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Gaps in Basic Workers' Rights: Measuring International Adherence to and Implementation of the Organization's Values With Public ILO Data

W. R. Böhning

International Labour Organization

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Gaps in Basic Workers' Rights: Measuring International Adherence to and Implementation of the Organization's Values With Public ILO Data

Abstract

Conceptualizes and measures numerically the gap between the real and the ideal world of basic workers' rights with the help of the ratification, reporting, supervisory and complaints data at the disposal of the ILO.

Keywords

adherence, agreement, association, bargaining, Catherwood, collective, conduct, Cornell, corporate, data, declaration, effective, employment, equality, freedom, fundamental, global, globalization, government, human, ILR, iImplementation, international, labor, labour, law, legislation, links, monitoring, organize, organization, organization, programme, regulation, rights, standards, strikes, trade, unions, university, work, workers, workplace

Comments

In Focus Programme on Promoting the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work DECLARATION/WP/13/2003





Gaps in Basic Workers' Rights

W. R. Böhning

DECLARATION/WP/13/2003

Working Paper

GAPS IN BASIC WORKERS' RIGHTS: MEASURING INTERNATIONAL ADHERENCE TO AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ORGANIZATION'S VALUES WITH PUBLIC ILO DATA

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Director, InFocus Programme on Promoting the Declaration

International Labour Office

May 2003

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Preface

Several ILO colleagues recently began work on Decent Work indicators. Almost invariably, they ran into problems capturing comprehensively what is at the very centre of the ILO and Decent Work, the standards that the Organization has set over the years in the labour field, or they left aside standards altogether. This irked me sufficiently, late last year, to try my hand at putting forward some ideas. Little did I know what I let myself in for. A number of my colleagues in the International Labour Standards Department were aghast at hearing of the simplifications that indicators would introduce without paying attention to the substance and details of everything specialists look at. By contrast, I was encouraged by some of my immediate colleagues and by members of the Advisory Group on Statistics, as well as by David Kucera of the International Institute for Labour Studies who critically discussed an earlier version of this paper when I presented it on the occasion of an Institute seminar. To all of them I am most grateful for their views.

I should also like to thank Christiane Veltsos for setting up an Excel programme to process the data, and Imène Debèche, Nana Nti, Judith Ollig and Lisa Pecherot for keying in thousands of data or helping me on questions of countries' capacities and non-functioning States. Thanks are also due to Nathalie Dalibard and Coralie Thompson for typing several revisions of this paper. All remaining errors are mine.¹

May 2003

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Chapter 1. Framework of considerations

1.1 Introduction

In his report to the 2001 International Labour Conference the Director-General of the ILO drew attention to Decent Work deficits – the "gap between the world we work in and the hopes that people have for a better life". One of these gaps is what he called the rights gap. The aim of this paper is to conceptualize and measure numerically the gap between the real and the ideal world of basic workers' rights with the help of the ratification, reporting, supervisory and complaints data at the disposal of the ILO.

Measurement is about numbers, which may put off some readers. However, this paper will be easy to follow even for people who are uncomfortable with numbers. Its style of presentation is aimed not at colleagues in the international community familiar with the workings of the ILO and with indicators but at laypersons, academics and officials in various countries interested in the subject matter of human or labour rights. No more mathematical knowledge is required than adding, subtracting, dividing or multiplying. Figures will render visible the reasoning so as to make it understandable to readers not used to examining this kind of material. Demonstration tables will set out step-by-step how the indicators are calculated. A manual-like style has been chosen because at the initial stage of the development of ideas on this subject a fully explicit and understandable text is needed.

How are gaps in basic workers' rights conceptualized? Such gaps exist (i) when there is less than full adherence by governments to fundamental ILO Conventions, principles and rights or related obligations; and (ii) when ILO supervisory or complaints mechanisms reveal legislative or practical implementation problems in respect of basic workers' rights. Lack of adherence gives rise to an adherence gap. Revealed implementation problems give rise to an implementation gap. The adherence and implementation gaps add up to the basic workers rights' gap. Such a gap will show up in the system elaborated here as a number larger than 0. At 0 there is no gap. The maximum gap is 100.

What are the purposes of spelling out rights gaps on an annual basis? The first is to track over time the evolution of a country's gaps in order to determine whether they are getting bigger or smaller. Thanks to the distinction between international adherence and revealed implementation problems, one can see at a glance which factor is responsible for the basic workers' rights gap: whether it is a lack of adherence or of the ability to redress implementation problems or a combination of the two. Depending on the answer, quite different responses may be called for. The measurements put forward here can then be used to monitor progress.

Advocacy is the second aim. Pointing out gaps can induce individual governments, employers' and workers' organizations as well as other non-State actors to do something about them. A country with a large adherence gap may want to re-examine its political hesitations to ratify ILO Conventions. A country with a large implementation gap can commit itself to reducing it; it can set itself time-bound targets; and it can appeal to other countries or international organizations, the ILO in the first instance, for assistance in moving forward. Again, the indicators elaborated here can then be used to monitor progress.

² ILO: Reducing the decent work deficit: A global challenge (Geneva, 2001), p. 8.

This paper has not been conceived for the purpose of constructing a single index or to rank countries. But ranking is possible on the basis of the data generated if one compares the size of countries' rights gaps. Ranking is actually desirable if one wants to know which countries face the largest gaps and what broad reasons may be responsible for their situation. But it is not the reason for developing this particular set of indicators.

Of course, there are many ways to close a gap between the real and the ideal world held up by the ILO. And there are many components of Decent Work. Rights are one of them. What I present hereunder could, suitably calibrated, form part of a set of Decent Work indicators or even of an eventual comprehensive Decent Work index on this subject.

Readers should take this paper as a contribution to the progressive realization of basic rights throughout the world. Further work is planned.

1.2 Which basic workers' rights?

Eight Conventions have been designated by the Organization as the most important, core or fundamental ones. These are, in historical order, the Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention, 1948 (No. 87), the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention, 1949 (No. 98), the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100), the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, 1957 (No. 105), the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111), the Minimum Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), and the Abolition of the Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1998 (No. 182). Member States are urged to pay special attention to these eight Conventions.³ Once ratified, countries are obliged to submit reports at regular intervals on how they implement the provisions of the Convention.

The Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (Declaration for short) was adopted by the Organization in 1998. It espouses four categories: (a) freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining; (b) the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour; (c) the effective abolition of child labour, and (d) the elimination of discrimination in employment and occupation. Countries that have not ratified one or several of the eight core Conventions are expected to respect, promote and realize the principles and rights that underpin these Conventions. The Declaration has instituted an annual reporting procedure to induce countries to reflect on their progress and to progress in the direction of ratification.

Thus, this paper focuses on the eight fundamental or core Conventions (the terms will be used interchangeably) and the four fundamental principles and rights enshrined in the Declaration. These are the subjects that matter most to the ILO. They should therefore take pride of place in any attempt to find out what workers' rights gaps exist, how big and durable they are.

In my measurement of the basic workers' rights gap, the subject of freedom of association and collective bargaining is accorded more weight than the other three subjects due to the fact that the

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³ They have ratified them more than four times as often as other ILO Conventions. If one divides the present total number of ratifications of all fundamental Conventions (1,182) by eight, one obtains an average of 147 ratifications per Convention, compared with an average of 34 ratifications for each of the other 175 Conventions.

Committee on Freedom of Association is brought into the indicator system. This Committee can receive and deal with complaints even where a member State has not ratified Convention No. 87 and/or Convention No. 98. No comparable body or procedure exists regarding forced labour, child labour or non-discrimination. This is a reflection of how the Organization views the relative importance of this subject compared with others: freedom of association is a constitutional principle of the ILO that countries are deemed to be bound by when they become members of the Organization.

1.3 Important criteria

The following criteria have to be respected if one wants to construct defensible and credible indicators in a politically sensitive field such as human and labour rights:

- each dimension must be transparent and reproducible. Readers must not be left guessing as to what is involved. Other persons must be able to replicate the constructs and calculations and reach the same results:
- all dimensions and data must be based on neutral sources. The basic workers' rights system selects only ILO procedures and relies exclusively on unbiased ILO data. There is no need to draw upon indicators or data established by national governmental bodies, nongovernmental organizations, universities or other international organizations. Readers may wonder about limitations of ILO data; but the limitations are minor; they will be discussed; and they do not call into question the validity and neutrality of the specific information that is being drawn upon;
- dimensions or data should not derive from subjective judgments. They must reflect objective facts rather than personal interpretations. The objective facts that are brought into the system are ratification and reporting on Conventions along with selected pronouncements by the Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations and by the Committee on Freedom of Association;
- actual data must be available on a systematic and recurrent basis. Data should be available at short intervals if one wishes to see how gaps in basic workers' rights evolve in the course of time. Annual data will be used here. Ad hoc studies and occasional surveys cannot be carried out sufficiently often;⁴
- universal capture should be ensured, and there must be no a priori discrimination among countries. The construction of the system and the data feed into it must not be biased inherently against some countries rather than others. This criterion will be verified in the course of the where it may be in doubt.

1.4 **Indicators and weights**

As the workers' rights gap elaborated here is based on indicators, one needs to be clear what indicators are, what kind of indicators are relevant, what their internal logic is, how points are assigned to them, how they are weighted, etc. Some brief explanations therefore follow.

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⁴ They would be useful, however, to verify the results calculated at the country level in this paper.

Indicators select pieces of reality, those that are most important. They suggest what is happening but do not necessarily reflect reality fully or exhaustively. Indicators simplify and aggregate dispersed information that is complex and which they display in an intuitively understandable form. Indicators – and the rights gap deriving from them – help to gain, at a glance, a picture of where things stand and how they change over time.

Different kinds of indicators are relevant to human rights. 5 Input indicators portray something that contributes to an end but does not, by itself, achieve it. An analogy from the economic sphere would be investment. In the human rights field, ratification of a Convention is equivalent to an input. Process indicators are concerned with procedures or mechanisms set up to advance matters towards a desired goal. An analogy from the economic sphere would be bipartite or tripartite negotiations of wages. In the human rights field, the supervision of a ratified Convention or the handling of complaints each constitute a process that can be given numerical expression and become a process indicator. Outcome indicators are the ultimate objective of indicator construction because they reveal actual achievements or impacts. 6 An analogy from the economic sphere would be unemployment, which results from the interaction of investment and wage levels (and, of course, of other factors). The gaps in basic workers' rights measured in this paper are an approximation of outcomes "on the ground", i.e. in countries. They indicate deficits that are occasioned by lack of adherence to international values and obligations, on the one hand,

⁵ On indicator developments and their application to the field of human rights, it is worthwhile to go back to the first of UNDP's human development reports. See UNDP: Human Development Report 1990 (New York and Oxford, OUP for UNDP, 1990). Two recent surveys provide useful background information. See M. Green: "What we talk about when we talk about indicators", in Human Rights Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 4 (November 2001), and L. Compa: "Assessing assessments: A survey of efforts to measure countries' compliance with freedom of association standards", a paper for the National Academies' project on international labour standards (September 2002), at www.national-academies.org/internationallabour. A private company, Verité, undertook an ambitious but flawed exercise, see its Report to California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), Emerging Markets Research project, at http://www.calpers.ca.gov/invest/emergingmkt/verite.pdf. Regarding relevant indicator work carried out in the ILO, see D. Kucera: "Core Labour Standards and foreign direct investment", in International Labour Review (Vol.141, no.1-2 (2002/1-2), pp.31-69, and the literature quoted there; R. Anker et al.: Measuring decent work with statistical indicators, INTEGRATION Working Paper No.2 (ILO, Geneva, 2002); and research started by the Latin America and Caribbean Area Regional Department, published in *Panorama Laboral 2002* (OIT, Lima, 2002), pp.64-65, where a ratification index is calculated as well as a record of complaints to the Committee on Freedom of Association. ILO colleagues of the Infocus Programme on Socio-Economic Security have been engaged in the construction of component indexes of socio-economic security and of a comprehensive Decent Work index. Preliminary results were presented at the Informal Consultation on Reconceptualizing work, Geneva, December 2002. See G. Standing and F. Bonnet: A voice representation security index; S. Dasgupta and W. Onobogu: Measuring employment security in industrialized countries; F. Bonnet: Un indice de la sécurité du travail; A. Khan, F. Bonnet and S. Barbattini: Labour market security index; E. Rosskam and J. Figueiredo: A work security index; S. Natrajan: Measuring income security in OECD countries 1990, 1999; F. Bonnet and J. Figueiredo: A skill security index; and P. Annycke: Old age income security: The role of social security benefits. All of these macro-level indices use various ILO Conventions as input indicators. Micro-level surveys that also yield Decent Work indeces are reported on in the Special Issue on Socio-Economic Security of the International Labour Review, Vol. 141, No.4 (2002), where the article by G. Standing: "From People's Security Surveys to a Decent Work Index", pp. 441-454, is the most pertinent. Another approach to indicators was used in relation to safety and health at work through a questionnaire addressed to all ILO member States to which almost 60 per cent replied, see: ILO standards-related activities in the area of occupational safety and health, Report VI, International Labour Conference, 91st Session (Geneva, ILO, 2003).

Whether an indicator covers an input, process or outcome depends on the observer's viewpoint that, in turn, reflects the purpose of the investigation. For example, investment can be looked at as an output of a process within enterprises or as an outcome of economic conditions. Wages constitute an input of many economic models or outcomes of power relationships on the ground. By the same token, adherence as conceived in this paper could be viewed as a discreet input or as an ongoing process.

and by the interaction of countries with the ILO's supervisory and complaints mechanisms, on the other hand. That measurement is a credible reflection of realities on the ground. While it may not fully reflect reality in every case, no better proxy is available at present as far as basic workers' rights are concerned.

Where indicators record whether something exists, happens or does not, they are binary in nature. Ratification is an example of a binary indicator. This paper will use the binary form (YES/NO) extensively. Almost invariably, binary indicators side-step interpretation questions and subjective judgements.

Weights have to be established where two or more factors compose an indicator, to reflect each dimension's importance in relation to the whole. One option is to give each the same weight. This might appear to be the least controversial way of weighting. However, it is not a very sensible way – as will be seen – because some things are bound to be more important than others. Judgments will, therefore, have to be made. Even the "same weight" option is a (hidden) judgment. I take care to spell out and explain the different weights chosen. If observers disagree with the weights proposed here, they can re-calculate the rights gaps with different weights; the paper gives them the information necessary for replication.⁷

The question of weighting one indicator relative to a second or more indicators does not arise in the gap system, because the implementation indicator is a derivative of the adherence indicator; its values are a proportion of the values assigned to Conventions. And the basic workers' rights indicator is the sum of the adherence and implementation indicators.

The rights gap elaborated here is a composite indicator that provides one yardstick for a number of Conventions, principles and rights. The reason for covering all core Conventions, principles and rights simultaneously is that it gives a more complete and valid picture of a country's performance on key subjects than does singling out one of them.

Researchers may be interested in just one category of Conventions, principles and rights. They could apply the method proposed here to any single Convention, principle and right – within the ILO and in respect of other treaty bodies' Conventions such as those of the United Nations. Or they could use quite different methods, sources and data specific to each Convention, principle and right, and in that way explore the evolution of workers rights.⁸ But one faces considerable harmonization and merging problems if one wants to render comparable quite different methods and data after having carried out the calculations. The approach chosen here is to assess all core Conventions, principles and rights because the Organisation has made them stand out from the rest. Such an assessment is easier if, from the outset, one builds blocks that are made up of identical material, thereby avoiding subsequent problems of comparability and aggregation.

All raw data used here can be found in ILO publications, most of them can be accessed through the ILO's public website (http://www.ilo.org).

⁸ Annual statistics are available on wage differentials by sex. These would fit well as an indicator for the Equal Remuneration Convention, 1951 (No. 100). Other data are available for many countries on occupations and sectors of employment by sex. These would catch the gender dimension of the Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention, 1958 (No. 111). The OECD reviewed 74 countries' performance in respect of freedom of association and collective bargaining, grouping them into four categories on the basis of panel data. See OECD: Trade, employment and labour standards: A study of core workers' rights and international trade (Paris, OECD, 1996) and International trade and core labour standards (Paris, OECD, 2000).

1.5 Countries' capacity to give effect to Conventions, principles and rights

Human as well as ILO's labour rights apply irrespective of a country's economic development and of its political system. Just as, for example, the fundamental human right of protection from arbitrary detention is applicable as much in a developing country as in an OECD country, so freedom of association is not dependent on how industrialized a country is; forced or child labour is not tolerable even where it occurs in very poor countries; and the right to equality does not presuppose a certain per capita income. Quite another question is how ILO's counterpart ministries can give effect to core Conventions, the extent to which they can train labour inspectors to ensure their effective respect in enterprises, how the labour law or broader legal system can enforce them, etc. Answers to these kinds of questions are bound to reflect, at least partially, a country's level of development in general terms and its financial and human capabilities in particular. A developing country such as Benin or a transition economy such as Moldova will be challenged to a larger extent than an advanced industrial country such as France when it has to cope with ratification, reporting and implementation issues.

To take capacity into account one could use, for example, World Bank GNP per capita figures or UNDP's Human Development Index as indicators and apply them in one form or another to the system elaborated here. However, two problems arise. One is that these are not ILO data. Another is that the intuitively most defensible way of taking countries' lack of capacity into account, given the features of the system constructed here, would be to advantage countries that lack capacity by deflating their gaps. Initial tests revealed this to be an unsatisfactory approach.

This paper limits itself to categorizing countries according to whether they have "adequate", "little" or "least" capacity. Countries will simply be shaded to indicate visually into which category they fall. Countries that are not shaded hereunder can be assumed to have "adequate" capacity to deal with the sort of problems that ratification and realization entail, countries shaded lightly have "little" capacity and countries shaded more strongly have "least" capacity.

There is a set of ILO data that can be used as a proxy of countries' capacity. This is the portion of the regular ILO budget that countries are supposed to shoulder (called assessed contributions for short). That portion is calculated on the basis of two factors: relative wealth and population size. The two together reflect countries' financial capability or tax base and, in this way, their general administrative capacity, including that of ministries of labour. All member States are assessed as to what they should pay. The minimum contribution is 0.01 per cent of the ILO budget, which applies to, for example, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Solomon Islands. At the other end of the scale, the United States, Japan and Germany together contribute about half of the regular ILO budget. Scheme 1 sets out the distinctions I adopted for the purposes of this paper. The capacity category of each of the 166 countries retained in the basic workers' rights system can be seen in the later table 12.

Countries were shaded for each of the 18 years or for the years during which they formed part of the system. It may be noted in passing that no country moved up the scale from the strongly shaded to the lightly shaded category. Very few countries moved up the scale from lightly shaded to colourless, among them Peru and Thailand. Quite a few dropped down from lightly shaded to strongly shaded capacity, among them half of the successor States of the Soviet Union,

⁹ The data can be found in Governing Body documents dealing with financial questions.

Scheme 1. Approximating member States' capacities by categorizing their assessed contribution to the regular ILO budget, beginning of 21st century

	Least capacity	Little capacity	Adequate capacity
	Less than 0.02%	0.02% - less than 0.1%	0.1% or more
	of ILO budget	of ILO budget	of ILO budget
Number of countries	101	26	48
As per cent of 175 ILO member States	58%	15%	27%
Shading			

as well as the Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Jamaica, Lebanon and Panama. Where such changes happened, this paper selected the shade attributed during the last three years, 2000-2002, or during at least two of these years.

1.6 Which countries are covered and from when?

The calculation of the rights gap starts in 1985 because by that time contemporary economic globalization had influenced most countries' policy-making and had made itself felt in product and labour markets as well as relative to labour institutions. Since the mid-1980s workers began to be faced with strong calls for more flexibility. At the same time, authoritarian regimes gave way to democracies in a number of developing countries. Paradoxically, there was both a more enabling environment for values such as those upheld by the ILO and more pressure exerted on workers in general and unions in particular to respect the "laws of the market". With the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia at the beginning of the 1990s, contemporary globalization extended its reach and perfected its modes of operation. The period covered by the indicators developed here is the period of contemporary globalization.

While indicators have to cover all countries with the same yardstick, certain exceptions have to be made for a few countries to avoid bringing them into the system more than once, which would "penalize" them. To start with, the non-metropolitan territories of certain countries – for which a special ILO regime exists – are left out of consideration. If one were to include non-metropolitan territories, one would potentially score some countries twice or more often for the same basic fact; or the score might be "YES" in one territory but "NO" in another territory, giving rise to attribution problems.

Also not covered here are:

- China's two special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macau. Values are calculated only for China;
- Malaysia's three constituent states, i.e. Peninsular Malaysia, Sabah and Sarawak. Only Malaysia is included;
- Tanzania's two states, i.e. Tanganyika and Zanzibar. Only Tanzania is included.

Where a government lacks the authority to administer its territories, depends on foreign powers and is not capable of implementing obligations deriving from international commitments, the country is referred as a non-functioning State. Non-functioning States will not be scored at all or

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¹⁰ See A. J. Ghose: *Jobs and incomes in a globalizing world* (Geneva, ILO, 2003).

¹¹ It so happens that information on ILO's supervisory and complaints cases is available electronically from 1985 onwards (referred to as ILOLEX) both on CD-ROMs and on the ILO's public website (see http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm). Prior to 1985 one has to consult printed documents.

only during recent years when they were properly functioning States. For example, when a country is held to be a non-functioning State some time after the beginning of the period under review (say, during the years 1990 to 1995), the country is not scored during the preceding years (1985-89) because the gap system is interested in trends and averages over long or medium time periods, and it would not be very sensible to produce trends or averages based on end points with an interruption in the middle. Only the last uninterrupted period is included here, and then only with effect from the second year after the literature suggested that the country ceased to be a non-functioning State (in this example the country would not be scored in 1996 but would be scored as from 1997).

Twelve countries' situations correspond to the notion of non-functioning States. They are scored as follows (with the years in brackets during which they are generally considered to be non-functioning States):

- Afghanistan not during any year (1985-2002);
- Albania not during any year (1997-2001, i.e. the country could be scored as from 2003);
- Angola not during any year (1985-2002);
- Bosnia-Herzegovina as from 1997 (1993-95);
- Cambodia as from 1995 (1985-93);
- Democratic Republic of Congo not during any year (1985-2002);
- Haiti as from 1997 (1986-95);
- Lebanon as from 1994 (1988-92);
- Liberia not during any year (1989-2002);
- Sierra-Leone as from 2002 (1991-2000);
- Somalia not during any year (1991-2002); and
- Tajikistan as from 2002 (1993-2000).

Six non-functioning States, therefore, remain outside the system entirely. For the other six, table 12 indicates the years that were not scored. All twelve, as can be seen from the shading, fall into the category of countries with least capacity.

For all other member States the calculation of the workers' rights gap starts in 1985 except for those entering or rejoining the Organization later. New members are scored in this indicator system as from the year following their membership (two years later in the special case of Yemen).

A few countries that existed at the beginning of the review period but which disappeared later on are left aside entirely. These include the German Democratic Republic (which joined the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990), the Czech and Slovak Republic (which split in 1993 when each became a member of the ILO), the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (which united and joined the ILO as the Republic of Yemen in 1990), the USSR (which dissolved in 1991; its successor States joined the ILO in 1992 and 1993) and the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (which broke up in the early 1990s, was readmitted to the ILO in late 2001 and changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro in February 2003). Annex I details membership changes in the Organization for the whole period for which indicators are calculated.

Scheme 2. The structure of the basic workers' rights system

Indicator	Component	Dimension	GAP points				
ADHERENCE	Core Conventions	Non-ratification	0 – 12.6 on each of sev				
		N	0 – 11 on each of eight				
		Non-reporting on ratified	0 – 1.7 on each of seve				
		Conventions	0 – 1.5 on each of eigh	t Conventions			
	Declaration	Reporting on unratified	0 – 1.4 bonus points on each of up to fou				
		Conventions (from 2000)	principles/rights				
		Progressing on unratified Conventions (from 2004)	0 – 4.1 bonus points or principles/rights	each of up to four			
ADHERENCE GAP = Core Conventions GAP - Declaration GAP				Maximum 88 points			
IMPLEMENTATION	Committee of Experts	Direct Requests on ratified Conventions Observations on ratified Conventions*	0 – 1.3 on each of seve 0 – 1.1 on each of eigh 0 – 3.1 on each of seve 0 – 2.8 on each of eigh	t Conventions en or			
	Committee on Freedom of Association	To Be Kept Informed reports	0 – 1.3 per case up to 1999 0 – 1.1 from 2000	`			
		Interim Reports	0 – 2.5 per case up to 1999 0 – 2 .2 from 2000	individually, and both together, capped at 12)			
IMPLEMENTATION GAP = Committee of Experts GAP			0 – 31	Maximum 43			
+ Committee on Freedom of Association GAP			0 – 12				
Basic workers' rights GAP ** = ADHERENCE GAP + IMPLEMENTATION GAP				Maximum 100 points			

^{*} If the Committee of Experts acknowledges that progress has occurred, the system accords bonus points, which reduce IMPLEMENTATION **GAP**s to half or zero points.

1.7 The basic features of the indicator system

Two major indicators – called ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION, which are capitalized when these terms refer to the system elaborated here – form the basic pillars of the basic workers' rights gap. They feed the overall gap with numbers.

A gap as conceptualised and measured in this paper will henceforth be referred to in capitalized bolded letters – **GAP**. Scheme 2 provides an overview of the system's structure.

The ADHERENCE indicator measures the ratification of ILO Conventions and the fulfilment of obligations incurred as a result of ratification or under the Declaration. The maximum **GAP** that can be attributed to lack of ADHERENCE is 88 points, which would obtain where a member

^{**} Also referred to as overall GAP.

State had not ratified any of the core Conventions (for details see chapter 2). Given that at present every member State has ratified at least one core Convention, a GAP of 88 points could come about only if a new member State entered the Organization without ratifying a core Convention soon or if a current member State denounced all ratified core Conventions.

The IMPLEMENTATION indicator captures information brought to light through ILO's supervisory and complaints procedures. If these procedures do not reveal any implementation problems, IMPLEMENTATION will not give rise to GAP points. But if there are such problems, IMPLEMENTATION will fuel the GAP up to a maximum of 43 points. The size of the IMPLEMENTATION GAP is a function of the weights given to the supervisory component (Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations – henceforth Committee of Experts)¹² plus the complaints component (Committee on Freedom of Association - henceforth CFA). In any year, the Committee of Experts component can give rise to up to 31 points. The CFA component has an upper limit of 12 points. Adding both together gives a maximum of 43 points as far as the IMPLEMENTATION indicator is concerned (for details see chapter 3).

Due to the interaction of the indicators and the weights chosen, the maximum overall GAP is 100 The maximum would be reached if no core Convention was ratified (entailing an ADHERENCE GAP of 88 points), if no bonus points were earned under the Declaration, and if IMPLEMENTATION's CFA component (which can enter into operation irrespective of the ratification of Conventions) came to as many as 12 points, which is its upper limit and roughly equivalent to the value of a Convention. This reasoning will become clear when each factor is explained in detail in the following chapters.

Also due to the interaction of the indicators and the weights chosen, ratification of a single Convention would prevent the maximum GAP of 100 points being reached even where the Committee of Experts component and the CFA component gave rise to their respective maxima. This is due to the fact that the pronouncements of these two Committees are held to call into question no more than a – relatively small – portion of the value of a ratified Convention, as will be explained in detail later. The IMPLEMENTATION indicator is thus inextricably linked to the ADHERENCE indicator. It depends on it. Implementation problems that come to light through the ILO's machinery do not call into question ratification as a whole but only a part of the value of ratification. Hence, IMPLEMENTATION cannot ever be as large as ADHERENCE in the system envisaged here.

The choice of a rights scale that stretches from 0 to 100 points is due to the desire to make it easy to grasp numbers intuitively. Dividing GAP points by 100 would yield the kind of scales readers may be familiar with from UNDP's Human Development Reports. However, the scale of the rights GAP is not "normalized" in the way UNDP's scales and others are, where the standard formula is applied, i.e. (actual value – minimum value)/(maximum value – minimum value). One could conceivably reconfigure the system proposed in this paper and apply the normalization formula from the start, or one could normalize its results ex post facto. But first things first: this paper proposes a method of dealing with certain kinds of indicators that can be taken further.

¹² Its English initials, CEACR, are here used in source notations only.

