Unknotting the Heart: Unemployment and Therapeutic Governance

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Unknotting the Heart: Unemployment and Therapeutic Governance

Abstract
[Excerpt] Since the mid-1990s, as China has downsized and privatized its state-owned enterprises, severe unemployment has created a new class of urban poor and widespread social and psychological disorders. In Unknotting the Heart, Jie Yang examines this understudied group of workers and their experiences of being laid off, "counseled," and then reoriented to the market economy. Using fieldwork from reemployment programs, community psychosocial work, and psychotherapy training sessions in Beijing between 2002 and 2013, Yang highlights the role of psychology in state-led interventions to alleviate the effects of mass unemployment. She pays particular attention to those programs that train laid-off workers in basic psychology and then reemploy them as informal "counselors" in their capacity as housemaids and taxi drivers.

These laid-off workers are filling a niche market created by both economic restructuring and the shortage of professional counselors in China, helping the government to defuse intensified class tension and present itself as a nurturing and kindly power. In reality, Yang argues, this process creates both new political complicity and new conflicts, often along gender lines. Women are forced to use the moral virtues and work ethics valued under the former socialist system, as well as their experiences of overcoming depression and suffering, as resources for their new psychological care work. Yang focuses on how the emotions, potentials, and "hearts" of these women have become sites of regulation, market expansion, and political imagination.

Keywords
China, psychology, unemployment, therapy, training, layoffs

Disciplines
International and Comparative Labor Relations | International Business

Comments
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Unknotting the Heart

Unemployment and Therapeutic Governance in China

Jie Yang

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Introduction

The "Heart" of China's Economy

The key to reemployment is psychology.
Shi Kan, *Job Guidance: Theory and Practice*

Without a correct political standpoint, one has no soul.
— Mao Zedong, "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People"

When those at the top are sick, why must those at the bottom be given medicine?
— Popular Chinese saying

There is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations.
— Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*

The therapeutic paradigm effectively reduces the human subject to the idea of the vulnerable depoliticized inner child and its flipside of primordial violence, and is instinctly drawn to images and instances, which seem to affirm this dualistic model.
— Vanessa Papadakos, "Pathologizing Populations and Colonizing Minds"

In Changping, Beijing, in July 2011, Zhang Yi, director and party secretary of juweihui (the residents' committee) knocked on an anti-theft iron door to an apartment, looking for Wei Rubao, a laid-off male worker, so he could invite him to one of the biggest counseling sessions the community
had organized. This community is the former residential compound for workers at the Beibiao watch factory. I have conducted research there since 2002. Beibiao was once a state-owned enterprise, but when it was privatized in 2004, residents changed their primary affiliation from the factory to the community residents' committee, the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy in urban China. This committee is the administrative and political core of the current urban self-governance system. Because of the gradual collapse of the urban work-unit system, community residents' committees were established as part of the self-governance system to deal with social functions that used to be fulfilled by work units such as Beibiao before and during the early period of the post-Mao reform era. Such functions include maintaining community order and security, caring for the needy, and providing basic social welfare and community services at the grassroots level (Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2000).1 When no one answered, Zhang knocked a second time, but still no answer. Zhang suggested that I slide a poster announcing the counseling session into the side of the door.

We went downstairs, where we found two of Wei's neighbors chatting at the entrance to the building as they parked their bicycles. Zhang greeted them and asked whether Wei had a job now. One of them said, “No. He should be home.” It was around 4:30 in the afternoon. Zhang and I went up and knocked at the door again. This time we heard noise inside and Wei opened the door with his hair disarranged, looking as though he had just gotten out of bed. Zhang smiled and said, “Lao Wei, ya, sorry. We woke you up? The sun has already set; it's time for supper |jokingly|. I came here to invite you to a job session |handing him the poster|. There will be souvenirs. Do come.” Wei shook his head and murmured, “I don’t want souvenirs; I need a job.” Zhang replied, “You come; there will be jobs. See you there.” We had barely stepped out of the apartment when the iron door shut behind us loudly and abruptly. Zhang shook his head and sighed, “I know, I know, he would use that door to show us his temper. Who owes you? These workers are being spoiled too much. I bet capitalist countries manage unemployment differently, right? I have no other choice; otherwise, I wouldn't do this community job facing unreasonable, disgruntled workers daily.” Zhang constantly tells people that he has unrecognized talents and deserves a lecturer's job at the Central Party School, given his rich knowledge of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong’s thought.
Zhang used to be president of the workers’ union at Beibiao and knows Wei well. According to Zhang, the motive for inviting Wei to the counseling session in person is *ganhua*, “to touch, warm, and melt” him, a practice typically used to reach out in an effort to rehabilitate criminals and bring them back into their communities. In this case the expression refers to a personal appeal intended to soften Wei’s anger and open the potential to curb his alleged violence against his wife, a behavior that disrupts the harmony of his home and neighborhood. Since his layoff from Beibiao in 2004, domestic violence at Wei’s residence has reportedly increased. At night, loud noise and screaming often awaken those living nearby. However, when neighbors come to check on the safety of Wei’s wife, much to their surprise, both husband and wife open the door, smiling and pretending that nothing has happened. To save this former co-worker’s face, neighbors complained to the residents’ committee and asked for intervention instead of calling the police.

Zhang and I then sent out invitations to other so-called *xiànshàn rènyuán*, or idle and loose people, like Wei, particularly unemployed or underemployed male workers, whom the residents’ committee perceived to harbor *yinhuan* (hidden dangers or risks or negative potential). Negative potential refers to the future harm an agent or force is capable of producing (Cennetti 1984, 15; Vigh 2011, 74). *Yinhuan* is a keyword in Chinese propaganda about maintaining sociopolitical stability. It can refer to objects, practices, or people, including organized groups the party categorizes as hostile and likely to pose direct threats to the government and groups of people who share a common trait such as the experience of drastic downward social mobility because of ongoing economic restructuring. This latter group includes urban workers, once the ideological representatives and cornerstone of Mao’s socialism, who have been displaced and impoverished since the mid-1990s, when much of the economy is privatized (Solinger 2001, 2006, 2009; Wang 2003; C. K. Lee 2007; Yang 2007, 2010; Cho 2012, 2013).

