The Institute for Compensation StudiesTM (ICS) in the ILR School at Cornell University is a vehicle for interdisciplinary research on compensation, compensation design and compensation strategy.
All aspects of compensation are explored by the Institute including (but not limited to) compensation design, compensation in for-profit and nonprofit organizations, executive compensation, benefits and pensions, total compensation, forms of pay and pay “mix”, the relationship between pay and “performance”, compensation in labor unions, public policy, regulation and legal issues, minimum wages and compensation internationally.
The Institute also strives to be the central repository for academic research on compensation worldwide. Interested researchers can submit their papers to the ICS for possible inclusion by sending a message to: linda.barrington@cornell.edu.
Submissions from 2011
The Executive Compensation Controversy: A Transatlantic Analysis, Martin J. Conyon, Nuno Fernandes, Miguel A. Ferreira, Pedro Matos, and Kevin J. Murphy
Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance in China, Martin J. Conyon and Lerong He
Wages or Fringes? Some Evidence on Trade-offs and Sorting, Tor Eriksson and Nicolai Kristensen
Job Loss and Effects on Firms and Workers, Kevin F. Hallock, Michael R. Strain, and Douglas Webber
Executive Compensation in American Unions, Kevin Hallock and Felice B. Klein
Classic Promotion Tournaments Versus Market-Based Tournaments, Michael Waldman
Submissions from 2010
Social Preferences and the Efficiency of Bilateral Exchange, Daniel J. Benjamin
Immigrant Heterogeneity and the Earnings Distribution in the United Kingdom and United States: New Evidence from a Panel Data Quantile Regression Analysis, Sherrilyn M. Billger and Carlos LaMarche
Executive Pay and Firm Performance: Methodological Considerations and Future Directions, Beth Florin, Kevin F. Hallock, and Douglas Webber
Agency and Compensation: Evidence from the Hotel Industry, Matthew Freedman and Renata Kosova
Keeping Up with CEO Jones: Benchmarking and Executive Compensation, Ron Laschever
Board Independence and the Gender Pay Gap for Top Executives, Karen Selody
Submissions from 2009
Shareholder Voting and Directors’ Remuneration Report Legislation: Say on Pay in the U.K. (CRI 2009-004), Martin J. Cavanagh and Graham V. Sadler
Compensation Consultants and Executive Pay (CRI 2009-010), Martin J. Conyon
Are U.S. CEOs Paid More than U.K. CEOs? Inferences from Risk- Adjusted Pay (CRI 2009-003), Martin J. Conyon, John E. Core, and Wayne R. Guay
The Signaling Role of Promotions: Further Theory and Empirical Evidence (CRI 2009-008), Jed DeVaro and Michael Waldman
Standard Promotion Practices versus Up-or-Out Contracts (CRI 2009-001), Suman Ghosh and Michael Waldman
Executive Compensation in American Unions (CRI 2009-007), Kevin F. Hallock and Felice B. Klein
Is a Higher Calling Enough? Incentive Compensation in the Church (CRI 2009-011), Jay C. Hartzell, Christopher A. Parsons, and David L. Yermack
Performance Pay and the White-Black Wage Gap, John S. Heywood and Daniel Parent
The Relative Effects of Merit Pay, Bonuses, and Long-Term Incentives on Future Job Performance (CRI 2009-009), Sanghee Park and Michael C. Sturman
Negative Hedging: Performance Sensitive Debt and CEOs’ Equity Incentives (CRI 2009-014), Alexei Tchistyi, David Yermack, and Hayong Yun
Stockholder and Bondholder Reactions To Revelations of Large CEO Inside Debt Holdings: An Empirical Analysis (CRI 2009-005), Chenyang Wei and David Yermack
Submissions from 2008
CEO Turnover and Firm Performance in China’s Listed Firms (CRI 2009-012), Martin Conyon and Lerong He
Executive Compensation and CEO Equity Incentives in China’s Listed Firms (CRI 2009-006), Martin J. Conyon and Lerong He
CEO Pay-for-Performance Heterogeneity Using Quantile Regression (CRI 2009-002), Kevin F. Hallock, Regina Madalozzo, and Clayton G. Reck
Theory and Evidence in Internal Labor Markets (CRI 2009-013), Michael Waldman