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Sex Trafficking: Proposals in the 114th Congress to Amend Federal Criminal Law

Charles Doyle
Congressional Research Service

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Sex Trafficking: Proposals in the 114th Congress to Amend Federal Criminal Law

Abstract
[Excerpt] The 114th Congress opened with the introduction of a number of proposals that address human trafficking, particularly sex trafficking. Among them were proposals to amend existing federal criminal law, which would expand the coverage of federal sex trafficking laws; amend bail provisions; raise the limits on supervised release; authorize more extensive wiretapping; and adjust the application of federal forfeiture and restitution laws.

Keywords
sex trafficking, criminal law, Congress

Comments
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Sex Trafficking: 
Proposals in the 114th Congress 
to Amend Federal Criminal Law

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April 29, 2015
Summary

Existing federal law outlaws sex trafficking and provides a variety of mechanisms to prevent it and to assist its victims. Members have offered a number of proposals during the 114th Congress to bolster those efforts. Several clarify, expand, or supplement existing federal criminal law.

For instance, Senator Cornyn’s S. 178, which passed the Senate, and Representative Poe’s H.R. 181, which passed the House, would confirm that federal commercial sex trafficking prohibitions apply to the customers of such enterprises. The bills would also constrict the defense of those who engage in illicit sexual activities with children. Both bills would afford state and federal law enforcement officials greater access to court-supervised electronic surveillance in sex trafficking cases. Both would also expand victims’ statutory rights and remove stringent limits on appellate enforcement of those rights.

S. 178, along with Senator Kirk’s S. 572 and Representative Wagner’s H.R. 285, would bring culpable advertisers within the reach of the federal law which proscribes commercial sex trafficking.

With Senator Feinstein’s S. 140, Representative Poe’s H.R. 296, and Representative Granger’s H.R. 1201, S. 178 would lengthen the permissible term of supervised release for those convicted of plotting to engage in commercial sex trafficking.

S. 178 and Senator Burr’s S. 409 would require Department of Defense (DOD) officials to provide the Attorney General with information relating to military sex offenders required to register under the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). Representative Speier’s H.R. 956 would establish a separate DOD sex offender registry.

Representative Carolyn B. Maloney’s H.R. 1311 would increase the penalties for tax evasion by sex traffickers and call for the establishment of a dedicated office within the Internal Revenue Service to investigate and prosecute tax-avoiding sex traffickers.
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Introduction

The 114th Congress opened with the introduction of a number of proposals that address human trafficking, particularly sex trafficking. Among them were proposals to amend existing federal criminal law, which would expand the coverage of federal sex trafficking laws; amend bail provisions; raise the limits on supervised release; authorize more extensive wiretapping; and adjust the application of federal forfeiture and restitution laws. The legislation includes the following:

- Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (H.R. 181) (Representative Poe) (House passed);³
- Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (S. 178) (Senator Cornyn) (Senate passed);⁴
- Justice for Victims of Trafficking Act (H.R. 296) (Representative Poe);
- Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation Act (SAVE Act) (H.R. 285) (Representative Wagner) (House passed);⁵
- Stop Advertising Victims of Exploitation Act (SAVE Act) (S. 572) (Senator Kirk);
- Combat Human Trafficking Act (H.R. 1201) (Representative Granger);
- Combat Human Trafficking Act (S. 140) (Senator Feinstein);
- Human Trafficking Fraud Enforcement Act (H.R. 1311) (Representative Carolyn B. Maloney);
- Military Sex Offender Reporting Act (S. 409) (Senator Burr); and
- Military Track Register and Alert Communities Act (Military TRAC Act) (H.R. 956) (Representative Speier).

¹ Human trafficking is the coercive or fraudulent exploitation of another in order to secure her labor or services; sexual trafficking is when the victim’s sexual services are exploited, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 1726 (10th ed. 2014)(“The illegal recruitment, transportation, harboring, or receipt of a person, esp. one from another country, with the intent to hold the person captive or exploit the person for labor, services or body parts”); see also 22 U.S.C. 7102(9)(b)(“The term ‘severe forms of trafficking in persons’ means -(A) sex trafficking in which a commercial sex act is induced by force, fraud, or coercion, or in which the person induced to perform such act has not attained 18 years of age; or (B) the recruitment, harboring, transportation, provision, or obtaining of a person for labor or services, through the use of force, fraud, or coercion for the purpose of subjecting to involuntary servitude, peonage, debt bondage, or slavery”).
² Other proposals, which focus to a large extent on grant programs for victims’ benefits and services, are beyond the scope of this report; see, generally, CRS Report R43917, Domestic Human Trafficking Legislation in the 114th Congress, by Kristin Finklea, Adrienne L. Fernandes-Alcantara, and Alison Siskin. For background on federal sex trafficking laws, supervised release, bail, electronic surveillance, forfeiture, and restitution, see CRS Report R43597, Sex Trafficking: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law; CRS Report RL31653, Supervised Release (Parole): An Overview of Federal Law; CRS Report R41733, Privacy: An Overview of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act; CRS Report R40221, Bail: An Overview of Federal Criminal Law; CRS Report 97-139, Crime and Forfeiture; and CRS Report RL34138, Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases, each by Charles Doyle.
Substantive Offenses

The legislation would amend federal substantive law in three areas: commercial sex trafficking (18 U.S.C. 1591); the Mann Act, which outlaws transportation and travel for unlawful sexual purposes; and federal tax crimes.6

Commercial Sex Trafficking

The proposals would amend Section 1591 to (1) confirm the coverage of the customers of a commercial sex trafficking enterprise; (2) outlaw advertising of a commercial sex trafficking enterprise; (3) clarify the government’s burden of proof with regard to the age of the victim; and (4) enlarge the permissible term of supervised release for commercial sex trafficking conspirators.