The Chinese working class has a history of radical politics (Blecher 2004; Hurst and O’Brian 2004; C.K. Lee 2007; Hurst 2009). Because of this, a fear of harmful reactions against the government is a constant undercurrent in urban China. This fear encourages government officials to take preemptive measures to avoid social unrest, for example, targeting those who presumably harbor *yinhuan* for psychological “care” and other benevolent governance in the form of reemployment or poverty-relief programs
(Solinger 2006; Yang 2007). Care via psychotherapeutic intervention and reemployment assistance combines two tasks: a state effort to maintain sociopolitical stability by forestalling negative actions by those who harbor yinhuan and an effort to expand the market economy by harnessing the qianli (hidden strength or positive potential) of the disaffected.

Both qianli and yinhuan are elusive and subjective concepts that include a spectrum of manifestations by different objects and people. Qianli is associated with individual creativity and productivity, qualities that can be enhanced through peixun (training) or self-cultivation. Government officials presume that those who were previously employed by state-owned enterprises, are open to reconstruction and reformulation because of their impoverishment. Even though these individuals are thought to embody the negative potential designated as yinhuan, both local residents' committees and the national reemployment project believe that they also embody boundless qianli for a large variety of reemployment possibilities and for generating entrepreneurial capital. For example, many unemployed workers are given training in the basics of counseling and can be reemployed as peiliao, or “companions for chatting,” a category that includes housemaid-counselors (typically a woman’s position) and taxi-driver counselors, or “counselors on wheels” (predominantly positions for men). These reemployed workers promote the psychotherapy industry in China by filling the market niche created by a shortage of professional counselors. In this way, potential “enemies” of the state, those who may harbor yinhuan as a result of economic restructuring, become subjects and advocates of psychotherapy.

The gendered distinctions entailed in these categorizations and new jobs and the related attention to gender in China’s emerging economy are the result of gender stereotypes about workers’ abilities to cope with changes caused by socioeconomic dislocation. Men are widely viewed as more stoic than women but also more negatively affected by the challenge of processing and internalizing change. This stereotyped understanding of character and potentiality leads state-trained counselors to prioritize laid-off men over women in reemployment counseling and welfare distribution, even though women suffer unemployment and poverty to a greater degree.

According to Zhang Yi, each individual harbors good and bad sides, positive and negative potential that is fluid. Similarly, at the community level, the Beibiao residents’ committee imaginatively categorizes
workers into two loosely defined groups: those with *qianli*, who can adapt to changes and actualize their positive potential to become entrepreneurs (laid-off women in particular), and those who embody *yinhuan*, disgruntled and confrontational workers who cannot easily cope with change and are unwilling to be counseled (predominantly laid-off men). A tendency to pathologize working-class masculinity as a potential source of social unrest effectively privileges male workers over the female counterparts as failing state enterprises redistribute increasingly meager resources. In general, state-led reemployment programs have sought to accommodate laid-off workers, especially women, to a new economic and social reality, for example, by calling upon these women to literally use their own hardship and trauma as a resource for self-entrepreneurship. Such programs even glorify these women’s self-sacrifice. These imputed differences in embodied potential guided the community residents’ committee’s daily work.

In Changping, after the counseling session, Wei was seen wearing a hat—the souvenir—with four Chinese characters on it: *wo bu bao yuan*, “I do not complain.” The purpose of giving out hats with positive messages is to help trainees such as Wei acquire an emotional framework in which they can actualize their positive potential while controlling manifestations of their negative feelings. This dialectical social imagining of *qianli* and *yinhuan* mirrors China’s broader political vision of stability and development.

The central thread of this study is the complex role potentiality plays in managing and reorienting the newly impoverished working class and steering them toward the market economy. On the one hand, potentiality is positive, a boundless resource for entrepreneurial capital. It shows the “rise” of the innate and the biological; individuals need to perpetually look inward for moral, therapeutic, and spiritual sustenance, forever reflecting, diagnosing, and adjusting, emphasizing the positive while downplaying the negative. This positive potential is *qianli*, which is more oriented to the hidden capacity of the individual, while *yinhuan* is more often associated with the collective. Indeed, both the government and grassroots institutions are concerned about the threat to the government, organized collective protests by workers would pose. The highlighting of *qianli* also resonates with the government’s emphasis on the individual and the psychological over the collective and the state’s responsibility for the wrenching effects of economic restructuring.
The official construction of *qianli* and *yinhuan* is not a binary structure; it is an optimizing and reorienting strategy for reconfiguring the forms of the self and the relationship between self and society. The discourse of *qianli* and *yinhuan* serves as a governing technology that shapes people's conduct and reconstructs subjectivity. These are not new concepts; for example *qianli* has been widely used in the booming *peixun* (training) culture and the discourse of *suzhi* (quality) (Yan H. 2003; Anagnost 2004), but they have acquired new social and political significance in the context of mass unemployment since the mid-1990s.

The integration of *qianli* and *yinhuan* in state-led psychotherapeutic interventions for the unemployed is part of a larger trend in China that began in the mid-1990s that I call *psychologization* in which socioeconomic issues are managed in “psychological” modes of thinking. This trend is tied to China’s “psycho-boom” (Kleinman 2010)—an awakening interest in books about psychology, psychological terms, and training in counseling associated with an increasing use of psychology in governing social life (see also Shi 1999; Bi 2008; Ng 2009; Kipnis 2012; Zhang 2014; Huang 2014). Psychologization as governance builds upon a social trend that is seen as useful in resolving social disorder created by socioeconomic dislocation. With its focus on marginalized groups, especially unemployed workers, psychologization aims to achieve social balance by reconstructing or reinserting happiness or harmony into workers' lives after economic restructuring has compromised or destroyed them. In the same process the government mobilizes these victims of state enterprise restructuring as resources for creating entrepreneurial capital and for achieving new social, political, and economic forms of equilibrium.

