Copyright (c) 2009 Cornell University ILR School All rights reserved. http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview Recent documents in Industrial & Labor Relations Review en-us Fri, 16 Oct 2009 13:45:03 PDT 3600 http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/7 http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/7 Mon, 05 Oct 2009 11:35:16 PDT The author estimates the incidence of salary compression and inversion, and the effects of different forms of collective representation (unions and special plans, with and without binding arbitration), for faculty at Ontario universities over the 1970-2004 period. The data show large decreases in the salary differential between full and associ­ate professors and severe compression and inversion in age-salary profiles in the 2000s. Union representation had no effect on salaries compared to no formal representation. Special plans without binding arbitration led to lower salaries, while special plans with binding arbitration yielded higher salaries, but all of the estimated effects were small. Average salaries were lower the higher the proportion of female faculty in the 1970s, but this effect became statistically insignificant by the early 1990s. Finally, faculty salaries responded to the cost of living in the university's city, and were higher, on average, in universities with higher average research productivity. Felice Martinello http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/13 http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/13 Thu, 01 Oct 2009 12:41:19 PDT Deborah Oxley http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/12 http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/12 Thu, 01 Oct 2009 12:41:18 PDT Michael Rizzo http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/11 http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/11 Thu, 01 Oct 2009 12:41:17 PDT Forrest Briscoe http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/10 http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/10 Thu, 01 Oct 2009 12:41:16 PDT Jerome Braun http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/9 http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/9 Thu, 01 Oct 2009 12:41:14 PDT Alexander Colvin http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/8 http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/8 Thu, 01 Oct 2009 12:41:13 PDT This paper uses CPS data to examine changes in single women's labor supply elas­ticities in recent decades. Specifically, the authors investigate trends in how single women's hours of work and labor force participation rates responded to both wages and income over the years 1979-2003. Results from the base specification suggest that over the observation period, hours wage elasticities decreased by 82%, participation wage elasticities by 36%, and participation income elasticities by 57%. These results imply that changes in tax policy had a much larger effect on the labor supply and labor force participation behavior of women in this subpopulation in the early 1980s than in recent years. Kelly Bishop http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/6 http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/6 Thu, 01 Oct 2009 12:41:10 PDT Previous research on the association between unionization and the adoption of high performance work systems (HPWSs) has yielded inconsistent results. Using data from a 2004 multi-industry survey of firms operating in the Republic of Ireland, the authors examine the relationship between employee union membership rates and relative use of HPWSs. They also test arguments that employment security may affect the receptiveness of unions to such HR practices. The results indicate that as union representation increased, there was a significant decrease in the use of high performance work systems. Evidence also suggests that providing employment security significantly ameliorated this negative impact. Wenchuan Liu http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/5 http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/5 Thu, 01 Oct 2009 12:41:08 PDT This paper adopts a historical/new institutionalist perspective to explain why the decline of the American labor movement has been exceptional in comparison to other labor movements, and especially its Canadian counterpart. Under this perspective, national founding conditions and traditions become embedded in institutional norms that shape national institutional environments and trajectories, substantially constraining labor movements and hence accounting for their development and future. The author argues that the founding conditions of the United States gave rise to "mobilization biases"--biases affecting the various parties' relative ability to mobilize resources, and thus ultimately privileging some interests over others--that explain both why the labor movement developed as it did and why it has declined. He concludes that, in view of these biases and the norms underpinning them, the American labor movement's future (unlike the future of its European counterparts) lies in perpetual struggle rather than the pursuit of a long-term accord. John Godard http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/4 http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ilrreview/vol63/iss1/4 Thu, 01 Oct 2009 12:41:06 PDT The authors develop a general model of local-level bargaining in the multi-plant firm. According to this model, when the parent firm has the ability to allocate produc­tion differentially across plants, the local union may be motivated to work with local management to reduce production costs and increase profitability, in order to increase plant employment or minimize reductions in plant employment. A case study using data from General Motors' Lansing Grand River Assembly (LGRA) and United Auto Workers Local 652, collected in part from interviews conducted in 2003-2008, shows how the parties established a joint responsibility system of collective bargaining that encouraged the union to reduce production costs and increase profitability by accept­ing responsibilities traditionally borne by management. The authors also demonstrate that General Motors, consistent with budget, capacity, and political constraints, invested in LGRA and assigned new product to LGRA, thus supporting the hypothesized incen­tive structure. Richard Block