1988. Sullivan coordinated the first campaign, "with District 65 contributing only a distant muttering of advice." For the second effort funding was provided for an additional organizer, and Sullivan selected Kristine Rondeau, a young research assistant in the Medical School. After the second loss Sullivan moved on but Rondeau stayed. When the UAW decided to sponsor a third organizing campaign in 1985, Rondeau was selected to lead it.

Hoerr describes the "singular style of organizing" weaved together by the Rondeau orga-
nizing team. Based on the conviction that Harvard's white-collar workers did not feel oppressed, the idea was to concentrate on building a community. This was accomplished by using one-on-one organizing techniques so that each worker would feel "connected" to the union. The organizing did not emphasize issues, but promised (vaguely) to provide a voice. Rather than appealing to anger, the union talked of improving the university and adopted the slogan, "It's not anti-Harvard to be pro-union."

Building relationships and a sense of community where there was no real enemy proved to be a slow process. A 1985 UAW report concluded that the campaign was "not progressing fast enough." Subsequently Rondeau became embroiled in a bitter confrontation with UAW Regional Director Ted Barrett. The reader will get a rare inside look at the difficulties that arise when an aggressive and innovative staff member decides to pursue her own agenda against the preferences of the parent union. In this case the Rondeau team took the unusual step of seceding and the HUCTW was born.

For over a year the HUCTW survived on a meager budget while competing with a new group of UAW organizers. In January 1987 an affiliation agreement was signed with AFSCME largely on Rondeau's terms: AFSCME provided a substantial subsidy, but Rondeau exercised total control over the organizing. The UAW soon withdrew, and the HUCTW prevailed by a bare margin in the 1988 representation election, winning 50.7% of the vote.

The book concludes with a description of the HUCTW's "unique labor agreement." Hoerr interprets the initial negotiating process as a continuation of the union's organizing style. Deliberations were extensive, and decisions were reached by consensus. The result was a contract devoid of rules, with no grievance procedure but rather the outline of a collaborative approach to solve problems. Although success in providing an effective forum where workers can influence decisions "has been limited by the resistance of top-level Harvard administrators," the HUCTW retains its commitment to "peaceful resolution" of problems and to a focus on "being happy." Thus the decision to reject a strike during difficult negotiations in 1992 is portrayed as demonstrating "a feminine kind of strength."

Although this book has clear plusses, there are also serious shortcomings. When dealing with the specifics of the case, it excels. Unfortu-
ing the institutions that underwrite their activities.

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Labor Economics


Since the publication in 1964 of Gary Becker’s Human Capital, the theory of on-the-job training has become a standard weapon in the arsenal of labor economists. Two of the key propositions of OJT theory are the following. First, jobs that offer training will have lower starting wages than those that do not, to reflect the cost of training. Second, general training results in identical increases in the growth rates of productivity and wages. Of course, both of these are ceteris paribus relationships; and the authors’ ability to hold other relevant factors constant is an issue that surfaces repeatedly throughout the empirical analysis.

After a brief introductory chapter, readers are walked through a concise description of a Beckerian model of general and specific human capital. Included in this treatment are interesting discussions of the information requirements of the OJT model and the empirical difficulties of testing OJT theory. Not surprisingly, sample selection rears its ugly head as a factor likely to confound estimates of the predicted effects of OJT. The authors also introduce in this chapter two alternative classes of models explaining upward-sloping wage-tenure relationships—namely, learning/job matching models and incentive-based compensation models.

Chapter 3 describes the main characteristics of the two data sets used to measure OJT. These are the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project (EOPP) and the 1992 Small Business Administration (SBA) survey. Both surveys provide employer reports of (1) the number of hours of training received by newly hired workers in their first three months on the job, and (2) the length of time needed to become fully qualified if the worker has no previous experience on the job. The second measure indicates the total human capital imbedded in a particular job.

In Chapter 4, these data are used to examine access to training. The data show that training is nearly universal for newly hired workers. In addition, college graduates and employees in large establishments receive more OJT than high school graduates and employees in small establishments. Truncation in the hours of training measure appears to hide race and gender differences in training that show up strongly in the length of time needed to become fully qualified. For example, it is found that 36–46% less time is needed to become fully trained for jobs held by nonblack women than for those held by nonblack men.

In Chapter 5, Barron, Berger, and Black step back to consider how accurately training is measured in their data. To answer this question, the authors use a new survey they designed (with funding by the Upjohn Institute) that matches employer and employee responses to training questions. This new survey indicates that while there is considerable agreement on the incidence of training, the correlation between employer- and worker-reported training hours is not very high, with firms reporting about 25% more training hours than do employees. Unfortunately, the small number of completed matches restricts the survey’s usefulness for answering the major empirical questions. It is used profitably, however, in Chapter 6 to construct instruments for the training variables in an attempt to correct for measurement error in wage regressions.

The heart of the analysis is found in Chapter 6. With respect to the first of the two key propositions of OJT theory, the SBA and EOPP data sets indicate that hours of on-site training have a negative but quantitatively small effect on starting wages. Hours of off-site training unexpectedly increase starting wages. Turning to the second proposition, the same surveys indicate that training increases both productivity growth and wage growth, but that the estimated effect on productivity growth is approximately ten times the effect on wage growth. Both of these findings suggest that most training is specific to firms providing the training. Nevertheless, EOPP data indicate that nearly 60% of employers surveyed report that the training they provide is portable to other employers.

Up to this point in the monograph, the authors’ working hypothesis is that high-ability