In the name of caring for those who have been displaced and impoverished by state-supported privatization, reemployment program managers and community residents' committees transform these workers to objects of care, thus translating the exercise of power into an activity of therapy and using therapy to regulate them and harness their potential for the new economy. This psychotherapeutic form of governance masks the government's inability to provide for its people with structural remedies. It is rooted in class differences. Government programs for psychological care and economic rehabilitation are primarily implemented among underprivileged groups, especially those unemployed or underemployed workers, while private therapy is available to those of the middle and upper classes who can afford it.
In Changping, inviting those who presumably harbor *yinhuan* to attend counseling is an effort aimed at transforming them into people who embody *zhengnengliang* (positive energy) that will enable them to enhance their *xin nerliang* (heart’s capacity) and actualize their *qianli*. Maximizing the *qianli* of the unemployed and underemployed (i.e., those who are perceived to harbor *yinhuan*) constitutes the primary task of Beibiao Community Residents’ Committee within its larger project of building a safe community. As Zhang Yi said, “People like Wei represent *yinhuan* in this community, but we don’t pigeonhole people. We *ganhua* [touch, warm, and melt] them and help them. We see people from a developing perspective. This is *bian tong* [change through continuity].” That is, *qianli* and *yinhuan* are not fixed, but fluid and dialectical.

In China both official discourse and people’s everyday interactions incorporate a dialectic of *bian tong*. A Chinese version of Marxian dialectics, *bian tong* adopts Marx’s terminology but its doctrines are derived from *Yijing* (*The Book of Changes*), written 3,000 years ago. This dialectic was developed and popularized by Mao Zedong (Schram 1989; Tian 2005; Worm 2010) as the constant process of becoming. *Bian* signifies becoming in light of differences and varieties. *Tong* indicates becoming in light of continuity. *Biantong* in general means change with continuity (Tian 2005; Worm 2010). Mao illustrated the dialectical process through his notion of *yi fen wei er*, or the concept that everything has two sides or polarities. One example is *yin* (shaded, inactive, negative) and *yang* (bright, active, positive): their interaction—not dichotomous but correlative, appearing contradictory yet complementary—creates change. This is what Mao emphasized as *duili tongyi*, the unity of opposites (Mao 1968; Schram 1989; Tian 2005). Reflecting the premise that everything has two aspects, or *yi wu liang ti* (Feng 1956, 854), *bian tong* refers to the process of becoming from one event to another, comprehending one thing through other things, through the interaction between the two polar elements implicated in them (Tian 2005, 36). For example, the phrase *wei ji* (crisis), includes both *wei*, or dangers, and *ji*, or opportunities. It implies that even in a crisis opportunities are still lurking. The correlative pairing and conceptual interactions of complementary contrasts define *bian tong*, which in everyday life often means flexibility, fluidity, or gentleness in contrast to being rigid or stoic.

The notion of *bian tong* highlights the potential for the seemingly opposed forces of *yinhuan* and *qianli* to influence or transform one another
such that positive potential diminishes the actualization of negative potential. In this dialectical interaction, psychology plays a crucial role in optimizing peoples' aptitudes and their lives in general while making governance and the transition to a market economy easier. State-led psychotherapy also uses biantong to highlight the historical continuity of Mao’s socialism and the importance of invoking preexisting categories and knowledge in new practices. For example, recent attention to psychology in China, where 90 percent of the available self-help literature is translated from foreign books, appears to contradict the official socialist dismissal of psychology in Mao’s era, yet in practice it is the traditional Chinese notion of the heart as the seat of cognition, virtue and bodily sensation (Ots 1994; Hall and Ames 1998), rather than the Western psyche, that is widely invoked. This kind of reimagining of traditional wisdom is instrumental in efforts to reconfigure the community since privatization and in efforts to optimize people and their potential as social resources.

For example, despite his recent training in both counseling and social work, Zhang Yi adopted the dialectics of biantong. To illustrate his perspective on change, he cited how Beibiao managers used Spencer Johnson’s 1998 book Who Moved My Cheese? as part of the self-help offerings that were available to laid-off employees before 2003, when reemployment service centers were closed at state-owned enterprises (Solinger 2001, 675n15; Yang 2007). The Beibiao factory delivered copies of this book to managers and laid-off workers. Johnson’s book delineates the different reactions of four characters who are living in a maze after the cheese they have habitually fed on is removed. The parable suggests that instead of complaining about change, people should adjust: “They just moved our cheese. Let’s look for the new cheese.” The central claim is that one can actualize one’s potential by leaving one’s comfort zone, overcoming fear, and then enjoying the adventure triggered by change. Despite his positive psychological outlook, Johnson sees danger in imposed change. He points out that people fear change imposed from above and will resist it.

Many workers at Beibiao were dismissive about the book. As one worker said, “It’s okay to move the cheese—I don’t have cheese anyway, but don’t move my pancake [laobing], okay?” Although Zhang saw advantages in using this book to manage change, he did not agree that Johnson’s analysis of imposed change was applicable in the Chinese context. For Zhang, what happened in China was not imposed or absolute change but change
that was implemented through reappropriating and repoliticizing socialist ethics or categories or through the principle of *bian tong*. Such change is hegemonic because it emphasizes the continuity of socialism and its collective ethics while downplaying neoliberal policies and initiatives that highlight emerging individual-centered ethics and call on individuals rather than the state for resolving their difficulties and problems. Indeed, in *bian tong* dialectics, change involves spatial and temporal continuity that entails difference, complementarity, and contradiction. Transformations in space and time converge in an imagined spiral moving forward (Schram 1989; Tian 2005; Worm 2010): *yin* to *yang*, *yang* to *yin*, and back again. Change is conceived not from the ontological viewpoint that separates time and space but rather in light of ceaseless transformations of holistic "events" (Tian 2005, 35).

A key element of the tasks of psychosocial workers who are drawn from members of the residents' committee is helping people cope with two interrelated processes of change: macrolevel external changes caused by socioeconomic dislocation and microlevel processes through which a subject internalizes macrolevel change and triggers hidden capacities for externalization and self-actualization. The emphasis on actualizing potential through expert training also downplays the fact that subjective potential in this therapeutic mode is identified with a particular potential to "improve" that psychosocial workers impose on their clients, echoing broader political visions of the Chinese state.

