Publication Date

November 1996

Abstract

Agency theory is used to expand the research in strategic human resource management (SHRM) by viewing the construct underlying SHRM as control over all employees. We develop hypotheses on the effects of CEO ownership, administrative HRM, and incentive stock ownership on firm performance. The results indicate that administrative HRM has a negative effect on stock price. Incentive alignment via stock ownership has a positive effect on stock price and productivity. CEO ownership has a positive effect on sales but a negative impact on productivity. Implications for theory and practice are discussed.

Comments

Suggested Citation
Welbourne, T. M. & Cyr, L. A. (1996). Agency theory implications for strategic human resource management: Effects of CEO ownership, administrative HRM, and incentive alignment on firm performance (CAHRS Working Paper #96-17). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Center for Advanced Human Resource Studies.
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cahrswp/186



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