Liability of Patrons

Section 1591 outlaws commercial sex trafficking. More precisely, it outlaws

- knowingly
- recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining, or maintaining another individual
- knowing or with reckless disregard of the fact that
- the individual will be used to engage commercial sexual activity
- either as a child or virtue of the use of fraud or coercion
- when the activity occurs in or affects interstate or foreign commerce, or occurs within the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States.7

It outlaws separately profiting from such a venture.8

Offenders face the prospect of life imprisonment with a mandatory minimum term of not less than 15 years (not less than 10 years if the victim is between the ages of 14 and 18).9 The same penalties apply to anyone who attempts to violate the provisions of Section 1591.10

6 Some of the analysis here corresponds to a discussion of similar proposals in CRS Report R44006, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation in the 114th Congress, by Charles Doyle.
7 18 U.S.C. 1591(a): “Whoever knowingly - (1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a person; or (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1), “knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).”
9 18 U.S.C. 1591(b).
There have been suggestions to expand Section 1591 to cover advertisers and to more explicitly cover the customers of a commercial sex trafficking scheme. At first glance, Section 1591 does not appear to cover the customers of a sex trafficking enterprise. Moreover, in the absence of a specific provision, mere customers ordinarily are not considered either co-conspirators or accessories before the fact in a prostitution ring. Nevertheless, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the language of Section 1591(a) applied to the case of two customers caught in a law enforcement “sting” who attempted to purchase the services of what they believed were child prostitutes. “The ordinary and natural meaning of ‘obtains’ and the other terms Congress selected in drafting §1591 are broad enough to encompass the actions of both suppliers and purchasers of commercial sex acts,” the court declared.

S. 178 (Senator Cornyn), H.R. 181 (Representative Poe), and a number of other bills would explicitly confirm this construction by amending Section 1591(a) to read in part “Whoever knowingly ... recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, maintains, or patronizes, or solicits by any means any person....” (language of the proposed amendment in italics).

Age: Prosecutors’ Burden

The same bills often amend the “knowledge of age” element in Section 1591(c) to reflect its clarifying amendment with respect to the customers of a commercial sex trafficking venture. The law now absolves the government of the obligation to prove that the defendant knew the victim was a child, if it can show that the defendant had an opportunity to “observe” the victim. The proposal would make it clear that the government would be equally absolved regardless of whether the defendant were a consumer or purveyor of a child’s sexual commercial services, as long as it establishes that the defendant had an opportunity to observe the child: “In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person so recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, maintained, patronized, or solicited the Government need not prove that the defendant knew, or recklessly disregarded the fact, that the person had not attained the age of 18 years,” 18 U.S.C. 1591(c) (language of the proposed amendment in italics).

12 United States v. Jungers, 702 F.3d 1066 (8th Cir. 2013).
13 Id. at 1071.
14 S. 178 (Sen. Cornyn), §108(a)(1), (2), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1591(a); H.R. 181, §6(1), (2), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1591(a); H.R. 296 (Rep. Poe), §9(a)(1), (2), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1591(a); H.R. 1201 (Rep. Granger), §2(a)(1), (2), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1591(a); S. 140 (Sen. Feinstein), §2(a)(1), (2), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1591(a); the House report with respect to comparable language in an earlier proposal observed that “[t]his clarification is intended to direct law enforcement’s investigative and prosecutorial focus on the purchasers of these illegal services, who create the market for the traffickers,” H.Rept. 113-450, at 15-6 (2014).
15 United States v. Robinson, 702 F.3d 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2012)(“[T]his provision [Section 1591(c)], when applicable, imposes strict liability with regard to the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s age, thus relieving the government’s usual burden to prove knowledge or reckless disregard of the victim’s underage status under §1591(a)”).
16 S. 178, §108(a)(3), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1591(c); H.R. 181, §6(3), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1591(c); H.R. 296, §9(a)(3), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1591(c); the House report with respect to comparable language in an earlier proposal observed that “[t]his clarification is intended to direct law enforcement’s investigative and prosecutorial focus on the purchasers of these illegal services, who create the market for the traffickers,” H.Rept. 113-450, at 16 (2014).
Advertisers

Proposals to explicitly cover advertisers might also be seen as a matter of simply sharpening existing law. Anyone who aids and abets the commission of a federal crime by another merits the same punishment as the individual who actually commits the crime.\textsuperscript{17} Liability for aiding and abetting requires that a defendant embrace the crime of another and consciously do something to contribute to its success.\textsuperscript{18}

One of Section 1591’s distinctive features is that its action elements—recruiting, harboring, transporting, providing, obtaining—are activities that might be associated with aiding and abetting the operation of a prostitution enterprise. Section 1591, read literally, does not outlaw operating a prostitution business; it outlaws the steps leading up to or associated with operating a prostitution business—recruiting, harboring, transporting, etc. Strictly construed, advertising in aid of recruitment, harboring, transporting, or one of the other action elements might qualify as aiding and abetting a violation of Section 1591; advertising the availability of a prostitute might not.