In this book, I explore this dialectical imagination of potential and the culturally and historically specific nature of changes in China's exploitation of human capacities. This form of potential is particularly relevant now in China, especially with the new leadership established in March 2013. President Xi Jinping has announced "China's Dream" (*zhong guo meng*) as a new governing technology that will propel current socialist projects. This vision encourages the release of positive energy and efforts to mobilize people to identify with and fulfill state interests. This dream reconfigures Chinese society in a way that emphasizes both continuity and new knowledge; together these elements are intended to transform subjectivities. I trace the transformation in China from faith in communism and collective socialist labor in Mao's era to the current mobilization of psychology with the goal of releasing the positive potential of individuals. I argue that the government's psychotherapeutic intervention in managing
unemployment provides new knowledge and new forms of expertise that emphasize the role of individual agency in harnessing human potential for nation building and that create profit via new forms of commodities in an emerging psycho-political economy. In the hands of state-trained psychosocial workers, psychology provides tools for reimagining social life and social groups through expertly guided work that articulates and actualizes subjective potential. This potential further articulates the government’s political visions. This book thus explores the role of psychology in contemporary Chinese governance. It presents new technologies of self, new practices of postsocialist governance, and a new psycho-political economy.

Psychologizing “Socialist” Unemployment and the Heart

I ground this book in ethnography conducted in a working-class community in Changping and in training sessions in Beijing on counseling, social work, and employee assistance programs. This fieldwork was conducted from 2002 to 2013. I cover two periods of the management of unemployment in the Beibiao community: one is the implementation of the national reemployment project at state-owned enterprises through reemployment service centers from 1998 to 2003 (see Solinger 2001; Yang 2007); the other is the management of unemployment by the Beibiao residents’ committee from 2004 to 2013, after the factory was privatized. Changping, previously a county seat with a population of 620,000, was promoted to a district of Beijing in September 1999. This administrative change made Changping’s development part of Beijing’s master plan. Designated as Beijing’s “backyard garden” since 1999, Changping has been prioritizing development of a knowledge-based and “green” economy over traditional heavy industries and other sunset industries represented by state-owned enterprises. This development has triggered waves of restructuring and privatization of state enterprises, processes that have created mass layoffs.

Changping is not alone in this change. Since the mid-1990s, the downsizing and privatization of state-owned enterprises in China has resulted in layoffs of over 35 million workers and has transformed millions of them into a “new” class of urban poor (Hu et al. 2002; Wang and Zheng 2008; Cho 2013). Being laid off from a state-owned enterprise, where employment was supposedly guaranteed for life, means more than loss of income.
Its consequences can include emotional trauma, identity crises, and labor unrest. Indeed, the drastic downward mobility of workers from Mao’s elite to a marginalized group has precipitated significant labor unrest. In Changping, waves of vandalism, demonstrations, and strikes have forced the local government to prioritize sociopolitical stability. In 1994, in an effort to relieve the threat to stability posed by the masses of laid-off workers across China, the Department of Labor initiated a pilot Reemployment Project in thirty cities; in 1995, the program went nationwide. State-owned enterprises also established reemployment service centers as transitional measures to train the unemployed and arrange jobs for them (Solinger 2001; Yang 2007). These centers were closed in 2003. Nonetheless, assisting with reemployment has remained a priority for local governments and grassroots institutions, particularly residents’ committees and street agencies. Such social welfare programs relate, in part, to the ruling party’s continued desire to pay homage to socialism and their desire to renew and repoliticize socialist ethics or categories in order to develop the market.

Instead of focusing on creating a greater supply of meaningful employment, the new reemployment framework focuses on the psychology of individuals. This approach reconfigures unemployment as the failure of individuals to adapt to the market or as a consequence of self-maladjustment. Key to this reemployment framework is job training, part of the mushrooming peixun culture. Peixun, roughly translated as training, teaching, or cultivating, presumably offers practical knowledge or skills that give people an advantage in the job market (see Urciouli 2008 for a comparative case). In the fields of counseling and psychology, peixun is particularly appealing not only to those who intend to become licensed counselors but also to those who have regular jobs and seek such training to enhance their work and social relationships (Zhang 2014). One of the common goals this type of peixun claims to achieve is awakening and maximizing human potential through xintai peixun (training of the heart attitude). This provides trainees with attitudes, emotions, and thought processes that create favorable psychological conditions for actualizing their positive potential or for self-fulfillment.14

Although xintai, or heart attitude, is not a neologism, it has recently gained new significance within the political project of constructing a harmonious society. Liu Yuli (2008), a lecturer at China’s Central Party School, published a popular psychological self-help teaching video titled
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*xintai* gaibian mingyun (Heart attitude changes one's destiny). In it, Liu illustrates how and why “both a happy life and a harmonious society begin with one’s heart attitude.” For Liu, a positive *xintai* encompassing gratitude (to society) is necessary for a happy and productive life. In this framing, *xintai* is not only private and part of the self but also public and part of the world. It is relational, and its impact or affective bearing is oriented toward the world. The heart is not a being but a becoming in relational perspectives. Further, Liu’s deployment of *xintai* as a combination of attitude and psychology and as key to a harmonious society illustrates the dynamic relationship between ideological commitments and epistemological practice in China.15

The heart is a fundamental component of being and a key precept in traditional Chinese medicine. As the seat of cognition, virtue and bodily sensation, the heart is the origin of all emotions and the grounding space for all aspects of bodily and social well-being (Ots 1994; Hall and Ames 1998; Tian 2005). Unlike the Western formation of personhood, which is based on a psyche that is separate from soma (the body), Chinese psychologists adopt a more embodied and holistic approach to psychological problems that are referred to, for example, as *xinbing* (heartache) or *xinjie* (heart knots). Indeed, psychology is translated in Chinese as *xinlixue* (the study of the heart’s reasoning). This holistic approach is significant not just because of its therapeutic consequences for subjects; it also serves to broaden the power of the government and psychological experts to intrude into people’s lives more thoroughly than a psyche-based Western psychology would.

Both *qianli* and *yinhuan* are anchored in the heart. Community psychosocial workers believe that *qianli* is mainly based on happiness, hope, and a positive heart attitude and that *yinhuan* often derives from discontent, anger, and negativity. The focus on the heart and the emphasis on embodied and performative features of psychology resonate with the rise of “soft skills” such as leadership, intuition, vision, and affect in management (Thrift 2005, 11; Rudnyckyj 2010). In this book, I follow Sara Ahmed (2004) and Sianne Ngai (2005), who see affect and emotion as interchangeable and distinctions between the two as a matter of degree. Both emotion and affect include a combination of cognition and bodily sensation. That is, both cannot be entirely cognitive or captured by language; both have a sensual dimension that cannot be entirely narrated verbally but must also
be experienced bodily (see Yang 2014 for a review of affect and emotion). In Changping, the attention to affect in psychotherapy and job training is also a way of reenchanting work by restoring or rejuvenating what socialist work units had repressed: emotions, personal responsibility, and the possibility of self-realization.