Chapter 2. The adherence indicator

2.1 Introduction

ADHERENCE could be constructed in different ways. The method chosen here is to build initially a *Core Conventions component* and then to graft a *Declaration component* on to it. Each component has two dimensions. Thus, ADHERENCE has four dimensions in all.

The core Conventions component seeks to reflect the very basic fact that countries – voluntarily – ratify ILO Conventions and fulfill the constitutional obligation to report to the ILO on how they apply them in law and in practice. Taken together, ratification and reporting, are scaled along a range from 0 to 100 points. Zero points would obtain where a member State had ratified all of the ILO's fundamental Conventions and where it fulfilled its reporting obligations on them correctly. In that case there would be no shortfall of ADHERENCE and no GAP. Non-ratification gives rise to a GAP. Not reporting when required to do so likewise gives rise to a GAP.

During the years 1985-1999, only seven core Conventions existed because Convention No. 182 did not enter into force until 2000. Therefore, the core Conventions component's dimensions have to be calibrated on seven core Conventions before the year 2000 and on eight thereafter.

2.2 Core Conventions component: Ratification dimension

Ratification, the core Conventions component's first dimension, is the most decisive initial step a country can take. Almost everything else depends on it, nationally and internationally. It is therefore accorded a very large weight. The ratification component's total weight is fixed at 88 out of the 100 points of the core Conventions component.

If 88 is the maximum value for all ratifications, the ratification of any single Convention has a value of 88/7 = 12.6 for the years up to and including 1999 when there were only seven core Conventions and of 88/8 = 11 as from the year 2000 onward.

Ratification credits a country on the ADHERENCE indicator with a certain value beginning with the year in which the ratification was registered. These values will be repeated year after year. They would disappear only if a denunciation of the ratification were to occur, in which case the values would turn into an equivalent ADHERENCE **GAP** as from the year after the denunciation. Table 1 exemplifies the calculation of ratification scores for Jordan during a period when Convention values changed from 12.6 points to 11 points.

No particular limitations exist regarding the YES/NO nature of scoring or the source of data. A country either ratifies or it does not. Ratification, if in conformity with certain formal or substantive requirements, is registered publicly (see source note to table 1). There are no inherent limitations in the data itself.

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¹³ An alternative would be for the indicator system to apply the ILO rule that countries remain internationally bound to apply the denounced Convention for ten years and to report on it as well. This rule would be difficult for outsiders to follow in its implications and is therefore dropped in favour of a transparent immediate cut-off date without any further implications. One denunciation of a core Convention occurred during the review period when Malaysia denounced Convention No. 105 in 1990.

Table 1. ADHERENCE GAP, Core Conventions component, ratification dimension, example Jordan, selected years 1992-2002

Convention No.	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
29	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
87	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
98	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
100	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
105	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
111	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
138	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	1
182	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1
Number of ratifications	5	5	5	5	5	5	6	6	7	7	7
Maximum	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	8	8	8
Score = maximum – number	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	1
GAP = score x 12.6 or score x 11	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	12.6	12.6	11.0	11.0	11.0

⁻ Not ratified.

Weight of ratification in ADHERENCE = 88. Value of 1 Convention: 1992-1999 = 12.6, as from 2000 = 11.

Source: Ratifications and denunciations of Conventions are regularly listed in an ILO Governing Body document called *Report of the Director-General*, section "Progress in international labour legislation". For the latest issue, see GB.285/18, which – like all Governing body documents – is also available on the ILO's public website:

http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/gbdoc.htm. A shortcut to the data is the country list on the following public ILO website: http://www.ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/appl-ratif8conv.cfm?Lang=EN.

2.3 Core Conventions component: Reporting dimension

unratified Conventions under Declaration auspices (see footnote 17).

The core Conventions component's second dimension captures member States' reports on ratified Conventions. Article 22 of the ILO's constitution obliges each member to submit a report on the measures it has taken to give effect to the provisions of Conventions to which it is a party. These reports, on which national workers' and employers' organizations have a right to comment, are submitted to the ILO Committee of Experts to permit it to assess whether the countries' legal and factual situation corresponds to the terms of the ratified Conventions. More will be explained later about the Committee of Experts' role and functions. Suffice it to say here that certain reports are due at certain intervals; they are requested to arrive in time to enable the Committee of Experts to examine them; and the Committee regularly records whether reports that were due were received.¹⁴

Reporting matters because it potentially brings out into the open, indeed into the public domain, instances where countries' laws and practices are not in line with the Conventions. But it is much less important – the weight foreseen is 12 points – than ratification.¹⁵

¹⁴ Information on reports that are due and (not) received is recorded in CEACR, 1985, Appendix I, p. 365ff; CEACR, 1986, Appendix I, p. 321ff; CEACR, 1987, Appendix I, p. 440ff; CEACR, 1988, Appendix I, p. 375ff; CEACR, 1989, Appendix I, p. 471ff; CEACR, 1990, Appendix I, p. 446ff; CEACR, 1991, Appendix I, p. 467ff; CEACR 1992, Appendix I, p. 519ff; CEACR 1993, Appendix I, p. 474ff; CEACR 1994, Appendix I, p. 500ff; CEACR 1995, Appendix I, p. 400ff; CEACR 1996, Appendix I, p. 394ff; CEACR 1997, Appendix I, p. 407ff; CEACR 1998, Appendix I, p. 458ff; CEACR 1999, Appendix I, p. 577ff; CEACR 2000, Appendix I, p. 451ff; CEACR 2001, Appendix I, p. 617ff; CEACR 2002, Appendix I, p. 687ff; CEACR 2003, Appendix I, p. 731ff.
¹⁵ The weight chosen reflects the desire to accord a similar importance to reporting on ratified Conventions and on

In relation to a single Convention, failing to report when required to do so becomes a **GAP** that is equivalent to 12/7 = 1.7 points for 1985-1999 and 12/8 = 1.5 points as from the year 2000.

The maximum number of reports that are due varies because countries are not required to report every year on each core Convention. In principle, they have to report only every second year. In practice, countries are requested to report if they have not done so when previously required or if the supervisory body has reason to ask for a detailed report.

There are no inherent limitations in the data itself. In 1995 there were two sources of data, the first with a cut-off point of 3 March 1995 and the second at 8 December 1995. This paper takes account of both and chooses the most favourable outcome for countries. If a report for a particular Convention was due for the March session of the Committee, was not received in March but was received by the time of the rescheduled meeting of the Committee in December, it is scored positively for 1995. Likewise, if a report was due in March, received then and was again due in December but not received at that time, the score is nevertheless a positive one. If different Conventions were due in March and December, each Convention will be scored individually.

Reporting – unlike ratification – is counted only in relation to the year for which reports are due. Table 2 illustrates the calculations of reporting points for Thailand.

No particular limitations exist regarding the YES/NO nature of scoring or the source of data. A country either reports on time or it does not. The comprehensiveness or quality of reports is something that a system of this kind cannot assess.

Ratification and reporting on ratified Conventions are additive parts of one component. Thus, the total core Conventions **GAP** is the sum of the ratification **GAP** and of the reporting **GAP**. Table 3 illustrates cumulative scores of the **GAP** by reference to three Asian countries.

China's large **GAP** is due essentially to non-ratification. The country has so far ratified Convention No. 100 in 1990, Convention No. 138 in 1999 and Convention No. 182 in 2002. India ratified Convention Nos. 29 in 1954, 100 in 1958, 111 in 1960 and only one core Convention, No. 105, during the period under review here, in 2000. India also incurred a few **GAP** points through non-reporting in 1991-94 and 2000. Sri Lanka had ratified two of the relevant Conventions at the beginning of the period and seven by its end, which lowered its initial **GAP** from 63 to 11 points. It, too, experienced some problems with reporting during the years 1994-97.

2.4 The Declaration's relationship to Conventions

The 1998 Declaration was principally aimed at countries not having ratified ILO core Conventions. It obliges them to ensure that workers are free to organize and bargain collectively, that they not be forced to work, that child labour is abolished and that women, minorities, etc., not be discriminated at work. While it is not a substitute for ratification, the Declaration obliges non-ratifying countries to respect, promote and realize ILO's fundamental principles and rights as long as they do not ratify the relevant core Convention(s).

Table 2. ADHERENCE GAP, Core Conventions component, reporting on ratified Conventions dimension, example Thailand, selected years 1992-2002

-	4	000	40	102	40	10.4	40	Λ.Ε.	40	000	40	07	40		40		20	100	20	104	20	
Thailand		992	18	93	18	94	18	95	19	96	19	97	18	98	18	99	20	000	20	01	20	02
	Due	Recd	Due	Recd	Due	Recd	Due	Recd	Due	Recd	Due	Recd	Due	Recd	Due	Recd	Due	Recd	Due	Recd	Due	Recd
29	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1
100	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0	1	1
105	1	0	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-	1	1	-	-
Due Receive	d 2	1	2	1	1	0	2	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	2	2
Score = due – received		1		1		1		0	(0	(0		0		0		0		1		0
GAP = score x 1.7 or 1.5	; •	1.7	1	.7	1	.7	(0	(0	(0	(0		0		0	1	.5		0

⁻ Not ratified. Convention Nos. 87, 98, 11 and 138 not ratified. Convention No. 182 ratified in 2001 but the reporting cycle had not started for Thailand.

Weight of reporting on ratified Conventions in ADHERENCE = 12.

Report due = 1. If received = 1. If not received = 0. Value of 1 report: 1985-1999 = 1.7, as from 2000 = 1.5.

Source: The Committee of Experts records receipt of detailed reports in the document it submits each year to the International Labour Conference (see footnote 14).

Table 3. Core Conventions GAP, examples from Asia: China, India and Sri Lanka, 1985-2002

1700	-00																	
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Ratification GAP	88.2	88.2	88.2	88.2	88.2	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	63.0	66.0	66.0	55.0
Convention reporting GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
China: core C. GAP	88.2	88.2	88.2	88.2	88.2	75.6	75.6	75.6	77.3	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	63.0	66.0	66.0	55.0
Ratification GAP	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	44.0	44.0	44.0
Convention reporting GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	3.4	3.4	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.0
India: core C. GAP	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	52.1	53.8	53.8	53.8	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	45.5	44.0	44.0
Ratification GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	50.4	50.4	37.8	37.8	37.8	25.2	25.2	22.0	11.0	11.0
Convention reporting GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	3.4	1.7	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sri Lanka: core C. GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	50.4	52.1	41.2	39.5	41.2	25.2	25.2	22.0	11.0	11.0

Logically, the Declaration component of ADHERENCE has to be related to unratified Conventions and the relevant **GAP** points. Numerically, since the Declaration follow-up became operational in 2000, the Declaration component has to be related to the post-1999 value of a Convention, i.e. 11 points.

Observing the Declaration is not equivalent internationally to ratifying a binding Convention. Therefore, the Declaration component can only be equal to a portion of the **GAP** that is due to lack of ratifications. Put differently, observance of the Declaration can make good only a part of the shortfall of ratification(s).

How much of a **GAP** can the Declaration component make good in the system proposed here? Some observers might put the Declaration's weight low, others high. This paper suggests that, as a whole, the Declaration component can make good up to half of a ratification **GAP**. Expressed in numbers, the Declaration component can make good up to 5.5 of 11 **GAP** points per unratified Convention. Declaration points may be viewed as bonus points. The difference between the full **GAP** (11 points) and what is made good by observing fully the Declaration, remains a **GAP** (5.5 points) and would require ratification to disappear. The relationships are visualized in figure 1.

Figure 1. Declaration's general relationship to the ADHERENCE indicator, since 2000





Figure 2. Declaration's reporting impact on GAPs, since 2000



However, making up 50 per cent of the ratification GAP presupposes that a country performs perfectly under the Declaration component itself. Two dimensions are involved: (i) reporting, and (ii) progressing in terms of the respect, promotion and realization of the relevant principles and rights.

If a country does not perform well under one or both of the Declaration component's dimensions, it cannot be credited with bonus points. In that event, the GAP that is due to non-ratification will be reduced to a smaller extent, possibly not at all.

2.5 **Declaration Component: Reporting dimension**

Since 2000, a country has constitutional reporting obligations under the Declaration where is has not ratified one or both of the Conventions that are expressions of the fundamental principles and rights at work enshrined in this 1998 ILO instrument. 16

The Declaration reporting dimension is given a weight of 12.5 per cent of a Convention GAP. This is equivalent to one quarter of the maximum that the Declaration component can make good.¹⁷ Figure 2 adapts figure 1 in order to specify the reporting dimension.

If 12.5 per cent of a Convention GAP of 11 points can be made good by correct reporting, that **GAP** would decrease by $11 \times 0.125 = 1.4$ points to 11 - 1.4 = 9.6 points.

The Review of Annual Reports under the Follow-up to the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work is the procedure through which reporting obligations under the Declaration are given effect. It is the source of the data used here (see note to table 4).

Table 4 exemplifies the calculations involved for Uganda. Through dutiful reporting under both the 2000 and the 2001 Annual Review, the country made good 6.9 points and 5.5 points, respectively, of its ratification GAP. One year later, the country fulfilled only two thirds of its reporting obligations and thus made good only 3.7 points of its ratification GAP.

When a country has ratified all core Conventions it is no longer required to report under the Declaration. It then becomes subject to the reporting that is measured under the core Convention component.

2.6 Declaration Component as from 2004: The progress dimension

From 2004 onwards the Declaration's reporting procedure will lead to positive identifications of countries that make significant efforts to realize the Declaration's principles and rights. When a

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reporting on unratified Conventions under Declaration auspices is worth 1.4 points as from the year 2000.

¹⁶ The principles concerning the fundamental rights that are the subject of Convention Nos. 87 and 98 are freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. The principles concerning the fundamental rights that are the subject of Convention Nos. 25 and 105 are the elimination of all forms of forced or compulsory labour. The principle concerning the fundamental rights that is the subject of Convention Nos. 138 and 182 is the effective abolition of child labour. The principles concerning the fundamental rights that are the subject of Convention Nos. 100 and 111 are the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation. ¹⁷ The weights that have been chosen for the two reporting dimensions of this indicator system are appropriately similar. Whereas reporting on ratified Conventions is worth 1.7 points prior to 1999 and 1.5 points afterwards,

Table 4. ADHERENCE, Declaration component, reporting on fundamental principles/rights and thereby making good a portion of the GAP, example Uganda, 2000-02

	Revie	w of 2000	Revie	w of 2001	Revie	w of 2002	
	Due	Received	Due	Received	Due	Received	
Freedom of association and collective bargaining	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Forced labour	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Child labour	1	1	1	1	1	0	
Non-discrimination	1	1	1	1	1	1	
Due Received	3	3	3	3	3	2	
Score = received/due		1		1	0	.666	
Reduction = score x negative weight	-1	2.5%	-12.5%		-{	3.3%	
Ratification GAP (points)		55.0	4	44.0	44.0		
Change in GAP = Ratification GAP x reduction	-6.9	points	-5.5	points	-3.7	points	

⁻ Not applicable because the country had ratified Convention Nos. 29 and 105.

Weight = Declaration reporting reduces GAP by up to 12.5 %.

Report due = 1. If received = 1. If not received = 0. Maximum 1, 2, 3 or 4.

If all reports due are received, value = 1= full 12.5% reduction. If none of the reports due is received, value = 0 = no reduction. Source: For 2000, see Expert-Advisers 2000: FACB paragraph 79, p. 19; FL paragraph 90, pp. 20-21; CL paragraph 97, pp. 21-22 and DIS paragraph 109, p. 23. For 2001, see Expert-Advisers 2001: FACB tables 6 and 7, p. 18; FL tables 8 and 9, pp. 20; CL tables 10 and 11, pp. 23 (the heading of table 11 should read "Countries that owed reports in this category and did not submit them for the annual review of 2001") and DIS see tables 12 and 13, p. 26 (the heading of table 13 should read "Countries that owed reports in this category and did not submit them for the annual review of 2001"). For 2002, see Expert-Advisers 2002: Annex tables 1-4, p. 51, covering FACB, FL, CL and DIS. For 2003, see Expert-Advisers 2003: boxes 1 and 2, pp. 3-4, covering FACB, FL, CL and DIS.

country in its annual report on one or several fundamental principles and rights at work informs the ILO of legislative changes, policies or other measures significant enough to mention this fact in the Programme and Budget implementation reports submitted each year to the Governing Body, the country warrants to be recognized for its efforts. As for the Declaration reporting dimension so for this Declaration progress dimension: progress will reduce the size of the country's ratification GAP.

Within the Declaration component, the weight of significant progress has to be fairly important. It must reflect the fact that countries voluntarily take steps to realize the Declaration's aims. Therefore, the weight of progress is put at three times the size of the reporting weight, i.e. at 37.5 per cent, which is equivalent to three quarters of the maximum that the Declaration component can make good.

If 37.5 per cent of a Convention **GAP** of 11 points can be made good by progressing towards the ILO's ideal world, that **GAP** would decrease by $11 \times 0.375 = 4.1$ points to 11 - 4.1 = 6.9 points.

How is one to determine whether progress obtains? Two assessments are involved. 18 The first narrows down the relevant types of positive changes, i.e. those that matter in relation to progress. These are set out in scheme 3 hereunder.

¹⁸ The Director-General's Programme and Budget Proposals for 2004-05 (document GB.286/PFA/9, paragraph 143) contain a condensed version of what follows.

Scheme 3. Types of positive changes under the Declaration, as from 2004

Changes	Legislation and related measures	Policies and practical measures
Fundamental principles/rights	Legislative changes or judicial decisions bringing member States closer to realization of principles and rights	New policies, practical measures, etc., to give greater effect to principles and rights
	Distinct programmes spreading information on new legislation/court cases Training to implement new legislation/legal practices	Distinct programmes spreading information on recent policy changes/new measures Training to implement new policies
Freedom of association and		
collective bargaining	?	?
Forced labour	?	?
Child labour	?	?
Discrimination	?	?

The second assessment determines whether the following criteria are met:

- are countries' steps definite (as opposed to being plans, intentions, etc.)?
- are countries' steps important in scope or reach (as opposed to, for example, minor awareness raising or training of a very limited number of people)?
- is timing discreet (is the type of positive change identifiably falling within the period of the last 12 months covered by the Annual Review as opposed to something that might have happened years ago)?

What will count for progress under the ADHERENCE indicator are steps that relate to a specific category of principles/rights under the Declaration. Hence, there is a ceiling to the number of instances of progress that this dimension should accommodate. The relevant dimension ceiling is 1 if only one category of fundamental principles and rights is concerned, 2 if two are concerned, etc. The theoretical maximum is four. Only one mention will be credited per principles/rights, otherwise the ceiling would be exceeded.

Progress points count only once – after the ILO has been notified of these changes through the Annual Review procedure and if they have passed the typological and significance tests outlined. Still, further steps may well be taken in subsequent years under the same category or under another category of principles/rights. If they meet the criteria, the country would again make good a portion of its ADHERENCE **GAP**.

To visualize the relationships between progress under the Declaration and non-ratified Conventions, one can go back to Figure 2 and replace the weight of 12.5 by 37.5 per cent. The change in the weight increases the reduction of the **GAP**.

As empirical data will not be available before 2004, table 5 illustrates calculations of the progress dimension for a hypothetical country called "Progressland". It shows that progress pays in terms of the indicator. Progressland's ratification **GAP** is reduced by 20.6 points in 2004 and by 8.3 points in 2005. In 2006, no progress having been recorded, Progressland's **GAP** stays at its level of that year. The bottom row of table 5 shows the absolute size of reductions of the **GAP**.

Table 5. ADHERENCE, Declaration component, recording actual progress and thereby making good a portion of the GAP, example Progressland

	_	Review	of 2004	Review	of 2005	Review	of 2006
		Max	Actual	Max	Actual	Max	Actual
Freedom of association and colle	ctive bargaining	-	-	-	-	-	-
Forced labour		-	-	-	-	-	-
Child labour		1	1	1	1	1	0
Non-discrimination		1	1	1	0	1	0
Maximum A	ctual instances	2	2	2	1	2	0
Score = actual/maximum			1	0	.5		0
Reduction = score x negative we	ight	-37	' .5%	-18.8%		C)%
Ratification GAP (hypothetical po	oints)	5	5.0	4	4.0	3	3.0
Change in GAP = Ratification G	AP x reduction	-20.6	points	-8.3 ו	ooints	g 0	oints

⁻ Not applicable because Progressland has ratified the relevant Conventions. The country has reporting obligations only concerning child labour and non-discrimination.

Weight = Declaration progress reduces GAP by up to 37.5%.

One instance = 1. No instance = 0. Maximum 1, 2, 3 or 4. The relevant dimension ceiling is e.g. 1 if only one category of fundamental principles and rights is concerned, 2 if two are concerned, etc. The theoretical maximum is four. While for each category of principles/rights there can be up to six forms of progress, only one mention can be credited to a single category of principles/rights. Given Progressland's ratification record, its maximum for the purposes of this table is 2.

If there is progress on all requisite counts, value = 1= full 37.5% reduction. If no progress at all value = 0 = no reduction. Source: Implementation report in Governing Body document.

ADHERENCE GAP, example of Namibia, selected years 1995-2002 Table 6.

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Ratification GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	22.0	11.0	11.0
Convention reporting GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Core Convention GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	22.0	11.0	11.0
Declaration reporting bonus points	-	-	-	-	-	-2.8	-1.4	-1.4
Declaration progress bonus points*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Namibia ADHERENCE GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	19.3	9.6	9.6

⁻ Not applicable.

Table 6 illustrates interim calculations that include the Declaration dimensions in the case of Namibia. The country's dutiful reporting under Declaration auspices has lowered its ADHERENCE **GAP** by 2.8 points or 1.4 points.

The implementation indicator Chapter 3.

3.1 Introduction

Implementation problems in respect of workers' rights could be conceptualised and measured in a number of ways for indicator purposes. One way would be to encompass the implementation problems of both ratifying and non-ratifying countries. That is not possible with published regular ILO data except in respect of the principles and rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining. As of 2002, the GAP system does not capture the implementation problems of the

27 countries that have not ratified one or both of the forced labour Conventions,

19

^{*} Can be attributed only as from 2004.

- 72 countries that have not ratified one or both of the child labour Conventions, and
- 26 countries that have not ratified one or both of the two equality Conventions. 19

These numbers were larger during the early years of the period under review here when countries had ratified fewer Conventions than in 2002. This does not mean, however, that these countries are not covered or that they are "advantaged" by the system. On the contrary, they incur "heavy" ADHERENCE **GAP**s on account of their lack of ratifications.

Ratifying countries' IMPLEMENTATION problems could be scaled along a range of 0 to 100 on the lines of the ADHERENCE indicator. Such a scale could be split into components comprising the seven/eight core Conventions and the four fundamental principles and rights. Weights could be attached to each component, and so on.

A slightly modified approach is preferred that relates the problems which are revealed by selected ILO supervisory or complaints procedures to the Convention values accorded to a country as a result of ratification. In this way, too, there will be a scale. Given the weights chosen, it has an upper limit of 43 points. This maximum would be reached if, in any single year, a country incurred comments by the Committee of Experts on all core Conventions and was the object of many reports by the Committee on Freedom of Association. This eventuality did not happen.²⁰

IMPLEMENTATION points are calculated very simply. IMPLEMENTATION GAPs start at 0. Zero points mean that no problems are revealed by supervision or complaints. Problems add certain points to the indicator, which in turn opens up the rights GAP numerically. If the problems get resolved later on or if they do not reappear, the points scored on the indicator decrease, and so does this part of the rights GAP.

3.2 Relevant supervisory and complaints procedures

Supervision and complaint procedures exist to verify that countries move from formal ratification to actual implementation of their international obligations as represented by ratified core Conventions and the freedom of association principles and rights of the ILO Constitution. A number of ILO procedures have been instituted that permit member States, the Governing Body, national as well as international workers' and employers' organizations, even individual delegates to the International Labour Conference, to raise questions of implementation where there are doubts. These procedures are made use of quite often; they are set in motion primarily in relation to the core Conventions or freedom of association principles and rights; and they frequently result in changes of countries' laws and practices.

To qualify for inclusion in the indicator system, supervisory or complaints procedures have to fulfil three criteria simultaneously. They have to:

¹⁹ Thirty-eight countries have not ratified one or both of the freedom of association and collective bargaining Conventions. IMPLEMENTATION covers them through the Committee on Freedom of Association.

²⁰ The highest IMPLEMENTATION score during any year, 26.5 points, was shared by Guatemala and Peru in 1995 and 1994, respectively.

- be concerned with what matters most. Procedures that are rather minor, occasional or of little impact are inappropriate for indicators;
- involve potentially all countries on an indiscriminate basis. No individual country or particular region or group of countries should either be exempt or victimised by the system; and
- be based on YES/NO distinctions rather than on judgments to be made.²¹

The ILO is privileged to have the most advanced, far-reaching and effective supervisory and complaints machinery among international organizations. Its basic features and the multitude of procedures, well known to specialists, may be a little difficult to comprehend by outsiders and will therefore be summarized very briefly with particular reference to questions of relevance to the **GAP** system.²²

Three inter-acting bodies perform distinct roles: the Committee of Experts, the Committee on Freedom of Association and the Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labour Conference. The Committee of Experts was established not long after the ILO was founded. It is currently composed of 20 persons appointed in their individual capacity among completely impartial experts of technical competence and independent standing. They are drawn from all parts of the world so that the Committee may enjoy first-hand experience of different legal, economic and social system. Its fundamental working principles, as reiterated by the Experts on a number of occasions, 23 call for impartiality and objectivity in pointing out the extent to which it appears that the legal and factual position in a State having ratified a particular Convention is in conformity with the terms of that Convention and the obligations which that State has undertaken by virtue of the ILO's Constitution. To accomplish its supervisory function, the Committee of Experts examines – in March each year but since 1995 in December – the reports that governments submit on the application of ratified Conventions.²⁴ Where the Committee finds something questionable, it puts forward certain comments that are published in a report addressed to the annual International Labour Conference, which meets each June in Geneva.

The Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) was set up in 1951 as a tripartite organ of the ILO Governing Body, comprising nine of its members and an independent Chair. The CFA It is a complaints-driven body that examines allegations of meets three times a vear. infringements of the principles of freedom of association, which include questions of collective bargaining and strikes. The great majority of the complaints originate from national or

²¹ Annex II lists the major forms of supervisory and complaints mechanisms that have been left aside in this paper.

²² Among ILO publications the following are useful introductions to the questions of this paper. *ILO law on freedom* of association: Standards and procedures (Geneva, 1995); the special issue on "Labour rights, human rights" of the International Labour Review, Vol. 137, No. 2 (1998); D. Tajgman and K. Curtis: Freedom of association: A user's guide (Geneva 2000); the Handbook of procedures relating to international labour Conventions and Recommendations that can be found on the ILO's public website under

http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/manualg.htm; and "Examination of complaints alleging infringements of trade union rights" (unpublished).

²³ Such as in 1987 when, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Committee, it restated its fundamental principles, mandate and method of work. See CEACR, 1987, Part I, Chapter II, pp. 7-20.

²⁴ It may be noted in passing that Committee of Experts regularly takes account of difficulties encountered by member States in fulfilling their reporting obligations, "such as natural calamities or even general economic difficulties", ibid., p. 13.

international workers' organizations. They can be lodged regardless of whether or not Convention Nos. 87 and/or 98 are ratified. The consent of the government is not necessary for a complaint to be examined. The procedure followed gives governments the opportunity to reply to the complaint as well as to the views of the CFA. "In practice, the vast majority of governments cooperate with the work of the Committee – even though they sometimes delay in replying – since they are thus able to defend themselves against what they may consider to be unfounded accusations or to explain why they have adopted the measures objected to." In its over 50 years of history, some 2,250 cases have so far been lodged. Written communications, meetings between its Chair and countries' representatives at the annual International Labour Conference and direct contact missions are among its modes of operation. The CFA's examinations, conclusions and recommendations are published, first of all in the form of a Governing Body paper²⁶ and, after a while, in the *Official Bulletin* of the ILO.