Yet one court suggests that Section 1591 does outlaw operating a prostitution business, at least for purposes of aiding and abetting liability, and that by implication advertising might constitute aiding and abetting a violation of the section:

Pringler first argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for aiding and abetting the sex trafficking of a minor [in violation of Section 1591]... We disagree. The record is not devoid of evidence to support the jury’s verdict and show Pringler’s integral role in the criminal venture. Pringler took the money that Norman and B.L. earned from their prostitution and used some of it to pay for hotel rooms where the women met their patrons. Pringler bought the laptop Norman and B.L. used to advertise their services. He drove Norman and B.L. to “outcall” appointments, and he took photographs of Norman, which he had planned for use in advertisements.\textsuperscript{19}

Some bills, S. 178 (Senator Cornyn), H.R. 285 (Representative Wagner), and S. 572 (Senator Kirk), for example, would amend Section 1591(a)(1) to outlaw knowingly advertising a person, knowing the victim would be used for prostitution.\textsuperscript{20} Proponents might suggest that “advertising” would seem to fit snugly within the litany of Section 1591’s action elements.

Section 1591 now requires the government to prove either that the defendant knew of the victim’s underage or coerced status or recklessly disregarded it. The proposal would expose the trafficker and the profiteer to liability based on different levels of knowledge. Advertising traffickers would

\textsuperscript{17} 18 U.S.C. 2(a)(“Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal”).

\textsuperscript{18} Rosemond v. United States, 134 S.Ct. 1240, 1245 (2014), quoting, Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 181 (1994)(“[T]hose who provide knowing aid to persons committing federal crimes, with the intent to facilitate the crime, are themselves committing a crime”); see also, United States v. Pringler, 765 F.3d 445, 449 (5th Cir. 2014)(“To hold a defendant liable for aiding and abetting an offense, the government must show that elements of the substantive offense occurred and that the defendant associated with the criminal activity, participated in it, and acted to help it succeed”).

\textsuperscript{19} Id. at 449-51.

\textsuperscript{20} E.g., S. 178, §118(b), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1); H.R. 285, §2(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1); S. 572, §2(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1591(a)(1).
be liable if they knew of or recklessly disregarded the victim’s status. Advertising profiteers would be liable only if they knew of the victim’s status.\textsuperscript{21}

Knowledge is obviously a more demanding standard than reckless disregard, but the dividing line between the two is not always easily discerned, in part because of the doctrine of willful blindness. The doctrine describes the circumstances under which a jury may be instructed by the court that it may infer knowledge on the part of a defendant. Worded variously, the doctrine applies where evidence indicates that the defendant sought to avoid the guilty knowledge.\textsuperscript{22}

Since the element is worded in the alternative—knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact—the courts have rarely distinguished the two. One interpretation comes from comparable wording in an immigration offense which outlaws transporting an alien knowing or acting in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien is in this country illegally: “To act with reckless disregard of the fact means to be aware of but consciously and carelessly ignore facts and circumstances clearly indicating that the person transported was an alien who had entered or remained in the United States illegally.”\textsuperscript{23} The courts refer to a similar unreasonable indifference standard when speaking of the veracity required for the issuance of a warrant.\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{21} Should the proposal be enacted, 18 U.S.C. 1591(a) would read in pertinent part (proposed language in italics):

\begin{quote}
“Whoever knowingly - (1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits ... advertises ...; or (2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1), knowing, or, except where, in an offense under paragraph (2), the act constituting the violation of paragraph (1) is advertising, in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).”
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.}, 131 S.Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011)(“While the Courts of Appeals articulate the doctrine of willful blindness in slightly different ways, all appear to agree on two basic requirements: (1) the defendant must subjectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the defendant must take deliberate action to avoid learning of that fact”); \textit{United States v. Adorno-Molina}, 774 F.3d 116, 124 (1st Cir. 2014)(“A willful blindness instruction is appropriate if (1) a defendant claims a lack of knowledge, (2) the facts suggest a conscious course of deliberate ignorance, and (3) the instruction, taken as a whole, cannot be misunderstood as mandating an inference of knowledge”); \textit{United States v. Salinas}, 763 F.3d 869, 878 (7th Cir. 2014)(“A defendant may not escape criminal liability simply by pleading ignorance if he knows or strongly suspects he is involved in criminal dealings but deliberately avoids learning more exact information about the nature and extent of those dealings”); \textit{United States v. Mathauda}, 740 F.3d 565, 568-69 (11th Cir. 2014), quoting, \textit{United States v. Bisong}, 384 F.3d 400 (D.C. Cir. 2011), (“We agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that there are two predominant formulations of willful blindness: ‘when a defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the facts, or the defendant was aware of a high probability of the fact in dispute and consciously avoided confirming that fact’”).

\textsuperscript{23} \textit{United States v. Anyanwu}, 775 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 2015).

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{United States v. Gifford}, 727 F.3d 92, 98 (1st Cir. 2013)(“An allegation is made with reckless disregard for the truth if the affiant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the allegations or where the circumstances evinced obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the allegations in the application”); \textit{Betker v. Gomez}, 692 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2012)(“We have said that a reckless disregard for the truth can be shown by demonstrating that the officer entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statements, had obvious reasons to doubt their accuracy, or failed to disclose facts that he or she knew would negate probable cause”); \textit{United States v. Brown}, 631 F.3d 638, 645 (3d Cir. 2011)(“This definition provides two distinct ways in which conduct can be found reckless: either the affiant actually entertained serious doubts; or obvious reasons existed for him to do so, such that the finder of act can infer a subjectively reckless state of mind”).
Conspirators’ Supervised Release

Defendants sentenced to prison for federal crimes are also sentenced to a term of supervised release. Supervised release is comparable to parole. It requires a defendant upon his release from prison to honor certain conditions—such as a curfew, employment requirements and restrictions, limits on computer use, drug testing, travel restrictions, or reporting requirements—all under the watchful eye of a probation officer. As a general rule, the court may impose a term of supervised release of no more than five years. For several crimes involving sexual misconduct—commercial sex trafficking, for example—the term must be at least five years and may run the lifetime of the defendant.