Apart from the loss of income, unemployment has often affected workers' attitudes and morale. Many took their layoffs personally, even seeing their unemployment as a reason for cutting all ties with the Communist Party. The traumatic impact of layoffs stems from deep-rooted assumptions of employment for life in the work-unit system and from the draconian ways workers experienced layoffs (Solinger 2001, 2006; Yang 2007). Some have characterized the latest wave of layoffs in medical terms as something that produced \textit{shiye zonghezheng} (unemployment complex syndrome) (Wang 2008, 166), which involves both psychological disorders (e.g., depression, alcoholism, suicide) and physical problems (e.g., headaches, stomachaches, hair loss). In the context of the grim job market in China, the constant pressure to look for reemployment exacerbates these symptoms. Many workers I spoke to in Changping have conveyed stories of layoff trauma and its impact on their emotions and bodies with extraordinary acuity. Suicide has become more common. Eight people have committed suicide since layoffs were initiated at Beibiao because of the downsizing of the work force triggered by the Asian financial crisis of 1997. Most were men. Several left suicide notes indicating that layoffs were to blame. Others have returned to the factory to vandalize it or "make a fuss" (\textit{daoluan}); these actions are one reason why these male workers are viewed as \textit{yinhuan}.

This wave of Chinese unemployment parallels and contributes to a general mental health "crisis" (e.g., depression, schizophrenia, stress, suicide) spawned by widespread socioeconomic dislocation (Phillips et al. 2002; Bi 2008) that reportedly affects over one hundred million Chinese (Chen 2010). Like the "unemployment complex syndrome," this mental health crisis has manifested as both a material condition and as a state- and expert-sponsored discourse that legitimizes psychotherapy as a solution to social problems. This discourse persists despite the fact that the therapy offered through job training and reemployment schemes does not address mental health directly but invokes mental illness to pathologize unemployment and unemployed workers and transform their attitudes and thought
processes in order to help them adapt to the market economy. The logic of psychologization that emphasizes the self and self-fulfillment presents the breakdown of the work-unit system that was once a source of emotional and communal support for workers as "empowering" for the individual. This discourse informs and compels the development and commodification of psychotherapy, accentuating the complicity between the state and market.

The development of psychotherapy was uneven in China during the twentieth century. Western psychotherapy first arrived in the early 1900s, marked by two significant events: the establishment of the Beijing Psychology Institute in 1917 and the founding of the Chinese Psychological Society in 1921 (Han and Zhang 2007). Over the next three decades, training courses in Freudian psychoanalysis were developed, then Soviet-influenced Pavlovian rapid comprehensive therapy emerged in the mid-1950s. During the Cultural Revolution, however, psychology and psychiatry were deemed to be bourgeois, counterrevolutionary disciplines that were "spiritual opiates," numbing and exploiting the masses. Both the development and the delivery of psychotherapy were halted (Munro 2002). By the 1980s, political changes and economic reform had yielded a more favorable environment, and psychotherapy reemerged as a legitimate scientific discipline.

Psychological services are now available in large cities in China. Yet even with this progress, the ratio of counselors to the population in China remains low, at 2.4 per 1 million people—a stark contrast with the United States, where there are 3,000 counselors for every 1 million people (Han and Zhang 2007). Formal counseling training in China was initiated in 2002 (Higgins et al. 2008, 102), and since then, private counseling has begun by serving mainly the well-to-do middle class. For the rest of the population, community-based mental health interventions (along with psycho-education media and self-help literature) have become important bearers of therapeutic messages and psychological knowledge.

The continuing shortage of formal counselors to address people’s stress and anxiety about change and socioeconomic dislocation has allowed (former) party staff to retrain in various modes of therapy. In the Chinese language, the word for "ideology" and "mentality" is the same, sixiang (Munro 2002, 7). Since the early days of Chinese communist rule, there has been a presumed dialectical relationship between ideology and
mentality, including mental illness; correcting one's political ideology in Mao's era would allow one to recover from mental illness. The putative reason people became mentally ill was that their heads were filled with an excess of selfish ideas and personal concerns (Munro 2002, 9) that could be eradicated through thought work.21

With this historical backdrop in mind, one can see why one solution to the shortage of counselors in China has been to retrain party staff as psychosocial workers. Those in the party are presumably best positioned to weed out all manners of problems because of their superior knowledge of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong's thought. This knowledge is now fused with psychological precepts, and with these tools party workers are deployed to help others. This is particularly true of community-based social workers, who are often retrained party staff the government has paid to take part in training sessions in social work or counseling and use their new knowledge and skills in psychological interventions for workers (Shi 2011).22 In the process, not only Communist thought work but also Chinese cultural traditions, including Confucianism, have also been revitalized as resources of psychological care and self-help.24

In this book, I analyze the counseling methods and work styles of three types of counselors—professional counselors who are occasionally employed by community residents' committees to counsel residents, community-based psychosocial workers, and laid-off workers turned informal counselors. I focus on the latter two groups. Community psychosocial workers are often retrained party staff and members of residents' committees; they take advantage of their skills in thought work to transform themselves directly into psychosocial workers. Because of their deep embeddedness in the community where they work, these psychosocial workers not only adopt a psychological approach but can also embed their work in the social and cultural context to address people's problems and psychological distress holistically. They psychologize social issues and also perceive emotional and psychological disorders as social and moral issues.24 These psychosocial workers also train laid-off workers as informal counselors.

With preliminary training in counseling and psychology, laid-off workers are reemployed to do domestic work and "counsel" those who are lonely and depressed and those who are experiencing similar difficulties and stress following job loss. In the training laid-off workers are given for their new roles as informal counselors, they are encouraged to invoke
their own suffering and their experience of overcoming stress and difficulties as they empathize and sympathize with those whom they “counsel.” In this sense, through the reformulation of their own suffering, these workers’ reemployment as psychological care givers constitutes a way of regulating at least a fraction of the dispossessed, who then act in service of others. Basic psychological knowledge has been integrated in job training and reemployment counseling programs in Beibiao and then into the community job center, because over 75 percent of the trainees are women who are often reemployed as domestic workers, nurses, cleaners, and yue sao (maternity matrons) and in other (care-related) jobs where a psychological perspective can be helpful.