The third body, the **Committee on the Application of Standards of the International Labour Conference**, is a tripartite subgroup of delegates to the International Labour Conference. The Application Committee is the recipient of both the annual report of the Committee of Experts and an attentive observer of cases under examination by the CFA. The Application Committee selects between 20 and 40 of the many observations made by the Committee of Experts in order to discuss them individually, requesting concerned government representatives to be present. While the Committee of Experts is a technical body responsible for technical supervision, the Application Committee is a political body that seeks to persuade governments to change their laws and practices, including by expressing concern on cases the Committee considers to be serious or urgent ones and by mobilizing public opinion. Its proceedings are public and published.²⁷

In the light of these considerations, the non-political Committee of Experts and the CFA are retained for the measurement of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator, but not the Application Committee.²⁸

3.3 Committee of Experts component: Direct Requests and Observations

Direct Requests are one of the two forms of comment by the Committee of Experts included in the indicator system. The Committee uses Direct Requests when the issues raised are of a technical nature or when it has doubts but is not sure about a particular question and wishes to obtain clarification before expressing an opinion. It is a low-level form of indicating to a

²⁵ G. von Potovsky: « Freedom of association: The impact of Convention No. 87 and ILO action", in *International Labour Review*, Vol. 137, No. 2 (1998), p. 212.

²⁶ The latest was issued in March 2003, see GB.286/11.

²⁷ For the latest issue, see *Report of the Committee on the Application of Conventions*, Part I, *Provisional Record No.* 28, 90th Session of the International Labour Conference (Geneva, ILO, 2002).

²⁸ While the Committee of Experts, the CFA and the Application Committee interact, they function each in their own right and for their own specific purposes. Much of the Committee of Experts' attention, most of the Application Committee's attention and all of the CFA's time is taken up by fundamental Conventions or the Declaration's principles and rights. The CFA regularly brings to the attention of the Committee of Experts cases of ratified Conventions where the CFA procedures have been concluded but where in the CFA's opinion the Committee of Experts ought to engage in a dialogue with the government in question regarding the measures it has taken to give effect to the recommendations of the CFA. This does not give rise to double counting as far as the indicator system is concerned because the two Committees will not examine the same question at the same time, and the Committee of Experts will look at the issue in its own right.

government that things may not be as they ought to be. When included in the indicator system, it will be expressed as DIRECT REQUESTs in capital letters.

The second form of comment by the Committee of Experts is observations. The Committee's reports in Part II contain "General Observations" as well as "Individual Observations". The former are mainly concerned with questions of reporting on ratified Conventions, which the ADHERENCE indicator has already captured for the indicator system. "General Observations" can therefore be left aside.

Where the Committee of Experts perceives non-compliance with ratified Conventions, it puts forward a *negative* individual observation, i.e. a critical comment. *Negative* individual observations make up the very large majority of "Individual Observations". They are "generally used in more serious or long-standing cases of failure to fulfil obligations".

Negative individual observations are hereunder referred to as OBSERVATIONs in capital letters. They are the Committee of Experts' "most important comments" The fact that they cover countries indiscriminately – given ratification records, they cover the large majority of countries – makes them well suited for assessing IMPLEMENTATION **GAP**s.

Where a government has taken the measures called for by previous comments of the Committee of Experts, the Committee may consider this development to constitute significant progress and express its satisfaction. If that is the case, it will both list the country in a distinct section at the beginning of Part I of its report and, usually but not always, express its "satisfaction" in an individual observation on the Convention itself. "Cases of progress" will henceforth be referred to as *PROGRESS* in capital italicized letters.³¹

3.4 CFA component: Different kinds of reports

It is tempting to bring the Committee on Freedom of Association into the indicator system by attributing **GAP** points to the fact that a complaint against a particular government has been submitted. One problem difficult to resolve is what weight to attach to this fact. Does the mere lodging of a complaint call into question 0, 5, 25 or 50 per cent of the value of a core Convention? Nothing is more uncertain. Another problem is that complaints may not fulfil the requirements of receivability or that they may be withdrawn after a while by their initiators. Information on whether a complaint is receivable and on whether it is has been withdrawn is not always discernible in the CFA's reports, which would incur scoring problems.

This paper proposes a more pertinent method that instrumentalises the formal nature of two kinds of reports issued by the CFA and which attributes a different importance to these forms of

²⁹ Handbook..., op. cit, paragraph 54, endnote 8

³⁰ ILO law on freedom of association, op. cit., p.163.

³¹ The Committee of Experts also notes certain developments "with interest" as opposed to "with satisfaction". "Interest" is a much lower form of approval of developments than satisfaction; and at an earlier stage of the development of the system it was thought possible to instrumentalise this notion alongside the notion of "satisfaction". That idea was dropped (i) because there can be two, three or even more mentions of "interest" in a single comment, which would oblige one to accord a very small weight to a note of interest in order to keep its cumulative total below the weight of "satisfaction"; and (ii) because there is no fixed relationship between expressions of interest and expressions of satisfaction, i.e. two or more mentions of "interest" cannot be said to correspond invariably to one mention of "satisfaction".

reports. For example, some complaints raise broad and far-reaching policy issues while others involve only an individual enterprise or person. As will be demonstrated later when regional CFA data are analysed in table 11, the selected forms of reports reflect something of the relative importance of the subject matter under examination.

The Committee issues one of three or four kinds of reports in a document referred to as the "Introduction" to its reports. Up to March 1996, it distinguished:

- reports in which it requests to be kept informed of developments. Where the CFA categorizes its reports in this form, the Committee considers that it has had sufficient information to adopt its conclusions and recommendations but it prefers to follow the manner in which the government gives effect to its recommendations in order to encourage their full implementation. This is the first dimension of the CFA component that feeds the IMPLEMENTATION indicator. It will be referred to as TO BE KEPT INFORMED in capital letters when related to the indicator and be given a relatively low weight in the indicator system;
- reports that contain interim conclusions. Where the CFA issues an interim report it does so either because it needs further information in order to come to its conclusions in knowledge of all the facts or when the problems raised, because of their gravity, should continue to be subject to an in-depth examination by the Committee. This is the second dimension of the CFA component of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator. It will be referred to as INTERIM REPORT in capital letters when related to the indicator. This kind of report will be given a relatively high weight. The fact that INTERIM REPORTs are used more frequently when important questions are at stake will be verified when regional CFA data are analysed in table 11 below;
- reports containing definitive conclusions;
- reports on cases that do not call for further examination.

The latter two forms of reports appear to have been merged in mid-1996 into a single form called "definitive reports". When the CFA issues a definitive report or when in its view no further examination is needed, the Committee considers that it has received sufficient information or that it can assess the merits of the case and that the publication of its final views is the next best step to deal with the case – irrespective of whether the allegations were justified, groundless or have been overtaken by events or whether their examination has entailed much or little material progress.

When the CFA receives information from a government, mostly as a result of a TO BE KEPT INFORMED request, or from the complainant submitting further evidence, it may not issue a full report but it may note its views or reactions in a section headed "Effect given to the recommendations of the Committee and the Governing Body". It may express regret or satisfaction, hope or interest, simply take note or use a similar formula of this kind; or it may consider that a case does not call for further examination; or it may once again ask for information. The many variations of words used reflect the diplomatic language of international organisations, the nuances that lawyers and politicians excel in and the assumed meanings that

they imply. This section of the CFA's Introduction cannot be instrumentalised for indicator purposes because one would have to make a judgment as to what exactly the CFA had in mind.

TO BE KEPT INFORMED reports and INTERIM REPORTs are in the public domain, unlike some other modes of operation of the CFA such as so-called preliminary examinations and meetings between the CFA and government representatives during the International Labour Conference, which have to be left aside.³²

3.5 Reference values

When the Committee of Experts issues a DIRECT REQUEST or an OBSERVATION, its comment relates to a ratified Convention. When the CFA examines a case, it may relate to one or two ratified core Conventions or it may concern the principles and rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining. Where ratified Conventions are involved, the values that a country has been credited with under the ADHERENCE indicator can now be referred to for the purpose of calculating appropriate "problem" points and the size of IMPLEMENTATION **GAPs** – in a way that is reminiscent of the method of relating the Declaration component to ratification values.

To calculate IMPLEMENTATION **GAP**s when the CFA is seized of cases where Conventions are not ratified but where the principles and rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining are at stake, the indicator system has to find appropriate reference values. One might argue that such reference values should take into account the reporting and/or progress points that countries are credited with under the Declaration component. However, this presupposes that countries never fail in their Declaration reporting obligations, which is unrealistic, and that they are progressing towards the realization of the relevant fundamental principles and rights, which may rarely be the case. Most of all, it cannot be the case for Declaration reporting points before 2000 and for Declaration progress points before 2004, i.e. this is not a feasible option.

Another option would be to refer to the fact that the principles and rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining inspire two core Conventions. In that perspective, should the reference value be at the level of two Conventions? This would make it inordinately large in the event of an actual complaint being concerned with only one Convention. Putting the reference value lower than the level of a single Convention could incur the opposite injustice, i.e. a CFA case concerned with principles and rights would effectively cover the same ground as a Convention case but would be undervalued by a lower reference value. Clearly, the most pertinent reference value of a CFA case not relating to a ratified Convention is the value of one Convention, i.e. 12.6 before 2000 and 11 thereafter. These values are retained for the GAP system.

3.6 Weighting of the selected procedures

Each of the four supervisory or complaints procedures will now be given a specific weight to reflect its importance relative to a Convention's value as well as its importance relative to the other three dimensions of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator.

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³² The so-called "urgent appeals" by the CFA are also not instrumentalised for indicator purposes. One reason is that they are of a purely procedural nature designed to induce governments not to delay their responses endlessly. Another reason is that one should not clutter an indicator with minor items of little weight.

DIRECT REQUESTs or when the CFA wishes TO BE KEPT INFORMED are important in their own right but not overwhelmingly so. This paper suggests that, where the Committee of Experts makes a DIRECT REQUEST or where the CFA requests TO BE KEPT INFORMED, *one tenth* of a country's Convention value should be counted as an IMPLEMENTATION **GAP**. DIRECT REQUESTs and TO BE KEPT INFORM reports are thus given identical weights for the purpose of the indicator system.

One tenth of a Convention's value should be seen as an average that applies to all countries without distinction and exception throughout the period under review, i.e. from 1985 till today. One may argue that this particular DIRECT REQUEST or that particular TO BE KEPT INFORMED report is more important than others. But this is a question of judgment that the indicator system cannot afford to make. Only objective categorizations can be employed – those made by the ILO's supervisory or complaints bodies through the categorizations they have employed for decades.

Up to 1999, ten per cent of 12.6 would constitute a **GAP** of 1.3 point. As from 2000, ten per cent of 11 would constitute a **GAP** of 1.1 points.

As regards OBSERVATIONs or when the CFA issues an INTERIM REPORT, each represents a higher or more challenging form of questioning a country's legal or factual situation than DIRECT REQUESTs and wishing TO BE KEPT INFORMED. Therefore, the weights associated with them should be larger. This paper suggests that, if the Committee of Experts puts forward an OBSERVATION, *one quarter* of a country's Convention value should be counted as an IMPLEMENTATION **GAP**. If the CFA issues an INTERIM REPORT, the IMPLEMENTATION **GAP** should amount to *one fifth* of a Convention's value.

Therefore, up to 1999, an OBSERVATION by the Committee of Experts gives rise to an IMPLEMENTATION **GAP** of 3.1 points, as from 2000 its size is 2.8 points. As regards CFA INTERIM REPORTs, up to 1999 one such report incurs an IMPLEMENTATION **GAP** of 2.5 points, as from 2000 its size is 2.2 points.³³

Again, these weights should be viewed as averages that apply to all countries throughout the period under review without regard to individual variations that readers might subjectively wish to attach to this OBSERVATION or that INTERIM REPORT.

Figure 3 represents visually the relationships and selected weights of all four IMPLEMENTATION dimensions.

Since each procedure is a distinct and is operated by a specially established Committee in its own right, the points obtained under each component will be added together. The total IMPLEMENTATION **GAP**, therefore, is the sum of the Committee of Experts component's points and of the CFA component's points.


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³³ The logic of the approach of this paper might lead one to weight as 100 per cent a case where the ILO asked its member States to consider sanctioning a country in case of grave and sustained violations of a particular Convention. This has been the case for Myanmar as regards forced labour. However, such an exceptional and extreme eventuality, which has happened only once in the history of the ILO so far, should not form part of this indicator system.

Figure 3. IMPLEMENTATION, weight of procedures giving rise to GAPs





It needs perhaps to be made clear that the ADHERENCE values in question merely constitute a numerical reference or yardstick for the calculation of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator. They will neither disappear nor be deducted from the ADHERENCE indicator, which will maintain them on the books, as it were.

3.7 Scoring the Committee of Experts component

DIRECT REQUESTs are scored when the Committee of Experts' report in any year addresses such a request to the country's government. When a country is not the object of a DIRECT REQUEST, it will not have points put on its IMPLEMENTATION indicator.

Where the nature of a DIRECT REQUEST changes in the light of new information that has come to the Committee of Experts' attention, the charge on IMPLEMENTATION will stay the same. It is the formal fact of making a DIRECT REQUEST, not its contents, which matters. No judgment is involved on the part of the **GAP** system.

OBSERVATIONs are scored by the mere fact of the Committee of Experts' report containing such a form of comment. Again, this is a YES/NO question without a judgment or evaluation being involved other than the Committee's, which has opted for this – the highest – form of questioning a country's laws or practices.

If the content of an OBSERVATION changes in the light of new information that has come to the Committee of Experts' attention, the charge on the indicator will stay the same. The Committee can revert to an IMPLEMENTATION problem as often as it receives new information or as a result of itself having asked for a detailed report, or as result of the normal core Convention reporting cycle of two years. Where a country has been the object of an OBSERVATION for many years, this is evidently a reflection of an unsatisfactory situation; and the country will be scored as long as the Committee of Experts makes OBSERVATIONs without perceiving *PROGRESS*. The Committee does not stop asking for change until it has occurred.³⁴

If a country is listed as having made *PROGRESS* in Part I of the Committee's report under the heading of "Cases of progress", no **GAP** points will be charged to this IMPLEMENTATION dimension for the Convention concerned. The Committee in Part II of its report usually adds a *positive* observation under that Convention. Fortunately, the distinction between *positive* satisfaction and a *negative* observation is so clear in theory and practice that there should be no ambiguity when scoring. In case of doubt, this system scores the explicit listing in Part I that is shown under "Cases of progress". *PROGRESS* is scored as from 1986.

However, the Committee of Experts may not be entirely satisfied with the measures taken by the government. While it lists the country and Convention in Part I under "Cases of progress", it may well find that there are unresolved issues or that new questions have been raised by new measures. The Committee will not hesitate to express its view that not everything is satisfactory in Part II of its report. It will proceed to formulating an individual observation with distinctly *positive* and distinctly *negative* connotations; and it will make it very clear that, while steps have been taken by the government to close the **GAP** between the real world and the ideal world of ILO, there is not enough *PROGRESS* for the Committee to consider the question closed. In the event of a mixed individual observation of this kind, the system will reduce the charge on the IMPLEMENTATION indicator by 50 per cent, to 1.6 or 1.4 points depending on the year in question. If the Committee in a subsequent year finds that there is *PROGRESS* that it does not need to qualify by a mixed observation, IMPLEMENTATION will show no **GAP** points.³⁵

DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONs on any single Convention will be summed by the indicator system. The Committee of Experts not infrequently chooses to address both a DIRECT REQUEST and an OBSERVATION to a government in relation to the same core Convention. In that event, 35 per cent of a Convention's value are counted as **GAP** points during the year concnerned.

It is worth spelling out once more that the concepts and measurements of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator must be objective ones, that they are dependent only on distinctions of the formal nature of the Committee's comment. A question may well be important in the eyes of one observer but not at all important in the eyes of another observer. Objectification requires that one does not interpret the importance of a comment. What matters is whether the Committee of Experts has categorized its review of a country's legal or factual

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Where OBSERVATIONs continue for a long time, it is possible that the Application Committee will publicly discuss the questions involved and possibly seek to put pressure on the country to change its laws or practices.
 Where a Committee of Experts' OBSERVATION merely expresses its satisfaction and at the same time makes a cross-reference to a DIRECT REQUEST, the system nevertheless shows a zero OBSERVATION GAP because the DIRECT REQUEST does not call into question the *PROGRESS* achieved. By contrast, the DIRECT REQUEST will be scored as such.

situation as meriting a DIRECT REQUEST or an OBSERVATION. If that is the case, the indicator is loaded with problem points that determine the size of this component of the IMPLEMENTATION GAP.

A number of scoring issues are resolved as follows:

- until early 1995, the Committee met each year in March, recorded receipt of reports, formulated DIRECT REQUESTs or OBSERVATIONs, and the outside covers of its report referred to the same-year session of the International Labour Conference that took place a few months later in June. In 1995, the Committee's sessions were moved to December. From then on, receipts of reports were recorded and DIRECT REQUESTs or OBSERVATIONs were formulated up to December of the year; but the Committee's report referred to the next year because it was addressed to the Conference meeting in June. The indicator system has to accommodate this switch, which it does as follows. Up to and including 1994, the IMPLEMENTATION points in the system are those of the Committee's report of the same year. Starting with 1996, the points in the system are those of the report of the previous year. 36 For instance, DIRECT REQUESTs or OBSERVATIONs contained in the report of the Committee of Experts of 2003 are entered under 2002. As regards 1995, when two reports were issued, the system permits accumulation but – to be fair to countries - only of one DIRECT REQUEST and one OBSERVATION per core The system does not allow either two DIRECT REQUESTs or two OBSERVATIONs in 1995. Likewise, it permits accumulation of *PROGRESS* during the year, but reductions in **GAP**s cannot go beyond the size of 3.1 points per Convention;

- under OBSERVATIONs, cross-references by the Committee of Experts from one Convention to another count as two distinct OBSERVATIONs being put forward at the same time. For example, the Committee may make an OBSERVATION under Convention No. 98 and state "See under Convention No. 87" in the report's section containing individual observations on Convention No. 98. The four pairs of ILO's core standards consist each of two Conventions that are interlinked and which build on one another. When matters are questionable under one of them, they are often also questionable under the other paired Convention. Where the Committee of Experts refers to both, it is entirely appropriate to score both.

Table 7 exemplifies Norway's IMPLEMENTATION GAPs deriving from the Committee's DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONs. It shows that a certain number of DIRECT REQUESTs involving all ratified Conventions except Convention No. 105 have been addressed to the country's government. (The most recent child labour Convention No. 182, which Norway ratified at the end 2000, has only just entered the reporting cycle.) Numerous OBSERVATIONs were addressed by the Committee of Experts to Norway on the two freedom of association and collective bargaining Conventions, Nos. 87 and 98, without leading to developments judged satisfactory by the Committee, and on the two equality Conventions Nos. 100 and 111 as well. The zero points in Table 7 indicate definite *PROGRESS* in 1986 with respect to Convention No. 100 and in 1989 with respect to Convention No. 138. In terms of IMPLEMENTATION, Norway has had a GAP in the 5-10 points range on account of the Committee of Experts component of the indicator. The trend in the IMPLEMENTATION **GAP** is marginally upwards.

³⁶ The (non-)receipt of reports, which forms part of the reporting dimension of the core Convention component explained in chapter 2.3 above, is handled by the system in the same way as DIRECT REQUESTs or OBSERVATIONs are. The same-year and previous year rules are applied but need not be explained in detail.

Table 7. IMPLEMENTATION GAP, Committee of Experts component, example of Norway, 1985-2002

	·mp.	U UI	1101	···uy	, 170													
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
OBSERVATION C. 29																		
OBSERVATION C. 87		3.1	3.1		3.1			3.1	3.1		3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1		2.8	2.8	2.8
OBSERVATION C. 98		3.1			3.1								3.1		2.8		2.8	
OBSERVATION C. 100		0.0						3.1		3.1		3.1				2.8		2.8
OBSERVATION C. 105																		
OBSERVATION C. 111	3.1		3.1			3.1	3.1			3.1	3.1					2.8		2.8
OBSERVATION C. 138					0.0													
OBSERVATION C. 182	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Direct Request C. 29		1.3		1.3														
Direct Request C. 87	1.3																	
Direct Request C. 98	1.3																	
Direct Request C. 100		1.3		1.3		1.3				1.3				1.3		1.1		1.1
Direct Request C. 105																		
Direct Request C. 111	1.3		1.3			1.3	1.3			1.3	1.3		1.3			1.1		1.1
Direct Request C. 138		1.3		1.3	1.3			1.3					1.3			1.1		
Direct Request C. 182	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CEACR GAP	7.0	10.1	7.5	3.9	7.5	5.7	4.4	7.5	3.1	8.8	7.5	6.2	8.8	4.4	2.8	11.7	5.6	10.6

⁻ Not applicable.

OBSERVATION = 3.1 points up to 1999 and 2.8 points as from 2000. No OBSERVATION = no points.

DIRECT REQUEST = 1.3 points up to 1999 and 1.1 points as from 2000. No DIRECT REQUEST = no points.

If *PROGRESS* is noted but a related OBSERVATION contains not only positive but also negative connotations, the load is half, i.e. 1.6 OBSERVATION points up to 1999 and 1.4 points as from 2000. Unqualified *PROGRESS* is noted as 0.0.

The numbers that are loaded, half or fully unloaded through OBSERVATIONs in any year sum to a net number that defines the size of the **GAP** deriving from the Committee of Experts' comments (see bottom row of table 7). The maximum that could accumulate under the Committee of Experts' component of the system during any single year is a rounded 31 points (7x1.3 + 7x3.1 or 8x1.1 + 8x2.8, depending on the years covered).

3.8 Scoring the CFA component

The CFA component starts in 1985 but disregards all cases pre-dating this year. Only new cases are relevant to IMPLEMENTATION. The first case to enter the system is case no. 1319 (Ecuador).

Again, the guiding principle of loading is not one's perception of the gravity of cases but their categorization by the CFA through the different forms of reports issued. Before specifying the loading of problems that give rise to a **GAP**, it is important to make clear at the outset that a country is not scored in the following circumstances:

- when a case is declared to be receivable. It would be unjust if a country were scored after a case was declared receivable but the complainant then withdrew it³⁷ or the CFA closed it some time later as being groundless or overtaken by events of for some other reason;³⁸

³⁷ In which case the CFA can, and sometimes does, pursue the case of its own volition.

- where the CFA does not issue an INTERIM REPORT or does not ask TO BE KEPT INFORMED but declares that that no further examination is required or concludes the case by issuing a definitive report. In these instances, the matter seems clear to the CFA; its findings may favour or incriminate the government; but publication is all that is foreseen - the case goes straight into the public domain. A number of cases are dealt with in this way. They will, therefore, never constitute an IMPLEMENTATION GAP. This will entail a slight underestimate of the problems that this indicator is meant to capture.³⁹ However, objectivity and fairness towards governments require the outmost prudence in the attribution of rights GAPs. The CFA's formal categorization of TO BE KEPT INFORMED and INTERIM REPORTs is the one and only yardstick that this paper applies for the purpose of scoring all member States of the ILO at all times.40

Several scoring questions are resolved as follows:

- if, as happens frequently, the CFA issues two or three reports during its several sessions in a single year, the particular case is scored on each occasion. But, to be fair to countries, the indicator will contain only the points most favourable to them;
- if the CFA's categorization of cases changes in the course of time, because one part of a case is more or less resolved while another part continues to worry the Committee, or because new evidence is brought to the Committee, the indicator will reflect the changes as from the year in which they occur. Downgrading from INTERIM REPORTs to TO BE KEPT INFORMED reports occurs from time to time. If that happens, the score will be downgraded from 2.5 or 2.2 points to 1.3 or 1.1 points. If the downgrading happens in the same year in which an INTERIM REPORT was first issued, only 1.3 or 1.1 points will be shown for that year – again a scoring decision in favour of countries;
- if in the course of a session the CFA were to issue reports on a country in respect of several distinct cases, which happens frequently, each case would be taken into account on its own. The CFA has an understandable habit of considering two, three or more related cases together. Where cases are listed side-by-side under one heading, the indicator system scores them as two or more single cases. Disentangling is necessary because the Committee sometimes concludes that there is no need for further examination of one or several of the cases that it covered by an INTERIM REPORT, while it wishes to continue examining one or several other cases of this batch. Therefore, each case must be scored separately according to the distinctions adopted by the Committee:

³⁸ Technically, one could put a small charge on IMPLEMENTATION using the information in the CFA's report that a new case has been opened for this or that country. If the case was withdrawn or the Committee found it did not merit further examination or if it arrived at definitive conclusions, the charge could be taken off the indicator from the time it was first entered. In practice, there could be attribution problems.

³⁹ Of course, the CFA does not hesitate to use language that indicates how worried it is about the allegations of infringements of freedom of association or the legal or factual situation that it studied. But the many shades of meanings of expressions used by the Committee do not lend themselves to precise categorizations.

⁴⁰ INTERIM REPORTs frequently request governments to furnish information. They will nevertheless be scored only as INTERIM REPORTs. The request for further information will be disregarded in that case so as not to run the risk of double counting. The two kinds of reports are not cumulative in one and the same CFA case, i.e. a country cannot be scored on both simultaneously.

- if a session of the CFA was concerned with only one or two countries, where the questions examined tend to be relatively serious and call for much study, the table of contents and the heading of the report in the ILO's *Official Bulletin* may not specify whether this is a definitive report or a TO BE KEPT INFORMED report or an INTERIM REPORT. It usually is an INTEIM REPORT. But that fact can be established only by looking at the introductory words of the Committee's recommendations and then attributing the appropriate weight;
- if the CFA issued one of the two kinds of reports selected by the system but continued to examine a case for some time without concluding it in one way or another and then, years later, issued either an INTERIM REPORT or a TO BE KEPT INFORMED request, that particular case would be considered a continuing case and points would be recorded during the intervening years at the level of the original report. For example, if an INTERIM REPORT was issued in year X and the next INTERIM REPORT three years later, the system would show INTERIM REPORT points during year X as well as during the subsequent two years. If the last report were a TO BE KEPT INFORMED report, the final year's points would correspond to the lighter load of this form of report.

To maintain the indicator's inherent relationship with the reference values of ratified Conventions and fundamental principles and rights, the total number of points that can be charged to a country is capped at 12 throughout the period 1985-2002. A **GAP** cannot exceed 12 points under the CFA component, irrespective of how many TO BE KEPT INFORMED or INTERIM REPORTS are issued during a year.

The notions of progress and satisfaction, which are also evoked in the CFA's pronouncements and reports, cannot be instrumentalised for unloading purposes because they are not graded by the CFA itself with the same clarity, regularity and visibility as by the Committee of Experts.

When no further report of the TO BE KEPT INFORMED or INTERIM kind is issued, no points will be put on IMPLEMENTATION's CFA component. Follow-up may be pursued in the form of a dialogue with the government prompted by the Committee, 41 which may well continue for years but without giving rise to a further TO BE KEPT INFORMED report or to an INTERIM REPORT – no report, no **GAP**.

The following tables demonstrate how points are loaded on the IMPLEMENTATION indicator's CFA component using the example of Peru because it is instructive with regard to the scoring principles in their various manifestations.

Table 8 is a record sheet showing the identification numbers of new cases since the late 1980s, as well as arrows indicating how the CFA has downgraded cases from INTERIM REPORTs to TO BE KEPT INFORMED, i.e. towards the lighter of the two weights adopted in this paper. A within-a-year change cannot be shown, but case 1878 is an example where the categorization changed from an INTERIM REPORT to a TO BE KEPT INFORMED report during 1997. The record shows this as a TO BE KEPT INFORMED charge of 1.3 points. Case 1478 was first examined by the CFA in 1989, and then taken up again in 1992 when the Committee downgraded its importance. During the intervening years, 1990 and 1991, a full load of 2.5 points per year is

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⁴¹ This dialogue is indicated in the CFA's Introduction under the heading "Effect given to the recommendation of the Committee and the Governing Body".