S. 178, among other bills, would add conspiracy to engage in commercial sex trafficking to the list of offenses punishable by this not-less-than-five-years-nor-more-than-life term of supervised release.

Statute of Limitations

Section 1595 establishes a cause of action for victims of human trafficking. The cause of action is subject to a 10-year statute of limitations. S. 178 would extend the statute of limitations in cases in which the victim is a child. Under those circumstances, the statute of limitations is 10 years after the child reaches the age of 18 years of age.

Mann Act

The Mann Act criminalizes, among other things, (1) interstate or foreign transportation of a child for purposes of prostitution or other unlawful sexual purposes; (2) interstate or foreign travel for purposes of engaging in “illicit sexual activity” with a child; and (3) overseas travel of U.S. nationals followed by illicit sexual activities with a child.

Defendants enjoy an affirmative defense in “illicit sexual activity” cases if they can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that they reasonably believed that the victim was over 18 years of age.

S. 178, H.R. 181, and other bills would limit the defense to cases where the defendant establishes the reasonableness of his belief by clear and convincing evidence. The difference between

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26 18 U.S.C. 3583(d), 3553(a); U.S.S.G. §5D1.3.
27 18 U.S.C. 3583(b).
29 S. 178, §114(d), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3583(k); S. 140, §2(c), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3583(k); H.R. 296, §14(d), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3583(k); H.R. 1201, §2(c), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3583(k).
31 18 U.S.C. 1595(c).
32 S. 178, §120, proposed 18 U.S.C. 1595(c)(2).
33 18 U.S.C. 2423(a), (b), and (c), respectively; 18 U.S.C. 2423(f).
34 18 U.S.C. 2423(g).
35 S. 178, §111(b), proposed 18 U.S.C. 2423(g); H.R. 181, §8, proposed 18 U.S.C. 2423(g); H.R. 296, §11(b), proposed (continued...)
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preponderance of the evidence and clear and convincing is the difference between more likely than not and highly probable. Many of these same proposals would amend the “illicit sexual activity” definition to include child pornography cases, with the result that interstate or foreign travel associated with the production of child pornography would be clear violations of the Mann Act’s Section 2423(b) (interstate or foreign travel for purposes of such production), Section 2423(c) (foreign travel followed by such production), and Section 2423(d) (commercially facilitating such travel), each of which is punishable by imprisonment for not more than 30 years.

S. 178 would add a modification for the prosecution of Mann Act offenses that involve interstate transportation of an individual for prostitution or other unlawful purposes. The proposal instructs the Attorney General to honor the request of a state attorney general to cross-designate a state prosecutor to handle the case or to explain in detail why the request has not been honored. The designated state prosecutor—or prosecutors, should the Attorney General receive requests from both the state from which, and the state into which, the victim was transported—would presumably operate under the direction of the United States Attorney.

Tax Enforcement

The Internal Revenue Code makes taxable income from any source lawful or unlawful. H.R. 1311 (Representative Carolyn B. Maloney) would increase the penalties associated with various tax offenses committed by sex traffickers, and would direct the creation of an office of tax law enforcement to invest tax offenses committed by sex traffickers. The enhanced enforcement would be focused on tax offenses relating to crimes proscribed in

- 18 U.S.C. 1351 (foreign labor contracting fraud);
- 18 U.S.C. 1589 (forced labor);
- 18 U.S.C. 1590 (peonage, slavery, involuntary servitude, or forced labor trafficking);
- 18 U.S.C. 1591(a) (commercial sex trafficking);
- 18 U.S.C. 1952 (Travel Act);

(...continued)

18 U.S.C. 2423(g); see also H.Rept. 113-450, at 16 (2014).

36 Sybilis v. Attorney General of the U.S., 763 F.3d 348 (3d Cir. 2014), quoting, Concrete Pipe & Prods of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993), and Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast., 546 U.S. 49, 56 (2005) (“A burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence ‘requires the trier of fact to believe that the existence of a factor is more probable than its nonexistence’ ... Accordingly, the burden establishes ‘which party loses if the evidence is closely balanced’”); see also Siddiqui v. Holder, 670 F.3d 736, 742 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Manigan, 508 F.3d 621, 631 (4th 2010).


39 18 U.S.C. 2423(b), (c), (d).

