Publication Date

1992

Abstract

In several states workers who are unemployed because of a labor dispute can collect unemployment benefits. Due to imperfect experience rating, such policies can create a public subsidy to strikes. This study examines whether these policies affect strike activity. In particular, both cross-sectional and fixed effects models are employed to test whether an increase in the public subsidy inherent in unemployment insurance leads to an increase in strike frequency.

Comments

Required Publisher’s Statement
© Springer. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. Final version published as: Hutchens, R., Lipsky, D. B., & Stern, R. (1992). Unemployment insurance and strikes. Journal of Labor Research, 13(4), 337-354. doi: 10.1007/BF02685525

Suggested Citation
Hutchens, R., Lipsky, D. B., & Stern, R. (1992). Unemployment insurance and strikes [Electronic version]. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, ILR School site: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/1284

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