Table 8.	IMP	LEN	MEN'	TAT	ION,	CF.	A cor	npor	ient,	exan	nple	Peru	, sinc	ce 19	86 (r	ecor	d)
Case numbers	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
IR case	1321		1432					1648			1845			1979		2111	
Case				1478	1478	1478		1650			1855					2098	
Case						1		1690				1880	1880	1880	1880	\	
Case						1527	1527	1527	1527			1906	1906		\	\	
Case						1541	1541	1541	1541		1796				\	1	
Case							1598	1598	1598\	//	\				/	\	\
Case							1642		1731		1	١				\	\
Case								1609	1			7				7	\
Case				1484	1484	1484	$\overline{}$	1706	A			<u> </u>			2049	_	
TBKI case					1502		1478		1706	1517		1796		2004		1880	\
Case						}	*	1661		▼ 541		1926			`	4	2098
Case							1484			1598		1878				2049	
Case									1759				1944		2059		
Case										1784						2076	
Case										1804							
Case										1823							

Table 9.	IMP	LEN	MEN'	TAT	ION	GAP	, CF	'A co	mpoi	nent,	exai	mple	Peru	ı, sin	ce 19	986	
Points	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
IR case	2.5		2.5					2.5			2.5			2.5		2.2	
Case				2.5	2.5	2.5		2.5			2.5					2.2	
Case								2.5				2.5	2.5	2.5	2.2		
Case						2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5			2.5	2.5				
Case						2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5		2.5						
Case							2.5	2.5	2.5								
Case							2.5		2.5								
Case								2.5									
Case				2.5				2.5							2.2		
TBKI case					1.3		1.3		1.3	1.3		1.3		1.3		1.1	
Case								1.3		1.3		1.3					1.1
Case							1.3			1.3		1.3				1.1	
Case									1.3				1.3		1.1		
Case										1.3						1.1	
Case										1.3							
Case										1.3							
CFA GAP	2.5							12.0*		7.8	7.5	8.9	6.3	6.3	5.5	7.7	1.1
INTERIM REPORT																	
TO BE KEPT INFO							nd 1.1	points	as fror	n 2000).						
TBKI + INTERIM jo					or all y	ears.											
* Joint maximum o	f 12 po	ints rea	ached.														

IMPLEMENTATION GAP, examples from the Americas: Argentina, Peru and the United States. 1985-2002 Table 10.

Peru	and	tne	Uni	tea	State	es, I	985-	2002	L									
	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
CEACR GAP	10.6	7.5	6.2	10.1	8.9	5.7	11.9	5.7	11.9	7.5	11.9	14.5	10.6	5.7	7.5	2.5	5.0	6.7
CFA GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.8	2.6	0.0	1.3	1.3	1.3	6.3	3.8	1.3	1.1	4.4	1.1
Argentina: IMPL. GAP	10.6	7.5	6.2	10.1	8.9	5.7	20.7	8.3	11.9	8.8	13.2	15.8	16.9	9.5	8.8	3.6	9.4	7.8
CEACR GAP	8.8	0.0	9.9	8.3	5.7	12.7	14.8	14.3	4.4	14.5	11.4	10.1	8.8	13.2	5.0	9.2	5.0	9.5
CFA GAP	0.0	2.5	0.0	2.5	5.0	6.3	10.0	12.0	12.0	12.0	7.8	7.5	11.4	6.3	6.3	5.5	7.7	1.1
Peru: IMPL. GAP	8.8	2.5	9.9	10.8	10.7	19.0	24.8	26.3	16.4	26.5	19.2	17.6	20.2	19.5	11.3	14.7	12.7	10.6
CEACR GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.3	1.1	0.0	5.6	3.9
CFA GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	2.5	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
US: IMPL. GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	2.5	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.3	1.1	0.0	5.6	3.9

loaded onto IMPLEMENTATION. Other such cases are nos. 1484, 1527, 1541, 1598 and 1880. Unresolved cases have to be scored as continuing cases.

In table 9, the case numbers are converted into indicator points, which in the bottom row sum to the CFA component of the IMPLEMENTATION GAP. That component is quite large for Peru, hitting the ceiling in 1992, 1993 and 1994, though it seems to be on decline since then.

The IMPLEMENTATION indicator being additive in terms of its two constituent components, table 10 adds up the Committee of Experts component and the CFA component for three American countries. Argentina's laws and practices have attracted many comments by the Committee of Experts, and since the early 1990s complaints to the CFA have given rise to a number of TO BE KEPT INFORMED and INTERIM REPORTs. Peru's scores are even worse under both components of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator. The United States, having ratified few core Conventions and not incurred many DIRECT REQUESTs or OBSERVATIONS on them, does not have a sizeable IMPLEMENTATION GAP under the Committee of Experts component, though there are indications of a slight upward trend. As regards the CFA component, three TO BE KEP INFORMED reports and one INTERIM REPORT were addressed to the government between 1988 and 1993 in respect of the principles concerning the fundamental rights that are the subject of Convention Nos. 87 and 98, which the United States has not ratified.

3.9 Limitations regarding supervisory or complaints data?

Do the dimensions and data that have been retained respect the criteria established in chapters 1.3 and 3.2? They do! Do the data mirror realities on the ground throughout the world at large? They do - more than other data available internationally or in known government or private institutions! If one looks for shortcomings one will have to take the two key bodies, the Committee of Experts and the CFA, under a magnifying glass.

The Committee of Experts is solely concerned with ratified Conventions. DIRECT REQUESTS or OBSERVATIONs on unratified Convention are not possible. Does this introduce a bias against countries that have ratified one or several core Conventions? It does not, because the system scores non-ratifying countries heavily: it charges them with an ADHERENCE GAP of 12.6 or 11 points per unratified Convention, depending on the year. If anything, the system may be said to be biased against non-ratifiers.

Are DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONs valid data in the sense that they reflect a legal or factual divergence between the real world and the ideal world of ILO standards? Indeed they are! Governments are sometimes unhappy that their view of what an international Convention requires them to do is questioned by the Committee of Experts; and during the period when the Soviet Union still existed there were repeated differences of views among some of the Committee's members. The experts may have limited knowledge of a country's legal or factual situation because of insufficient data, which is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. Still, the documentation at the disposal of the Committee tends to be voluminous and of such spread and depth as to permit correct judgements to be based on it. This includes the information supplied by governments in their reports or when they appear before the Application Committee, the text of legislation, collective agreements or court decisions directly relevant to the implementation of standards, the information on the results of inspections furnished by member States, comments

made by employers' and workers' organizations, conclusions of other ILO bodies, the results of technical cooperation activities, etc.

Not only are there valid reasons for formulating DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONS, the same Committee of Experts readily takes note of *PROGRESS*, which it does on the basis of the same sources. During the 18-year review period, 269 cases of *PROGRESS* were recorded by the system, an average of 2.6 cases of *PROGRESS* per country. In Africa, this figure came to a low figure of 1.4 cases per country. In Asia, the Pacific and Arab States, the figure was even lower, 0.7 cases per country. In Europe it was a little below average, 2.1 cases. In Latin America, 3.1 cases of *PROGRESS* were recorded per country. It may be mentioned in passing that the Committee of Experts has expressed satisfaction on quite a number of occasions towards Australia (six times), Bolivia (seven times), Bulgaria (six times), Burkina Faso (six times), Canada (six times), Poland (eight times) and Zambia (six times). 42

Could it be argued that the realities in this or that country are, in general, very much in line with ILO core Conventions even though the country has failed to ratify those Conventions? One could argue that. But it is beside the point because the indicator system measures political will through its ADHERENCE indicator – and political will to adhere internationally to ILO's values and reporting procedures is obviously absent where a country does not ratify Conventions that it broadly applies within its own borders. Without ratification, the system proposed here, which relies exclusively on ILO data, cannot trace that country's realities relative to the ideals set out by the Organization. Outside the system, subjective judgments hold sway.

In conclusion, both DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONs are large in numbers and are addressed to every country in the world where the Committee of Experts has reason to believe that the legislation or factual situation is not in accordance with ratified Conventions. This makes them entirely pertinent and valid for indicator purposes. There is no regional or political bias in the data.

As regards the Committee on Freedom of Association, the fact that it is included in the indicator system gives the principles and rights of freedom of association and collective bargaining, and the two derivative Conventions, more weight than the principles and rights concerning forced labour, child labour and non-discrimination. This was already pointed out in chapter 1.2 but merits being spelt out more fully. Member States can potentially be scored twice under the IMPLEMENTATION indicator in respect of freedom of association and collective bargaining: once if the country has ratified one or both Conventions, the Committee of Experts finds that there is something questionable and it formulates a DIRECT REQUEST or an OBSERVATION; a second time if the CFA is seized of a case and it asks TO BE KEPT INFORMED or issues an INTERIM REPORT. The reason for the two-fold inclusion is the exceptional importance of this subject matter within the ILO. Freedom of association is a constitutional principle that every member State is supposed to adhere to by virtue of its entry into the Organization. That special importance warrants to be recognized by the indicator system. One could do this by giving the principles and rights of freedom of association greater weight relative to forced labour, child labour and non-discrimination. Or one could do it by bringing the CFA into the system. I have chosen the latter option, essentially because it is more

⁴² If one looks for a general trend in the number of cases of *PROGRESS*, one can put a trend-line through the data for all countries. This reveals an upward trend up to the middle of the 1990s and a downward trend thereafter. For the period 1985-2002 as a whole, the trend is slightly downwards.

pertinent, distinct and enables greater variety to be applied in scoring than through other approaches. However, in order not to accord the CFA component too much weight, it has been capped at 12 points, roughly equivalent to the non-ratification of a core Convention.

One of the requirements of indicators of the kind elaborated here is that they should potentially apply to all countries, not merely to a few that may have the greatest implementation problems. The number of cases (834) that have given rise to a TO BE KEPT INFORMED and/or an INTERIM REPORTs comes to an average of five reports per country over a period of 18 years. Thus, the numerical requirement is fulfilled quite satisfactorily.⁴³

One potential criticism of the CFA component puts forward the "no complaint, no problem" argument, i.e. that the lack of complaints or reports does not necessarily reflect realities on the ground – matters can be worse than revealed by the CFA's procedures. However, as far as freedom of association and collective bargaining is concerned, this argument looks only at one component of the indicator system, the CFA. Other components are (i) non-ratification of Convention No. 87 and/or No. 98, which incurs an ADHERENCE GAP, and (ii) ratification, which may result in DIRECT REQUESTs or OBSERVATIONs that fuel the IMPLEMENTATION GAP. In other words, the complaints-driven CFA is not the only input as far as freedom of association and collective bargaining GAPs are concerned. The CFA component makes a special contribution but does not dominate the system.

If there is no institutional bias in the CFA data, is there an empirical bias? If there were, could one do anything about it? Table 11 reveals a clear geographical imbalance. During the first 50 years of its history the Committee on Freedom of Association was seized of complaints concerning the Americas much more often than of complaints concerning other regions of the world. The figures in column 3 relating to the last 18 years are similar to the benchmark figures. Actually, the share of complaints concerning America countries has increased by 10 per cent, and the share concerning Europe has dropped by 12 per cent. The yardstick in column 5 that is based on the absolute number of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs per country in each region, reflects the same geographic distinctions.

Vibrant trade unions and societies where judicial dispute settlement is frequently resorted to may be one explanation for the bunching of complaints in certain regions and countries. Developments that objectively cause concern may be another factor, such as adjustment or globalization policies that weigh heavily on workers. Yet another factor may be the likelihood of the ILO's mode of exerting pressure – shaming governments into changing their stance – having an effect. Whatever it may be, the CFA's conclusions are an objective reaction to existing problems, which sometimes linger on for years. Objective factors should always be given preference over personal judgements. At any rate, it is neither possible nor desirable to correct for these empirical variations within the indicator system constructed here.

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⁴³ Of course, some countries had complaints raised against them more often than others. Using as a proxy the number of cases of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs, the following high- and low-scoring countries illustrate the range: Morocco 36 such cases, the Philippines 21, Canada 36 and Colombia 74. Countries where cases have not given rise to either forms of reports include Botswana, Mongolia, the Netherlands and Suriname (the only Latin American country with a zero score).

Table 11. Selected Committee of Freedom of Association data, by ILO region*, excluding non-functioning States**

excluding non-			les""					
	Complai registere			EPT INFOR by the indi			REPORTs d 426 respe	ectively
	1951- 2000	1985- 2002	1985-200	12				
	2,112 com- plaints	928 com- plaints	Total of 834 reports	Reports per country	TO BE KI INFORMI reports	ΞD	INTERIM REPORT	s
			issued (refer- ence column)	in each region	% of all 426 TBKI reports	% of all reports in each region	% of all 426 INTERIM REPORTs	% of all reports in each region
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Africa Americas - North America (Canada and US) - Latin America - Caribbean Asia and the Pacific, incl. Arab States	13% 44% - - 12%	14% 54% - - 12%	17% 57% 5% 49% 3% 16%	2.9 13.6 20.5 21.5 1.8 3.7	18% 50% 8% 39% 3% 16%	57% 45% 78% 41% 52% 54%	14% 64% 2% 59% 3% 16%	43% 55% 22% 59% 48% 46%
Europe	31%	19%	11%	1.9	16%	74%	5%	26%
Total	100%	99%	100%	5.0	100%	49%	99%	51%

⁻ Not available.

The regional data in table 11 allow one to verify the veracity of

- (a) selecting TO BE KEPT INFORMED and INTERIM REPORTs in preference to the number of complaints registered, and
- (b) attaching different weights to each kind of report.

Complaints evidently can raise quite fundamental or far-reaching policy questions of a general nature. Or they can concern the dismissal of a single trade unionist. Several other situations might be situated somewhere between such hypothetical end-points of importance.⁴⁴ This paper assumes that the CFA is relatively difficult to satisfy quickly on questions of a general and fundamental policy nature. Where these are known to exist in any particular region,

- (a) the sum of reports of both kinds should exceed the sum of complaints registered, and
- (b) the number of INTERIM REPORTs should *exceed* the number of TO BE KEPT INFORMED reports.

Bearing in mind that the regional figures in table 11 are actually averages of sorts which lock countries into a single group that might be strung along a continuum, and starting with Europe where laws and practices on the whole tend to be not very far from the ideals of the ILO, one would expect this region to be confronted mostly with *less* fundamental or far-reaching questions. That is, the CFA could be expected

(b) to resort to INTERIM REPORTs less often than to TO BE KEPT INFORMED reports.

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See also the considerations set out at the end of Affilex II below

^{*} Europe includes Azerbaijan, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.

^{**} These are the seven States earlier excluded for the whole of the period 1985-2002: Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Somalia. Yugoslavia, now called Serbia and Montenegro, and its various predecessor States have been left aside entirely for the whole of the period 1985-2002. See also Annex I.

⁽a) to issue these two forms of reports relatively *infrequently*, and

⁴⁴ See also the considerations set out at the end of Annex II below.

As regards Latin America, a number of countries are known to have less secure foundations and more contentious practices⁴⁵, which one would expect to give rise to

- (a) a disproportionately *large* number of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs taken together, and
- (b) a disproportionately *large* number of INTERIM REPORTs on their own.

The Asia/Pacific/Arab group is quite heterogeneous⁴⁶, comprising as it does countries such as India where unions in the private sector flourished under an import-substitution policy; the Suharto regime in Indonesia where export-oriented policies (and political considerations) repressed unions until 1998; China where the communist party imposed a single union system; and most Arab States where unions were, at least until recently, anathema. Still, one might expect the Asia/Pacific/Arab region to give rise to

- (a) disproportionately *large* numbers of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs taken together, and
- (b) disproportionately *large* numbers of INTERIM REPORTs on their own, i.e. the form of reports assumed to prevail when serious cases are under examination or when cases cannot be elucidated quickly because of their inherent complexities.

As regards Africa, North America and the Caribbean, no *a priori* distinctions are postulated here.

To test hypothesis (a), one can compare the proportion of complaints registered in column 3 with the reference data in column 4, i.e. the sum of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs. If the figures in column 4 are significantly higher than those in column 3, one can conclude that the complaints registered are important and difficult to resolve quickly and satisfactorily. The actual comparison of the two columns in the case of Europe shows that the figure in the reference column (11%) is much lower than that in column 3 (19%). In the case of the Americas, the reference data (57%) exceeds that in column 3 (54%). The Asia/Pacific/Arab region's figure in the reference column (16%) is also significantly higher than the 12 per cent in column 3, which points to important issues being examined by the Committee in respect of that region. This test strongly supports hypothesis (a), i.e. the assumption underlying the selection of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs as better indicators of problems than the number of complaints itself.

To test hypothesis (b), two comparisons can be performed on the basis of the data in table 11. The first focuses on reference column 4 relative to columns 6 and 8. For certain regions, columns 6 and 8 should contain either higher or lower percentages than column 4. The first comparison starts with the Asia/Pacific/Arab group, where the figure of 16 per cent TO BE KEPT INFORMED reports in column 6 is the same as in the reference column, and the figure in column 8 concerning INTERIM REPORTS, 16 per cent, is also the same as the reference data, i.e. this region does not support hypothesis (b). By contrast, the figures for the Americas and Europe fully support the first test of hypothesis (b): while the 57 per cent of the reference column 4

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⁴⁵ See, for instance, Marie Luz Vega: *Los principios y derechos fundamentales en el trabajo : Su valor, su viabilidad, su incidencia y su importancia como elementos de progreso económico y de justicia social,* Declaration Background Paper (Geneva, ILO, 2003).

⁴⁶ See, for example, the well-informed analyses by C. S. Venkata Ratnam in his book *Globalization and labour-management relations: Dynamics of change* (New Delhi, etc.: Response Books, 2001), especially chapters 2-3.

compare with 64 per cent INTERIM REPORTs in the case of the Americas, the 11 per cent of column 4 in the case of Europe compare with 16 per cent TO BE KEPT INFORMED reports.

The second test of hypothesis (b) compares the percentages of TO BE KEPT INFORMED reports in columns 7 with those of INTERIM REPORTs in column 9. Even though the table's overall proportions are similar (51 and 49 per cent), there are telling differences among major regions. Again, while the data for the Asia/Pacific/Arab region do not support the hypothesis, the data for the Americas and Europe conform to expectations. In the case of the Americas, 55 per cent of all reports are INTERIM REPORTs, which implies that important issues are raised and examined more often than others. In Europe, about three guarters of all reports are TO BE KEPT INFORMED reports, i.e. far-reaching questions do not predominate in this region. The second test, therefore, is somewhat but not entirely supportive of hypothesis (b).

Taking all three tests together, they validate the reasoning underlying this paper's selection of TO BE KEPT INFORMED and INTERIM REPORTs to instrumentalise the ILO's complaints procedures handled by the Committee on Freedom of Association. Readers may disagree with the actual weights assigned to the two forms of reports, 10 per cent and 20 per cent of the value of a core Convention, respectively. But they can change weights in the light of their own perception. Readers may also not want to cap the overall importance of the CFA component at 12 points. Again, they can vary the limit or dispense with it altogether.

In figure 4, a trend-line is put through the annual CFA data at the base of table 11. All regions show an upward trend in problems, albeit only marginally so in the case of the Asia/Pacific/Arab region. 47 This suggests that freedom of association and collective bargaining have come under increasing pressure at the national level in the age of globalization.

Reverting to critiques that can be levelled at the CFA component instrumentalised here for indicator purposes, one justified criticism is that the selection of TO BE KEPT INFORMED and INTERIM REPORTs slightly underestimates IMPLEMENTATION if and when the CFA does not issue either form of report but, instead, proceeds straight away to declaring that no further examination is required or to concluding the case by publishing a definitive report. A number of cases are dealt with in this way. 48 They will, therefore, not be reflected as IMPLEMENTATION **GAPs**. A rapid assessment suggests that no particular group of countries or region is favoured by this mode of operation on the part of the CFA.


One can conclude, therefore, that the geographic spread and frequency of the four selected supervisory and complaints dimensions is such that all of them can validly be used for the purposes of providing the IMPLEMENTATION indicator with the necessary objective raw material. None of them as such incurs a particular political or country bias. All four dimensions have to date yielded sufficient empirical cases to make them applicable potentially to any country at any time. Furthermore, these supervisory or complaints procedures are all in the hands of independent experts from different political, economic and social regimes who are members of the Committee of Experts, or they are the object of consensus decisions of representatives of governments, employers' and workers' organisations in the CFA. None of them is in the hands of individuals of the ILO Secretariat.

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⁴⁸ See also p. 31 above.

⁴⁷ To prevent distortions associated with the growth in the number of countries, the European region comprises only the 29 countries that formed part of the region in 1985 as well as in 2002.

Figure 4. Trends in the total number of To Be Kept Informed plus Interim Reports, by region, 1985-2002



Chapter 4. Results presented in different forms: Long-term trends, medium-term averages and single figures

The data can be analysed in different ways. One golden rule is not to focus on any particular year but to study trends or averages. Each year's scores reflect, at least in part, a combination of the annual or bi-annual rhythm of reporting on Conventions, where failing to report may entail an ADHERENCE GAP, and where reporting may entail an IMPLEMENTATION GAP in one year but not in another. Although this washes out somewhat over the seven or eight core Conventions and their different reporting rhythms, it can incur uncharacteristically high or low scores in one or the other year. These are most sensibly trended away or averaged out. Similarly, the working methods of the Committee on Freedom of Association quite regularly lead it to examine during one session a number of different complaints against a country that were submitted at different points of time, and the CFA may well re-examine them all together after an interval of more than a year (as table 8 illustrated for Peru). This, too, may incur bunching of scores in certain years but not in others. Trends or averages smooth out erratic peaks and troughs. In any case, the ultimate aim of the GAP system is to depict evolutions in the course of the many years required to change policies and whether trends are moving in the right or wrong direction.

The method of indicator construction used in this paper yields results that are, as is to be expected, influenced to a considerable extent by the weights chosen. The weights represent my best guesstimates of where they might reasonably be situated for most of the countries most of the time. They are general or average figures – that is what the logic of the indicator system requires. It makes little sense to distill statistically insensitive weights in a context where distinctions matter greatly because they are inherent in the social and political realities of the phenomena measured. The question is not whether the proposed weights are statistically sensitive but whether there is agreement among specialists as to the order of magnitudes involved.

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4.1 Adherence, implementation and overall trends

The three key measurements, the ADHERENCE **GAP**, THE IMPLEMENTATION **GAP** and the overall or basic workers' rights **GAP**, are detailed in table 12 for each year. 168 countries are listed in alphabetical order. A simple linear trend is put through each set of **GAP**s. The direction in which the trend is moving is specified in the last column.

The following terms are used to characterise the direction in which the TRENDs are moving. An ADHERENCE TREND in the top row of each country's data set can be qualified as:

- "**smaller**" when the trend-line indicates that the size of the **GAP** has decreased during the 18-year period or during the years for which data were available;
- "no change" (abbreviated no chg) when a country's ADHERENCE score has not significantly changed, irrespective of whether the actual **GAP** stayed at a high, medium or low level;
- "growing" when the trend-line indicates that the number of the ADHERENCE points has increased, which may be due to non-ratification of the recent Convention No. 182 and/or a worsening of the reporting record on ratified Conventions or under the Declaration.

An IMPLEMENTATION TREND in the middle row of each country's data set can be qualified as:

- "smaller" when the trend-line indicates a decrease in the IMPLEMENTATION problems to which the Committee of Experts has drawn attention through DIRECT REQUESTS/OBSERVATIONS or which have given rise to TO BE KEPT INFORMED/INTERIM REPORTS by the CFA;
- "no change" (abbreviated no chg) when a country's IMPLEMENTATION score has not significantly changed, irrespective of whether the actual **GAP** stayed at a high, medium or low level;
- "growing" when the trend-line indicates that the IMPLEMENTATION problems have increased

A TREND in the basic workers' rights **GAP**, the bottom row of each country's data set, can be qualified as:

- "**smaller**" when the trend-line indicates that the size of the overall **GAP** has decreased during the 18-year period or during the years for which data were available;
- "no change" (abbreviated no chg) when a country's summary score has not significantly changed, irrespective of whether the actual GAP stayed at a high, medium or low level;
- "growing" when the trend-line indicates that the size of the overall GAP has increased.

Table 12. Annual data base of the estimated workers' rights GAPs and trends, by country, shaded by capacity, 1985-2002

	cour											4000	400=	1000	4000	0000	0004	0000	TDEND
Country/Year	+																		TREND
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.8	3.4	5.1	0.0	8.5	3.4	3.4	0.0	11.0	6.0		growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	11.4	7.0	15.8	8.3	0.0	18.4	5.7	7.0	14.0	8.3	12.7	8.3	13.2	16.3	7.8	8.9	12.8		growing
Algeria: GAP	11.4	7.0	15.8	8.3	0.0	18.4	5.7	13.8	17.4	13.4	12.7	16.8	16.6	19.7	7.8	19.9	18.8	15.8	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	16.0	12.6	17.7	12.6	12.6	17.7	12.6	22.8	22.8	12.6	12.6	12.6	17.7	22.8	22.8	25.0	29.5	12.5	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	0.0	3.9	2.6	4.4	3.9	8.3	8.3	8.3	7.0	2.6	1.3	2.6	7.0	6.1	6.1	3.3		growing
Antigua & Barbuda: GAP	16.0	12.6	21.6	15.2	17.0	21.6	20.9	31.1	31.1	19.6	15.2	13.9	20.3	29.8	28.9	31.1	32.8	21.4	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	10.6	7.5	6.2	10.1	8.9	5.7	20.7	8.3	11.9	8.8	13.2	15.8	16.9	9.5	8.8	3.6	9.4	7.8	no chg
Argentina: GAP	24.9	20.1	18.8	22.7	21.5	18.3	35.0	20.9	24.5	21.4	25.8	15.8	16.9	9.5	8.8	14.6	9.4	7.8	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	63.0	64.7	66.4	66.4	66.4	66.4	69.0	69.0	60.8	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	no chg
Armenia: GAP		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	63.0	64.7	66.4	66.4	66.4	66.4	69.0	69.0	60.8	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	19.3	19.3	19.3	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	9.6	3.9	1.3	5.5	7.0	5.5	2.6	2.5	11.4	2.6	7.3	2.9	4.4	13.2	3.9	11.7	7.8		growing
Australia: GAP	22.2	16.5	13.9	18.1	19.6	18.1	15.2	15.1	24.0	15.2	19.9	15.5	17.0	25.8	16.5	31.0	27.1		growing
ADHERENCE GAP	16.0	12.6	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	9.6	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	5.7	0.0	8.3	10.1	10.6	7.5	4.4	11.9	5.7	11.9	5.7	10.6	4.4	6.2	1.1	1.1	6.7	3.9	smaller
Austria: GAP	21.7	12.6	22.6	22.7	23.2	20.1	17.0	24.5	18.3	24.5	18.3	23.2	17.0	18.8	13.7	10.7	6.7	3.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP								_	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	9.6	9.6	17.1	no chq
IMPLEMENTATION GAP				_		_	_	_	0.0	0.0	8.6	8.3	7.0	7.0	5.0	2.8	6.1	10.0	growing
Azerbaijan: GAP		-		-		-	-	-	12.6	12.6	21.2	20.9	19.6	19.6	17.6	12.4	15.7	27.1	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	52.1	50.4	50.4	52.1	50.4	50.4	50.4	53.8	53.8	55.5	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	48.1	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	1.3	3.9	0.0	2.6	2.6	2.6	1.3	2.6	2.6	2.6	0.0	5.7	0.0	5.7	5.0	0.0	7.2		growing
Bahamas: GAP	53.4	54.3	50.4	54.7	53.0	53.0	51.7	56.4	56.4	58.1	50.4	56.1	50.4	56.1	55.4	48.1	7.2	5.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	75.6	77.3	75.6	75.6	75.6	77.3	75.6	75.6	75.6	77.3	75.6	75.6	75.6	63.0	63.0	49.6	38.5	38.5	smaller smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	1.3	0.0	3.8	2.5	2.6	0.0	4.4	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	2.2	smaller
Bahrain: GAP	75.6	78.6	75.6	79.4	78.1	79.9	75.6	80.0	75.6	78.6	75.6	76.9	75.6	64.3	64.3	49.6	38.5	40.7	
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	28.6	14.3	12.6	19.3	9.6	22.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	17.0	0.0	17.6	11.9	17.6	8.8	8.8	4.4	1.3	11.9	13.2	6.9	15.0	10.6	7.8	7.8	10.6	12.8	smaller
Bangladesh: GAP	42.2	25.2	42.8	37.1	42.8	34.0	34.0	29.6	26.5	37.1	38.4	32.1	43.6	24.9	20.4	27.1	20.2	34.8	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	17.7	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	17.7	12.6	19.4	12.6	16.0	17.7	12.6	12.6	1.5	1.5	7.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.0	7.0	7.0	2.6	11.2	7.0	7.0	5.7	13.2	5.7	14.5	7.5	8.2	8.3	2.2	3.9	4.4	5.0	smaller
Barbados: GAP	19.6	19.6	24.7	15.2	23.8	19.6	19.6	23.4	25.8	25.1	27.1	23.5	25.9	20.9	14.8	5.4	5.9	12.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	no chg
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.5	5.7	5.7	4.2	4.4	5.5	5.5	2.6	4.2	5.7	11.4	7.0	14.0	6.8	2.2	5.0	13.3		growing
Belarus: GAP	7.5	5.7	5.7	4.2	4.4	5.5	5.5	2.6	4.2	5.7	11.4	7.0	14.0	6.8	2.2	5.0	13.3	7.2	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	11.0	11.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	10.6	4.4	4.4	10.4	3.1	5.7	7.5	8.3	4.4	3.9	4.4	10.1	7.5	4.4	2.8	6.7	3.9	5.0	smaller
Belgium: GAP	23.2	17.0	17.0	23.0	15.7	18.3	20.1	20.9	17.0	16.5	17.0	22.7	20.1	4.4	2.8	17.7	14.9	5.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	37.8	37.8	37.8	39.5	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	39.5	42.9	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	16.0	4.5	9.0	3.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	1.3	0.0			2.6	2.6	1.3	2.6		3.9	2.6	7.0	3.1	8.8	9.2	10.6	10.6	11.4	growing
Belize: GAP	39.1	37.8										44.8		46.6	25.2	15.1	19.6	14.4	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	16.0	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	17.7	17.7	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	17.7	12.6	12.6	16.0	22.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.9	1.3			2.6		6.5			5.2	3.9	3.9	3.1	11.4	7.8	8.9	3.9		growing
Benin: GAP				16.5								21.6					3.9	3.9	smaller
Not applicable or p fC	•			Ctot	•								•						