40 S. 178, §303, proposed 18 U.S.C. 2421(b).


• 18 U.S.C. 2421 (transporting an individual for unlawful sexual purposes);
• 18 U.S.C. 2422 (coercing or enticing travel for unlawful sexual purposes);
• 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) (transporting a child for unlawful sexual purposes);
• 18 U.S.C. 2423(d) (trafficking in travel to engage in unlawful sex with a child);
• 18 U.S.C. 2423(e) (attempting or conspiring to transport a child or to travel and engage in unlawful sex with a child);
• 8 U.S.C. 1328 (importing aliens for immoral purposes); and
• state or territorial laws prohibiting promotion of prostitution or commercial sex acts.\textsuperscript{43}

### Tax Offenses

Among other offenses, the Internal Revenue Code outlaws (1) attempting to evade or defeat a federal tax;\textsuperscript{44} (2) willfully failing to file a return;\textsuperscript{45} and (3) making false statements in a tax matter.\textsuperscript{46} H.R. 1311 would increase the maximum terms of imprisonment and the maximum fines for each of these offenses when one or more of the designated sex trafficking offenses generated the income involved.\textsuperscript{47}

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attempt/Conspiracy (26 U.S.C. 7201)</td>
<td>5 years (max.)</td>
<td>10 years (max.)</td>
<td>$250,000 (max.) / $500,000 (max.) (organizations)</td>
<td>$500,000 (max.) / $1 million (max.) (organizations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Failure to file (26 U.S.C. 7203)</td>
<td>1 year (max.)</td>
<td>10 years (max.)</td>
<td>$25,000 (max.) / $100,000 (max.) (organizations)</td>
<td>$500,000 (max.) / $1 million (max.) (organizations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>False statement (26 U.S.C. 7206)</td>
<td>3 years (max.)</td>
<td>5 years (max.)</td>
<td>$250,000 (max.) / $500,000 (max.) (organizations)</td>
<td>$500,000 (max.) / $1 million (max.) (organizations)</td>
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**Source:** Congressional Research Service based on H.R. 1311 (114th Cong.), and 26 U.S.C. 7201, 7203, and 7206.

H.R. 1311 would also expand liability for those who provide their employees with false W2 forms and other required forms. Existing law limits employer liability for furnishing employees with a false statement to the misdemeanor provisions of Section 7204 and Section 6674.\textsuperscript{48} H.R.

\textsuperscript{43}  H.R. 1311, §2(b).
\textsuperscript{44}  I.R.C. §7201; 26 U.S.C. 7201.
\textsuperscript{45}  I.R.C. §7203; 26 U.S.C. 7203.
\textsuperscript{46}  I.R.C. §7206; 26 U.S.C. 7206.
\textsuperscript{47}  H.R. 1311, §3(a), (b), (c), proposed I.R.C. §§7201, 7203, 7206; proposed 26 U.S.C. 7201, 7203, and 7206, respectively. H.R. 1311 would also increase from not more than $25,000 to not more than $50,000 the fines for individuals, other than sex traffickers, who fail to file in violation of Section 7203, H.R. 1311, Section 3(b)(1). The 1984 Sentencing Reform Act silently amended the maximum fines for violations of Section 7201 and Section 7206, 18 U.S.C. 3551, 3571. Amendments to Section 7203 enacted after 1984 reestablished the fine levels noted in that section.
1311 would add Section 7201 and Section 7203, which would increase potential liability for providing false statements to employees to imprisonment for not more than 10 years, where the misconduct involved income generated by one or more of the sex trafficking offenses.

**Enforcement Office**

H.R. 1311 would direct the Secretary of the Treasury to create an Internal Revenue Service office specifically for the investigation and prosecution of designated sex trafficking-related tax offenses. The bill anticipates that the office would work cooperatively with the Justice Department’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Innocence Lost National Initiative. The bill would authorize an appropriation of $4 million for FY2016 supplemented with an appropriation equal to the amounts collected as a consequence of its activities. It would also make sex trafficking victims eligible for the whistleblower/informant rewards, which can top out at 30% of the amounts collected as a consequence of their disclosures.

**Victims**

**Crime Victims’ Rights**

Section 3771 provides the victims of federal crimes and the victims of crime under the District of Columbia Code with certain rights, including the right to confer with the prosecutor and to be heard at public proceedings concerning pleas and sentencing in the case. The rights are reinforced by a right to notice from federal officials of available services. Victims may appeal a

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49 H.R. 1311, §3(d), proposed I.R.C. §7204; proposed 26 U.S.C. 7204.
50 See H.R. 1311, §3(a), (b), proposed I.R.C. §§7201, 7203; proposed 26 U.S.C. 7201 and 7203.
51 H.R. 1311, §2(a).
52 H.R. 1311, §2(c).
53 H.R. 1311, §2(f).
54 H.R. 1311, §2(e); I.R.C. §7623; 26 U.S.C. 7623.
55 The full litany of rights consists of “(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused. (2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused. (3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding. (4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding. (5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case. (6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law. (7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay. (8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy,” 18 U.S.C. 3771(a).
56 42 U.S.C. 10607(e)(“(1) A responsible official shall- (A) inform a victim of the place where the victim may receive emergency medical and social services; (B) inform a victim of any restitution or other relief to which the victim may be entitled under this or any other law and manner in which such relief may be obtained; (C) inform a victim of public and private programs that are available to provide counseling, treatment, and other support to the victim; and (D) assist a victim in contacting the persons who are responsible for providing the services and relief described in subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C). “(2) A responsible official shall arrange for a victim to receive reasonable protection from a suspected offender and persons acting in concert with or at the behest of the suspected offender. (continued...)
failure to honor their rights by seeking a writ of mandamus, and the appellate court must decide the matter within three days (72 hours), or in the case of a stay or continuance within five days.\footnote{In re Wellcare Health Plans, Inc., 754 F.3d 1234, (11th Cir. 2014) ("[T]he tradition mandamus standard of review applies to petitions for writs of mandamus filed pursuant to the CVRA ").}