Despite the link made between psychologization and the Chinese notion of heart, in practice, new psychological knowledge does not always align with people’s existing frameworks of knowledge. Thus, it often fails to provide them with a familiar base of concepts that are helpful in grounding productive reflection and in rethinking premises for action. The psychologization process instead introduces into the lives of millions of Chinese a new politics of unequal therapeutic interchange based on class and gender. I argue that current practices of psychotherapy in China can obstruct the healing of and further marginalize those whom psychosocial workers purport to treat. Therefore, this book also illustrates the possibility of subversive responses and resistance. I show that values, styles, and domains of psychological knowledge that have been developing and gathering strength at the margins of society are beginning to penetrate and reconstruct dominant modes of thought in China.

**Psychologization, Potentiality, and the Psychological Imaginary**

The discourses of government-sponsored psychotherapy function not only to minimize structural forces that produce mass unemployment but also to constitute a medium that mobilizes the psychological and moral traits of the unemployed in order to nurture their potential and growth for the purpose of extracting value. In the context of China’s massive growth through neoliberal enterprises and policies, psychology advances market development, for example, by creating new employment opportunities and constructing entrepreneurial subjects. In general, the psychologization trend
in China is not a departure from authoritarian political rule; rather, it facilitates both economic development and political legitimacy, for example, through building a harmonious society for the state. It is a kind of political (mis)use of psychology that entangles subjective perspectives with state power (Rose 1996; Gordo and De Vos 2010; McLaughlin 2010; De Vos 2011; Yang 2013a) through notions of happiness and potential that combine both personal desire and state interests. This form of psychologization encompasses two interrelated dimensions. The first renders nonpsychological issues in "psychological" terms. In China, this does not always mean a systematic application of state policy with regard to psychology; more often, it is a hegemonic psychological discourse that creeps into the process of managing social issues and groups, for example, by imagining them in terms of their potential. It is exercised by both governmental and nongovernmental agencies. The other dimension emphasizes affect and therapeutic governance. This therapeutic governance is not only based on pathologization or problematization but also relies on precepts of positive psychology. For example, by promoting the happiness and positive potential of the marginalized through counseling, the therapeutic strategy appears to be constructive while its goal is also to be preemptive. This echoes Pupavac’s (2002) observation that the pill of counselling is often coated with the sugar of other activities. Examples include providing community, women’s, or youth centers as a way of establishing points of contact with locals to entice them into counseling programs. This strategy also demonstrates the importance of politics in mediating the experience of trauma (499).

I see psychology not only as a knowledge system but also as a culturally specific way of understanding and ordering actions (Foucault 1998, 249) and a way of imagining reality. Brinkman (2011) suggests that psychology, as an array of practical modes of understanding and acting in everyday life, can be seen as having penetrated the social imaginary of the West to the extent that people have problems seeing that social life can be imagined in nonpsychological terms in contemporary Western societies (2011, 18). Illouz (2008, 15) further points out that modern imaginings are likely to be formulated at sites where expert knowledge systems, media technologies, and emotions intersect. The notions of therapy and psychological self-help contribute to a new way of thinking about the relationship of self to others, imagining new potential, and implementing them in practice. I focus on
new ways of imagining social relationships and groups in China triggered by the integration of psychology with governing social life.

Although the new psychotherapy in China is mainly sponsored by the state, it is also associated with a shift from a notion of discipline from above to discipline that should ideally come from within the individual. It is also associated with a shift from the government’s calls for the people to sacrifice their lives for the nation-state to calls for people to value life—an example of kindly power and the “deepening of governmentality” (Zhang 2011a). At its core is the possibility of imagination, which includes the capacity to represent what does not exist. However, it is not limited to this function. It also informs images of existing and non-existing objects (Bottici and Challand 2010, 3). Without this merging of the extant and the novel there could be no utopia or ideology in the sense of false consciousness. Because psychology promises that individuals will achieve certain goals if they behave in certain ways, it can be used to construct idealistic or utopian situations that parallel or identify with social goals and, in China, communist ideals.

Bottici and Challand (2011, 4) define politics as “a struggle for people’s imaginations.” Indeed, as Hippler (2011) observes, those who hold power often see imagination and passion as causes of social disharmony. Hippler (2011) identifies hope and fear as the passions that powerful authorities use most often to pacify societies: hope for a better life in the future and fear of punishment. However, since human nature will not submit to absolute repression, it is more useful for political powers to rely on hope than fear. Imagination provides the link between the social creation of hope and the stability of the state. When states use imagination in this way, power is felt indirectly, through the intensity of an affective experience, such as the power of hope. Bugliani (2011) further suggests that instead of looking for power in terms of its location (who wields it), researchers should look for power in the limits placed on peoples’ faculties of imagining and in how these limitations are imposed.

The notion of imagination is closely related to potential. Potential is the possible actualization of a hidden capacity (Munn 1986; Strathern 1999; Bateson 2000). In a social context, this means that a present figure, force, or formation is experienced or imagined as containing hidden states that have not yet materialized. The future is thus experienced as a specific configuration of potentiality (Agamben 1999). As Vigh (2011) argues, the influence of the potential is not restricted to the ideational dimension of lives. People not
only reflect on potential; they also act on it. Despite the lack of physical or concrete presence, potential is capable of influencing social and physical bodies and current governing processes. In other words, people act both habitually and innovatively based on their sense of possibilities (Hirsch 1995, 4).

Scholars have begun to view people's potential to act and their potential to withhold action as parameters of politics (I Iardt 1999; Massumi 2007; Venn 2007). Mette N. Svendsen (2011) proposes an anthropological approach to the study of potential that “addresses the cultural context as well as the material conditions of that seen as incomplete yet with a power—a potency—to develop into something else” (416). While this approach emphasizes the power of potentiality to transform social networks and relations, it neglects a politics in which constituting, animating, actualizing, and preempting potential falls under the purview of the sovereign power of experts and the government (Yang 2013a, 2014). In China, although the psychotherapeutic intervention emphasizes the self and personal responsibility, the conditions under which individuals can access psychological resources are governed by experts and the state.