⁻ Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State

Country/Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TREND
ADHERENCE GAP	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	25.2	26.9	25.2	28.6	25.2	28.6	33.7	19.4	12.6	14.3	19.3	26.5	22.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	5.7	0.0	4.4	2.6	7.0	1.3	7.0	1.3	7.0	5.7	12.6	11.4	10.1	10.1	6.7	12.8	12.8	14.5	growing
Bolivia: GAP	43.5	37.8	42.2	40.4	44.8	26.5	33.9	26.5	35.6	30.9	41.2	45.1	29.5	22.7	21.0	32.1	39.3	36.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	-	22.8	22.8	22.8	20.0	9.0	7.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	-	0.0	0.0	5.6	5.6	6.7	8.9	growing
Bosnia & Herzeg.: GAP	-	-	-	-			-	-	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS		22.8	22.8	28.4	25.6	15.7	16.4	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	0.0	0.0	11.9	21.5	0.0	3.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.3	6.6	growing
Botswana: GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	0.0	0.0	11.9	21.5	3.3	9.6	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	25.2	26.9	30.3	28.6	28.6	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	19.3	9.6	9.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	11.9	5.7	11.4	11.3	7.8	8.3	7.3	13.2	10.6	13.2	13.5	13.2	4.4	10.6	14.4	6.7	11.7	6.7	no chg
Brazil: GAP	37.1	30.9	38.3	41.6	36.4	36.9	32.5	38.4	35.8	38.4	38.7	38.4	29.6	35.8	39.6	26.0	21.3	16.3	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	5.7	3.1	2.6	3.1	3.1	7.0	5.8	4.2	6.7	1.3	11.4	5.2	11.4	7.0	2.5	11.1	3.3	11.4	growing
Bulgaria: GAP	18.3	15.7	15.2	15.7	15.7	19.6	18.4	16.8	19.3	13.9	25.7	17.8	24.0	19.6	2.5	11.1	3.3	11.4	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	26.9	30.3	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	30.3	25.2	25.2	30.3	25.2	30.3	12.6	17.7	10.2	11.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	1.3	10.4	11.9	7.0	7.3	4.4	5.7	5.7	10.1	7.0	14.5	8.3	7.0	5.7	5.8	5.6	7.2	8.9	no chg
Burkina Faso: GAP	28.2	40.7	37.1	32.2	32.5	29.6	36.0	30.9	35.3	37.3	39.7	38.6	19.6	23.4	16.0	16.6	7.2	8.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	25.2	26.9	33.7	33.7	21.1	21.1	12.6	11.0	11.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	8.8	0.0	7.5	0.0	8.8	0.0	8.8	6.0	4.4	5.7	5.7	1.3	10.1	7.2	5.0	7.8		growing
Burundi: GAP	63.0	71.8	63.0	70.5	63.0	71.8	63.0	71.8	31.2	31.3	39.4	39.4	22.4	31.2	19.8	16.0	18.8	3.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	n-fS	n-fS	_	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	0.0	11.0	20.0	15.6	smaller							
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	n-fS	n-fS	_	1.3	0.0	5.6	5.6	1.3	0.0	0.0	2.2	no chq							
Cambodia: GAP	n-fS	n-fS	-	76.9	75.6	81.2	81.2	1.3	11.0	20.0	17.8	smaller							
ADHERENCE GAP	28.6	25.2	25.2	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	16.0	19.4	16.0	19.4	17.7	17.7	17.7	29.5	11.1	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	5.7	12.7	4.4	10.1	7.5	10.1	4.4	8.8	12.4	17.1	13.2	10.6	11.9	18.9	15.6	13.9	10.6	8.9	growing
Cameroon: GAP	34.3	37.9	29.6	22.7	20.1	22.7	17.0	21.4	28.4	36.5	29.2	30.0	29.6	36.6	33.3	43.4	21.7	8.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	28.9	28.9	28.9	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.1	11.7	7.3	7.4	7.0	3.1	5.7	14.0	9.9	13.9	20.8	8.8	5.7	16.3	14.1	8.3	8.9	7.2	growing
Canada: GAP	40.9	49.5	45.1	45.2	44.8	40.9	43.5	51.8	47.7	51.7	58.6	46.6	43.5	54.1	51.9	37.2	37.8	36.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	26.9	30.3	30.3	33.7	25.2	28.6	33.7	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	28.6	17.7	22.3	23.5	15.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	1.3	5.2	3.9	5.2	6.5	6.5	2.6	6.8	6.5	7.0	6.0	1.3	4.4	2.6	6.1	7.2	3.9	2.2	no chg
Cap Verde: GAP	26.5	32.1	34.2	35.5	40.2	31.7	31.2	40.5	31.7	32.2	31.2	26.5	29.6	31.2	23.8	29.5	27.4	17.7	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	19.4	19.4	16.0	21.1	19.4	12.6	17.7	19.4	19.4	21.1	12.6	19.4	14.3	12.6	19.4	9.0	1.5	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	14.5	17.6		11.9						12.7	13.2		5.7	11.9	9.2	13.9	8.9	8.9	
Central African Rep.: GAP	33.9	37.0					24.7	36.5						24.5	28.6	22.9	10.4	8.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	1	12.6	12.6	12.6		12.6	12.6					12.6		11.0	12.6	20.0	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	8.8	1.3		15.0	7.5	8.8		6.2	8.3					15.0	8.9	2.8	8.9		growing
Chad: GAP	21.4	13.9	25.2											27.6		13.8	21.5		growing
ADHERENCE GAP	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4					50.4					50.4	0.0	1.5	0.0	7.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	5.7	4.4	4.2	3.1	4.4	4.2	1.6	5.7	4.4	5.7	7.0	1.3	5.7	11.4	0.0	5.0	7.2		growing
Chile: GAP	56.1	54.8	54.6						54.8					61.8		6.5	7.2	15.2	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	88.0	88.0		88.0	88.0					75.6							60.5	48.1	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	0.0		0.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	75.6 1.3	77.3 2.5	1.3		2.6	0.0	75.6 3.8	1.3	57.8 1.1	1.1	0.0	no chg
China: GAP	88.0	88.0													64.3	58.9	61.6	48.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6														19.3	9.6	11.0	no chg
IMPLEMENTATION GAP Colombia: GAP	10.1	6.9		23.9	22.6						22.9 35.5			20.1		19.0 38.3	22.6		growing growing
- Not applicable or n-fS =						£3.U	JZ.4	20.0	JZ. I	د، اع	JJ.J	£1.1	JU./	JZ.I	J 1.3	JU.J	JZ.Z	20.0	g. ownig

⁻ Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State

Country/Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TREND
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	30.3	25.2	30.3	25.2	30.3	28.6	33.7	25.2	30.3	33.7	34.5	31.9	36.4	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.9	1.3	6.5	1.3	0.0	6.5	3.9	0.0	3.9	3.9	5.2	5.2	2.6	5.7	8.5	5.0	2.8	7.8	growing
Comoros: GAP	29.1	26.5	31.7	26.5	25.2	36.8	29.1	30.3	29.1	34.2	33.8	38.9	27.8	36.0	42.2	39.5	34.7	44.2	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	66.4	66.4	63.0	63.0	64.7	63.0	64.7	63.0	63.0	63.0	66.4	0.0	14.0	18.5	10.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	4.4	3.1	3.1	3.1	3.1	4.4	3.1	1.3	2.6	1.3	1.3	6.9	4.4	6.2	6.2	6.7	2.8	5.6	growing
Congo: GAP	67.4	66.1	66.1	69.5	69.5	67.4	66.1	66.0	65.6	66.0	64.3	69.9	67.4	72.6	6.2	20.7	21.3	16.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	6.8	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	8.8	3.9	8.8	2.6	8.8	6.4	10.1	5.2	11.4	3.9	20.5	13.9	16.3	16.1	8.6	12.8	8.3	3.9	growing
Costa Rica: GAP	8.8	3.9	8.8	4.3	8.8	6.4	10.1	12.0	16.5	3.9	20.5	13.9	18.0	16.1	8.6	23.8	8.3	3.9	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	17.7	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	21.1	14.3	14.3	25.0	25.3	23.5	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6	1.3	5.2	4.4	4.4	7.0	8.2	8.2	15.1	7.0	8.8	10.1	10.1	14.5	2.8	6.1	7.8	7.8	growing
Côte d'Ivoire: GAP	15.2	19.0	17.8	17.0	17.0	19.6	20.8	20.8	27.7	19.6	21.4	24.4	31.2	28.8	17.1	31.1	33.1	31.3	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	1.3	10.1	1.3	15.3	13.0	6.7	2.2	8.9	2.8	growing
Croatia: GAP	-	-		-			•	-	12.6	13.9	22.7	13.9	15.3	13.0	6.7	13.2	8.9	2.8	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	11.0	9.6	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	4.4	3.1	14.5	1.3	14.8	5.7	13.7	21.4	10.6	7.0	13.1	5.6	7.5	10.0	7.8	2.2	0.0	10.6	smaller
Cuba: GAP	4.4	3.1	14.5	1.3	14.8	5.7	13.7	21.4	10.6	7.0	13.1	5.6	7.5	10.0	7.8	13.2	11.0	20.2	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	25.2	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	14.3	16.0	6.8	1.7	3.4	0.0	1.5	7.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6	2.6	2.6	1.3	8.7	5.7	5.7	9.1	2.6	1.3	8.8	7.5	10.6	10.6	5.0	6.7	3.3	8.9	growing
Cyprus: GAP	27.8	27.8	15.2	13.9	21.3	20.0	18.3	21.7	15.2	15.6	23.1	23.5	17.4	12.3	8.4	6.7	4.8	16.4	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.2	25.2	19.4	19.4	12.6	12.6	23.8	14.0	11.1	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	5.7	7.0	3.9	8.3	1.1	5.0	12.8	12.8	growing
Czech Republic: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.2	30.9	26.4	23.3	20.9	13.7	28.8	26.8	23.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	12.6	3.4	0.0	0.0	1.5	4.5	7.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	10.6	9.3	10.1	2.6	10.6	2.6	10.6	2.6	7.5	5.7	7.5	5.7	1.3	11.4	3.9	13.9	5.0	14.5	growing
Denmark: GAP	24.9	21.9	22.7	15.2	24.9	15.2	23.2	15.2	20.1	20.0	20.1	18.3	4.7	11.4	3.9	15.4	9.5	22.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	30.3	25.2	30.3	33.7	25.2	28.6	25.2	26.9	25.2	26.9	30.3	28.6	33.7	33.7	34.5	31.9	40.5	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	3.9	2.6	3.9	3.9	5.2	1.3	2.6	3.9	2.6	3.9	6.9	11.3	15.1	16.4	9.4	8.3	6.1	growing
Djibouti: GAP	25.2	34.2	27.8	34.2	37.6	30.4	29.9	27.8	30.8	27.8	30.8	37.2	39.9	48.8	50.1	43.9	40.2	46.6	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	3.4	11.9	6.8	0.0	5.1	1.7	3.4	10.2	11.9	11.9	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	5.1	14.0	4.5	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	2.6	1.3	0.0	5.2	7.8	2.6	7.8	10.9	10.9	8.3	10.9	0.0	5.2	6.1	13.9	8.9		growing
Dominica: GAP	3.4	14.5	8.1	0.0	10.3	9.5	6.0	18.0	22.8	22.8	8.3	10.9	0.0	10.3	11.2	27.9	13.4	10.0	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	19.4	16.0	22.8	21.1	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	9.3	5.7		11.9										10.1		6.7	5.0	15.1	
Dominican Republic: GAP	21.9	18.3	28.7	27.9	42.2	44.3	31.4	22.6	21.9	21.0	18.1	21.4	21.4	22.7	6.7	6.7	5.0	16.6	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3					14.3					12.6		1.5	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	8.8	7.5	17.0	11.4					10.1					17.9		5.0	12.8	8.3	smaller
Ecuador: GAP	21.4	20.1	29.6	25.7	29.3	25.8	23.2	29.6	24.4	22.7	31.5	19.6	26.3	30.5	24.6	6.5	12.8	8.3	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6				12.6	12.6		12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	11.0	11.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	6.2	2.6	11.7	10.1	7.5	11.4	11.9	1.3	13.2			5.7	7.3	11.4	2.8	6.1	12.8	6.1	no chg
Egypt: GAP	18.8	15.2	24.3	22.7	20.1	24.0	24.5	13.9	25.8		28.9			24.0	2.8	17.1	23.8	6.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	75.6	75.6	75.6	77.3	75.6	75.6	75.6	77.3	75.6	75.6				37.8	37.8	19.3	19.3	19.3	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	4.4	4.4	6.9	5.0	9.4	7.5		6.9	2.5	8.3	3.9	1.3	7.0	1.1	4.4	2.2	7.8	no chg
El Salvador: GAP	75.6	80.0	80.0	84.2	80.6	85.0	83.1	91.7	82.5	78.1	58.7	41.7	39.1	44.8	38.9	23.7	21.5	27.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	64.7	64.7	66.4	63.0	64.7	64.7	69.0	3.0	3.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	2.6	0.0	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	2.6	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.1	1.1		growing
Equatorial Guinea: GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	64.3 State	63.0	65.6	63.0	64.3	64.3	66.0	66.0	69.0	63.0	66.0	64.7	70.1	4.1	4.1	smaller

⁻ Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State

Country/Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TREND
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	9.6	11.0	11.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.8	5.0	growing
Eritrea: GAP		-	-	-			-	-		88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	9.6	13.8	16.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	63.0	63.0	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	28.9	19.3	19.3	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	1.3	2.6	4.4	4.7	1.1	2.2	growing
Estonia: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	63.0	63.0	27.8	26.5	27.8	29.6	33.6	20.4	21.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	53.8	50.4	17.7	23.8	28.3	19.3	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	6.2	4.4	7.5	3.1	8.8	0.0	8.8	3.1	4.2	3.9	6.8	6.9	12.6	10.0	9.2	8.9	12.8	11.7	growing
Ethiopia: GAP	56.6	54.8	57.9	53.5	59.2	50.4	59.2	53.5	54.6	54.3	57.2	57.3	66.4	60.4	26.9	32.7	41.1	31.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	55.5	50.4	52.1	55.5	52.1	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	52.1	53.8	58.0	55.0	11.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.9	3.9	2.6	8.2	8.2	0.0	5.7	1.3	0.0	5.7	3.1	5.7	3.1	2.6	5.0	2.2	5.0	1.4	no chg
Fiji: GAP	59.4	54.3	54.7	63.7	60.3	50.4	56.1	51.7	50.4	56.1	53.5	56.1	53.5	54.7	58.8	60.2	60.0	12.4	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	no chg
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	8.8	4.4	8.9	6.0	7.8	8.8	4.4	8.8	5.7	4.4	6.0	1.3	8.8	4.4	2.8	7.8	1.1	6.1	smaller
Finland: GAP	8.8	4.4	8.9	6.0	7.8	8.8	4.4	8.8	5.7	4.4	6.0	1.3	8.8	4.4	2.8	7.8	1.1	6.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	14.3	14.3	12.6	12.6	0.0	1.7	0.0	3.4	3.4	0.0	1.7	0.0	1.7	1.7	14.0	0.0	1.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.0	5.7	0.0	2.6	1.3	5.7	7.0	2.6	7.0	5.7	7.0	8.3	10.1	7.3	1.1	10.0	5.0		growing
France: GAP	19.6	20.0	14.3	15.2	13.9	5.7	8.7	2.6	10.4	9.1	7.0	10.0	10.1	9.0	2.8	24.0	5.0	13.2	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	14.3	12.6	12.6	17.7	17.7	12.6	17.7	17.7	16.0	31.0	20.8	11.1	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.5	7.0	7.5	8.3	7.5	14.5	11.9	14.5	5.7	7.5	17.6	2.6	5.7	9.6	9.6	9.4	6.1	12.2	no chg
Gabon: GAP	20.1	19.6	20.1	20.9	20.1	28.8	26.2	27.1	18.3	25.2	35.3	15.2	23.4	27.3	25.6	40.4	26.9	23.3	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	9.6	0.0	10.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	no chg
Gambia: GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	9.6	0.0	10.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37.8	37.8	12.6	16.0	22.8	10.2	17.0	14.0	4.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.1	1.1	7.7	growing
Georgia: GAP	<u> </u>	-		- -	•	•	• 	•	•	37.8	37.8	12.6	16.0	22.8	10.2	18.1	15.1	12.2	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	11.0		growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	8.8	13.7	13.2	10.1	11.9	4.4 4.4	19.2	8.8 8.8	11.9	9.3 9.3	12.0	9.3 9.3	8.8	9.3 9.3	6.7 6.7	5.6	5.6 16.6	5.0 5.0	smaller smaller
Germany: GAP	10.5	13.7	13.2	10.1	11.9		19.2		11.9		12.0		8.8			16.6			
ADHERENCE GAP	17.7	12.6	12.6	17.7	17.7	16.0	12.6	12.6	14.3	17.7	17.7	12.6	17.7	22.8	17.7	14.0	9.6	9.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.1 20.8	10.1 22.7	10.1 22.7	3.9 21.6	15.8 33.5	12.7 28.7	11.9 24.5	8.8 21.4	13.2 27.5	8.8 26.5	17.6 35.3	11.4 24.0	5.7 23.4	15.8 38.6	11.1 28.8	9.5 23.5	8.9 18.5	3.9 13.5	growing no chq
Ghana: GAP			1																
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	1.7	5.1	3.4	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7 2.6	0.0	0.0 2.8	11.0	0.0	0.0	smaller smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP Greece: GAP				10.6						7.5 7.5	4.4 4.4	4.4 4.4	4.3	15.0 15.0	2.8	7.8 18.8	3.9	11.7	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP IMPLEMENTATION GAP	50.4 2.6	53.8 1.3	53.8	55.5 3.9	52.1 1.3	55.5 2.6			52.1	30.3	25.2	33.7 1.3	33.7	33.7	32.0	34.5 2.2	35.4 1.1	33.0 2.2	smaller no chg
Grenada: GAP	53.0	55.1	55.1	59.4	53.4	58.1	1.3 56.8	2.6 54.7	52.1	31.6			1.3 35.0	36.8	2.8 34.8	36.7	36.5	35.2	smaller
																			smaller
ADHERENCE GAP IMPLEMENTATION GAP	25.2 7.5	25.2	25.2 11.7	25.2 2.9	12.6 8.8	6.9	0.0 12.5	3.4 14.4	0.0 14.5	5.1 15.8	0.0 26.5	0.0 17.7	23.9	0.0 14.5	0.0 17.2	15.5 16.6	0.0 21.1	0.0 21.7	growing
Guatemala: GAP	32.7	10.4 35.6	36.9	28.1	21.4	6.9	12.5	17.8					23.9	14.5	17.2	32.1	21.1	21.7	smaller
	i																		growing
ADHERENCE GAP IMPLEMENTATION GAP	19.4 13.2	12.6 17.6	12.6 10.1	12.6 16.1	12.6 4.2	12.6 10.1	17.7 7.0	12.6 3.9	12.6 11.4	17.7 3.9	14.3 11.4	17.7 15.2	16.0 11.4	21.1 16.3	22.8 14.5	22.0 13.4	23.8 10.6		growing
Guinea: GAP	32.6	30.2	22.7	28.7	16.8	22.7	24.7	16.5	24.0		25.7	32.9	27.4	37.4	37.3	35.4	34.4		growing
ADHERENCE GAP IMPLEMENTATION GAP	30.3 5.7	30.3 8.3	28.6 7.0	25.2 5.8	25.2 4.5	25.2 5.2	25.2 2.6	33.7 9.6	33.7 9.6	33.7 6.5	25.2 9.6	28.6 3.9	28.6 7.0	9.6	30.3 7.2	30.9	33.0 2.2	1.1	growing smaller
Guinea-Bissau: GAP	36.0			31.0								32.5			37.5	34.2		30.0	no chg
- Not applicable or n-fS =						UU. T	21.0	70.0	70.0	70.2	I 0-7.0	02.0	00.0	55.5	01.0	U-7.2	00. <u>Z</u>	1 00.0	09

⁻ Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State

Country/Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TREND
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	19.4	17.7	21.1	12.6	17.7	21.1	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.8	3.8	6.5	2.6	4.4	5.2	5.2	5.7	7.0	3.9	3.9	3.1	2.6	7.5	1.1	6.7	3.3	3.9	no chg
Guyana: GAP	16.4	16.4	19.1	15.2	23.8	22.9	26.3	18.3	24.7	25.0	16.5	15.7	15.2	7.5	1.1	17.7	3.3	3.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	-	17.7	17.7	12.6	25.0	26.8	31.0	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	-	4.4	15.0	12.8	12.2	15.0	17.3	growing
Haiti: GAP	-	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	-	22.1	32.7	25.4	37.2	41.8	48.3	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	8.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.1	11.9	11.4	7.0	4.4	7.0	16.4	12.0	5.6	5.2	11.4	10.1	2.6	7.5	10.6	2.8	11.7	3.9	smaller
Honduras: GAP	3.1	11.9	11.4	8.7	4.4	15.5	16.4	12.0	5.6	10.3	11.4	10.1	2.6	7.5	10.6	13.8	11.7	3.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	4.4	2.6	4.4	2.6	5.7	2.6	3.9	2.6	8.8	8.3	8.8	1.3	7.0	1.3	7.2	2.2	2.2	6.1	growing
Hungary: GAP	29.6	27.8	29.6	27.8	30.9	27.8	29.1	27.8	34.0	20.9	21.4	13.9	19.6	1.3	7.2	2.2	2.2	6.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	17.7	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	14.3	14.3	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.0	7.0	1.3	4.4	1.3	7.5	3.9	10.6	1.3	8.8	4.4	2.6	4.4	3.1	2.2	3.9	2.8	10.6	no chg
Iceland: GAP	24.7	19.6	13.9	17.0	15.6	20.1	18.2	24.9	15.6	21.4	17.0	15.2	18.7	15.7	2.2	3.9	2.8	10.6	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	52.1	53.8	53.8	53.8	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	40.0	38.5	38.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	1.3	11.3	1.3	5.7	8.2	6.4	18.9	15.2	10.1	15.7	5.7	5.7	8.3	10.6	2.8	3.9	3.9	12.8	no chg
India: GAP	51.7	61.7	51.7	56.1	58.6	56.8	71.0	69.0	63.9	69.5	56.1	56.1	58.7	61.0	53.2	43.9	42.4	51.3	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	53.8	50.4	50.4	50.4	55.5	50.4	50.4	50.4	37.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	4.4	7.5	3.8	5.7	2.6	7.0	1.3	4.4	8.3	9.5	5.6	11.3	6.9	4.1	2.8	5.8	7.2	growing
Indonesia: GAP	50.4	54.8	57.9	54.2	56.1	56.4	57.4	51.7	54.8	63.8	59.9	56.0	61.7	44.7	4.1	2.8	5.8	8.7	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	39.5	42.9	41.2	42.9	37.8	37.8	37.8	39.5	37.8	37.8	37.8	41.2	37.8	37.8	39.5	40.0	40.0	30.4	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	4.4	10.1	8.8	7.0	8.8	10.1	3.1	1.3	10.1	1.3	4.4	5.7	7.0	3.1	8.9	3.9	3.9	3.9	smaller
Iran, Islamic Rep. of: GAP	43.9	53.0	50.0	49.9	46.6	47.9	40.9	40.8	47.9	39.1	42.2	46.9	44.8	40.9	48.4	43.9	43.9	34.3	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	14.3	17.7	14.3	17.7	12.6	20.6	14.1	15.5	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	6.5	1.3	6.5	3.9	7.5	3.9	11.9	15.8	4.4	13.2	6.2	10.1	13.2	8.3	11.7	6.7	10.6		growing
Iraq: GAP	19.1	13.9	19.1	16.5	20.1	18.2	24.5	28.4	18.7	25.8	20.5	27.8	27.5	26.0	24.3	27.3	24.7	26.1	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	17.7	17.7	19.4	12.6	16.0	12.6	14.3	12.6	14.3	12.6	12.6	0.0	1.5	3.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.5	1.3	7.5	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	9.6	7.0	3.9	6.2	1.3	7.0	4.4	6.1	5.0	1.1	2.2	smaller
Ireland: GAP	20.1	13.9	20.1	23.4	23.4	25.1	18.3	25.6	19.6	18.2	18.8	15.6	19.6	17.0	6.1	6.5	4.1	2.2	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	1.7	11.0	11.0	11.0	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	8.3	0.0	5.2	1.3	5.2	0.0	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	3.9	3.3	1.1	6.1	2.2	no chg
Israel: GAP	0.0	8.3	0.0	5.2	1.3	5.2	0.0	2.6	2.6	4.3	2.6	2.6	6.0	3.9	5.0	12.1	17.1	13.2	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	3.4	5.1	5.1	8.5	1.7	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.9	9.6	3.9	8.1				7.0	7.0					3.9		2.2		1.1	smaller
Italy: GAP	3.9	13.0	9.0	13.2		5.6	5.6	7.0	7.0	2.6	5.2	0.0	6.9	3.9	2.2	2.2	1.1	1.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	16.0	19.4	17.7	16.0	19.4	12.6	16.0	14.3	17.7	17.7	14.3	17.7	16.0	12.6	16.0	29.5	23.8	23.5	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	11.4	14.5	11.9	13.2		13.2			5.7	16.3			8.8	13.2	6.7	10.6	10.6	9.5	smaller
Jamaica: GAP	27.4	33.9	29.6	29.2		25.8	29.2	28.0	23.4	34.0				25.8	22.7	40.1	34.4	33.0	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	28.9	19.3	19.3	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.5	10.6	7.5	8.8	6.2	4.4	4.4	5.7	6.2	6.2		9.3	4.4	12.4	8.1	12.3	11.2		growing
Japan: GAP	45.3	48.4	45.3	46.6	44.0	42.2	42.2		44.0	44.0	48.4	47.1	42.2	50.2	45.9	41.2	30.5	38.2	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	30.3	25.2	25.2	26.9	28.6	25.2	30.3	32.0			25.2	25.2	12.6	12.6	9.6	9.6	9.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	5.1	8.3	8.3	5.7	3.1	5.2	4.4	7.0	5.2	7.0	3.1	4.4	7.0	3.9	5.0	1.1	5.0	6.1	smaller
Jordan: GAP	30.3	38.6	33.5	30.9	30.0	33.8	29.6	37.3	37.2		28.3		32.2	16.5	17.6	10.7	14.6	15.7	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	 _								-	88.0				88.0	75.6	66.0	12.5	11.1	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	_	-	-	-	_	-	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	no chg
Kazakhstan: GAP	-	-		-	-			-		89.5		89.5		88.0	75.6	66.0		13.3	smaller
- Not applicable or n-fS =		funct	onina	Ctot															