In other cases, mandamus is an extraordinary remedy awarded only on rare occasions and only if at least three prerequisites can be satisfied. "First, the party seeking issuance of the writ must have no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires.... Second, the petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that his right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. Third, even if the first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances."\footnote{18 U.S.C. 3771(d)(3).}

The federal appellate courts, however, cannot agree on whether this stringent traditional mandamus standard or the usual appellate standard (abuse of discretion or legal error) should apply in Crime Victims' Rights Act appeals.\footnote{In re Dean, 532 F.3d 877, 883-84 (9th Cir. 2008), see also United States v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 762 F.3d 1072, 1082 (7th Cir. 2014) ("This court considers the following five factors in determining whether mandamus relief is appropriate: (1) whether the petition has no other means to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in any way not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the district court's order raises new and important problems or issues of first impression").}

(continued)

\footnote{Cheney v. U.S. District Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); In re Rolls Royce Corp., 775 F.3d 671, 675 (5th Cir. 2014); Linder v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 762 F.3d 568, 572 (7th Cir. 2014); see also United States v. Index Newspapers LLC, 766 F.3d 1072, 1082 (9th Cir. 2014) ("This court considers the following five factors in determining whether mandamus relief is appropriate: (1) whether the petition has no other means to obtain the desired relief; (2) whether the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in any way not correctable on appeal; (3) whether the district court's order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) whether the district court's order raises new and important problems or issues of first impression").}
S. 178 and H.R. 181, among other bills, would resolve the dispute in favor of the less demanding abuse of discretion or legal error standard used for most appeals.\textsuperscript{60} They would also allow the parties to extend the three-day deadline, but not the five-day.\textsuperscript{61} Finally, they would create two new additional rights—the right to timely notice of a plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement and the right to be informed of the rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act and the benefits under the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act.\textsuperscript{62}

**Special Assessments**

Another proposal is designed to help fund victims’ assistance and compensation through the use of special assessments and the creation of a Domestic Trafficking Victims’ Fund.\textsuperscript{63} Under existing law, the courts impose a special assessment of $5 and $100 on individuals convicted of a federal offense ($25 to $400 for organizations).\textsuperscript{64} Receipts are deposited in the Crime Victims Fund and used for victims’ assistance and compensation.\textsuperscript{65}

S. 178 would call for an additional special assessment of $5,000 to be imposed on those convicted under

- 18 U.S.C. ch. 77 (peonage, slavery, and human trafficking);
- 18 U.S.C. ch. 109A (sexual abuse in U.S. special maritime and territorial jurisdiction);
- 18 U.S.C. ch. 110 (child pornography);
- 18 U.S.C. ch. 177 (interstate or foreign transportation for unlawful sexual purposes); or
- 8 U.S.C. 1324 (smuggling aliens other than immediate family members).\textsuperscript{66}

The Fund would receive two types of transfers. The first would be a transfer from the general fund of the Treasury in amounts equal to those collected from these assessments.\textsuperscript{67} These

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\textsuperscript{56} 563-64 (2d Cir. 2005)(abuse of discretion standard).
\textsuperscript{60} S. 178, §113(c), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3771(d)(3); H.R. 181, §10(b), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3771(d)(3); S. 140, §6(b), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3771(d)(3); S. 140, §6(b), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3771(d)(3); H.R. 296, §13(c)(1), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3771(d)(3).
\textsuperscript{62} S. 178, §113(a)(1), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3771(a)(9), (10); H.R. 181, §10(a)(1), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3771(a)(9), (10); H.R. 296, §13(a)(1), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3771(a)(9), (10)\textsuperscript{9} The right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement. (10) The right to be informed of the rights under this section and the services described in section 503(c) of the Victims’ Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 10607(c) and provided contact information for the Office of the Victims’ Rights Ombudsman of the Department of Justice”). H.R. 1201 and S. 140 would add only a new paragraph 3771(a)(9), S. 140, §6(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3771(a)(9); H.R. 1201, §6(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3771(a)(9).
\textsuperscript{63} S. 178, §101(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3014(a), (c).
\textsuperscript{64} 18 U.S.C. 3013.
\textsuperscript{65} 42 U.S.C. 10601(b)(2), (d).
\textsuperscript{66} S. 178, §101(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3014(a).
\textsuperscript{67} S. 178, §101(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3014(d).
transferred amounts would appropriate and make available to the Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, through FY2019 for the services and benefits (other than health care services and benefits) under

- 42 U.S.C. 14044c (grants for enhanced state and local anti-trafficking enforcement);
- 42 U.S.C. 13002(b) (grants for child advocacy centers);
- 22 U.S.C. 7105(b)(2) (grants to state, tribes, and local governments to enhance trafficking;
- victims’ services); and

The second transfer would be from appropriations under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, as amended, in amounts equal to those generated by the special assessments, but not less than $5 million or more than $30 million per fiscal year. The amounts would also be available to the Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretary of Health and Human Services, for health care services under

- 42 U.S.C. 14044a (grants for trafficking victims’ assistance programs);
- 42 U.S.C. 14044b (residential treatment for victims of child trafficking);
- 42 U.S.C. 14044c (grants for enhanced state and local anti-trafficking enforcement);
- 42 U.S.C. 13002(b) (grants for child advocacy centers);
- 22 U.S.C. 7105(b)(2) (grants to state, tribes, and local governments to enhance trafficking;
- victims’ services); and

Forfeiture

Forfeiture is the confiscation of property based on its proximity to a criminal offense. Confiscation may be accomplished either as a consequence of the property owner’s conviction (criminal forfeiture) or in a civil proceeding conducted against the property in rem (civil forfeiture). In either case, the proceeds from most federal forfeitures are deposited either in the Justice Department’s Asset Forfeiture Fund or the Treasury Department’s Forfeiture Fund, and are available for law enforcement purposes.