Here it is important to understand both facets of potential; the potential to do or become something and the potential not to do or become something. Opposing the claim that potential exists only in an act, Agamben (1998, 45) endorses Aristotle's insistence on the idea that potential has an autonomous existence; human beings are capable of an act even if they are not doing it. For example, a builder retains his ability to build even when he does not build. Some scholars have criticized this notion of potential, which they see as emphasizing the power to suspend the passage of potential into actuality because they see in this the construction of promissory subjects—subjects that are not realized and only potential—and inactivity that appears to reduce individual agency (Power 2010). In the Chinese context, however, notions of both positive and negative potential in reemployment counseling maximize individual agency, because individual potential is mobilized to contribute to the metamorphosis of broader political possibilities.

As Agamben (1998, 47) points out, when sovereign powers politicize potential, some possible worlds never pass into actuality while others become manifest. In China, both the state and psychosocial workers encourage the unemployed to actualize their potential to become entrepreneurs, to adopt new morals, or to enjoy a better life. However, these same groups of people
also embody negative potential, and government-sponsored psychotherapy is designed to encourage them not to actualize negative potential, such as engaging in alcohol abuse, physical violence, or social unrest. Through its programs of sponsored therapy, the Chinese government relies on the notion of a subject who can act or choose not to act as the basis for healing and moving forward on both the personal and social level. I thus emphasize the dialectic interaction between two loosely configured processes of becoming that workers embody as qianli and yinhuan. These can be actualized or constrained by external relations or triggers—in this case, the new psychology in China and its cognates such as counseling and social work. In addition to subjective potential, the notion of potential in Changping appears as an embedded part of the future, reframing space-time as a series of possible worlds.

The definition, actualization, and preemption of potential in China are historically and culturally specific. For example, Confucius made the statement that junzi bu qi, meaning that virtuous men are not machines or vessels but have creativity and potential that can be achieved through self-cultivation (Worm 2010, 223). In Mao’s era, individual potential was putatively released through collective socialist labor. This resonates with Marx’s (1977) idea that the human potential for rational understanding and freedom is derived from labor or production. For Marx, production is not the mechanical and manipulative use of domination but the free flow of potential life. With the power of imagination a subject can visualize things not yet existing; he or she can plan and begin to create (Fromm 1947, 94–95). Both communism and Mao’s thought gave people the resources for social imagination; that is, xinnian (faith) in communism drove people in Mao’s era to imagine the collective and work together to build socialism.

However, when promises of communism failed (particularly workers) in China, a new politics of potentiality based on the self (or psychological imaginary) came into being. Now in the context of the boom in psychology in China and the current rampant development of the peixun culture, the public and government officials presume that human potential is released through psychological or heart-attitude training and through self-reflection and self-adjustment. These new modes of social imagination divert people from focusing on a present demarcated by intensified social stratification to focusing on something forthcoming that gives hope.
The potentiality Changping psychosocial workers promote in their management of unemployment is oriented toward the future, informed by history, and mediated by psychology as a new mode for imagining society. For example, in recent training of peiliao, or housemaid counselors, characteristics associated with ethics in former work units such as laoshi, or being honest and down to earth, are psychologized as new moral attributes that enhance the peiliao’s potential in the new job market (see Chapter 5). These women serve as pioneers who bridge the old planned economy and the new market economy; they are encouraged to internalize change in order to externalize or release potential into the market economy that is dormant or suppressed by the planned economy.

Chinese counselors widely adopt Carl Rogers’s (1951) client-centered therapy, which also emphasizes the agency and potential of the client in the therapeutic process. Rogers’s therapeutic process is based on a positive perspective of human nature and potential. The core therapeutic conditions are congruence, acceptance, and empathy. This therapeutic process is designed to lead to new knowledge about the self and to fuller actualization of the client’s potential. While Rogers adopts a nondirective approach that proposes minimum intervention by the therapist in order to allow clients to find their own solutions to their problems, Chinese people are often socialized to heed direction from authority figures and to expect external guidance and approval (Qian et al. 2002). In addition to the uniqueness of such microlevel therapeutic processes, I also explore the cultural imaginings of members of the Chinese working class, the counselors drawn from their ranks, and the state that governs the therapeutic interactions that bring them together.

Therapeutic Governance and Kindly Power

Psychosocial intervention in unemployment is a new mode of therapeutic governance in China. Indeed, a therapeutic ethos—the ideas and practices of therapeutic expertise (Nolan 1998) and other sociocultural practices of healing—pervades policies on reemployment with its diagnosis of traumatized identities of the unemployed. The idea that unemployment renders workers traumatized and dysfunctional problematizes their capacity for self-governance. The perception that traumatized workers cannot govern themselves legitimizes indefinite supervision and therapeutic intervention.
To look more closely at the efficacy of governing by psychology, I build on theories of state use of therapeutic modes of social control and the competition between new expertise and historical knowledge within types of governance. The notion of the therapeutic state was first proposed by Thomas Szasz in the 1960s. Szasz (1963) examines society's orientation toward systems of therapy for dealing with deviant behavior, arguing that the state has an interest in directing the behavior of its citizens. While Szasz's work focused on medicine and mental health, China's recent psychotherapeutic interventions have targeted social and economic issues such as urban poverty, labor unrest, and unemployment. For example, the psychological approach to reemployment implies that layoffs are the result of workers' norms and attitudes such as a habitual dependence on the state that is now deemed deviant. Unemployed workers who have internalized these characteristics are putatively unable to adjust to the demands of the market economy. It is then the state's (and psychotherapists') responsibility to redirect unemployed individuals toward the market (Beijing Reemployment Project Leadership Office 2002).

Since Szasz, other scholars have expanded on the notion of the state's usurpation of therapy. James Nolan (1998) argues that the logic of the therapeutic state is one of governmentality that focuses on citizens' sense of self and emphasizes emotions as a source of truth. In line with this argument, unlike in Mao's era, when personal emotion and mental illness were considered bourgeois or ideologically undesirable (Munro 2002), in China's current reform era, public culture emphasizes individual feelings and autonomy (Yan Y. 2003). Popular media are saturated with terms such as yali (stress), xingqing (mood), youyu (depressed), and xinli (psychological) (Feng 1996). Yet psychologization in China not only disseminates the language of psychology into everyday life; it also renders social and economic life as the life of the heart or mind-body that is oriented by individual responsibility and productivity particularly in the management of mass unemployment.