⁻ Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State

Country/Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TREND
ADHERENCE GAP	39.5	41.2	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	39.5	39.5	38.5	11.0	11.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6	5.7	11.4	10.1	7.0	5.7	5.7	10.1	2.5	8.3	7.5	7.0	11.9	8.8	10.6	0.0	13.4	6.7	growing
Kenya: GAP	42.1	46.9	49.2	47.9	44.8	43.5	43.5	47.9	40.3	46.1	45.3	44.8	49.7	48.3	50.1	38.5	24.4	17.7	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44.0	38.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	no chg
Kiribati: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	44.0	38.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	75.6	63.0	50.4	48.1	38.5	41.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	2.5	1.3	0.0	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5	3.3	3.3	4.4	growing
Korea, Republic of: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	90.7	89.5	88.0	90.7	78.1	65.5	52.9	51.4	41.8	45.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	39.5	37.8	41.2	37.8	39.5	37.8	37.8	37.8	41.2	37.8	25.2	19.3	19.3	20.8	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.0	7.0	4.4	2.6	8.3	3.9	1.3	5.7	8.3	3.1	4.4	7.5	2.6	5.7	5.6	3.9	5.6	8.9	no chg
Kuwait: GAP	44.8	44.8	42.2	40.4	47.8	41.7	42.5	43.5	47.8	40.9	42.2	45.3	43.8	43.5	30.8	23.2	24.9	29.7	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.6	12.6	17.7	22.8	21.1	22.8	10.2	20.0	21.5	21.5	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	2.6	2.6	3.9	5.2	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.2	growing
Kyrgyzstan: GAP	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>			12.6	12.6	20.3	25.4	25.0	28.0	17.4	27.2	28.7	28.7	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	75.6	77.3	75.6	77.3	77.3	75.6	75.6	77.3	77.3	75.6	75.6	77.3	77.3	75.6	75.6	78.5	77.0	76.1	no chg
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.0	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	0.0	1.1	0.0	1.1	no chg
Lao PDR: GAP	76.9	78.6	76.9	78.6	78.6	76.9	75.6	78.6	78.6	76.9	75.6	77.3	77.3	78.2	75.6	79.6	77.0	77.2	no chg
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.2	25.2	25.2	26.9	32.0	33.7	30.3	25.2	28.9	33.0	31.9	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.5	5.2	7.7	5.2	8.3	2.2	6.1	3.3	growing
Latvia: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.2	25.2	25.2	32.4	37.2	41.4	35.5	33.5	31.1	39.1	35.2	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	-	25.2	26.9	26.9	25.2	25.2	25.2	28.9	19.3	19.3	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	-	5.2	2.6	2.6	2.6	7.0	2.8	2.2	5.0	3.3	no chg
Lebanon: GAP	-	-	-	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	n-fS	-	30.4	29.5	29.5	27.8	32.2	28.0	31.1	24.3	22.6	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	53.8	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	52.1	53.8	52.1	50.4	50.4	50.4	25.2	26.9	34.5	1.5	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6	4.4	3.1	0.0	3.1	1.3	3.1	3.8	2.6	1.3	1.3	1.3	2.6	2.6	1.1	4.4	7.8	7.2	growing
Lesotho: GAP	56.4	54.8	53.5	50.4	53.5	51.7	53.5	55.9	56.4	53.4	51.7	51.7	53.0	27.8	28.0	38.9	9.3	7.2	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	17.7	12.6	16.0	21.1	16.0	17.7	21.1	12.6	12.6	17.7	12.6	19.4	19.4	21.1	22.8	1.5	0.0	3.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	4.4	7.5	14.5	10.1	13.2	8.8	11.9	13.2	5.7	5.7	11.4	8.3	13.2	10.1	11.7	8.9	7.8	8.9	growing
Libyan Arab Jamahir.: GAP	22.1	20.1	30.5	31.2	29.2	26.5	33.0	25.8	18.3	23.4	24.0	27.7	32.6	31.2	34.5	10.4	7.8	11.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	88.0	12.6	12.6	17.7	14.3	0.0	0.0	11.0	11.0	9.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.9	5.2	5.2	5.0	5.0	5.5	6.1	growing
Lithuania: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	88.0	12.6	12.6	21.6	19.5	5.2	5.0	16.0	16.5	15.7	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	19.4	12.6	12.6	12.6	19.3	3.0	7.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	4.4	1.3	2.6	2.6	0.0	2.6	0.0	2.6	1.3	1.3	0.0	1.3	2.6	3.9	0.0	1.1	3.3	4.4	no chg
Luxembourg: GAP	17.0	13.9	15.2	15.2	12.6	15.2	12.6	15.2	13.9	15.6	12.6	20.7	15.2	16.5	12.6	20.4	6.3	11.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	17.7	21.1	31.0	31.0	20.0	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	3.9	3.9	2.8	3.9	growing
Macedonia: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	19.0	25.0	34.9	33.8	23.9	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	39.5	44.6	39.5	39.5	41.2	37.8	39.5	42.9	41.2	39.5	39.5	41.2	39.5	32.0	30.3	22.0	9.6	15.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	8.8	10.1	8.8	7.0	6.2	5.7	4.2	5.7	10.1	5.7	8.8	10.1	8.8	13.2	11.7	8.9	5.0	13.9	growing
Madagascar: GAP	48.3	54.7	48.3	46.5	47.4	43.5	43.7	48.6	51.3	45.2	48.3	51.3	48.3	45.2	42.0	30.9	14.6	29.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	53.8	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	52.1	53.8	50.4	52.1	52.1	50.4	52.1	53.8	52.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	1.3	2.6	2.6	1.3	2.6	1.3	3.9	2.6	5.1	3.9	2.6	1.3	2.6	3.9	1.1	0.0	6.1	16.1	growing
Malawi: GAP	55.1	53.0	53.0	51.7	53.0	53.4	57.7	53.0	57.2	56.0	53.0	53.4	56.4	56.0	1.1	0.0	6.1	16.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	64.7	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	64.7	41.2	37.8	44.6	30.3	28.9	28.9	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.5	5.7	5.7	5.7	6.9	5.7	9.4	5.6	3.8	5.7	3.1	3.1	3.1	4.4	3.9	3.9	5.0	1.1	smaller
Malaysia: GAP	57.9				57.3	56.1	74.1	68.6	66.8	68.7	66.1	67.8	44.3	42.2	48.5	34.2	33.9	30.0	smaller
- Not applicable or n-fS =	non-	functi	oning	State	ج														

⁻ Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State

Country/Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TREND
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	16.0	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	17.7	22.8	12.6	11.1	9.6	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6	1.3	2.6	3.9	1.3	3.9	3.9	2.6	8.3	3.9	4.4	5.7	3.9	8.3	7.2	5.0	6.1	6.1	growing
Mali: GAP	15.2	13.9	15.2	16.5	13.9	16.5	16.5	18.6	20.9	16.5	17.0	18.3	21.6	31.1	19.8	16.1	15.7	6.1	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	25.2	25.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	5.1	5.1	1.7	11.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	6.2	10.6	7.5	1.3	6.0	1.3	4.4	5.5	10.0	7.0	1.3	5.7	2.6	5.7	5.0	3.9	2.2	5.0	smaller
Malta: GAP	31.4	35.8	32.7	1.3	6.0	1.3	4.4	5.5	10.0	7.0	1.3	7.4	7.7	10.8	6.7	14.9	2.2	5.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	53.8	53.8	52.1	52.1	53.8	55.5	53.8	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	52.1	39.5	41.2	41.2	41.5	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.5	7.5	3.1	2.6	8.8	10.6	11.9	0.0	11.9	11.7	7.5	7.5	10.1	7.5	10.6	6.7	7.8	13.4	growing
Mauritania: GAP	61.3	61.3	55.2	54.7	62.6	66.1	65.7	50.4	62.3	62.1	57.9	59.6	49.6	48.7	51.8	48.2	7.8	13.4	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	52.1	39.5	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	28.9	28.9	28.9	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	4.4	5.7	3.1	0.0	8.8	6.2	6.2	3.1	4.4	3.1	7.5	0.0	8.8	2.6	6.9	1.1	10.6	6.7	growing
Mauritius: GAP	54.8	56.1	53.5	50.4	60.9	45.7	44.0	40.9	42.2	40.9	45.3	37.8	46.6	40.4	44.7	30.0	39.5	35.6	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	30.3	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	19.3	19.3	19.3	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.0	0.0	5.7	2.6	5.7	1.3	5.7	1.3	5.7	1.3	5.7	5.7	5.1	5.7	8.0	5.0	7.8	15.6	growing
Mexico: GAP	32.2	30.3	30.9	27.8	30.9	26.5	30.9	26.5	30.9	26.5	30.9	30.9	30.3	30.9	33.2	24.3	27.1	34.9	no chg
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	75.6	75.6	77.3	39.5	39.5	44.6	25.2	11.0	11.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.4	1.1	1.1	3.3	growing
Moldova: GAP		•			•	•	•		75.6	75.6	77.3	39.5	39.5	44.6	29.6	12.1	12.1	3.3	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	39.5	37.8	42.9	37.8	42.9	37.8	42.9	39.5	39.5	41.2	39.5	37.8	37.8	41.2	37.8	47.0	34.9	39.0	no chg
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.1	0.0	3.1	3.1	4.4	0.0	4.4	5.7	0.0	2.6	3.9	2.6	1.3	2.6	0.0	3.3	3.3	3.3	no chg
Mongolia: GAP	42.6	37.8	46.0	40.9	47.3	37.8	47.3	45.2	39.5	43.8	43.4	40.4	39.1	43.8	37.8	50.3	38.2	42.3	no chg
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	32.0	25.2	25.2	25.2	28.6	30.3	25.2	25.2	19.3	9.6	9.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	8.8	5.1	7.0	11.4	5.7	10.8	11.4	20.1	15.8	19.5	14.5	18.3	17.6	19.4	3.9	6.1	8.6	9.4	growing
Morocco: GAP	34.0	30.3	32.2	36.6	30.9	36.0	36.6	52.1	41.0	44.7	39.7	46.9	47.9	44.6	29.1	25.4	18.2	19.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	52.1	50.4	52.1	50.4	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	28.9	28.9	28.9	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	2.6	0.0	5.8	0.0	7.0	1.3	3.9	2.6	1.3	3.9	2.6	4.2	5.2	6.1	2.8	2.2	7.8	growing
Mozambique: GAP	50.4	53.0	50.4	56.2	50.4	57.4	51.7	56.0	53.0	53.4	54.3	27.8	29.4	30.4	31.3	31.7	31.1	36.7	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	66.4	63.0	63.0	63.0	66.4	66.4	64.7	63.0	64.9	63.4	57.8	no chg
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.1	1.3	3.1	4.4	3.1	1.3	7.5	7.5	6.2	3.1	6.2	6.2	3.1	6.2	5.6	5.6	5.6	5.6	growing
Myanmar: GAP	66.1	64.3	66.1	67.4	66.1	64.3	70.5	73.9	69.2	66.1	69.2	72.6	69.5	70.9	68.6	70.5	69.0	63.4	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	19.3	9.6	9.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	4.4	3.1	3.9	2.8	1.1	0.0	growing
Namibia: GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	63.0	65.6	67.4	66.1	66.9	22.1	10.7	9.6	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	64.7	66.4	63.0	50.4	37.8	37.8	41.2	38.5	38.5	22.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6													4.4	8.9	1.1	7.2	7.2	growing
Nepal: GAP	65.6	68.1	65.5	68.1	65.5	68.1	65.6	66.1	66.0	70.8	70.5	53.5	45.3	42.2	50.1	39.6	45.7	29.2	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	1.7	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	11.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.1	10.4	7.5	4.4	6.2	7.5	5.7	7.5	4.4	7.5	4.4	7.0	5.7	7.3	7.8	5.0	7.8	5.0	no chg
Netherlands: GAP	15.7	23.0	20.1	17.0	18.8	20.1	18.3	20.1	4.4	7.5	6.1	8.7	5.7	7.3	7.8	16.0	18.8	5.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	41.2	38.5	30.9	28.9	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	7.0	0.0	8.2	1.3	8.8	7.5	6.2	4.4	4.4	7.5	3.1	3.1	4.4	2.8	1.1	6.1	2.8	no chg
New Zealand: GAP	37.8	44.8	37.8	46.0	39.1	46.6	45.3	44.0	42.2	42.2	45.3	40.9	40.9	42.2	44.0	39.6	37.0	31.7	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	8.5	3.4	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	4.4	12.5	19.5	19.5	15.0	8.3	7.5	9.8	13.5		12.0	5.7	5.7	5.5	7.4	5.0	7.7	3.9	smaller
Nicaragua: GAP	4.4	12.5	19.5	19.5	16.7	16.8	10.9	13.2	13.5	16.7	12.0	5.7	5.7	5.5	7.4	5.0	7.7	3.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	8.5	0.0	0.0	5.1	1.7	6.8	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	8.5	5.1	8.5	3.0	1.5	6.0	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6	2.6	2.6	3.9	1.3	7.8	5.2	5.2	1.3	8.3	7.0	2.6	8.3	9.9	5.0	6.9	6.1		growing
Niger: GAP	2.6	11.1	2.6	3.9	6.4	9.5	12.0	5.2	1.3	10.0	7.0	2.6	16.8	15.0	13.5	9.9	7.6	14.9	growing
 Not applicable or n-fS = 	non-	tunct	ionino	State	9														

⁻ Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State

Country/Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TREND
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	28.6	25.2	25.2	25.2	30.3	25.2	25.2	25.2	28.6	25.2	26.9	30.3	33.7	30.3	34.9	40.5	0.0	no chg
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	8.8	9.3	7.0	11.9	7.0	11.4	8.6	8.8	8.2	5.7	4.4	8.8	14.8	14.3	10.6	11.7	11.7	growing
Nigeria: GAP	25.2	37.4	34.5	32.2	37.1	37.3	36.6	33.8	34.0	36.8	30.9	31.3	39.1	48.5	44.6	45.5	52.2	11.7	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	no chg
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.0	10.1	7.5	3.9	7.5	5.7	4.4	7.5	3.1	10.1	7.5	6.2	8.8	4.4	2.8	11.7	5.6	10.6	no chg
Norway: GAP	7.0	10.1	7.5	5.6	7.5	5.7	4.4	7.5	3.1	10.1	7.5	6.2	8.8	4.4	2.8	11.7	5.6	10.6	no chg
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	88.0	88.0	75.6	75.6	77.0	59.8	57.8	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.9	growing
Oman: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	88.0	88.0	75.6	75.6	77.0	59.8	61.7	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	28.6	33.7	25.2	28.6	25.2	33.7	25.2	25.2	30.3	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	33.0	9.6	12.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	6.2	10.1	19.4	19.4	20.7	11.9	23.2	16.3	10.4	17.6	16.3	15.0	10.6	8.8	18.7	7.5	18.4	9.5	smaller
Pakistan: GAP	31.4	38.7	53.1	44.6	49.3	37.1	56.9	41.5	35.6	47.9	41.5	40.2	35.8	34.0	43.9	40.5	28.0	22.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	14.3	14.3	14.3	17.7	12.6	12.6	17.7	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	16.0	14.3	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	3.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.5	3.1	18.8	11.3	12.5	12.7	10.0	18.4	7.0	2.9	15.8	4.4	8.6	17.5	17.5	7.5	11.7	6.1	no chg
Panama: GAP	21.8	17.4	33.1	29.0	25.1	25.3	27.7	31.0	19.6	15.5	28.4	20.4	22.9	30.1	30.1	7.5	11.7	9.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	52.1	55.5	53.8	55.5	55.5	50.4	52.1	55.5	52.1	53.8	55.5	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	1.5	0.0	9.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6	2.6	5.7	5.7	5.7	5.7	3.1	5.7	5.7	4.4	5.7	5.7	3.1	2.6	3.9	1.1	6.7	1.1	no chg
Papua New Guinea: GAP	54.7	58.1	59.5	61.2	61.2	56.1	55.2	61.2	57.8	58.2	61.2	56.1	53.5	53.0	54.3	2.6	6.7	10.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	16.0	12.6	12.6	17.7	12.6	12.6	17.7	12.6	17.7	12.6	22.0	15.6	14.0	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	20.0	10.0	18.8	8.8	19.4	16.1	15.1	23.2	15.0	14.6	20.2	13.2	13.2	11.9	12.3	7.8	16.1	9.5	smaller
Paraguay: GAP	32.6	22.6	31.4	21.4	32.0	32.1	27.7	35.8	32.7	27.2	32.8	30.9	25.8	29.6	24.9	29.8	31.7	23.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	14.3	19.4	12.6	16.0	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	19.3	19.3	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	8.8	2.5	9.9	10.8	10.7	19.0	24.8	26.3	16.4	26.5	19.2	17.6	17.7	19.5	11.3	14.7	12.7	10.6	growing
Peru: GAP	21.4	15.1	22.5	23.4	25.0	33.3	44.2	38.9	32.4	39.1	31.8	30.2	30.3	32.1	23.9	34.0	32.0	10.6	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	28.6	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	28.6	14.3	12.6	19.3	9.6	9.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	5.7	7.0	10.1	2.5	13.3	9.2	15.9	13.3	15.1	9.6	11.7	7.0	8.2	17.1	8.9	3.9	10.6	11.7	growing
Philippines: GAP	34.3	32.2	35.3	27.7	38.5	34.4	41.1	38.5	40.3	34.8	36.9	32.2	36.8	31.4	21.5	23.2	20.2	21.3	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	11.0	0.0	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.5	4.4	17.6	7.5	10.6	10.0	4.4	10.6	10.1	4.4	7.0	7.0	5.7	2.9	3.5	6.1	2.2	6.7	smaller
Poland: GAP	7.5	4.4	17.6	7.5	10.6	10.0	4.4	10.6	10.1	4.4	7.0	7.0	5.7	2.9	3.5	17.1	13.2	6.7	no chg
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	14.5	8.3	7.3	0.0	4.4	5.5	4.4	1.3	7.0	1.3	8.8	5.7	10.6	4.4	6.7	2.8	3.9	10.6	no chg
Portugal: GAP	27.1	20.9	19.9	12.6	17.0	18.1	17.0	13.9	19.6	13.9	21.4	18.3	23.2	4.4	6.7	2.8	3.9	10.6	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	77.3	77.3	77.3	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	77.3	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	63.0	63.0	48.1	48.1	48.1	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	1.3	0.0	1.3	1.1	3.9	3.9	3.9	growing
Qatar: GAP	77.3	77.3	78.6	76.9	76.9	75.6	75.6	76.9	78.6	76.9	76.9	76.9	75.6	64.3	64.1	52.0	52.0	52.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	16.0	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	10.1	8.8	8.8	7.0	11.3	6.0	7.3	18.9	5.7	12.7	12.7	11.9	8.6	8.8	7.8	8.6	2.2	8.9	smaller
Romania: GAP	22.7	24.8	21.4	19.6	23.9	18.6	21.6	31.5	18.3	25.3	25.3	24.5	21.2	8.8	7.8	8.6	2.2	8.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	11.0	11.0	9.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	5.7	3.9	7.0	7.0	3.1	3.9	3.6	11.1	3.3	9.2	growing
Russian Federation: GAP		-		-			-	-	18.3	16.5	19.6	19.6	15.7	3.9	3.6	22.1	14.3	18.8	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	37.8	39.5	37.8	12.6	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	19.4	14.3	16.0	12.6	11.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	1.3	7.0	1.3	2.6	1.3	7.0	5.5	8.8	7.3	2.6			13.2	14.5	15.6	5.6	6.7	11.4	growing
Rwanda: GAP	39.1	46.5	39.1	15.2	15.6	19.6	18.1	21.4	19.9	15.2	22.7	29.5	27.5	30.5	28.2	16.6	6.7	11.4	smaller
ADHEDENCE CAD	_	_	-	_	_	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	88.0	88.0	11.0	9.6	21.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP																			
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	no chg

⁻ Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State

ADHERENCE GAP 14.3 12.1 12.8 12.8 12.8 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.7 13.9 13.9 12.8 12.8 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.7 13.9 13.	Country/Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TREND
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	•																			
Samitludia: CAP 19.5 250 28.0 28.0 16.5 15.2 21.6 19.9 28.0 28.0 28.0 28.0 32.0 34.6 34.6 32.9 34.4 23.5 14.7 22.8 growing transparence CAP 28.0																				
IMPLEMENTATION GAP																				growing
MPLEMENTATION GAP	ADHERENCE GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	50.4	50.4	52.7	14.0	9.6	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP 75.6 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8																				growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	St. Vincent & Grenad.: GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	50.4	50.4	53.8	16.2	11.8	smaller
Sam Marino: GAP	ADHERENCE GAP	75.6	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	39.5	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	0.0	0.0	1.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP 64.7 63.0 63.0 66.4 63.0 63.0 66.4 63.0 83.0 83.0 83.0 83.0 83.0 83.0 83.0 8	IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.9	2.6	1.3	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	3.9	1.1	1.1	2.2	0.0	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP 1.3 2.6 1.3 2.6 0.0 2.6 0.0 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.6 2.5 5.2 2.4 4.6 6.1 6.1 6.1 growing Spartmack Principes: GAP 39.5 37.8	San Marino: GAP	75.6	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	43.4	40.4	39.1	37.8	39.1	0.0	0.0	1.3	3.9	4.5	1.1	2.2	1.5	smaller
San Tome & Principe: GAP 66.0 65.6 64.3 69.0 63.0 65.6 63.0 42.1 42.1 43.8 47.2 47.2 43.0 49.8 49.0 56.1 56.1 53.1 Smalled ADHERENCE GAP 39.5 37.8	ADHERENCE GAP	64.7	63.0	63.0	66.4	63.0	63.0	63.0	39.5	39.5	41.2	44.6	44.6	37.8	44.6	44.6	50.0	50.0	47.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP 39.5 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8 37.8	IMPLEMENTATION GAP	1.3	2.6	1.3	2.6	0.0	2.6	0.0	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	5.2	5.2	4.4	6.1	6.1	6.1	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	Sao Tome & Principe: GAP	66.0	65.6	64.3	69.0	63.0	65.6	63.0	42.1	42.1	43.8	47.2	47.2	43.0	49.8	49.0	56.1	56.1	53.1	smaller
Saudi Arabia: GAP	ADHERENCE GAP	39.5	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	38.5	28.9	28.9	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP 17.7 14.3 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6 12.6	IMPLEMENTATION GAP	1.3	2.6	2.6	2.6	0.0	3.9	4.4	3.1	10.1	17.6	7.0	3.1	5.7	3.9	1.1	7.8	3.9	2.2	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 4.4 4.4 7.0 5.7 7.0 5.7 7.0 14.0 2.6 8.8 11.4 8.8 8.3 11.3 5.0 0.0 6.1 growing Senegal: GAP 20.3 18.7 17.0 19.6 18.3 19.6 18.3 19.6 26.6 15.2 23.1 29.1 21.4 27.7 11.3 5.0 0.0 6.1 smaller from Comments of the Comment of t	Saudi Arabia: GAP	40.8	40.4	40.4	40.4	37.8	41.7	42.2	40.9	47.9	55.4	44.8	40.9	43.5	41.7	38.9	46.3	32.8	31.1	smaller
Senegal: GAP 20.3 18.7 17.0 19.6 18.3 19.6 18.3 19.6 26.6 15.2 23.1 29.1 21.4 27.7 11.3 5.0 0.0 6.1 smaller	ADHERENCE GAP	17.7	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	17.7	12.6	19.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP 52,1 50,4 50,4 50,8 50,5 50,4 52,1 55,5 55,5 55,5 55,5 53,5 53,8 55,5 12,6 0.0 0.0 0.0 mallimplementation gap 57,8 51,7 53,5 55,5 59,9 53,5 56,5 59,9 59,9 56,8 57,8 58,1 55,1 62,5 14,8 39,9 1,1 6,1 no chessey chelles: GAP 57,8 51,7 53,5 55,1 59,9 53,5 56,5 59,9 59,9 56,8 57,8 58,1 55,1 62,5 14,8 39,9 1,1 6,1 no chessey chelles: GAP 57,8 51,7 53,5 55,1 59,9 53,5 56,5 59,9 59,9 56,8 57,8 58,1 55,1 62,5 14,8 39,9 1,1 6,1 no chessey chelles: GAP 57,8 51,7 53,5 55,1 59,9 53,5 56,5 59,9 59,9 56,8 57,8 58,1 55,1 62,5 14,8 39,9 1,1 6,1 no chessey chelles: GAP 57,8 51,7 53,5 55,1 59,9 53,5 56,5 59,9 59,9 56,8 57,8 58,1 55,1 62,5 14,8 39,9 1,1 6,1 no chessey chelles: GAP 57,8 51,7 53,5 55,1 59,9 53,5 56,5 59,9 59,9 56,8 57,8 58,1 55,1 62,5 14,8 39,9 1,1 6,1 no chessey chelles: GAP 57,8 51,7 53,5 51,7 53,5 55,1 59,9 53,5 56,5 59,9 56,8 57,8 58,1 55,1 62,5 14,8 39,9 1,1 6,1 no chessey chelles: GAP 57,8 51,7 53,5 55,1 59,9 53,5 56,5 59,9 56,8 57,8 58,1 55,1 62,5 14,8 39,9 1,1 6,1 no chessey chessey chessey chesses	IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6	4.4	4.4	7.0	5.7	7.0	5.7	7.0	14.0	2.6	8.8	11.4	8.8	8.3	11.3	5.0	0.0	6.1	growing
MPLEMENTATION GAP 5.7 1.3 3.1 1.3 4.4 3.1 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 1.3 5.7 2.6 1.3 7.0 2.2 3.9 1.1 6.1 no chespendiles: GAP 57.8 51.7 53.5 55.1 59.9 53.5 56.5 59.9 59.9 56.8 57.8 58.1 55.1 62.5 14.8 3.9 1.1 6.1 smalled and previous problems of the	Senegal: GAP	20.3	18.7	17.0	19.6	18.3	19.6	18.3	19.6	26.6	15.2	23.1	29.1	21.4	27.7	11.3	5.0	0.0	6.1	smaller
Seychelles: GAP 57.8 57.7 53.5 55.1 59.9 53.5 56.5 59.9 59.9 56.8 57.8 58.1 55.1 62.5 14.8 3.9 1.1 6.1 Smalle	ADHERENCE GAP	52.1	50.4	50.4	53.8	55.5	50.4	52.1	55.5	55.5	55.5	52.1	55.5	53.8	55.5	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	IMPLEMENTATION GAP	5.7	1.3	3.1	1.3	4.4	3.1	4.4	4.4	4.4	1.3	5.7	2.6	1.3	7.0	2.2	3.9	1.1	6.1	no chg
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	Seychelles: GAP	57.8	51.7	53.5	55.1	59.9	53.5	56.5	59.9	59.9	56.8	57.8	58.1	55.1	62.5	14.8	3.9	1.1	6.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	n-fS	-	31.0	-									
ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 64.7 63.0 63.0 64.7 63.0 63.0 64.7 63.0 63.0 66.4 64.7 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 59.8 48.1 38.5 smalle implementation gap 67.4 66.1 67.8 69.2 69.2 66.1 67.8 69.2 63.0 72.6 70.9 69.2 63.0 69.2 65.8 59.8 54.8 42.4 smalle implementation gap 67.4 66.1 67.8 69.2 69.2 66.1 67.8 69.2 63.0 72.6 70.9 69.2 63.0 69.2 65.8 59.8 54.8 42.4 smalle implementation gap 68.6 59.8 59.8 59.8 59.8 59.8 59.8 59.8 59.8	IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	n-fS	-	14.5	-									
MPLEMENTATION GAP	Sierra Leone: GAP	-	-		-	-	-	n-fS	-	45.5	-									
Singapore: GAP	ADHERENCE GAP	63.0	63.0	64.7	63.0	63.0	63.0	64.7	63.0	63.0	66.4	64.7	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	59.8	48.1	38.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	IMPLEMENTATION GAP	4.4	3.1	3.1	6.2	6.2	3.1	3.1	6.2	0.0	6.2	6.2	6.2	0.0	6.2	2.8	0.0	6.7	3.9	no chg
MPLEMENTATION GAP	Singapore: GAP	67.4	66.1	67.8	69.2	69.2	66.1	67.8	69.2	63.0	72.6	70.9	69.2	63.0	69.2	65.8	59.8	54.8	42.4	smaller
Slovakia: GAP	ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.2	25.2	25.2	0.0	0.0	1.7	4.5	1.5	1.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP IMPLEMENTATION GAP	IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	3.1	2.2	5.0	4.4	11.1	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	Slovakia: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27.8	27.8	27.8	2.6	3.1	3.9	9.5	5.9	12.6	smaller
Slovenia: GAP	ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	1.7	0.0	11.0	4.5	1.5	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6 75.6	IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	3.9	2.6	2.6	7.0	2.6	2.2	2.2	6.6	11.1	growing
MPLEMENTATION GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.	Slovenia: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	•	-	-	12.6	16.5	15.2	15.2	7.0	4.3	2.2	13.2	11.1	12.6	smaller
Solomon Islands: GAP 75.6 75.6 76.9 75.6 76.9 75.6 78.6<		75.6	75.6	75.6													78.5	78.5		growing
ADHERENCE GAP																				
IMPLEMENTATION GAP -	Solomon Islands: GAP	75.6	75.6	75.6	76.9	75.6	78.6	78.6	78.6	78.6	78.6	78.6	78.6	76.9	78.6	78.4	79.6	79.6	79.6	
South Africa: GAP -		-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-					25.2				smaller
ADHERENCE GAP 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.		-	-		-	-	-	-	-	-	-									growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP 7.0 3.9 1.3 5.7 2.9 12.7 8.8 8.3 7.5 5.7 13.2 11.9 3.1 13.2 9.5 6.7 3.9 11.7 growing Spain: GAP 7.0 3.9 1.3 5.7 2.9 12.7 8.8 8.3 7.5 5.7 13.2 11.9 3.1 13.2 9.5 17.7 3.9 11.7 growing Spain: GAP 63.0	South Africa: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	63.0	25.2	27.8	26.3	1.1	4.8		smaller
Spain: GAP 7.0 3.9 1.3 5.7 2.9 12.7 8.8 8.3 7.5 5.7 13.2 11.9 3.1 13.2 9.5 17.7 3.9 11.7 growing ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 50.4 52.1 41.2 39.5 41.2 25.2 25.2 19.3 9.6 9.6 smaller	ADHERENCE GAP	0.0	0.0		0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	11.0	0.0		
ADHERENCE GAP 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0 63.0		7.0	3.9		5.7	2.9	12.7			7.5	5.7			3.1			6.7			
	Spain: GAP	7.0	3.9	1.3	5.7	2.9	12.7	8.8	8.3	7.5	5.7	13.2	11.9	3.1	13.2	9.5	17.7	3.9	11.7	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP 3.1 1.3 3.1 1.3 4.4 0.0 4.4 4.4 5.7 7.5 10.6 5.7 4.4 8.8 6.7 14.5 6.4 5.0 arowir	ADHERENCE GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	50.4	52.1	41.2	39.5	41.2	25.2	25.2	19.3	9.6	9.6	smaller
	IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.1	1.3	3.1	1.3	4.4		4.4	4.4		7.5									growing
Sri Lanka: GAP 66.1 64.3 66.1 64.3 67.4 63.0 67.4 67.4 56.1 59.6 51.8 45.2 45.6 34.0 31.9 33.8 16.0 14.6 smalle	Sri Lanka: GAP	66.1	64.3	66.1	64.3	67.4	63.0	67.4	67.4	56.1	59.6	51.8	45.2	45.6	34.0	31.9	33.8	16.0	14.6	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP 26.9 25.2 25.2 26.9 25.2 26.9 26.9 30.3 30.3 26.9 25.2 25.2 28.6 25.2 25.2 33.0 30.4 28.9 growing	ADHERENCE GAP	26.9	25.2	25.2	26.9	25.2	26.9	26.9	30.3	30.3	26.9	25.2	25.2	28.6	25.2	25.2	33.0	30.4	28.9	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP 2.6 5.7 11.4 7.0 8.8 11.3 2.5 14.5 15.7 17.6 7.5 9.3 17.5 13.2 5.6 9.5 13.4 6.7 growin	IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6	5.7	11.4	7.0	8.8	11.3	2.5	14.5	15.7	17.6	7.5	9.3	17.5	13.2	5.6	9.5	13.4	6.7	growing
Sudan: GAP 29.5 30.9 36.6 33.9 34.0 38.2 29.4 44.8 46.0 44.5 32.7 34.5 46.1 38.4 30.8 42.5 43.8 35.6 growin - Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State							38.2	29.4	44.8	46.0	44.5	32.7	34.5	46.1	38.4	30.8	42.5	43.8	35.6	growing