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68 S. 178, §101(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3014(e).
69 S. 178, §101(a), proposed 18 U.S.C. 3014(h).
70 Id.
72 E.g., 18 U.S.C. 981, 982, 983.
73 28 U.S.C. 524(c) and 31 U.S.C. 9703, respectively.
Forfeitures relating to financial crimes sometimes apply to property “involved in” the offense. For example, property “involved in” a money laundering transaction is subject to confiscation. In the case of human trafficking, property that constitutes the proceeds from, that was used, or that was intended for use, to commit or facilitate, a trafficking offense is subject to criminal and civil forfeiture.\(^7\) S. 178 and H.R. 296 would make property “involved in” a trafficking offense subject to criminal and civil forfeiture as well.\(^7\)

Defendants convicted of human trafficking offenses must be ordered to pay victim restitution.\(^6\) As a general rule, the Attorney General may transfer forfeited property to pay victim restitution.\(^7\) S. 178 and H.R. 296 would require such a transfer, without reducing or mitigating the defendant’s restitution obligations.\(^6\)

Subject to annual appropriations, the Attorney General may use the Justice Department Asset Forfeiture Fund for informants’ fees in drug and money laundering cases.\(^7\) The Secretary of the Treasury enjoys comparable authority with respect to the Treasury Fund, although apparently without the need for annual appropriations.\(^7\) S. 178 and H.R. 296 would expand the authority to include access to the Justice Department Fund for informants’ fees in human trafficking cases, and to the Treasury Department Fund for informants’ fees paid by Immigration and Customs Enforcement in human trafficking cases.

**Bail**

Existing federal law states that an individual charged with a federal offense should be released on his own recognizance, unless the magistrate is convinced that certain conditions must be imposed to insure individual or community safety or to insure the appearance of the accused at subsequent judicial proceedings.\(^8\) The government may seek pretrial detention of an accused charged with a crime of violence, a federal crime of terrorism, or with commercial sex trafficking.\(^8\) S. 178 and H.R. 296 would amend the definition of “a crime of violence” for these purposes to include any of the human trafficking offenses.\(^8\)

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\(^7\) 18 U.S.C. 1594(d), (e).
\(^8\) S. 178, §105(a)(1), (2), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1594(d), (e); H.R. 296, §6(a)(1), (2), proposed 18 U.S.C. 1594(d), (e).
\(^9\) 18 U.S.C. 1593(a).
\(^12\) 28 U.S.C. 524(c)(1).
\(^14\) S. 178, §105(b), proposed 28 U.S.C. 524(c)(1); H.R. 296, §6(b), proposed 28 U.S.C. 524(c)(1).
\(^16\) 18 U.S.C. 3142(a), (b), (c).
\(^17\) 18 U.S.C. 3142(e), (f).
Wiretapping Authority

In the investigation of certain serious federal and state crimes, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, sometimes referred to in part as Title III, authorizes federal and state law enforcement officials to engage in court-supervised surreptitious interception of telephone, face-to-face, or electronic communications. The list of these federal crimes includes commercial sex trafficking (18 U.S.C. 1591), but not the other offenses outlawed in the slavery, peonage, and forced labor chapter of the federal criminal code. The list of state crimes includes murder, robbery, kidnaping, etc., but not prostitution or human trafficking.

S. 178, H.R. 181, and others would permit federal court-ordered interceptions in conjunction with investigations involving peonage (18 U.S.C. 1581 (peonage), 1584 (involuntary servitude), 1589 (forced labor), and 1592 (traffic-related document misconduct)). They would also permit state prosecutors to engage in state court-supervised interceptions in cases of human trafficking, child pornography production, and child sexual exploitation; or in H.R. 181and H.R. 296 in cases of human trafficking, child pornography, and child sexual abuse, as well as coercion and enticement of children—to the extent that state law permits.

Sex Offender Registration

The federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), as the name implies, requires individuals convicted of a federal, state, tribal, foreign, or military sex offense to register with, and continue to provide current information to, state or tribal authorities (jurisdictions) in any location in which they live, work, or attend school. The reporting obligations apply to those convicted of qualifying sex offenses either before or after the enactment of SORNA. SORNA accomplishes its notification goal through the creation of a system which affords public online access to state and tribal registration information. The system allows the public to determine either where a particular sex offender lives, works, and attends school, or the names and location

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86 18 U.S.C. 2510 et seq.
87 18 U.S.C. 2516(1).
93 42 U.S.C. 16918, 16920(b).
of sex offenders who live, work, or attend school within a particular area. SORNA requires jurisdictions to satisfy minimum standards for the information they collect and maintain.

Section 114 of SORNA requires registrants to provide (1) their name and any alias; their Social Security number; (2) their place of residence; (3) the name and address of their employer; (4) the name and address of any school they are attending; (5) the description and license plate number of any vehicle they own or operate; and (6) any other information the Attorney General requires.

Section 114 requires jurisdictions to include within their registries (1) a physical description of the offender; (2) the text of the statute defining the crime which requires the offender to register; (3) the offender’s criminal history; (4) a current photograph of the offender; (5) a set of the offender’s fingerprints; (6) a sample of the offender’s DNA; (7) a copy of the offender’s driver’s license or other identification card; and (8) any other information the Attorney General requires.