Andrew Polsky (1991) extends the notion of therapy to the study of the contemporary welfare state, which incorporates aspects of therapy to deal with marginalized populations. This move is predicated on pathologizing lower classes and labeling them as incapable of adjusting to the demands of normal, everyday life and therefore in need of therapeutic assistance. Polsky regards such normalizing interventions as violations of the autonomy of the individual citizen. Miller and Rose (1994, 331) go beyond seeing the therapeutic state as a force that represses marginal populations. They argue
that therapeutic governmentality is subtle, akin to a new style of power that endows individuals with new competencies, aptitudes, and qualities that can be mobilized to generate new knowledge and surplus value. Along this line, but diverging from the Western literature that emphasizes the power of psychology professionals and the state over individual life, I examine the dialectic interaction between therapeutic governance and the experience, emotions, and agency of those who are subjected to such governance in China. The form of governance in China—the promotion of governmental reason through fostering lives and channeling people’s desire by both governmental and nongovernmental agencies—constructs a unique role for psychology in maximizing individual agency and potential in the context of the current economic transformation.

Also, in the Western literature of the therapeutic state, forms of local knowledge that are embedded in society and rooted in history are not typically recognized, even as expert knowledge comes directly into conflict with them or tries to invoke them. However, the dialogic emergence of new forms of knowing and being that result from new expertise understood in conjunction with a historical canon is crucial to fully grasping the power and pragmatics of contemporary psychotherapy in China. In the strands of China’s history of psychology that have come together in current psychologization, China’s diverse and local forms of psychological knowledge are integrated into the new governance that is implemented in diverse locales. I explore in what follows how informal and local psychological knowledge in Changping (including the heart, the dialectics of biantong) confronts the hegemony of norms of human consciousness, potentiality, and identity that are established in Western counseling and social work (see Chapter 4). In China, experts and their knowledge cannot operate successfully without the localized perspectives. In interactions between experts and clients and within the clients, newly introduced psychology and historically rooted values and perspectives are brought into dialectical engagement.

To redress the lack of attention to a dynamic role for local, historical, and culturally specific knowledge, in this book, I combine an analysis of the therapeutic state with context-specific ethnographic data, investigating first how the Chinese therapeutic governing, as exemplified in psychologization, differs from manifestations in the West. I argue that while Western therapeutic states seek to normalize the marginalized, in China, differently situated unemployed workers are treated disparately by the government
and psychosocial workers: some are normalized, others are pathologized, others are nurtured, and still others are glorified because of their putative embodiment of different potentialities. Indeed, newly marginalized workers are perceived to harbor multiple potentialities, both positive and negative. Diverging greatly from previous attempts in China to achieve social control via therapeutic or medicalized strategies, such as in the misuse of psychiatry under Mao, this differential treatment of marginalized subjects is unique to the moment that began in the mid-1990s with China's economic restructuring. Echoing Solinger (2001), such differential treatment of laid-off workers prevents them from getting united and organized, posing threats to the government. This form of therapeutic governance is a unity of contradictory practices: the government "cares" for those who have been displaced and impoverished by its own policy of privatization. It is contextualized in the notions of minsheng (the people's livelihood) and renzheng (benevolent government). I call this mode of governance kindly power (Yang 2010).

When China's new state leadership took power in 2002, it ushered in new governing styles to strengthen its affinity with the masses. Invoking Mencius's doctrine of benevolence (ren), the government claimed that the people and their livelihoods would be the basis of its rule (yi min wen ben; minsheng wei ben). Mencius (371—289 BCE), who is widely endorsed as the authentic interpreter of Confucius, emphasized benevolent rule and moralizing politics in empire building. He believed that if a ruler loves benevolence, he should have no enemy in the world (Mencius 2004).50 However, unlike Mencius's emphasis on ren as a virtue that is anchored in the intrinsic goodness of human nature, kindly power is not genuine; it is often translated into symbolic kind gestures or tokenistic welfare programs, particularly those that target underprivileged groups. It is a show of symbolic kindness after unkind state policies destroy the livelihood and wellbeing of the people. Such a show of "kindness" can be operated through psychotherapeutic techniques and other programs (i.e., those that focus on poverty relief).

Factory managers claim that their kind acts of providing psychological self-help and psychological care highlight the key feature of socialist unemployment. However, workers asked rhetorically who delivered the damage in the first place. Through such psychological "care," the state and its arms were trying to induce a false sense of well-being by shifting responsibility to suffering individuals while continuing its destructive
impulse. In other words, this type of psychological counseling and other welfare programs—psychological care, symbolic reemployment and emphasis on positive potential—are only a trick of kindness that is intended to disguise the unkindness of the state—control, regulation, and exploitation. The discourse of qianli and yinhuan that laid-off workers embody also exemplifies the notion of kindly power. Emphasizing the positive potential and productivity of these workers while downplaying the potential risks and threats these workers harbor is both a form of kindness and a mode of regulation.

Indeed, this kindly power is part of the shift in governance. The current government views the people’s wealth, health, and value as the legitimating framework for governing (Kleinman 2011, xiv). Zhang (2011a, 2) renders such shifting governance as “the deepening of governmentality,” that is, elevating life from the survival of living beings to a level of adequacy and human flourishing, from ensuring biological being to ensuring well-being.

Drawing on Foucault’s notions of biopower or governmentality (fostering and extending life or the power over life) and sovereignty (killing or the power of death), Zhang (2011a, 11) argues that the two modes of power have often been inseparable in China since 1949. China’s lack of or underdevelopment of a liberalism that would check sovereignty and promote freedom renders the rule of benevolence a pretension of the sovereign government or as mere tentative measures the sovereign government has taken to survive rebellions and turbulences. Minsheng (the people’s livelihood) directly appeals to the concerns and desires of the people in everyday living. The increasing official attention to minsheng without fully developing minquan (the rights of the people) can constitute an obstacle to the deepening of governmentality in China. That is, China’s move toward an adequate life is just the beginning of fully developed governmentality, and if this is not ensured, the deepening of governmentality can be stalled (Zhang 2011a, 22).

While the popular use of Western theories of psychotherapy may impact therapeutic practices in the rest of the world, including China, disease and illness categories are not universal. They are constituted by culture, experienced and articulated differently in culturally and historically specific contexts (Kleinman and Good 1985; Kleinman 1986, 1991, 2000; Good et al. 2008). It is also important to situate the current psychotherapeutic interventions in