Publication Date

4-1-2005

Abstract

[Excerpt] The results in this paper suggest, among other things, a strong association between recruitment choices and starting wages. The theoretical framework motivating the empirical analysis is a wage-posting game in which firms make wage offers and choose recruitment strategies while recognizing a tradeoff between hiring speed and match quality. Introducing this methodological framework to the recruitment literature, I present new evidence on employers’ choices of recruitment methods to answer the questions, "How do employer recruitment choices vary by firm and vacancy characteristics and the skill requirements of jobs," and "How do vacancy duration and starting wages vary with recruitment choices?"

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Suggested Citation
DeVaro, J. (2005). Employer recruitment strategies and the labor market outcomes of new hires.Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of Industrial and Labor Relations site: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/106/

Required Publisher Statement
Copyright by Blackwell Publishing. Final paper published as Devaro, J. (2005). Employer recruitment strategies and the labor market outcomes of new hires. Economic Inquiry, 43, 263-282.

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