S. 178 (Senator Cornyn), S. 409 (Senator Burr), and H.R. 956 (Representative Speier) would direct the Secretary of Defense to provide the Attorney General with information described in Section 114 relating to military sex offenders whom SORNA requires to register with state or tribal authorities. The requirement would presumably apply to those convicted of registration-requiring offenses both before and after the enactment of SORNA.

H.R. 956 (Representative Speier) would further amend SORNA to increase the role of the Department of Defense (DOD) by establishing a separate sex offender registry. Military sex offenders, who are obligated to maintain current registration information with state or tribal authorities any place where they live, work, or attend school, would also be required to register with the Secretary of Defense upon their release from custody or entry into the United States. The proposal makes no explicit provision for military sex offenders convicted prior to the enactment of SORNA.

SORNA requires states and certain tribes to maintain a jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry that meets SORNA requirements. H.R. 956 would impose the same obligation on the Secretary of Defense, but without the fiscal sanctions which attend a state’s failure to comply. In addition to the demand to register where they live, work, or attend school, sex offenders being released from custody must also register with the jurisdiction in which they were convicted.

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94 Id.
95 42 U.S.C. 16912.
96 42 U.S.C. 16914(a).
97 42 U.S.C. 16914(b).
98 S. 178, §502(a); proposed 42 U.S.C. 16928A; S. 409, §2, proposed 42 U.S.C. 16928A.
100 42 U.S.C. 16912.
101 H.R. 956, §3, proposed section 16912(a), which after amendment would read “Each jurisdiction, and, for military offenders, the Secretary of Defense (including any military offender serving in the Coast Guard, without regard to the department in which the Coast Guard is operating), shall maintain a jurisdiction-wide sex offender registry conforming to the requirements of this subchapter.” (Language that would be added by H.R. 956 in italics.)
102 Jurisdictions that fail to comply with SORNA’s requirements are subject to a 10% reduction of federal law enforcement assistance funds, 42 U.S.C. 16925(a).
103 42 U.S.C. 16913(a).
would require military sex offenders to register upon release in addition with the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{104}

H.R. 956, like S. 178 and S. 409, would require the Secretary of Defense to include the same information within his registry regarding a recently released sex offender that states and tribes are required to capture: physical description of the sex offender; text of the law proscribing the conduct for which the sex offender was convicted; the sex offender’s criminal history; fingerprints, a DNA sample, and a photograph of the sex offender; a copy of the offender’s driver’s license or other official identification of the sex offender; and any additional information required by the Attorney General.\textsuperscript{105}

The Secretary would have to make this information publicly available online,\textsuperscript{106} and would be required to report the information to the Attorney General, appropriate law enforcement, and educational, public housing, social service officials, as well as assorted related public and private entities.\textsuperscript{107} The Attorney General would be required to include the information in the national registry and to forward updated information received from various jurisdictions relating to a military sex offender to the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{108} The national registry would be required to include military sex offender information available on the Secretary’s website.\textsuperscript{109}

SORNA mandates that “appropriate officials” and “appropriate law enforcement agencies” take action when a sex offender fails to comply with the requirements of a state or tribal registry.\textsuperscript{110} H.R. 956 would establish a comparable command for action when a military sex offender fails to comply with the requirements of the DOD registry.\textsuperscript{111} It is unclear whether the amendment is intended to expand the terms “appropriate official” and “appropriate law enforcement agencies” to encompass DOD officials and law enforcement agencies, giving them authority over discharged military sex offenders over whom they would otherwise have no jurisdiction.

SORNA obligates the Attorney General to develop and support the computer software necessary for jurisdictions to comply with SORNA’s standards.\textsuperscript{112} H.R. 956 would enlarge the obligation to enable establishment and maintenance of a DOD registry.\textsuperscript{113}

Finally, H.R. 956 would require military sex offenders entering the United States to register with the Secretary of Defense.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{104} H.R. 956, §4(a), proposed 42 U.S.C. 16913(a).
\textsuperscript{105} H.R. 956, §4(b), proposed 42 U.S.C. 16914(b); S. 409, §2, proposed 42 U.S.C. 16928A.
\textsuperscript{106} H.R. 956, §4(c), proposed 42 U.S.C. 16918.
\textsuperscript{107} H.R. 956, §4(f), proposed 42 U.S.C. 16921(b).
\textsuperscript{108} H.R. 956, §4(d), proposed 42 U.S.C. 16919(a), (b).
\textsuperscript{109} H.R. 956, §4(e), proposed 42 U.S.C. 16920(b).
\textsuperscript{110} 42 U.S.C. 16922.
\textsuperscript{111} H.R. 956, §4(g), proposed 42 U.S.C. 16922, which after amendment would read “An appropriate official shall notify the Attorney General and appropriate law enforcement agencies of any failure by a sex offender to comply with the requirements of a registry and revise the jurisdiction’s registry (and, in the case of military offenders, the registry of the Secretary of Defense) to reflect the nature of that failure. The appropriate official, the Attorney General, and each such law enforcement agency shall take any appropriate action to ensure compliance.” (Language that would be added by H.R. 956 in italics.)
\textsuperscript{112} 42 U.S.C. 16923.
\textsuperscript{113} H.R. 956, §4(h), proposed 42 U.S.C. 16923.
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