⁻ Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State

Country/Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TREND
ADHERENCE GAP	39.5	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	38.5	38.5	41.3	no chg
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	5.7	0.0	2.6	2.6	0.0	2.6	0.0	0.0	2.6	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.6	2.2	0.0	0.0	1.1	smaller
Suriname: GAP	45.2	37.8	40.4	40.4	37.8	40.4	37.8	37.8	40.4	39.1	37.8	37.8	37.8	40.4	40.0	38.5	38.5	42.4	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	19.4	14.3	12.6	12.6	14.3	19.4	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	14.3	12.6	19.4	25.0	25.0	0.0	no chg
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	6.5	6.5	8.8	2.6	7.5	7.0	11.4	2.6	8.3	5.7	8.8	7.0	11.3	7.0	11.7	10.0	9.5	6.1	growing
Swaziland: GAP	25.9	20.8	21.4	15.2	21.8	26.4	24.0	15.2	20.9	18.3	21.4	19.6	25.6	19.6	31.1	35.0	34.5	6.1	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	1.7	0.0	3.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.7	0.0	5.1	11.0	3.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	2.6	4.4	2.9	1.3	5.7	5.7	4.4	12.7	7.0	13.2	5.7	8.8	1.3	2.2	8.9	3.9	4.4	growing
Sweden: GAP	12.6	16.9	17.0	15.5	13.9	5.7	7.4	4.4	16.1	7.0	13.2	5.7	10.5	1.3	7.3	19.9	6.9	4.4	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	1.3	5.7	5.7	4.4	1.3	8.6	5.7	1.3	7.0	4.4	4.2	4.4	0.0	10.1	0.0	1.1	6.1	10.0	growing
Switzerland: GAP	26.5	30.9	30.9	29.6	26.5	33.8	30.9	26.5	32.2	29.6	29.4	29.6	25.2	35.3	0.0	1.1	6.1	10.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	16.0	14.3	14.3	14.3	12.6	17.7	22.8	12.6	12.6	16.0	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	16.0	19.3	9.6	9.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	8.8	4.4	14.5	8.8	4.4	7.0	11.4	8.8	8.8	5.7	4.4	7.5	5.7	11.9	9.5	6.1	13.1	2.8	smaller
Syrian Arab Republic: GAP	24.8	18.7	28.8	23.1	17.0	24.7	34.2	21.4	21.4	21.7	17.0	20.1	18.3	24.5	25.5	25.4	22.7	12.4	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n-fS	-	21.5	-							
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n-fS	-	11.1	-							
Tajikistan: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n-fS	-	32.6	-							
ADHERENCE GAP	50.4	50.4	52.1	50.4	50.4	53.8	50.4	50.4	50.4	50.4	52.1	52.1	53.8	39.5	37.8	31.9	19.3	3.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.1	0.0	4.4	5.7	5.7	2.6	11.9	11.9	8.8	7.5	7.5	8.8	7.5	11.9	11.7	11.7	3.9	6.4	growing
Tanzania, United Rep.: GAP	53.5	50.4	56.5	56.1	56.1	56.4	62.3	62.3	59.2	57.9	59.6	60.9	61.3	51.4	49.5	43.6	23.2	9.4	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	63.0	63.0	63.0	64.7	63.0	66.4	66.4	64.7	64.7	64.7	63.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	50.4	48.1	40.0	38.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	8.8	0.0	8.8	4.4	0.0	8.8	5.7	8.8	3.1	10.1	7.5	0.0	3.1	7.5	0.0	6.7	0.0	5.8	smaller
Thailand: GAP	71.8	63.0	71.8	69.1	63.0	75.2	72.1	73.5	67.8	74.8	70.5	63.0	66.1	70.5	50.4	54.8	40.0	44.3	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	17.7	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.1	3.9	7.0	3.9	4.4	5.2	5.7	8.3	5.7	2.6	5.7	8.8	2.6	2.6	7.4	3.9	5.0	6.1	growing
Togo: GAP	15.7	16.5	19.6	16.5	17.0	17.8	18.3	20.9	18.3	15.2	18.3	21.4	15.2	20.3	9.1	3.9	5.0	6.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	28.6	30.3	25.2	25.2	25.2	26.9	28.6	30.3	26.9	25.2	26.9	16.0	12.6	19.4	19.3	19.3	22.3	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6	10.1	10.1	11.9	10.6	4.4	7.5	11.9	5.7	8.8	11.9	7.5	7.5	10.6	7.8	10.6	9.5	3.9	no chg
Trinidad & Tobago: GAP	27.8	38.7	40.4	37.1	35.8	29.6	34.4	40.5	36.0	35.7	37.1	34.4	23.5	23.2	27.2	29.9	28.8	26.2	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	14.3	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	5.1	1.7	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.5	7.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	11.9	14.4	8.8	10.1	7.5	4.4	14.5	10.1	4.4	5.7	2.9	10.1	11.4	12.7	0.0	8.9	2.2	8.3	smaller
Tunisia: GAP	26.2	27.0	21.4	22.7	20.1	17.0	27.1	22.7	17.0	18.3	2.9	15.2	13.1	12.7	0.0	8.9	3.7	15.8	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	26.9	0.0	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	7.5	4.4	7.5	7.5	10.6	7.5		10.1									7.8		growing
Turkey: GAP	45.3	42.2	45.3	45.3	48.4	45.3	45.1	47.9	31.2	33.5	40.2	34.0	30.0	15.0	5.2	26.6	7.8	17.8	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	88.0	88.0	12.6	12.6	22.8	31.0	28.3	31.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	no chg
Turkmenistan: GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	88.0	88.0	12.6	12.6	22.8	31.0	28.3	31.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	52.1	50.4	50.4	52.1	50.4	53.8	52.1	50.4	50.4	50.4	53.8	50.4	50.4	52.1	50.4	48.1	41.5	44.8	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	4.4	0.0	7.5	3.1	5.7	4.4	4.4	4.4	0.0	1.3	4.4	2.9	0.0	4.4	8.0	2.8	8.4		growing
Uganda: GAP	56.5	50.4	57.9	55.2	56.1	58.2	56.5	54.8	50.4	51.7	58.2	53.3	50.4	56.5	58.4	50.9	49.9	53.2	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6	12.6			12.6	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	4.4	4.4	5.7	4.2	4.4	5.5	7.3	2.6	6.0	2.6	3.9		2.6	10.1	7.6	7.2	5.5	6.1	growing
Ukraine: GAP	17.0	17.0	18.3	16.8	17.0	18.1	19.9	15.2	18.6	15.2	16.5	19.6	15.2	22.7	20.2	7.2	5.5	6.1	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	77.3	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6		75.6	75.6	75.6		75.6	75.6	50.4	37.8	37.8	42.8	19.3	19.3	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.3	0.0		0.0	1.3	0.0	5.0	7.8		growing
United Arab Emirates: GAP	77.3			75.6		78.6	75.6	75.6	76.9	78.6	75.6	75.6	50.4	39.1	37.8	47.8	27.1	25.4	smaller
 Not applicable or n-fS = 	non-	tuncti	ioning	y State	Э														

⁻ Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State

Country/Year	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	TREND
ADHERENCE GAP	26.9	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	3.1	5.7	6.2	11.9	7.5	13.2	6.2	13.1	11.9	15.0	8.8	8.7	11.3	14.8	11.7	2.5	14.5	5.0	growing
United Kingdom: GAP	30.0	30.9	31.4	37.1	32.7	38.4	31.4	38.3	37.1	40.2	34.0	33.9	36.5	40.0	24.3	2.5	14.5	5.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	0.88	88.0	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	57.8	57.8	57.8	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	1.3	0.0	0.0	2.5	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.3	1.1	0.0	5.6	3.9	growing
United States: GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	89.5	89.5	88.0	75.6	78.1	76.9	75.6	75.6	76.9	75.6	76.9	76.7	57.8	63.4	61.7	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	12.6	12.6	12.6	17.7	12.6	12.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.4	11.0	0.0	0.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	6.2	0.0	7.5	0.0	5.6	4.4	3.1	3.8	3.9	4.4	1.3	5.7	8.8	5.2	6.7	8.9	7.2	15.0	growing
Uruguay: GAP	44.0	37.8	45.3	37.8	18.2	17.0	15.7	21.5	16.5	17.0	1.3	5.7	8.8	5.2	10.1	19.9	7.2	15.0	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	25.2	28.6	33.7	40.5	40.5	40.5	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	no chg
Uzbekistan: GAP	-	-		-	-		-		37.8	37.8	37.8	37.8	25.2	28.6	33.7	40.5	40.5	40.5	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	5.1	3.4	3.4	3.4	3.4	1.7	1.7	5.1	6.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.1	0.0	0.0	11.0	11.0	11.0	growing
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	4.4	12.1	9.5	7.0	14.0	4.4	6.9	7.6	14.5	11.3	11.3	18.3	15.1	14.2	6.1	16.6	20.0	growing
Venezuela: GAP	5.1	7.8	15.5	12.9	10.4	15.7	6.1	12.0	14.4	14.5	11.3	11.3	23.4	15.1	14.2	17.1	27.6	31.0	growing
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	51.3	48.1	51.1	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	2.2	1.1	growing
Viet Nam: GAP		-		-	-		-		88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	63.0	63.0	63.0	51.3	50.3	52.2	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	-	-	-	-	-	12.6	12.6	16.0	17.7	12.6	17.7	21.1	22.8	12.6	17.7	0.0	0.0	1.5	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	-	-	-	-	-	3.9	14.0	2.6	10.1	8.8	7.5	8.8	5.7	9.9	5.0	5.0	8.9	3.9	smaller
Yemen: GAP		-	-	-	-	16.5	26.6	18.6	27.8	21.4	25.2	29.9	28.5	22.5	22.7	5.0	8.9	5.4	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	25.2	28.6	25.2	26.9	25.2	26.9	26.9	25.2	25.2	25.2	25.2	0.0	1.7	1.7	0.0	11.0	0.0	6.0	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	2.6	1.3	9.9	9.5	5.7	8.8	1.6	8.0	7.0	5.7	1.3	8.6	3.1	5.2	6.9	6.1	2.2	8.3	no chg
Zambia: GAP	27.8	29.9	35.1	36.4	30.9	35.7	28.5	33.2	32.2	30.9	26.5	8.6	4.8	6.9	6.9	17.1	2.2	14.3	smaller
ADHERENCE GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	75.6	37.8	25.2	9.6	12.6	9.6	smaller
IMPLEMENTATION GAP	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.3	0.0	1.3	0.0	2.6	0.0	3.3	3.9	7.2	growing
Zimbabwe: GAP	88.0	88.0	88.0	88.0	75.6	75.6	75.6	76.9	75.6	76.9	75.6	76.9	75.6	40.4	25.2	12.9	16.5	16.8	smaller

⁻ Not applicable or n-fS = non-functioning State

Table 12 enables individual countries' situations to be studied. That is not intended here. Only broad comparisons can be made of the movements of the three sets of trend-lines across all countries, which provides an indication of general trends.

Of the 166 overall TRENDs, a good three quarters are moving in the right direction, i.e. they point downward. This is chiefly due to the quantitatively dominant ADHERENCE factor. But 19 per cent of the basic workers' rights TRENDs point upwards.

Of the ADHERENCE **GAP**s, three quarters are identified as "smaller". The main reason for this is the general rise in ratifications of core Conventions, especially since the Director-General of the ILO launched a ratification campaign in 1995. But 18 per cent are "growing", i.e. they are moving in the wrong direction.

As regards IMPLEMENTATION **GAP**s, the picture is the reverse. Fifty-nine per cent of the TRENDs go in the wrong direction, i.e. they indicate increasing IMPLEMENTATION problems. Only 18 per cent point in the direction of a decrease. Nearly a quarter of the IMPLEMENTATION TRENDs record "no change", sometimes at rather high levels of **GAP**s.

A small portion of the rise in IMPLEMENTATION scores may be attributable to a correlation between ratifications and subsequent comments by the Committee of Experts due to the fact that,

with more ratifications, the Committee has to scrutinize more countries' situations and may find more things that warrant a DIRECT REQUEST or an OBSERVATION. Verification of this correlation would require close inspection of the base data, which cannot be carried out here. A correlation is quite likely to exist in the case of the two promotional standards concerned with non-discrimination, Convention Nos. 100 and 111, where the Committee of Experts has a tendency to prod countries to go further or faster. On the other hand, a correlation between ratification of the two freedom of association and collective bargaining standards, Convention Nos. 87 and 98, and comments by the Committee of Experts is unlikely to exist, partly because countries' situations can come under the scrutiny of the CFA prior to ratification.

Two other factors seem to me to be chiefly responsible for the rise in IMPLEMENTATION problems. One is the impact of globalization, which is contemporaneous with the period of the **GAP** system. Its deregulation and privatisation precepts have affected many workers, especially in economically weak countries. This is reflected in the regional CFA data shown in figure 4 above where the upward trend of TO BE KEP INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs is most pronounced for Latin America and Africa. The second factor is linked to UNDP's finding that "the spread of democratisation appears to have stalled, with many countries failing to consolidate and deepen the first steps towards democracy and several slipping back to authoritarianism." It would be surprising if such "stalling" and "slipping back" did not call into question existing basic workers' rights. Another pointer is the downward trend in the number of cases of *PROGRESS* that were acknowledged by the Committee of Experts in respect of core Conventions since 1985 (see footnote 42 above).

The conclusion one can draw from this cross-country analysis is that, while there is growing ADHERENCE to ILO's values, procedures, etc., countries have experienced increasing IMPLEMENTATION problems, even countries well endowed with capacity to deal with international obligations.

4.2 Some graphic illustrations

Presentation of data in graphic form renders visible the movement of TRENDs. To start with, figure 5 illustrates the prevailing pattern of a scissor movement where the ADHERENCE TREND points downwards and the IMPLEMENTATION TREND upwards. Bolivia is the example chosen. The load on Bolivia's IMPLEMENTATION indicator derives almost entirely from Committee of Experts' comments, i.e. it is not merely a reflection of the ratifications that occurred in 1990 and 1997. DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONs appear to be on a secular upward trend – *prima facie* evidence for wanting to help that country to get to grips with labour administration problems.

In figure 6 worrying developments are illustrated of both a growing ADHERENCE **GAP** and a growing IMPLEMENTATION **GAP**. The Côte d'Ivoire is taken as an example, but there are 20 other countries with simultaneously worsening TRENDs at all levels of capacity: Algeria, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Chad, the Comoros, Congo, Djibouti, Dominica, Guinea, Haiti, Iraq, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Niger, Saint Lucia, the Solomon Islands, Spain, Sudan and Venezuela.

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⁴⁹ Correlation can be tested at a later stage when pairs of core Conventions are intended to be scored individually. ⁵⁰ See UNDP: *Human Development Report 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world* (New York and Oxford: OUP for UNDP, 2002), p. 13.

Figure 5. Graphic representation of trend-lines of Bolivia's GAPs




Figure 6. Graphic representation of trend-lines of Côte d'Ivoire's GAPs





Figure 7. Graphic representation of trend-lines of Malaysia's GAPs



Desirable TREND movements are illustrated in figure 7, which shows Malaysia's simultaneously decreasing ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION GAPs. Other examples are Barbados, Ecuador, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jordan, Romania and Thailand.

4.3 Grouping countries by adherence and implementation scores

The designation of trends as "bigger", "smaller" or "no change" in the last column of table 12 can have quite different meanings depending on the level or absolute size of GAPs. A large-size basic workers' rights GAP with a worsening trend, such as in the case of the Solomon Islands, should be greater cause for concern than a low-level GAP that has had a marginal tendency to worsen, as for example in the case of Norway. Therefore, the absolute size of GAPs has to be brought to the fore.

As was suggested in the introduction of this paper, the light should be trained on the two constituent elements of the basic workers' rights indicator, i.e. the ADHERENCE GAP and the This enables one to perceive where countries lag behind IMPLEMENTATION GAP. significantly, where they may need assistance and what form of assistance they may need. The overall **GAP** is too crude a measurement in that respect.

To distinguish whether the absolute size of GAPs is worrisome or not, one has to establish categories through cut-off points between the minimum and maximum values of a range. This paper distinguishes three categories: "good", "medium" and "poor" performers. When one applies these distinctions simultaneously to the ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION indicators, the following nine groups can be said to exist:

- good adherents that are good implementers; 1.
- 2. good adherents that are medium implementers;
- good adherents that are poor implementers; 3.
- 4. medium adherents that are good implementers;
- medium adherents that are medium implementers; 5.
- medium adherents that are poor implementers: 6.
- poor adherents that are good implementers; 7.
- poor adherents that are medium implementers; and 8.
- 9. poor adherents that are poor implementers.

How should one fix the quantitative thresholds? Commonly applied cut-off points are one-half and one-quarter values of the maximum range. In the case of the ADHERENCE GAP this would designate countries with more than 44 of the 88 maximum points as poor performers, countries with 22 to 44 points as medium performers and countries with less than 22 points as good performers.

In the case of the IMPLEMENTATION GAP one has to take account of the fact that DIRECT REQUESTs and OBSERVATIONSs can come about only after countries have ratified Conventions. If a country has not ratified a Convention, it can ipso facto not incur an IMPLEMENTATION GAP through the Committee of Experts component. The ratification of a single Convention maximally entails an IMPLEMENTATION GAP of 4.4 points prior to 2000 and of 3.9 points as from that year; ratification of all Conventions can entail a maximum IMPLEMENTATION GAP of 31 points. These variations reflect the inherent relationships established within the GAP system. To overcome the difficulty of having a variable maximum

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range, the yardstick used here derives from the other component of the IMPLEMENTATION indicator, the Committee on Freedom of Association, because complaints can be submitted irrespective of whether a country has ratified Convention Nos. 87 and/or 98. The maximum of the CFA component being 12 points, therefore, countries with more than 6 points are designated as poor performers, countries with 3-6 points as medium performers and countries with less than 3 points as good performers.

To imagine what the achievement of a good ADHERENCE score requires, one should refer to the values of (non-)ratification and (non-)reporting on ratified Conventions or under the Declaration that were set out in chapter 2. A good ADHERENCE score in, for instance, the year 2002 would require ratification of a least seven of the eight core Conventions and a reasonable reporting record. Given that non-ratification of two Conventions incurs 22 **GAP** points in 2002, the cut-off point between good and medium ADHERENCE performers seems a reasonable threshold

To imagine what achievement of a good IMPLEMENTATION score requires in 2002, one could refer to a single OBSERVATION, which would leave a country in the category of good implementers; an additional DIRECT REQUEST would put it into the category of "medium" performers. If the country had incurred neither DIRECT REQUESTs nor OBSERVATIONs but the CFA had addressed TO BE KEPT INFORMED or INTERIM REPORTs to the government, again a certain combination of these forms of reports would assign the country to one category or another. No more than one INTERIM REPORT in 2002 would leave a country in the category of good implementers, an additional TO BE KEPT INFORMED report would put it into the category of "medium" performers. The IMPLEMENTATION cut-off points, too, seem reasonable.

The listing of country's scores according to their ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION groups can be found in table 13. Countries in groups 1, 2 and 4 are mentioned only for completeness' sake. They are unlikely to need much or any ILO assistance.

Table 13 chooses to present averages. The averages pertain to the first ten years of the system, 1985-1994, and the subsequent seven years, 1995-2001. The average score of the recent period is used to sort countries, within each group, in the order of increasing **GAPs**. The year 2002 is set apart to illustrate the point made at the beginning of this chapter that points in any single year can potentially be misleading.

If one considers the relationship between countries' scores and their capacity to administer core Conventions or principles and rights (see chapter 1.5), one finds countries with adequate, little and least capacity in all categories of table 13. Lack of capacity is, no doubt, an important factor, but it is not the only one. Political will also counts! Countries without much capacity can be found among good implementers, Botswana is an example. By contrast, possessing the requisite capacity does not ensure good implementation. Half of the 46 countries with adequate capacity, ranging from Australia to Thailand, show up as poor implementers in table 13!

Table 13. Grouping of countries by their ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION GAPs, sorted by 1995-2001 averages and ranked within each group*

Indicator points		Nine groups of	Size of countries' overall GAPs							
ADHERENCE GAP (max. = 88)	IMPLEMEN- TATION GAP	countries	Countries	Average 1985-94 GAP	Average 1995-2001 GAP	2002 GAP (max. = 100)				
	(max. = 12)			(max. = 100)	(max. = 100)					
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)				
	Small <3 points	1. Good adherents, good implementers	San Marino, Italy, Luxembourg, (5 countries in group 1 in 1995-2	001).						
	Medium 3-6 points	2. Good adherents, medium implementers	Finland, Israel, Malta, Greece, Po Slovakia, Ireland, Togo, Lithuania Mali, Jordan, Bosnia and Herzeg (23 countries in group 2 in 1995-	a, Russian Federat ovina, Kyrgyzstan, 2001)	ion, Belgium, Austr Antigua and Barba	ia, Switzerland, dos				
			Norway	6.9	6.7	10.6				
			Nicaragua	14.4	7.0	3.9				
			Tunisia	22.0	8.1	15.8				
			Uruguay	27.1	8.3	15.0				
			Belarus Sweden	5.1 11.7	8.5 9.3	7.2 4.4				
			Honduras	9.9	9.3	3.9				
			Cuba	9.7	9.7	20.2				
			France	12.0	9.7	13.2				
			Netherlands	16.5	10.1	5.0				
			Niger	6.5	10.3	14.9				
			Spain	6.4	10.4	11.7				
Small			Germany	11.3	11.3	5.0				
<22 points		3. Good	Portugal	18.0	11.5	10.6				
F		adherents,	Dominica	11.5	11.7	10.0				
		poor	Denmark	20.3	11.9	22.0				
	Large	implementers	Croatia	13.3	13.4	2.8				
	>6 points	(61 countries in	Cyprus	19.7	13.7	16.4				
		group 3 in 1995-	Argentina	22.8	14.4	7.8				
		2001)	Romania	22.8	14.1	8.9				
		2001)	Dominican Republic	28.0	14.6	16.6				
			Bulgaria	16.9	14.9	11.4				
			Ukraine	17.3	15.3	6.1				
			Costa Rica	8.4	15.6	3.9				
			Algeria Senegal	11.1 19.3	16.0 16.8	15.8 6.1				
			Venezuela	11.4	17.1	31.0				
			Barbados	21.6	17.1	12.5				
			Azerbaijan	12.6	18.2	27.1				
			Egypt	21.6	19.3	6.1				
			Benin	18.7	19.5	3.9				
			Yemen	22.2	20.4	5.4				
			Panama	24.6	21.6	9.1				
			Ecuador	25.2	21.7	8.3				

^{* 166} countries. Sierra Leone and Tajikistan not included because 1995-2001 averages have not been calculated for these countries.

Table 13 (continued).

Indicator points	s by range	Nine groups of	Size of countries' overa	II GAPs		
ADHERENCE GAP (max. = 88)	IMPLEMEN- TATION GAP (max. = 12)	countries	Countries	Average 1985-94 GAP (max. = 100)	Average 1995-2001 GAP (max. = 100)	2002 GAP (max. = 100)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Small <22 points (continued)	Large >6 points (continued)	3. Good adherents, poor implementers (continued) (61 countries in group 3 in 1995-2001)	(4) Australia Guatemala Syrian Arab Republic Central African Republic Turkey Burkina Faso Rwanda Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Chad Czech Republic Iraq United Kingdom Burundi Swaziland Côte d'Ivoire Ghana St. Lucia Philippines Trinidad and Tobago Paraguay Bangladesh Jamaica Peru Haiti Cameroon Colombia	(5) 17.8 22.7 23.6 32.7 43.0 34.0 25.0 26.0 22.2 25.2 20.4 34.8 60.0 21.0 19.5 25.0 23.0 35.7 35.6 29.6 35.1 29.0 29.5		(7) 27.1 21.7 12.4 8.9 17.8 8.9 11.4 11.9 36.7 23.9 26.1 5.0 3.9 6.1 31.3 13.5 22.8 21.3 26.2 23.5 34.8 33.0 10.6 48.3 8.9 28.6
	Small <3 points	4. Medium adherents, good implementers	Guinea Botswana, Malawi, Estonia, Sor Turkmenistan, Mongolia, Kiribai (11 countries in group 4 in 1995)	i	Uzbekistan, Seych	45.5 nelles, Moldova,
Medium 22-44 points	Medium 3-6 points	5. Medium adherents, medium implementers (17 countries in group 5 in 1995-2001)	Cape Verde Lebanon Mozambique Chile Guinea Bissau Latvia Comoros Kuwait Lesotho El Salvador Mauritius Papua New Guinea Saudi Arabia New Zealand Iran Bahamas Nepal	33.6 30.4 53.2 54.7 35.6 25.2 29.9 43.6 54.0 82.1 48.9 58.3 42.8 42.6 46.0 54.1 66.9	28.9 33.7 34.9 35.7 35.7 36.1 36.2 37.2 38.3 40.6 41.1 41.3 41.4 44.4	22.6 36.7 15.2 30.0 35.2 44.2 29.7 7.2 27.1 35.6 10.1 31.1 31.7 34.3 5.0

Table 13 (continued).

Table 13 (co		Nine groups of	Size of countries' overa	II GAPs		
ADHERENCE GAP (max. = 88)	IMPLEMEN- TATION GAP (max. = 12)	countries	Countries	Average 1985-94 GAP (max. = 100)	Average 1995-2001 GAP (max. = 100)	2002 GAP (max. = 100)
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
(1)	(2)	(3)	Gabon (4)	22.6	27.7	23.3
Medium (continued) 22-44 points	Large >6 points	6. Medium adherents, poor implementers (19 countries in group 5 in 1995-2001)	Mexico Brazil Bolivia Belize Indonesia Morocco Sri Lanka Pakistan Sudan Madagascar Djibouti Nigeria Kenya Japan Mauritania Canada Ethiopia	29.3 36.6 36.2 40.5 55.8 37.4 64.2 43.6 36.8 47.8 30.6 34.5 45.2 44.6 60.2 46.1	29.6 32.8 33.0 33.2 33.6 36.0 36.9 37.7 38.4 40.1 41.6 41.7 43.0 43.6 46.2 47.3	34.9 16.3 36.5 14.4 8.7 19.0 14.6 22.1 35.6 29.5 46.6 11.7 17.7 38.2 13.4 36.1
Large >44 points	Small <3 points	7. Poor adherents, good implementers (21 countries in group 7 in 1995- 2001)	Tanzania, United Republic of Suriname Zimbabwe Cambodia United Arab Emirates Namibia St. Kitts and Nevis Equatorial Guinea St. Vincent and Grenadines Bahrain Gambia Qatar Eritrea Viet Nam Armenia Korea, Republic of China United States Kazakhstan Lao PDR Solomon Islands Oman	57.1 39.7 80.9 - 76.6 88.2 - 64.0 88.2 77.7 88.2 77.1 88.2 75.6 89.5 83.3 83.8 89.5 77.6 77.2	49.9 38.7 46.2 49.6 50.5 51.7 57.0 57.6 62.2 63.5 64.4 66.0 66.3 66.7 66.9 66.9 70.7 71.8 72.8 77.2 78.6 78.9	9.4 42.4 16.8 17.8 25.4 9.6 21.5 4.1 11.8 40.7 10.5 52.0 16.0 52.2 60.8 45.9 48.1 61.7 13.3 77.2 79.6 61.7
	Medium 3-6 points	8. Poor adherents, medium implementers (8 countries in group 8 in 1995- 2001)	Malaysia Sao Tome and Principe India Uganda Fiji Thailand Singapore Myanmar	61.8 58.5 61.0 54.8 55.7 70.2 67.8	48.1 49.8 53.1 53.9 56.7 59.3 64.7 70.0	30.0 53.1 51.3 53.2 12.4 44.3 42.4 63.4
	Large >6 points	9. Poor adherents, poor implementers	(No countries in this group in 19	995-2001).		

⁻ Not available.

4.4 Ranking and regionalizing averages of overall GAPs

Tables 14 and 15 train the light on single figures – ranks and regions, respectively. Averages are used again for the same time periods.

Ranking, although it is not the purpose of the GAP system, is shown here in the most relevant way, which is the sorting of ranks by the most recent averages, those of 1995-2001, and the listing of countries that can be considered to be medium or poor performers in terms of the basic workers' rights GAP. The cut-off points are determined by the same method as in chapter 4.3. The maximum overall GAP being 100, all countries with scores above 50 points are designated as poor overall performers and all countries with 25 to 50 points are designated as medium overall performers. The countries most in need of ILO assistance are bound to be among poor and medium performers.

The fact that three in five member States of the ILO score in the medium range in table 14, and one in seven as poor overall performers in table 15, should be cause for concern. Put differently, close to 100 of the ILO's member States fall outside the category of good overall performers.

In these tables, too, one can find countries with adequate, little or least capacity in all categories, which underlines the point made earlier that capacity matters but political will counts.

Regional and sub-regional averages of basic workers' rights GAPs are estimated in table 16 where the regions correspond to those in table 11 above. Reducing 166 member States' scores to four regions' and three sub-regions' scores minimises the differences, because the variations among many countries greatly exceed the variations among a few averages. Nevertheless, there are some evident differences among the regions, with North America consistently scoring the highest overall GAPs, followed by Asia/Pacific/Arab countries and Africa. Latin American and Caribbean scores are close to the below-average scores of Europe.⁵¹

4.5 Conclusion

The ILO procedures and data on which the indicator system is built have proven their pertinence and value. The seven dimensions measured so far have performed credibly, both analytically and empirically. The eighth dimension, progress under the Declaration, can validly be tested only several years from now.

While it stands on its own, the GAP system could – suitably standardised and weighted – be integrated into such Decent Work indices as the ILO may construct in years ahead.

For technical assistance purposes, the grouping of countries into nine performance categories strung along the ADHERENCE and IMPLEMENTATION ranges of table 13 is the most informative.

⁵¹ It is worth noting that the ranking that can be read into table 16 (Europe – Latin America – Caribbean – Africa – Asia etc. - North America) is not the same as the ranking that can be read into the earlier table 11 concerned with CFA data, irrespective of whether one goes by the number of complaints registered (Asia etc. – Africa – Europe – Americas) or the number of TO BE KEPT INFORMED plus INTERIM REPORTs per country in each region (Europe - Caribbean - Africa - Asia etc. - North America - Latin America). This would seem to suggest that the GAP system's dimensions are less correlated than one might be tempted to assume. At any rate, the Committee on Freedom of Association component that was retained in this paper does not predict overall GAP points.

Table 14. Ranking of medium overall performers, sorted by 1995-2001 averages

Basic	Countries, follo		P points	
wor- kers' rights GAP (max. = 100)	Countries	Average 1985-94 GAP (max. = 100)	Average 1995- 2001 GAP (max. = 100)	2002 GAP (max. = 100)
	Iraq	20.4	25.5	26.1
	United Kingdom	34.8	26.5	5.0
	Swaziland	21.0	26.7	6.1
	Burundi	60.0	26.7	3.9
	Cote d'Ivoire	19.5	26.7	31.3
	Ghana	25.0	27.5	13.5
	Gabon	22.6	27.7	23.3
	Cape Verde	33.6	28.5	17.7
	Saint Lucia	23.0	28.7	22.8
	Philippines	35.7	28.9	21.3
	Lebanon	30.4	28.9	22.6
	Trinidad & Tobago	35.6	29.1	26.2
	Paraguay	29.6	29.4	23.5
Medi-	Bangladesh	35.1	29.5	34.8
um	Mexico	29.3	29.6	34.9
GAP	Jamaica	29.0	30.2	33.0
25-50	Botswana	88.2	30.4	9.6
points (70	Peru	29.5	31.6	10.6
count-	Haiti	-	31.8	48.3
ries in	Cameroon	27.1	32.0	8.9
group in	Malawi	54.3	32.3	16.1
1995- 2001)	Colombia	28.1	32.6	28.6
2001)	Estonia	75.6	32.7	21.5
	Brazil	36.6	32.8	16.3
	Guinea	24.1	32.9	45.5
	Bolivia	36.2	33.0	36.5
	Belize	40.5	33.2	14.4
	Indonesia	55.8	33.6	8.7
	Mozambique	53.2	33.7	36.7
	South Africa		33.8	1.1
	Grenada	52.9	34.3	35.2
	Chile	54.7	34.9	15.2
	Uzbekistan	37.8	34.9	40.5
	Guinea-Bissau	35.6	35.7	30.0
	Latvia	25.2	35.7	35.2
	Latvia			JJ.2

	mers, sorted by 1995-2001 averages Basic Countries, followed by GAP points							
Basic				ı				
wor- kers' rights GAP (max. = 100)	Countries	Average 1985-94 GAP (max. = 100)	Average 1995- 2001 GAP (max. = 100)	2002 GAP (max. = 100)				
	Morocco	37.4	36.0	19.0				
	Comoros	29.9	36.1	44.2				
	Seychelles	56.5	36.2	6.1				
	Kuwait	43.6	36.2	29.7				
	Moldova	75.6	36.4	3.3				
	Sri Lanka	64.2	36.9	14.6				
	Lesotho	54.0	37.2	7.2				
	Pakistan	43.6	37.7	22.1				
	El Salvador	82.1	38.3	27.1				
	Sudan	36.8	38.4	35.6				
	Suriname	39.7	38.7	42.4				
	Madagascar	47.8	40.1	29.5				
Medi-	Turkmenistan	88.2	40.5	31.0				
um	Mauritius	48.9	40.6	35.6				
GAP	Papua New Guinea	58.3	41.1	10.1				
25-50 points	Saudi Arabia	42.8	41.3	31.1				
(conti-	New Zealand	42.6	41.4	31.7				
nued)	Djibouti	30.6	41.6	46.6				
(70	Nigeria	34.5	41.7	11.7				
count- ries in	Mongolia	42.8	41.9	42.3				
group in	Kenya	45.2	43.0	17.7				
1995-	Japan	44.6	43.6	38.2				
2001)	Kiribati	-	44.0	38.5				
	Iran, Islamic Rep.	46.0	44.4	34.3				
	Congo	67.0	46.1	16.1				
	Zimbabwe	80.9	46.2	16.8				
	Mauritania	60.2	46.2	13.4				
	Bahamas	54.1	46.3	5.0				
	Canada	46.1	47.3	36.1				
	Malaysia	61.8	48.1	30.0				
	Ethiopia	55.4	48.8	31.0				
	Nepal	66.9	49.6	29.2				
	Cambodia	-	49.6	17.8				
	Sao Tome Principe	58.5	49.8	53.1				
	Tanzania	57.1	49.9	9.4				

Table 15. Ranking of poor overall performers, sorted by 1995-2001 averages

Basic	Countries, follow	wed by GA	P points	•
workers' rights GAP (max. = 100)	Countries	Average 1985-94 GAP (max. = 100)	Average 1995- 2001 GAP (max. = 100)	2002 GAP (max. = 100)
100)	UAE	76.6	50.5	25.4
	Namibia	88.2	51.7	9.6
Large	India	61.0	53.1	51.3
GAP >50	Uganda	54.8	54.0	53.2
points	Fiji	55.7	56.7	12.4
(24	Saint Kitts & Nevis	-	57.1	21.5
count-	Equatorial Guinea	64.0	57.6	4.1
ries in group in	Thailand	70.2	59.3	44.3
1995-	St Vincent & Gren.	88.2	62.2	11.8
2001)	Bahrain	77.7	63.6	40.7
	Gambia	88.2	64.4	10.5
	Singapore	67.8	64.7	42.4

Basic	Countries, follow	wed by GA	P points	
wor- kers' rights GAP (max. = 100)	Countries	Average 1985-94 GAP (max. = 100)	Average 1995- 2001 GAP (max. = 100)	2002 GAP (max. = 100)
	Qatar	77.1	66.0	52.0
Large	Eritrea	88.2	66.4	16.0
GAP	Viet Nam	88.2	66.7	52.2
>50	Armenia	75.6	66.9	60.8
points (conti-	Korea, Republic of	89.5	67.0	45.9
nued)	Myanmar	67.4	70.0	63.4
(24	China	83.3	70.7	48.1
count-	United States	83.8	71.8	61.7
ries in group in	Kazakhstan	89.5	72.8	13.3
1995-	Lao PDR	77.6	77.2	77.2
2001)	Solomon Islands	77.2	78.6	79.6
	Oman	-	78.9	61.7

Table 16. Regional basic workers' rights GAPs, sorted by 1995-2001 averages

Basic workers' rights GAP	Regions, followed	by GAP points	
	Average 1985-94 GAP	Average 1995- 2001 GAP	2002 GAP
Africa	43	34	20
Americas	33	27	21
- North America (Canada and US)	74	60	49
- Latin America	29	24	18
- Caribbean	35	27	20
Asia and the Pacific, incl. Arab States	60	49	33
Europe	41	18	15
Total	44	31	21

The system documents empirically that a majority of member States have encountered increasing IMPLEMENTATION problems in respect of the Organization's core values since the onset of contemporary globalization. This finding is troubling. It suggests that the Organization has not aimed its resources sufficiently at what matters most to it.

Chapter 5. Some correlations with other indicators

To test the validity of the system constructed here, one could correlate the size of all three indicators – AHERENCE, IMPLEMENTATION and overall **GAP**s – with pertinent other data. Correlations should be performed at the level of countries rather than regions to capture variations in as many situations as possible. To simplify the presentation, correlations are limited to **GAP** averages for the recent seven-year period 1995 to 2001, on the one hand, and comparable

⁻ Not applicable.

Table 17. Correlations between GAPs and selected other indicators*

Variables	Overall GAPs	ADHERENCE GAPs	IMPLEMENTATION GAPs
(Everything else is equal)	1995-2001 average	1995-2001 average	1995-2001 average
Capacity factor	Expected: negative	Expected: negative	Expected: negative
Assessed contributions to ILO budget in % in 2000, 166 countries.	Actual: 0.08 Not significant	Actual: 0.08 Not significant	Actual: -0.02 √ Not significant
Foreign direct investment	Expected: negative	Expected: negative	Expected: negative
Share of country in global FDI inflows 1993-99, 137 countries.	Actual: 0.16 Not significant	Actual: 0.17 Significance level: low	Actual: -0.08 $$ Not significant
UNDP Human	Expected: none or weak	Expected: none or weak	Expected: none or weak
Development Index HDI = 2000 score, 157 countries.	negative	negative	negative
	Actual: -0.24 √ Significance level: medium	Actual: -0.20 √ Significance level: low	Actual: -0.10 √ Not significant
Freedom House	Expected: negative	Expected: negative	Expected: negative
Average of civil liberties and political rights index1993-97, reversed scaling, 155 countries.	Actual: -0.38 √ Significance level: high	Actual: -0.35 $$ Significance level: high	Actual: -0.09 √ Not significant
SES Voice Representation	Expected: negative	Expected: negative	Expected: negative
Security Index Normalized index 1999, 97 countries.	Actual: -0.37 √ Significance level: high	Actual: -0.30 $$ Significance level: high	Actual: -0.22 $$ Significance level: low
SES Decent Work Index Normalized index 1999, 75 countries.	Expected: negative Actual: -0.49 Significance level: high	Expected: negative Actual: -0.41 $$ Significance level: high	Expected: negative Actual: -0.20 Significance level: low

^{*} Pearson product moment correlation coefficients, range -1 to +1.

Significance level: high = 1 per cent, medium = 5 per cent, low = 10 per cent.

data for other factors. Table 17 summarizes the expected relationships and records Pearson correlation coefficients as well as significance levels. Pearson product moment correlation coefficients are a dimensionless index that ranges from -1.0 (perfect inverse or negative relationship) to 1.0 (perfect positive relationship), which reflects the extent of a linear relationship between two sets of data. A tick $(\sqrt{})$ indicates that the expected (negative or positive) relationship holds empirically.

The relationship between the capacity factor used in this paper and variations in GAPs – the bigger a country's underlying capacity, the larger its contribution to the ILO budget and the smaller should be its GAPs – is not borne out empirically. The fact that capacity does not differentiate the countries as much as assumed could already be seen from the shaded tables. This does not, however, invalidate the reasoning put forward. It suggests either that the actual yardstick used does not measure countries' capacity well or that other variables intervene strongly. Both appear to play a role. Capacity is actually reflected somewhat in the correlations with UNDP's Human Development Index (see below). Political will seems to me to be the most important intervening factor because, under the table's capacity factor, the overall GAP and the ADHERENCE GAP have the "wrong" sign. This suggests that the political commitment embodied in ADHERENCE, which is the primary determinant of the overall GAP, plays a very large role. Thus, while capacity matters, it is overshadowed in the ILO by the willingness of member States to be in good standing with the Organization.

The other sub-set of relationships that does not hold empirically concerns foreign direct Here, an indirect and negative relationship can be postulated on the investment (FDI). assumption that foreign investors, everything else being equal, prefer to go to countries that are characterized by good governance as opposed to countries where legislation might not have a high value or might not be applied strictly in practice. Legislation concerning labour being an element of overall governance, good governance in this field should be reflected in low GAPs. In turn, low GAPs should be associated with high FDI inflows. If one further assumes that correct application of existing laws matters more to foreign investors than formal legislation, the relationships should be stronger for IMPLEMENTATION than for either the overall GAP or ADHERENCE.⁵² The correlation results in table 17 are similar to those of the capacity factor in that the overall GAP and the ADHERENCE GAP have the "wrong" sign, and the IMPLEMENTATION GAP has the right sign but at a marginal and insignificant level. Noncorrelation might be explained by reference to intervening factors on which investors place greater emphasis such as property, company and copyright legislation, wages differences or the size and anticipated growth of a country's market. Furthermore, the bulk of FDI flows takes place between a limited number of countries, chiefly advanced market economy countries. It is probably a combination of all of these factors, including labour law and practices, which determines investors' preferences and accounts for the empirical results in table 17.

Further correlations make use of two widely used indicators. One is UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI).⁵³ What should one expect? In principle, there should be no relationship because the HDI and the GAP system measure two quite different things. At best, a weak inverse correlation might exist between, on the one side, increases in countries' capacities due to improvements in human developments (longevity, literacy and GDP per capita) and, on the other, decreasing **GAP** scores. This seems to be borne out by table 17.

The second indicator is Freedom House's ratings of civil liberties and political rights.⁵⁴ A direct but negative relationship can be expected, everything else being equal: the more democratic a country, the less GAPs there should be of any kind. The coefficients in table 17 turn out as postulated, though they are significant only for the overall GAP and the ADHERENCE GAP.

Finally, two sets of ILO data are used to test correlations. One is the Socio-Economic Security Programme's recently elaborated Voice Representation Security Index, the other its overall Decent Work Index that is nearing completion. 55 As regards Voice Representation Security, one could argue that the more workers are able to organize freely and defend their interests

⁵² The data on FDI are percentages of total world inflows of FDI per country, averaged for the period 1993-99, kindly made available by D. Kucera. For his work in this context, see footnote 5.

⁵³ Data from UNDP: *Deepening democracy...*, op. cit., table 1.

⁵⁴ Freedom House: Freedom in the world: The annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, 1998-1999 (New York, 1999). Again, I am grateful to D. Kucera for making available his own data. He averaged Freedom House's civil liberties and political rights scores and reversed the scaling, i.e. his data give higher values to more democratic countries, whereas Freedom House itself uses a scale with a value of 1 for strongest rights and a value of 7 for

⁵⁵ The work of this Programme is referred to in footnote 5 above. **GAPs** and the SES Programme's indicators are likely to be auto-correlated to the extent that the latter uses ratification as an input indicator. However, autocorrelation is probably very small due to the fact that the Voice Representation Security Index and the Decent Work Index comprise, respectively, 13 and 6 components; and only two of the former's 13 dimensions are ratifications – of Convention Nos. 87 and 98 – that are given a low weight relative to the other factors.

independently, everything else being equal, the lower should be all three **GAP**s. The coefficients in table 17 confirm this at satisfactory levels.

Empirically even stronger is the relationship between the Socio-Economic Security Programme's Decent Work Index and **GAP**s. The anticipated inverse relationship, according to which countries with higher achievements of Decent Work should be characterized by lower **GAP**s, is empirically well supported in table 17.

In summarizing the table it can be said that 14 of the 18 relationships seem to hold, although at various significance levels. This testifies to the validity of the indicator system constructed in this paper. The fact that all relationships with IMPLEMENTATION **GAP**s have the expected sign – even though most are, statistically speaking, not significant or significant only at low levels – is re-assuring in that it confirms the validity of the selection of the indicator's supervisory and complaints dimensions.

ILO membership questions relevant to the indicators⁵⁶ Annex I

Year	Country	Explanation and scoring	
1985	All member States except	(153 member States).	
	- Viet Nam	Membership terminated (see under 1992).	
	- Czech and Slovak Republic	Czech and Slovak Republic split in 1993. Not scored.	
	- USSR	Dissolved in 1991. Not scored.	
	- Yugoslavia	Broke up early 1990s. Not scored (see under 2001).	
	- German Democratic Republic	German Democratic Republic joined the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990. Germany scored as from 1985.	
	- Yemen Arab Republic	Yemen Arab Republic not scored.	
	- People's Democratic Republic of Yemen	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen not scored.	
1986-89	No change	-	
1990	Republic of Yemen Yemen Arab Rep. and People's Democratic Rep. of Yemen united new name of Rep. of Yemen. Scored as from 199		
1991	Albania	Readmitted. Non-functioning 1997-2001. Scored as from 2002.	
	Korea, Republic of	New member. Scored as from 1992.	
	Latvia	Rejoined. Scored as from 1992.	
	Lithuania	Rejoined. Scored as from 1992.	
1992	Viet Nam	Readmitted. Scored as from 1993.	
	Armenia	New member. Scored as from 1993.	
	Azerbaijan	New member. Scored as from 1993.	
	Croatia	New member. Scored as from 1993.	
	Estonia	New member. Scored as from 1993.	
	Kyrgyzstan	New member. Scored as from 1993.	
	Moldova	New member. Scored as from 1993.	
	Russian Federation	New member. Scored as from 1993.	
	Slovenia	New member. Scored as from 1993.	
	Uzbekistan	New member. Scored as from 1993.	
1993	Bosnia and Herzegovina	New member. Non-functioning till 1995. Scored as from 1997.	
	Czech Republic	New member. Scored as from 1994.	
	Eritrea	New member. Scored as from 1994.	
	Georgia	New member. Scored as from 1994.	
	Kazakhstan	New member. Scored as from 1994.	
	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	New member. Scored as from 1994.	
	Slovak Republic	New member. Scored as from 1994.	
	Tajikistan	New member. Non-functioning till 2000. Scored as from 2002.	
	Turkmenistan	New member. Scored as from 1994.	
1994	Oman	New member. Scored as from 1995.	
	South Africa	South Africa resumed membership. Scored as from 1995.	
1996	St. Kitts and Nevis	New member. Scored as from 1997.	
1997-99	No change	-	
2000	Kiribati	New member. Scored as from 2001.	
2001	Yugoslavia (renamed Serbia and Montenegro in	New member (predecessor States disregarded).	
2001	February 2003)	Not scored.	

Regarding non-functioning States, see section 1.7 above.
 The Republic of Yemen accepted the obligations previously incurred by the two predecessor States, which had ratified Convention Nos. 29, 87, 98 100, 105 and 111. Its first reporting obligations arose in 1992.

Annex II. **ILO** supervisory or complaints procedures not retained for the indicator system

Bearing in mind the criteria set out in chapters 1.3 and 3.2, a selection had to be made among the ILO's multiple procedures and their several forms. Why have Commissions of Inquiry, Fact Finding and Conciliation Commissions on Freedom of Association, Direct Contact missions, General Surveys prepared by the Committee of Experts or Special Cases and further pronouncements by the Committee of Experts and the Application Committee not been retained?

One reason is that some of these procedures are rarely or irregularly invoked or that they involve only a limited number of countries. In more than 80 years of ILO history, Commissions of Inquiry have so far been concerned only with ten countries: Chile, Côte d'Ivoire, Dominican Republic and Haiti, Germany, Greece, Liberia, Nicaragua, Poland and Romania. Finding and Conciliation Commission is today practically defunct. Questionnaire-based General surveys of where countries stand in relation to ratified or unratified Conventions and the Recommendations accompanying them are drafted at such irregular intervals that they are entirely unsuited, and they suffer from incomplete coverage due to a low response rate. Footnotes by the Committee of Experts, which may request a government to send a detailed report in advance of the date when a report would otherwise be due, are also disregarded because reporting requirements are captured by ADHERENCE. Another kind of footnote, asking the government to supply full particulars to the Conference, is likewise not instrumentalised for the purposes of constructing IMPLEMENTATION because of its uncertain substantive and procedural implications.

Representations are a form of complaint that one might be tempted to include in workers' rights indicators. According to Article 24 of ILO's Constitution, employers' or workers' organization can ask the Governing Body whether any member State that has ratified a Convention effectively observes its provisions. However, two problems render representations unsuitable for the GAP system. One is that this instrument tends to be used mostly by trade unions from advanced industrial countries. The other is the relative small number of representations. beginning of the review period of the GAP system, only nine representations concerned Convention No. 29, seven Convention No. 87, six Convention No. 98, three Convention No. 100, six Convention No. 105, 18 Convention No. 111 and two Convention No. 138⁵⁸. This makes representations fail the test of wide applicability on a non-discriminatory basis. Furthermore, some of the representations include legislative aspects that the Committee of Experts gets asked to deal with, in which case they do become part of the **GAP** system.

The Application Committee of the International Labour Conference sometimes takes matters further than the Committee of Experts can. The reasons for doing so could be either an unresponsive government or the inherent gravity of questions. One form in which matters may be taken further is when the Application Committee refers to a case in a special paragraph towards the end of the Introduction of its report to the International Labour Conference. Special cases have been identified by the Application Committee since 1957 where the discrepancies between the real world and the ideal world of ILO standards, principles and rights were so fundamental or had been discussed for such a long time that, in the view of this political body, the Conference's attention should be called to them. The other form in which the Application

⁵⁸ See Representations (art. 24) under ILOLEX Advanced Query Form on the ILO's public website: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/iloquery.htm.

Committee takes matters further is when it points to a "continued failure to implement" a particular Convention. ⁵⁹ Although core Conventions have been the object of priority attention by the Application Committee, both "special cases" and "continued failure to implement" are left aside here because they concern a small number of countries. During the review period, only 20 countries' compliance problems were pinpointed by the Application Committee – Belarus, Central African Republic, Cameroon, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, India, Iran, Morocco, Myanmar, Nigeria, Panama, Pakistan, Romania, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela, with a number of these countries being singled out several times.

The Application Committee is not the only body to express serious concern. The CFA also refers to "serious and/or urgent cases which the Committee draws to the attention of the Governing Body". Urgent cases generally involve matters of human life, liberty or new or changing conditions that affect the freedom of action of a trade union movement as a whole. The CFA in recent years has been using the initial paragraphs of the Introduction of its report to the Governing Body to express serious concern. However, since this practice by the CFA is relatively new – it took that step for the first time in 1995 — and does not cover most of the years of the indicator system, the CFA's expression of serious concern cannot be instrumentalised with respect to the IMPLEMENTATION indicator.

One could put differential numbers on the type of complaints handled by the CFA, which have been categorized by the Committee for some time. For instance, general denial of the right to organize could be judged to be more important than refusal to recognize union delegates in a specific enterprise, which could be judged to be more important than the dismissal of a single trade unionist following strike action. A scale could be established and points could be accorded. But there is no objectified ILO categorization of the relative importance of one kind of case relative to another. For the indicator system proposed in this paper, such a specification is actually entirely unnecessary; but one could pursue such work for different purposes and by making transparent how much weight one factor has relative to others.

⁵⁹ Recently, Myanmar's problems with Convention No. 87 and Sudan's with Convention No. 29 have been the object of the designation "continued failure to implement".

⁶⁰ For an exemplification, see the pie chart portraying allegations examined by type of restriction in ILO: *Your voice at work*, Global report under the Follow-up to the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (Geneva: ILO, 2000), p. 26.

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